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Preface
In 2003, while reading modern works on treason trials in Rome,
I came across the prosecution of M. Scribonius Drusus Libo, an
aristocrat destroyed in AD 16 for seeking out the opinions of a
necromancer. The case made little sense, and upon reading every
relevant book and article I could find, it became clear that most
scholars dismiss the episode as the trapping of a harmless fool by
greedy prosecutors. A minority treat Drusus Libo more seriously, but
these treatments are relatively short, indeed, the more recent discus-
sions span a few pages only. Since the Government appeared to
handle Drusus Libo with extreme caution, a more detailed investiga-
tion seemed to me worthwhile. This book, a revised version of a PhD
thesis submitted to the University of Sydney in 2008, is the result of
my investigation. Though much of the thesis was re-written, very
little additional research was undertaken. Except where I was made
aware of a new and important piece of research, relevant works
published since 2008 have not been included.
The book is intended for scholars, but it is hoped that students and
those with a general interest in the period will find the work acces-
sible. To aid the reader, and allow for critical engagement with many
of the conclusions, I have supplied, where possible, texts and transla-
tions vital to the argument. I consider this to be an important feature.
Nonetheless, a reconstruction of the past is more than the sum of
available evidence. The writing of history requires imagination; emp-
athic in origin, creative in spirit: the glue by which fragments of
knowledge are held together. The book includes many instances of
comments and motives imagined, and where evidence for something
is wholly lacking, such as what the conspirators of AD 16 hoped to
achieve, an interpretation has been offered which is hypothetical in
nature, but fits, nonetheless, with wider evidence, i.e., it is both
possible and logical. Thus, the book serves also as a statement on
method.
My work has benefitted from much criticism and learning received
since the submission of the PhD. The corrections and opinions of my
three examiners inspired much thought. In particular, discussion
with Dr Yakobson led to a sharpening of my views on the nature of
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the Principate, while the anonymous readers of the Oxford University
Press identified various mistakes and redundancies, and offered alter-
native interpretations on a number of points. The assistance of
Atticus Cox with the translations of Dio and Plutarch, Peta Greenfield
with checking the Latin texts, and Fiona Tweedie with reading and
correcting the final draft, was invaluable, as were the patience and
much appreciated abilities of the editing staff of the Oxford Univer-
sity Press. In addition, I must acknowledge the profound debt owed to
my four mentors: my two supervisors Martin Stone, Peter Brennan,
and also Kathryn Welch, and Keith McAllister. Without their sup-
port, belief and advice this book would not have existed. Indeed, I owe
Martin individual thanks for countless hours spent talking about
various aspects of the book and history in general. He went beyond
the call of the supervisor, for which the author will remain forever
thankful. Those listed above have each, in some way, improved this
work; any remaining faults are of course my own.
Finally I thank my family. My parents, Sue and Graham, have been
tremendously supportive, and deserve more than a book sincerely
dedicated, while no form of praise could ever adequately recognise
the indefatigable patience, fortitude, and love with which my wife
Hayley has supported this long endeavour.
Preface vii
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Introduction
Modern scholars mostly treat the Principate established by Augustus
as benign. Indeed, it is argued that Rome prospered on account of
it. Romans supposedly agreed: senators, equestrians, plebeians, and
Italians believed that under Augustus res publica was enhanced.
Augustus himself called it the best state of affairs (optimus status).
No serious opposition, they say, ever developed. The case of
M. Scribonius Drusus Libo throws doubt on this view of things.
In September AD 16 M. Scribonius Drusus Libo committed suicide
while the senate considered evidence that he was plotting to murder
Tiberius, his heirs, the younger Drusus and Germanicus, and several
important senators. Relying on Tacitus, scholars treat Drusus Libo as
a harmless fool, caught in the net of hungry prosecutors. They argue
that the case did not involve the politics of power. In this book I shall
argue that it did, and that he was destroyed not by predatory prose-
cutors but by Tiberius’ regime. The conspiracy of Clemens in AD 16 is
crucial. While the senate was considering Drusus Libo’s guilt, Rome
was alive with news that Augustus’ exiled grandson, Agrippa Postu-
mus, reportedly executed when Augustus died, was actually marching
on Rome. The resurrected Agrippa was in fact an ex-slave but there
were reports of significant support from senators, equestrians, and
members of the imperial household itself. The historical sources talk
of civil war looming.1 The present study places Drusus Libo among
those secretly helping the slave Clemens. His family connections hold
the key.
Drusus Libo’s pedigree was impressive. He had a maternal con-
nection with Pompey the Great, his father’s family were key players
during and after the civil wars, and through his great aunt Scribonia
he was connected with Augustus’ grandchildren, Gaius and Lucius
1 Suet. Tib. 25.1 f.; Tac. Ann. 2.39.1 f.; Dio 57.16.3 ff.
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Caesar, their sisters, the younger Julia and Agrippina, and with
Agrippa’s posthumous son. He was also attached, via adoption, to
the Livii Drusi, the family to which Augustus’ widow Livia and her
lineage, Tiberius, Germanicus, and the younger Drusus, belonged.2
These connections came with political clout, but with legitimacy they
also brought trouble. Tiberius’ rise to supreme power was at the
expense of Augustus’ grandsons, who were all dead by the time
Augustus was laid to rest. Their supporters, however, remained
unconvinced that life was possible under Tiberius. On hearing news
that Agrippa had been put to death, a group of malcontents, unable
to come to terms with Augustus’ successor, approached Drusus Libo.
My subject is the struggle between Tiberius and the supporters of
Augustus’ grandsons. It has serious implications for our understand-
ing of the Principate.
The Principate was not benign: it was in fact brutal and destructive.
This observation is not new. Ronald Syme used the words ‘despotic
and murderous’, but Syme’s view of the Principate no longer
prevails.3 Nor is my view exactly Syme’s. For Syme, the Principate
was a tragic affair, not because it was set up but because it was never
seriously challenged. It was understood and accepted, he thinks, that
Augustus had created a monarchy. But the Principate was in fact, as
I shall show, a more fragile structure, depending, as many autocratic
regimes do, not only on the consent of its members but on the
goodwill and patience of those being governed. It was with good
reason that the Principate was sold to the electorate, and the senate,
as an emergency structure for the pacification of troubled provinces.4
A power that was to be permanent was bestowed with time-limits.5
Autocracy was dressed up as democracy in action. Despotic regimes
that rule with a democratic mask are inevitably unstable, and require,
of necessity, instruments for silencing enemies. The period covered
in this book is crowded with instances of law and justice perverted. As
2 See appendix for full discussion of Drusus Libo’s connections.
3 R. Syme, The Roman Revolution (1939), 439.
4 Dio 53.13.1; 53.16.2–3; 54.4.1; 54.12.4–5; 55.6.1. R. Syme (1939) 313f., notes that
Augustus justified the new system by utilizing the belief that Rome’s provinces were in
danger of collapse and ruin. Nevertheless, Syme does not link the success or failure of
this justification to the Principate’s stability.
5 Dio 53.16.2–3. When, in AD 24, Tiberius received an extension of power without a
time-limit, the Principate as a political system was transformed into something more
like a monarchy, Dio 57.24.1.
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with modern versions, the Principate attracted criticism and opposi-
tion. But as power was taken up into Tiberius’ grasp, criticism and
opposition hardened. Not all men acquiesced in the face of tyranny,
nor did they simply lie low. The effect on the government was
tangible: Tiberius’ hold on supreme power was never guaranteed.
This book is therefore a contribution to the study of the invention
of the Principate at Rome.
Introduction 3
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1
An Urgent Summons and
a Terrible Charge
THE NARRATIVE
Evidence of what happened to M. Scribonius Drusus Libo is frustrat-
ingly superficial. Only summaries and passing references survive.
Tacitus provides the longest account, but the contemporary Velleius,
the younger Seneca, Suetonius, and Dio also supply information.1 An
official record of Drusus Libo’s posthumous conviction survives in
the Fasti Amiternini:
Fer. ex s.c.q.e.d. nefaria consilia quae de salute Ti. Caes. liberorumque eius et
aliorum principum civitatis deq(ue) r.p. inita ab M. Libone erant in senatu
convicta sunt.
A holiday on account of the decree which (was passed) because the wicked
plans commenced by M. Libo concerning the safety of Tiberius Caesar and
his children and other men of consular rank and also concerning the State
were defeated in the senate.2
The senate convened to investigate the allegations from 11 to 13
September AD 16, a period usually spent enjoying the Roman games
(Ludi Romani).3 The scenario was therefore unusual and foreboding.
But suspicion of Drusus Libo had been developing for some time:
1 Tac. Ann. 2.27–32; Vell. 2.130.3; Sen. Ep. Mor. 70.10; Suet. Tib. 25; and Dio
57.15.
2 CIL 12 p 244; V. Ehrenberg and A. H. M. Jones (1955), 52.
3 The Ludi Romani were held usually 4–19 Sept. In AD 20 the trial of Aemilia
Lepida was interrupted by, probably, the Ludi Romani, Tac. Ann. 3.23.1. Cf. R. H.
Martin and A. J. Woodman, The Annals of Tacitus: Book Three (1996), 217 f.
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Firmius Catus senator, ex intima Libonis amicitia, iuvenem inprovidum et
facilem inanibus ad Chaldaeorum promissa, magorum sacra, somniorum
etiam interpretes impulit, dum proavum Pompeium, amitam Scriboniam
quae quondam Augusti coniunx fuerat, consobrinos Caesares, plenam imagi-
nibus domum ostentat, hortaturque ad luxum et aes alienum, socius libidi-
num et necessitatum, quo pluribus indiciis inligaret.
Firmius Catus, a senator and close friend of Libo, urged the short-sighted
young man, given to empty things, to resort to the promises of astrologers,
the rites of magicians, and also dream interpreters, reminding him of his
great-grandfather Pompeius, his paternal aunt Scribonia, former wife of
Augustus, his imperial cousins, his house crowded with ancestral images,
and urging him to extravagance and debt: Firmius associated himself in these
debaucheries and embarrassments in order to entangle Libo in more evi-
dence.4
Catus, having collected witnesses, took his evidence to a certain
Vescularius Flaccus, a friend of Tiberius’. Catus sought an audience
with the princeps, but, having considered the evidence passed on by
Flaccus, Tiberius declined. We are told that Tiberius then distin-
guished Drusus Libo with a praetorship and invited him to dinners.5
Sometime later (Suetonius has two years) fresh and damning evi-
dence emerged.6 A necromancer named Junius had informed a pro-
secutor (delator), C. Fulcinius Trio, that Drusus Libo had paid him to
invoke dead spirits. Suddenly chaos:
statim corripit reum, adit consules, cognitionem senatus poscit. Et vocantur
patres, addito consultandum super re magna et atroci.
Immediately he [Trio] seized the accused, approached the consuls, and called
for an investigation in the senate. And so the fathers were called, it being
added that they were to deliberate upon a great and terrible matter.7
Drusus Libo, informed of the charge, sought out an advocate but,
despite the support of noble women (primores feminae), was unsuc-
cessful. The investigation began the next day, with the defendant
carried to the doors of the senate in a litter accompanied by his
brother, who was consul ordinarius for that year. Tiberius read out
both the charge and the names of the delatores: Fulcinius Trio,
4 Tac. Ann. 2.27.2 f. 5 Ibid. 6 Suet. Tib. 25.1 f.
7 Tac. Ann. 2.28.3.
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Firmius Catus, Fonteius Agrippa, and C. Vibius Serenus. Drusus Libo
defended himself.8
The charges were designed to erode the defendant’s credibility:
Drusus Libo had allegedly consulted someone as to whether he
would have enough money to cover the Appian road to Brundisium,
followed by similar accusations. Then the bombshell:
Uni tamen libello manu Libonis nominibus Caesarum aut senatorum additas
atrocis vel occultas notas accusator arguebat.
On one paper sinister or cryptic marks had been added to the names of
Caesars or senators in Libo’s hand, the accuser alleged.9
The evidence had an immediate effect. Drusus Libo denied the
allegation, the prosecutor pressed, and so the defendant’s slaves
were sold to the State for interrogation. Thus the first day concluded.
Before going home, Drusus Libo asked his relative P. Quirinius to
deliver final pleas to Tiberius, but the desperate tactic was obstructed
by the constitutional diligence of the princeps, who responded ‘that
he should ask the senate’: responsum est ut senatum rogaret. Arriving
home, Drusus Libo was confronted by troops in and around his
house. Disturbed by the soldiers he relinquished hope and committed
suicide. Seneca places Scribonia at the scene. It may be a literary
convention, but Scribonia’s presence does make sense. She certainly
ranked among the primores feminae and, moreover, had supported
other relatives in their moments of disgrace. Scribonia apparently
encouraged her great nephew not to anticipate the executioner. The
advice was ignored.
Death did not bring the investigation to a close. At some stage,
probably when the verdict was read out, Tiberius swore an oath that
he would not have supported death: iuravitque Tiberius petiturum se
vitam quamvis nocenti, nisi voluntariam mortem properavisset. Many
obviously considered death to be the appropriate punishment. Mo-
tions to remove Drusus Libo from public memory (damnatio mem-
oriae) were then proposed. M. Aurelius Cotta Maximus Messalinus10
proposed that Drusus Libo’s image should not be carried in the
funeral procession of any of his descendants, and Cn. Lentulus
proposed that no Scribonius should bear the cognomen Drusus.11
8 Ibid., 2.29. 9 Ibid., 2.30. 10 PIR² A 1488.
11 Tac. Ann. 2.32.1.
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Public acts of thanks were then performed. Offerings were made to
Jupiter, Mars, and Concord, and 13 September was to be observed as
a festival thereafter.12 These last decrees were suggested by
L. Pomponius Flaccus,13 Asinius Gallus, M. Papius Mutilus,14 and
L. Apronius. Tacitus mentions another, but only L. P . . . remains. The
initials could refer to at least four known senators during the period.15
Drusus Libo’s property was then divided among the delatores, and
those delatores who were senators were awarded/received a praetor-
ship, which probably means that Tiberius personally sponsored their
candidacy.16 Finally, a decree was passed expelling occult practi-
tioners from Italy, two of whom, L. Pituanius and P. Marcius, were
put to death.17
Most recent scholars, following Tacitus, dismiss Drusus Libo as
relatively harmless: a stupid young man pursued by covetous prose-
cutors and left for dead by a hypocritical regime.18 But certain items
become incredible if the entire episode was orchestrated for the
benefit of ravenous delatores: the fact of an emergency meeting of
the senate (and during the Ludi Romani); the nature of the charge;
Drusus Libo’s inability to find an advocate; the continuation of the
investigation after death; placing Drusus Libo into custody, rather
12 Ibid. 13 PIR¹ P 538. 14 Ibid., P 92.
15 R. J. A. Talbert, The Senate of Imperial Rome (1984), 246, lists L. Piso (cos. 1BC),
L. Piso (cos. 15 BC), L. Plancus (cos. AD 13), or L. Voluseius Proculus (suff. 17?).
16 There has been some debate over when these praetorships were taken up, see
F. R. D Goodyear, The Annals of Tacitus, Books 1–6, Vol. 2 (1981), 280 f.
17 Tac. Ann. 2.32.
18 Drusus Libo is held to be an important conspirator by: L. Freytag, Tiberius und
Tacitus (1870), 115 f; V. Duruy, Historie des Romains, IV (1879–85), 302; U. Silvagni,
L’Impero e le donne dei Cesari (1909), 270; A. Lang, Beitrage zur Geschichte des Kaisers
Tiberius, (diss. Jena., 1911), 26 ff; E. Ciaceri, ‘L’ Imperatore Tiberio e i processi di lesa
maesta’, Processi politici e Relazioni internazionali (1918), and Tiberio Successore di
Augusto² (1944); F. B. Marsh, ‘Tacitus and the Aristocratic Tradition’, CP, 21: 4
(1926), 289–310 and Reign of Tiberius (1931), 58 ff; R. S. Rogers, Criminal Trials and
Criminal Legislation under Tiberius (1935), 12–25; E. F. Leon, ‘Notes on the Back-
ground and Character of Libo Drusus’, CJ, 53: 2 (Nov. 1957) 77–80; B. Levick, Tiberius
the Politician (1999), 149 f. Drusus Libo is considered to be not dangerous by:
C. Merivale, History of the Romans under the Empire, V (1881–3), 219–21; J. C. Tarver,
Tiberius the Tyrant (1902), 326 f; A. VonDomaszewski,Geschichte der römischen Kaiser
I (1909), 277–8; A. Passerini, Studi giuridici in memoria di P. Ciapessoni (1947), 219 ff;
F. H. Cramer, Astrology in Roman Law and Politics (1954), 254–5; R. Syme, Tacitus, II
(1958), 400–1; D. C. A. Shotter, ‘The Trial of M. Scribonius Libo Drusus’, Historia,
21 (1972), 88–98; R. Seager, Tiberius (1972), 89–93; F. R. D. Goodyear (1981), 262 f;
S. Rutledge, Imperial Inquisitions: Prosecutors and Informants fromTiberius to Domitian
(2001), 158 f.
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than encouraging voluntary exile; the implementation of damnatio
memoriae; marking 13 September a holiday, and the invocation of
Concord. Concord is particularly suggestive. Her presence implies
that Drusus Libo’s disgrace accompanied a profound rupture in
Rome’s socio-political fabric. There is, therefore, a major discrepancy
between the facts of the case as they have come down to us, and the
explanation provided by Tacitus. As Rogers and Levick supposed, and
I shall argue, the conspiracy of the psuedo Agrippa Postumus (i.e. the
slave Clemens) in AD 16 best explains the contradiction: Drusus Libo
was supporting a plan to bring down the government.19 The structure
of the argument will fall roughly into two parts. First I shall argue that
Tiberius and his government treated Drusus Libo seriously rather
than as a harmless fool. I shall then propose a new historical inter-
pretation for the years 6 BC–AD 16 to demonstrate that Tiberius’ right
was seriously contested, and that his opponents had been supporters
of Augustus’ grandsons. We shall start by considering the fact that
Drusus Libo was forced to endure a senatorial investigation.
AN EMERGENCY SITTING OF THE SENATE
Only suspicion dogged Drusus Libo before the senate meeting, but
real trouble emerged when the necromancer he consulted, a certain
Junius, proved more ambitious than himself. Impressed by the situa-
tion, Junius sought out the most celebrated prosecutor of the day
(celebre ingenium). L. Fulcinius Trio was decisive:
statim corripit reum, adit consules, cognitionem senatus poscit. Et vocantur
patres, addito consultandum super re magna et atroci.
Immediately he [Trio] seized the accused, approached the consuls, and called
for an investigation in the senate. And so the fathers were called, it being
added that they were to deliberate upon a great and terrible matter.20
19 R. S. Rogers (1935), 12–25; B. Levick (1999), 149 f. Both treatments are brief.
Rogers offered merely a thought without evidence. Levick nevertheless rests her case
upon a belief that Rogers’ hypothesis was ‘convincingly shown’. Levick’s treatment,
moreover, spans all of four pages, and thus produces more questions than answers.
20 Tac. Ann. 2.28.3.
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An extraordinary meeting of the senate (senatus indictus) to deter-
mine Drusus Libo’s intention signals an emergency. During the late
Republic the senate might respond to the possibility of revolution by
asking the consul to ‘see to it that the State should suffer no harm’, the
so-called senatus consultum ultimum (SCU).21 But this was concep-
tually impossible in the early Principate, when the safety of the res
publica was supposed to depend on a princeps.22 Tiberius apparently
uttered the formula once, when, in AD 24, the consul L. Visellius Varro
prosecuted C. Silius Caecina Largus, but Tiberius’ intention is suspect:
Precante reo brevem moram, dum accusator consulatu abiret, adversatus est
Caesar: solitum quippe magistratibus diem privatis dicere: nec infringendum
consulis ius, cuius vigiliis niteretur ne quod res publica detrimentum caperet.
Proprium id Tiberio fuit scelera nuper reperta priscis verbis obtegere.
The defendant requested a brief delay so that the accuser could retire from
the consulate, but Caesar opposed: ‘It was by all means usual for magistrates
to name a day for the trial of private citizens: nor should the right of the
consul be infringed, by whose vigilance it depends that the State should suffer
no harm.’ It was characteristic for Tiberius to conceal his latest evil inven-
tions with ancient words.23
Tiberius’ opinion, irrefutable and cynical, had the effect of presenting
Silius as a danger to the State.24 To justify the consul’s participation
(who may have been driven by personal enmity), Tiberius evoked
21 The principal treatments are: G. Plaumann, ‘Das sogenannte senatus consultum
ultimum’, Klio, 13 (1913), 322–86; H. L. Last CAH¹ 9, 82 f; A. Lintott, Violence in
Republican Rome (1968), 149–74, and The Constitution of the Roman Republic (1999),
89–93; T. N. Mitchell ‘Cicero and the Senatus Consultum Ultimum’, Historia, 20
(1971), 47–61; A. Drummond, Law, Politics and Power: Sallust and the Execution of
the Catilinarian Conspirators, Historia Einzelschriften Heft, 93 (1995), 79–107.
22 Cf. Th. Mommsen, Staatstrecht 3.2.1240 f.; H. Dessau, Geschichte der römischen
Kaiserzeit, Vol. 1 (1924–30), 23.140; H. Volkmann, Zur Rechtsprechung im Principat
des Augustus: historische Beiträge (1935), 33; J. Bleicken, Senatsgericht und Kaiserger-
icht—eine Studie zur Entwicklung des Prozeßrechtes im frühen Prinzipat (1962), 40–3.
For the view that the SCU did not inspire senatorial cognitio in the Principate, see
W. Kunkel, Über die Entstehung des Senatsgericht (1969) = Kleine Schriften (1974),
267–323 and A. H. M. Jones, The Criminal Courts of the Roman Republic and
Principate (1972), 93, who both argue that its contested status would have been
enough to make its use as a precedent for senatorial cognitio fifty to sixty years later
unlikely.
23 Tac. Ann. 4.19.
24 Tac. Ann. 4.17. For a general discussion of the charge against Silius, with
bibliography, see A. A. Barrett, Agrippina: Sex, Power and Politics in the Early Empire
(1996), 34 f. and S. H. Rutledge (2001), 142.
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through the language of the SCU an atmosphere of emergency. The
device was, moreover, used to convey another message. Velleius
praised Tiberius for, among other things, restoring the senate’smaies-
tas.25 With less enthusiasm, Tacitus, Suetonius, and Dio have the
senate playing a larger role under Tiberius than Augustus.26 Their
works contain, in fragmentary form, Tiberius’ most important mes-
sage to posterity, something like: ‘I simply facilitate imperial admin-
istration, while the consuls with the senate run the show.’ By invoking
the SCU, Tiberius implied that his supreme position in no way
affected the traditional potestas and auctoritas of the consuls: Tiber-
ius’ Principate was in practice a restored Republic! This improvised
application of rhetorical colour does not explain why Drusus Libo
was scrutinized in the senate rather than a court. The explanation lies
instead with the senate’s established right to hear evidence of con-
spiracy when due process was impracticable.
L. Fulcinius Trio did not waste time by seeking out the praetor
presiding over the quaestio maiestatis, instead, as with all national
emergencies, he went straight to the consuls. Ordinarily, Trio would
have sought out the appropriate praetor and applied to prosecute
Drusus Libo. The praetor would then have summoned Drusus Libo to
appear before him to discuss the charge (nominis delatio). Satisfied
that the evidence deserved trial, the praetor would then publish the
charge and name Drusus Libo defendant (reus) before fixing a day for
the trial to begin. In cases of maiestas the reus was given ten days in
which to organize a defence or else enter into exile.27 Trio hurried to
the consuls because the evidence demanded their knowing and the
senate’s immediate response: the idea of seeking out the appropriate
praetor, and thus giving Drusus Libo time to expedite his plans,
would not have suggested itself. The praetor would instead be asked
to consider the matter only once the senate had published its opinion
(praeiudicium), at which point, had Drusus Libo not taken his own
life, the iudices would have been hard pressed to produce anything
but a verdict of guilty. In seeking out the consuls, Trio knew well that
precedent justified his decision.
25 Vell. 2.126.
26 Tac. Ann. 4.7.2; Suet. Tib. 30.1, 31.1; Dio 57.6.2, 57.15.9.
27 For procedure, see A. H. J. Greenidge, The Legal Procedure of Cicero’s Time
(1901), 459 f. On giving the accused ten days when the charge was maiestas, see Asc.
In Corn. 59C.
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On 18 October 63 BC M. Licinius Crassus, M. Marcellus, and
Q. Caecilius Metellus provided to the consul, M. Tullius Cicero,
evidence that suggested an impending insurrection by L. Sergius
Catilina. Cicero summoned the senate the next day. Nothing came
of this meeting but further suspicion that Catiline was up to no good,
but when more damning evidence emerged two days later senators
were again summoned, and this time the SCU was passed. For five
weeks Cicero sought proof that a massacre was imminent, until finally
a group was caught in the early hours of 3 December leaving Rome
with sealed letters for Catiline. Cicero led those captured to the
temple of Concord where senators were assembled. Having been
examined by the senate, Catiline’s associates were put under arrest
and for two days their fate was uncertain while senators considered
the options. On 5 December they were put to death. Whilst the
decision to execute the prisoners was controversial, the senate’s
right to investigate the matter was not. This right was acknowledged
even, or perhaps especially, during the early Principate.
In 26 BC, C. Cornelius Gallus, prefect of Egypt, was alleged to have
extorted from provincials, put up images of himself in Egypt, in-
scribed a list of his achievements on the pyramids, and slandered
Augustus in private.28 Augustus reacted to the allegations by publicly
withdrawing friendship (renuntiatio amicitiae) and inviting the sen-
ate to investigate the matter:
metu nobilitatis acriter indignatae, cui negotium spectandum dederat im-
perator . . .
in fear of the keenly disgusted nobility, to whom the emperor had given the
affair to be looked into . . .29
The plundering of Egypt and thus the tempting of local inhabitants to
revolt—which was not unheard of, especially for the Alexandrians—
was for Augustus a matter worthy of senatorial scrutiny.30 The
28 Dio 53.23.5; Suet. Aug. 66.2; De Gramm. 5; Jerome Chron. 164H; Amm. Marc.
17.4.5; Servius ad Georg. 4.1, ad Eclog. 10.1; Ovid Am. 3.9.63; Tr. 2.446. There is no
evidence of an inscription on a pyramid, but an inscription from Philae in Latin, Greek,
and Hieroglyphic does celebrate his actions. The Latin can be found at ILS 8995.
29 Amm. Marc. 17.4.5.
30 The slander cited by Ovid had already been punished by renuntiatio amicitiae,
contra Bauman (1967), 182–3. Daly, ‘The Gallus Affair’ Latomus, 164 (1979), 289–311
is probably correct to associate Suet. De Gramm. 16 with Augustus’ decision to sever
ties, not the formal indictments. Suetonius tells us that one of the gravest charges
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productive capacity of Egypt was vital to the overall health of the
economy, and hence the empire. Senators, on finding sufficient proof
that Gallus was guilty, agreed that his actions were of national
significance:
ŒÆd  ªæıÆ –ÆÆ ±ºHÆ 	 ÆP	e K 	E
 ØŒÆ	ÅæØ
 ŒÆd çıªE 	B

PÆ
 	æÅŁ	Æ, ŒÆd 	Æ	Å 	 	fiH APª	øfi ŁBÆØ ŒÆd Æı	f

ıŁı	BÆØ KłÅçÆ	.
The whole senate voted that he should be convicted in the courts and, having
been deprived of his estate, exiled, and that his estate should be given to
Augustus, and that they themeselves should offer sacrifices.31
Gallus committed suicide before the decree took effect. The pressure
on the quaestio to rubber-stamp the senate’s praeiudicium was en-
ormous: a verdict of not guilty was improbable and Gallus knew
it. Four years later, in 22 BC, the res publica supposedly faced a
more serious threat when the noble L. Terentius Varro Murena and
a certain Fannius Caepio were put to death for planning revolution.32
Though the sources do not explicitly give the senate a role before the
trial took place, inference and logic would suggest that it had one.
No detailed account survives of the episode, but enough remains to
construct a basic narrative: a plot was formed to bring down Augus-
tus’ government;33 a certain Castricius gained knowledge of the con-
spiracy and informed Augustus.34 Augustus called for his most
trusted advisers, one of whom was Maecenas. Maecenas related the
information to his wife, Terentia, who in turn told her brother
L. Terentius Varro Murena.35 The conspirators—aware that the
game was up—fled Rome. At some point, probably early the next
day, a decision was made to send troops after the pair.36 Tiberius then
levelled at Gallus by Augustus was that he had living with him a certain Q. Caecilius
Epirota, a freedman of Atticus who had been dismissed for having made innapropri-
ate advances towards his daughter, Pomponia (she was also Agrippa’s first wife).
31 Dio 53.23.7. Gallus was equestrian. He could not therefore be charged under the
lex repetundis. However, he could be, and probably was, charged under the lex
maiestatis. It is possible, nevertheless, that the senate judged that Gallus should, despite
the law, be convicted in the courts de repetundis.
32 I have followed the chronology established by M. Swan, ‘The Consular Fasti of
23 B.C., and the Conspiracy of Varro Murena’, HSCP, 71 (1967), 235–47.
33 Vell. 2.91.2; Macr. 1.11.21; Sen. De Brev. Vit. 4.5.
34 Suet. Aug. 56.4.
35 Suet. Aug. 66.3, who supplies Marcellus for Maecenas.
36 To be inferred from Macr. 1.11.21.
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took the matter to the praetor presiding over the quaestio maiestatis
and named Caepio as defendant.37 Caepio was condemned in absen-
tia; Murena was then subjected to the same process. Caepio was
finally caught in Naples.38 Murena was caught with a peripatetic
philosopher from Seleuceia named Athenaeus, who, we are told,
supported popular politics.39 Those caught were taken to Rome and
put to death, except Athenaeus, who was found not guilty and
released. Finally, thanks were voted as if it were a victory.40
The decision to send troops after the conspirators, accompanied no
doubt by a public declaration that the pair were wanted for question-
ing and ought to be considered fugitives, would have come from the
senate. Senators may even have suggested that the pair ought to be
tried for maiestas. It would certainly explain the voting of supplica-
tiones after the trial. It is inconceivable that Augustus was so clumsy
as to take a matter of national importance straight to the praetor,
when he had spent so much energy convincing the public, and
especially senators, that his new res publica was built upon senatorial
auctoritas, and especially impolitic to exclude the senate from some-
thing which belonged to it.41 I believe that on hearing news that
Caepio and Murena had fled Rome, Augustus immediately sum-
moned senators for the purpose of producing a united response.
Tiberius then approached the praetor to prosecute both men in
absentia, arguing in court that their fleeing was in fact an attempt
to enter into exile and should therefore be treated as confession.42
Most in the jury agreed. The men were brought back to Rome for
execution because they were not trusted in exile. The role of the
senate was vital here, as it must also have been for the investigations
into the acts of the elder Julia, Titus Labienus, anti-government
pamphlets in AD 6, Agrippa Postumus in AD 7, and Falanius and
Rubrius in AD 15.43 The idea that the senate was the appropriate




41 Res Gestae 34.1 is the obvious example of this.
42 Dio 54.3.3. The key is the construction T
 ŒÆd çıØ. Dio has the sense ‘as
if ”: i.e. they were convicted as if they were actually going into exile. Dio used ‘as if ’
because an intention to go into exile was the interpretation of the prosecutor - they
never actually reached a place of exile.
43 For the elder Julia, see Dio 55.10.13 f; Suet. Aug. 65.2. For Titus Labienus, see
Sen. Cont. 10. praef. 8; for anti-government pamphlets in AD 6, see Dio 55.27.3. For
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space for the discussion of matters supposedly concerning the safety
and health of the res publica compelled Tiberius to claim in AD 20 that:
Id solum Germanico super leges praestiterimus, quod in curia potius quam in
foro, apud senatum quam apud iudices de morte eius anquiritur.
In this way only we will have placed Germanicus above the laws (super leges),
that his death will be investigated in the curia rather than in the forum,
before the senate rather than before the judges.44
The Senatus Consultum de Pisone Patre reveals that senators were not
limited to discussing the circumstances of Germanicus’ death:
Ti(berius) Caesar divi Aug(usti) f(ilius) Aug(ustus) pontifex maxumus, tribu-
nicia potestate XXII, co(n)s(ul) III, designatus IIII ad senatum rettulit qualis
causa Cn. Pisonis patris visa esset et an merito sibi mortem conscisse
videretur . . . et quid de Visellio Karo et de Sempronio Basso, comitibus Cn.
Pisonis patris, iudicaret senatus. . .
Tiberius Caesar Augustus, son of the divine Augustus, pontifex maxumus, in
the twenty-second year of his tribunician power, having been consul three
times, consul designate for the fourth time, referred (the following) to the
senate: how the case of Cn. Piso the father had seemed, and whether his
suicide seemed justified . . . and what the senate judged concerning Visellius
Karus and Sempronius Bassus, members of Cn. Piso the father’s retinue . . .45
Agrippa Postumus, see Suet. Aug. 65.4. The affairs of Falanius and Rubrius in AD 15
(Tac. Ann. 1.73) should not be dismissed as unimportant. Falanius was accused of
having allowed an infamis to become a cultor Augusti in his house and to have sold a
statue of Augustus by default of having sold his house. Rubrius was alleged to have
used Augustus’ name while committing perjury. Tiberius suggested to the consuls that
both cases should be dismissed, but we should be cautious before writing them off as
unimportant episodes. Augustus had been made a god less than a year before, and
perceived violations against his numen had not, therefore, been appropriately defined.
The senate was being asked to make a ruling that would affect tens of thousands of
Romans. It is not unreasonable to assume that mass panic would have swept Rome
had the senate voted to condemn in the quaestio maiestatis. Panic may have spread
already. Any situation with the potential to cause an emergency was therefore dealt
with by the senate. It is interesting, however, to note Tiberius’ intervention. He wanted
the senate to deal with the questions quickly. But the senate was in a tricky situation.
To describe the acts as legal too quickly could appear impious, while to consider the
matters too long could cause widespread anxiety: senators were probably relieved
when Tiberius took the initiative.
44 Tac. Ann. 3.12.7.
45 SCPP 4–11. W. Eck, A. Caballos, and F. Fernández, Das senatus consultum de
Cn. Pisone Patre (1996), 231 take iudicare at SCPP 11 to be technical, but M. Griffin,
‘The Senate’s Story’, JRS, 87 (1997), 256 and J. S. Richardson ‘The Senate, the Courts,
and the SC de Cn. Pisone patre’, CQ, 47 (1997), 516, show that the term maintains a
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Before Piso had even reached Rome, where accusations of murder
awaited, the younger Drusus had been forced to remind a growing
mob that men were innocent till proved guilty.46 The plea to justice
had little effect. While senators were in session a large group allegedly
assailed the doors of the senate house:
Simul populi ante curiam voces audiebantur: non temperaturos manibus si
patrum sententias evasisset. Effigiesque Pisonis traxerant in Gemonias ac
divellebant, ni iussu principis protectae repositaeque forent.
At this same time voices of the people were heard in front of the Curia: they
promised violence if he should evade the opinions of senators. They dragged
statues of Piso to the Gemonian stairs and were breaking them up when, by
order of the princeps, they were rescued and replaced.47
Popular unrest made operation of the regular court impossible. The
auctoritas of the senate was needed to settle excited citizens and arrest
the possibility of further violence. As with Augustus’ decision regard-
ing allegations against Gallus, Tiberius decided that politics de-
manded the senate’s participation.48
Piso subsequently suffered damnatio memoriae because his suicide
was found deficient in merit.49 Judging the indictments against the
comites, the senate decreed:
Visellio Karo et Sempronio Basso comitibus Cn. Pisonis patris et omnium
malificiorum socis ac ministris, aqua et igne interdici oportere ab eo pr
(aetore), qui lege{m} maiestatis quaereret, bonaq(ue) eorum ab pr(aetoribus),
qui aerario praeesse<n>t, venire et in aerarium redigi placere.
That Visellius Karus and Sempronius Bassus, members of Cn. Piso the
father’s retinue, allies and assistants in all of his wicked crimes, ought to be
interdicted from fire and water by the praetor who investigates (crimes)
under the lex maiestatis, and that their property be sold by the praetors
standard meaning throughout the text which is far more general. Cicero uses iudicare
and other legal terminology to describe the senate’s debate on the arrested Catilinar-
ian conspiracy, Cic. In Cat. passim.
46 Tac. Ann. 3.8.2.
47 Tac. Ann. 3.14.4–6.
48 Tac. Ann. 3.10.3, see especially R. H. Martin and A. J. Woodman (1996), 132.
See also Dio 53.21.5–6. Cf. W. Kierdorf, ‘Die Einleitung des Piso-Prozesses’, Hermes,
97 (1969), 246–51.
49 SCPP 71: Quas ob res arbitrari senatum non optulisse eum se de[b]itae poenae . . .
“That on account of these reasons the senate deemed that he did not subject himself to
the punishment he deserved . . . ”
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responsible for the aerarium, and that the collected proceeds be placed in the
aerarium.50
The senate passed its judgment on the guilt of the accused and
prescribed the appropriate punishment, but the legal implementation
of these decisions required the quaestio: as with its investigation into
Gallus forty-five years earlier, the senate’s judgment was preliminary
not de iure.51 As the above cases make clear, the senate had an
important role within the Roman constitution that survived the
transition from the late Republic to the governments of Augustus
and Tiberius. It remained the space in which matters perceived to be
national emergencies were discussed. Some cases, such as those of
Falanius and Rubrius, were put to senators because the decision could
have far-reaching legal effects, while others, such as allegations
against Catiline’s associates, and Caepio and Murena, required an
immediate response to a perceived threat. The fact that Trio hurried
to the consuls, who in turn summoned an emergency meeting of the
senate, is therefore our first piece of evidence that Drusus Libo was
thought to have posed a serious and immediate threat. It is now time
to consider the charge.
A TERRIBLE CHARGE
Et vocantur patres, addito consultandum super re magna et atroci.
And so the fathers were called, it being added that they were to deliberate
upon a great and terrible matter.52
The spectacle of senators hastily summoned ‘to deliberate upon a
great and terrible matter’ led to a generally held impression that
50 Ibid. 120–3.
51 This is not to be confused with the senate’s right to pass legal judgment in cases
involving allegations under the heading repetundae and which satisfy the requirements
of the senatus consultum Calvisianum. The text is published as Edict V in R. S. Sherk,
Rome and the Greek East to the Death of the Augustus (1984), 130–2. J. S. Richardson
(1997), 517, wonders whether the praetor took the decision of the senate as equivalent
to the votes of the jury, but this cannot be right, since tribuni aerarii and equites who,
along with senators, made up the decuriae iudicum, would still need to acquiesce in a
court procedure.
52 Tac. Ann. 2.28.
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Drusus Libo was finished before even the submission of evidence.
Friends and family displayed their pessimism by refusing appeals to
both amicitia and pietas. In Tacitus’ narrative, the consuls’ decision to
summon senators was in response to evidence that Drusus Libo had
employed a necromancer to raise dead spirits. This was not a crime.
The crime lay in the nature of his conversation with the necromancer.
Though details of the indictment are not extant, most scholars
assume that maiestas was at least one of the charges. But while some
hold that his occult interests were the basis of the maiestas charge,
others believe that they were merely incidental, and that occult
practices did not then constitute prima facie maiestas, even when
the princeps was affected.53 Rutledge, whose notable contribution is
the latest, has put forward a third possibility: Drusus Libo was never
indicted for maiestas, only occult practices in so far as they contra-
vened the lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis.54 A reconsideration of
the relationship between Drusus Libo’s alleged activity and Roman
criminal law is therefore warranted.
In AD 11 Augustus responded to interest in his failing health by
publishing his horoscope and forbidding the practice thereafter. No
Roman was to employ a seer to discover one’s own, or another’s, time
of death:
ŒÆd 	E
 	Ø IÅªæŁÅ 	 ŒÆ	a Æ
 	Ød 	 æd ŁÆ	ı, Å’
i ¼ººØ ıÆæH ƒ, åæA· ŒÆ	Ø o	ø
 Pb 	fiH `Pª	øfi 	H ŒÆŁ’
Æı	e º u	 KŒ æªæÆçB
 AØ 	c 	H I	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Ø	ÆØ, ç’ z
KªªÅ	, çÆæHÆØ. P c Iºº’ KŒE 	 IE . . .
53 Organizing scholars into camps is necessarily an over-simplification of the
nuances which exist in each individual approach, but is nevertheless a fair representa-
tion of an obvious pattern. Occult practices equal maiestas in the case of Drusus Libo:
J. C. Tarver (1902), 326; R. S. Rogers (1935), 16; R. Seager (1972), 89 f. and ‘Review of
R. A. Bauman Impietas in Principem’, JRS, 66 (1976), 230–1; D. C. A. Shotter (1972),
92; P. Brunt (1980), 257, n. 10; D. Ogden, Greek and Roman Necromancy (2001), 156,
and possibly F. R. D. Goodyear (1981), 268. That occult practice was a subsidiary/side
issue: A. Lang (1911), 26–35; F. B. Marsh (1931), 58–60; B. Walker, The Annals of
Tacitus (1952), 91–5; F. H. Cramer (1954), 254–5; R. Syme (1958), 399–401, and
(1986), 256, 259; R. Macmullen, Enemies of the Roman Order: Treason, Unrest and
Alienation in the Empire (1966), 130 f., 326, n. 4; P. Garnsey (1970), 110; R. A.
Bauman (1974), 60–1.
54 S. H. Rutledge (2001), 158–161. Rutledge is cautious, and acknowledges that res
novas moliri could be evidence for a charge of treason; nevertheless, he seems to prefer
sicariis et veneficis.
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It was forbidden for seers to prophesy to anyone alone or on the topic of
death, even if others were present. Even so, Augustus was so far from caring
about such matters when he himself was concerned that he published by
edict for all to know the arrangement of the stars under which he had been
born. Nevertheless he forbade this practice.55
Augustus’ response was limited. Astrology was not criminalized, only
consultations between one person and a seer and questions
about death, which must mean questions about both death (mors)
and health (salus). Augustus’ official horoscope (lacking a time of
death)56 was certainly published to overwhelm the widespread inter-
est in his health, though a question de salute principis was not
specifically made a crime. Augustus’ personality was sufficiently
protected by the general ban on questions de salute alicuius - a further
prohibition would have been redundant. But did Augustus intend a
breach of the ban to constitute a breach of the lex maiestatis?
Shortly after the investigation into Drusus Libo a senatus consultum
outlawed all practice of astrology and magic in Rome.57 Another—
passed sometime later—determined that all Roman mathematici,
chaldaei, and harioli should be interdicted from fire and water and
have their property confiscated, whilst their foreign counterparts
should be put to death.58We cannot be sure to what extent the decrees
differed in penalty, since they seem to have been telescoped over time,
but obviously the first was not considered sufficient. A description of
the second survives in Ulpian:
Denique extat senatus consultum Pomponio et Rufo cons., factum, quo cave-
tur, ut mathematicis Chaldaeis ariolis et ceteris, qui simile inceptum fecerunt,
55 Dio 56.25.5.
56 Dio 76.11.1; see P.M. Swan,The Augustan Succession: AnHistorical Commentary
on Cassius Dio’s Roman History, Books 55–56 (9 B.C.–A.D. 14) (2004), 280.
57 Tac. Ann. 2.32, Dio 57.15.8; cf. P. M. Swan (2004), 280. This certainly refers to
AD 16.
58 Ulpian, ‘Proconsular Functions Book 4’, in Mosaicarum et Romanarum Legem
Collatio 15.2.1. The date is not secure. The decree states Pomponio et Rufo cons . . .The
suffecti for AD 16 were C. Vibius Rufinus and C. Pomponius L.f. Graecinus. The
ordinarii for AD 17 were L. Pomponius Flaccus and C. Caecilius Rufus. R. S. Rogers,
‘The Date of the Banishment of the Astrologers’, CP, 26 (1931), 203 f. argues for AD 16,
he is followed by F. H. Cramer (1954), 238 f. They do not provide new evidence. F. R.
D. Goodyear (1981), 284 f. takes Ulpian to mean AD 17. Though Tacitus and Dio date
the decree to AD 16, I believe Goodyear is probably correct. A date of AD 16 would have
produced Pomponio et Rufino . . . not Pomponio et Rufo . . .The second decree was
probably published at the very beginning of AD 17.
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aqua et igni interdicatur omniaque bona eorum publicentur, et si externarum
gentium quis id fecerit, ut in eum animadvertatur . . . Saepissime denique
interdictum est fere ab omnibus principibus ne quis omnino huiusmodi
ineptiis se inmisceret, et varie puniti sunt ii qui id exercuerint, pro mensura
scilicet consultationis. Nam qui de principis salute, capite puniti sunt vel qua
alia poena graviore adfecti . . .
In short, a senatus consultum from the consulship of Pomponius and Rufus is
extant in which it is laid down that astrologers, Chaldaei, seers and others
who engage in similar practices are to be interdicted from fire and water and
all of their property shall be confiscated, and if a foreigner has done this he
should be punished with death . . .A prohibition has often been imposed by
almost every emperor on those who meddle at all in such follies, and those
who practice it have been variously punished, obviously according to the
seriousness of the consultation. Those who have inquired into the safety of
the princeps have been put to death or have had some rather serious punish-
ment inflicted on them . . . ”59
Tacitus, Suetonius, and Dio also give versions of the decree/s:
Facta et de mathematicis magisque Italia pellendis senatus consulta.
Decrees of the senate were also passed expelling mathematici and magi from
Italy.60
Expulit et mathematicos sed deprecantibus ac se artem desituros promittenti-
bus veniam dedit.
He also expelled the mathematici but pardoned those who came to
him promising to give up their art.61
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As for the astrologers, magicians and anyone who practiced divination in any
other way whatsoever, he put the foreigners to death and banished all the
citizens who, even then, were accused of still practicing the art after the
former decree by which it was forbidden to be involved in any such activity
in the city; for to those amongst them who obeyed immunity was given.62
59 Ulpian, Mos. et. Rom. 15.2.1. 60 Tac. Ann. 2.32. 61 Suet. Tib. 36.
62 Dio 57.15.8–9.
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As a general description we can add a statement by the jurist Paulus:
qui de salute principis vel summa rei publicae mathematicos hariolos harus-
pices vaticinatores consulit, cum eo qui responderit capite punitur.
One who consults mathematici, harioli, haruspices or soothsayers concern-
ing the safety of the princeps or the wellbeing of the State, along with one
who responds (i.e. the practitioner), is capitally punished.63
Expulsion of all citizen ‘astrologers, chaldeans, seers and others who
engage in similar practices’ is a purge: Tiberius had criminalized the
lot.64 The ban was soon ignored, since astrologers can be found
working in Rome four years later, but as a legal measure it marks a
radical departure from Augustus’ approach. Both Ulpian and Paulus
make reference to salus principis but the words fere omnes principes in
Ulpian need not encompass Augustus, and it is clear from Paulus’
reference to caput that he is citing a much later interpretation, when
interdiction had ceased to be the penalty for that crime.65 Ulpian thus
began his discussion with the decree of AD 17 because it was ante-
cedent to consultations de salute principis being interpreted under the
heading maiestas. Allegations against Aemilia Lepida four years later
demonstrate the development.66 Charges of adultery (adulteria), poi-
soning (venena), and asking seers about the house of Caesar (quae-
situm Chaldaeos in domum Caesaris) were added to an indictment for
false testimony ( falsum). Quaesitum Chaldaeos in domum Caesaris
was argued to have constituted maiestas.67 Tiberius asked the senate
not to consider the charge ofmaiestas, and later when the defendant’s
63 P. S. 5.21.3.
64 A partial parallel is the emergency measures against the followers of Bacchus in
the 180s BC, except that genuine followers were allowed to continue worship by
registering with the appropriate magistrates. No such deal was made in AD 16 and
17. Cf. R. Macmullen (1966), 133, taking Dio and Suetonius to mean that those
pardoned were allowed to continue practiing their art, so long as they avoided certain
topics.
65 Though caput had earlier covered death and interdictio, a differentiation appears
in P. S. 5.29.1: His antea in perpetuum aqua et igni interdicebatur: nunc vero
humiliores bestiis obiciuntur vel vivi exuruntur, honestiores capite puniuntur.
‘Formely, they (who were convicted of treason) were permanently interdicted from
fire and water: but now humiliores are thrown to the beasts or burnt alive, whilst
honestiores are capitally punished.’ Paulus is referring to legal penalties under the
lex maiestatis during his own time. See also Callistratus, Judicial Examinations book
6 = Dig. 48.19.28.13.
66 PIR² 1.71 no. 420.
67 Tac. Ann. 3.22; Suet. Tib. 49.1.
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slaves were handed over to the consuls he asked that the interrogation
not include the issue concerning his family.68 The incarceration and
interrogation of slaves was administered according to the lex Iulia de
adulteriis, which was not a capital offence.69 When a capital offence
was discovered, it came under the lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis:
an intention to poison her ex-husband.70 Since Aemilia did not plan
to harm Tiberius or his family, the allegation of astrology was allowed
to slide. At the very worst she had too liberally indulged in silly games
fashionable with aristocrats.71 The prosecutors saw things differ-
ently.72 They understood that the senatus consulta of AD 16 and 17
had more significant legal effect than mere outlawry; any enquiry into
any aspect of the imperial family was prima facie maiestas. The only
known bridge between the senatus consultum of AD 11, the senatus
consulta of AD 16 and 17, and the investigation of Aemilia Lepida is
the case of Drusus Libo.73
Since C. Vibius Serenus was chosen to represent the prosecution in
the peroration, he must at some stage have dealt with Fulcinius Trio’s
evidence.74 Vibius began with a rhetorical device for character
68 Tac. Ann. 3.22–23.
69 For sale of slaves in cases of adultery, see Dig. 40.9.12.1. See P. Brunt, ‘Evidence
Given under Torture in the Principate’, ZSS, 97 (1980), 256–65. Cf. R. A. Bauman
(1974), 174.
70 R. A. Bauman (1974), 174; R. H. Martin and A. J. Woodman (1996), 212.
71 R. S. Rogers (1935), 51–56; R. H. Martin and A. J. Woodman (1996), 210 f.; cf.
R. A. Bauman (1974), 175. S. H. Rutledge (2001), 91–2, 349, n.32, mistakenly believes
thatmaiestaswas not thrown out, but was, in fact, the charge that decided the nature of
the penalty. This seems to be based on a belief that interdiction plus confiscation must
equal maiestas, but this is not true. If it was thought that Lepida had intended to
murder Quirinius with poison, then interdiction and confiscation would have been
appropriate; see Marcian, Institutes book 14 = Dig. 48.8.3.5 and P. S. 5.23.1–2.
72 R. S. Rogers (1935), 51–6; F. H. Cramer (1954), 256; R. Seager (1972), 130;
S. H. Rutledge (2001), 91–2, cf. E. Ciaceri (1918), 254–5; R. A. Bauman (1974), 173 f.
73 The decree of AD 11 probably extended the scope of the lex Cornelia de sicariis et
venificis, and possibly the lex Cornelia de iniuria. So U. Brasiello, La Repressione
Penale in Diritto Romano (1937), 231 ff; E. Levy, Gesammelte Schriften, vol 2 (1963),
348, and R. A. Bauman (1974), 61, who argues for the lex Cornelia de sicariis. The
Roman economy was dominated by inheritence. As such, young men and women
eager to know the future health of a relative were probably the most common victims
of Augustus’ decree. Thus the penalty was probably not terrible.
74 Tac. Ann. 2.30: donec Vibius, quia nec ipsi inter se concederent et Libo sine
patrono introisset, singillatim se crimina obiecturum professus . . . “then Vibius, as they
would not concede to one another, and Libo had entered without legal counsel,
offered to state the charges against him singly . . . ” At Ann. 4.29.4, Tacitus states:
Nam post damnatum Libonem missis AD Caesarem litteris exprobraverat suum tantum
studium sine fructu fuisse . . . “For after the condemnation of Libo, he [Vibius] sent to
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assassination: Drusus Libo’s addiction to occult practices evidenced
an ambitious spirit.75 Other tales were told and when the defendant
had been sufficiently humiliated, Vibius submitted evidence that
shocked Drusus Libo into denial and forced the sale of his slaves to
the actor publicus. According to Tacitus:
Uni tamen libello manu Libonis nominibus Caesarum aut senatorum additas
atrocis vel occultas notas accusator arguebat. Negante reo adgnoscentis servos
per tormenta interrogari placuit . . .Ob quae posterum diem reus petivit
domumque digressus extremas preces P. Quirinio propinquo suo ad principem
mandavit.
On one paper sinister or cryptic marks had been added to the names of
Caesars or senators in Libo’s hand, the accuser alleged. When the defendant
denied this it was resolved to interrogate under torture the slaves who
recognized the handwriting . . .On account of this the defendant asked to
adjourn till the next day, and having departed for home entrusted his final
prayers to the emperor to his relative P. Quirinius.76
Drusus Libo did not kill himself until after Tiberius refused his plea,
but the driving force was the senate’s explosive reaction to this single
libellus. He realized, on witnessing senators’ expressions, that the
situation was hopeless. A list of imperial and senatorial names is in
itself suggestive, but it became impressive when the accompanying
marks were described as atrocis vel occultas.77 It is clear from the
official commemoration of the trial that a majority in the senate
agreed with the prosecutor’s description:
Caesar a letter reproaching him that his energy was without reward . . . ” R. H. Martin
and A. J. Woodman, Tacitus: Annals Book IV (1989), 165, are probably correct to
suggest that Vibius was complaining because he had not received a level of reward
consistent with the other three accusers, pointing out that since Vibius was proconsul
in Spain c. AD 22, he must already have held the praetorship, or in fact, may have been
a praetor designate when the rewards were offered, cf. R. A. Bauman (1974), 60–1.
75 Tac. Ann. 2.30.
76 Ibid.
77 F. R. D. Goodyear (1981), 276, takes vel to be distributive, which means that
neither term describes the notae collectively. Some were obviously threatening whilst
others appeared mysterious. This is at the expense of H. Furneaux (1896), 319: ‘deadly
or at least mysterious symbols.’ Goodyear’s approach better suits the mood, since the
obviousness of some of the notae perfectly explains Drusus Libo’s immediate denial.
This is not to say, however, that the libellus was a forged plant. If Libo’s enemies
wanted to hang him on planted evidence, they would not have made some notae too
obscure. Indeed, the message of the libellus as a whole would have been clear cut.
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Fer. ex.s.c.q.e.d. nefaria consilia quae de salute Ti. Caes. liberorumque eius et
aliorum principum civitatis deq(ue) r.p. inita ab M. Libone erant in senatu
convicta sunt.
A holiday on account of the decree which (was passed) because the wicked
plans commenced by M. Libo concerning the safety of Tiberius Caesar and
his children and other men of consular rank and also concerning the State
were defeated in the senate.78
The words de salute Ti. Caes. Liberorumque eius et aliorum principum
civitatis so parallel the description of the libellus—nominibus
Caesarum aut senatorum—that the decree clearly inspired Tacitus’
report, though the poetical atrox is probably Tacitus’ own touch. The
libellus was also the clearest evidence of the res magna et atrox which
had prompted the emergency investigation in the senate - it was
supplied by the necromancer Junius. It is not hard to imagine how
Junius came to possess the document: Drusus Libo wrote the list at
home before taking it to Junius for consultation; Junius explained that
he needed to hold on to it: ‘the incantations will take a few days’;
Drusus Libo left the document with Junius, who, as soon as the
situation allowed, took it to one of the best prosecutors in Rome,
L. Fulcinius Trio.
The senatus consulta that followed the investigation and the ex-
ecution of the two mathematici, L. Pituanius and P. Marcius, rein-
force the link between Junius’ libellus and the res magna et atrox.
Pituanius was flung from the Rock, whilst the consuls decapitated
Marcius outside the Esquiline Gate at sound of trumpet.79 Though
they were probably tried first, the decision to execute was discretion-
ary, much like the executions of Caepio and Murena.80 Pituanius and
Marcius were evidently guilty of acts more serious than a mere breach
78 CIL I² p. 244. The phrase de re publica evidences the charge of maiestas, contra
S. H. Rutledge (2001), 159.
79 Tac. Ann. 2.32.
80 A comparison with the comites of Piso is instructive. On that occasion the senate
voted for interdiction, even though they were found to have been complicit in Piso’s
activities, SCPP. 120–1. R. Macmullen (1966), 133, suggests, rightly, that the nature of
their death was a show of strength by Tiberius and his government. Still, it is strange
that L. Pituanius and P. Marcius received different forms of the death penalty: one
thrown from the Rock and the other decapitated by the consul at the Esquiline Gate. It
is possible that one was a citizen and the other an alien. ‘Thrown from the Rock’ was a
traditional form of the death penalty for citizens, whilst ‘decapitation’ signals the
inapplicability of the leges Porciae. But that would not account for their citizen-like
nomenclature.
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of the Augustan edict of AD 11, which was not a capital offence. More
probably they were judged to have participated in Drusus Libo’s
conspiracy by way of their talents.
The role of the occult in this episode weighed on the mind of
Tiberius, and in doing so forged a bridge between the decree of AD 11
and those of AD 16 and 17. Debate in the senate during the drafting of
the latter, however, shows that a total ban was not universally
favoured:
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And all the citizens would have been acquitted contrary to his [Tiberius’]
opinion, if a certain tribune had not obstructed. And here indeed one would
particularly observe the form of democratic government, in so far as the
senate, being in agreement with Cn. Calpurnius Piso, overruled Drusus and
Tiberius, and was itself defeated by the tribune.81
Senators believed that a purge of occult practitioners (citizens) was
unjustified, and were willing to oppose Tiberius publicly. Senators
who had recently passed posthumous penalties upon the memory of
Drusus Libo and, perhaps, ordered the execution of his accomplices
were now agreed that Drusus and Tiberius were overstepping the
mark. Interest in the occult affected every level of society. High levels
of participation made Tiberius’ policy unenforceable, and senators
knew it. Opposition was perhaps also encouraged by a belief that the
occult played only a subsidiary role in the Drusus Libo affair, as can
be seen in the description of his intention in the sources.
Tacitus describes Drusus Libo’s intentions with moliri res novas;
Suetonius has res novas clam moliebatur; Dio has Æ	 	Ø
ø	æÇØ; Velleius has nova molientem and scelerata consilia; Se-
neca hasmaiora sperantis quam illo saeculo quisquam sperare poterat
aut ipse ullo; while the government itself used nefaria consilia . . . de
r.p.82 An intention to cause revolution will have always resulted in
maiestas, but a diminution of maiestas will not always have been
81 Dio 57.15.9.
82 Tac. Ann. 2.27.1; Suet. Tib. 25; Dio 57.15.4; Vell. 2.129, 130; Sen. Ep. 70.10; CIL I²
p. 244.
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caused by an intention to cause revolution; the sources unequivocally
agree that senators believed Drusus Libo was aiming at revolution.
The link to divination rested on the allegation, accepted as fact, that
the defendant had given the list of names to a necromancer. It is here
pertinent to refute the theory of Ogden that the dead spirits raised by
Junius were meant to kill the people listed on the parchment.83 Lucan,
Heliodorus, and Dio are our best sources for the Roman conception
of necromancy, and they show that dead spirits were not roused to
kill but to prophesy.84 Ogden has nevertheless drawn our attention to
an important problem: how do we combine the parchment with the
nature of Junius’ expertise? The parchment on its own required a
context. A context could only be supplied by a question. Vagueness
would have been important, but it would need to be specific enough
to gain an adequate answer. The question also had to be such that
Tiberius could show indifference, whether real or feigned. Suspicion
would not be aroused by something like ‘will a certain venture be
profitable?’85, but perhaps by ‘what does my future hold should any-
thing unfortunate happen to the men on this list?’ If this question
were put to Junius in combination with a written list comprising
members of the imperial family and other important men of State, it
would account for both Junius’ initial reaction and that of senators
upon hearing the evidence.
Junius judged immediately that Drusus Libo was up to no good and
wanted no part in it. Drusus Libo was deemed to have been plotting a
coup in which the intended victims were represented on the list; the
suspicion formed the basis of the indictment. The charge of having
consulted magical practitioners, however, played only a subsidiary
role. Its use as evidence was more important. Without obvious proof
of Drusus Libo’s plot, senators could only infer intent from Junius’
evidence. The fact that he also breached the edict of AD 11 was
probably an afterthought. As a result of this investigation the door
was left open for such questions to be considered treasonable in the
future, but that reaction (favoured by a minority) should not blind us
to the true nature of the charge, which was intent to cause revolution
83 D. Ogden (2001), 156; a similar idea was also put forward by R. Seager (1972), 92
f: ‘In practical terms it was believed that Libo intended to liquidate all possible rivals
by black magic and so attain the Principate himself.’
84 Lucan Phars. 6.588–830; Heliod. 6.12–15; Dio 79.7.4.
85 Apparently a popular question according to the Tabula Aristobuli, displayed in
F. H. Cramer (1954), 24.
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as interpreted under the lex maiestatis. Still, clarification of the charge
does not make Drusus Libo an actual revolutionary. He is considered
a dupe by most scholars, foolish enough to fall prey to more ferocious
members of society, delatores. Such a view is certainly supported by at
least two ancient writers. Seneca writes: adulescentis tam stolidi quam
nobilis, ‘a young man, more stupid than noble’, while Tacitus has:
iuvenem inprovidum et facilem inanibus, ‘a short-sighted young man,
given to empty things’.86 Though a tradition which rationalized
Drusus Libo’s behaviour as that of a thoughtless young fool had
taken hold within a generation, there is sufficient evidence to show
that he was not underestimated by those who destroyed him. In the
next chapter it will be argued that the treatment of Drusus Libo
during and after the investigation was not consistent with the scorn
shown to young fools who stumble into trouble, but rather the fear
inspired by those who threaten revolution.
86 Sen. Epist. 70.10; see also Tac. Ann. 2.27.
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The Treatment of an Enemy
INABILITY TO OBTAIN DEFENCE COUNSEL
Advocacy maintained, from Republic to Principate, its moral force
within the Roman social conscience. A belief that people should be
defended regardless of the charge remained axiomatic.1 Exceptions
were rare and, usually, repudiated. Seneca denounced as impious
Drusus Libo’s abandonment:
Cum aeger a senatu in lectica relatus esset non sane frequentibus exsequis
(omnes enim necessarii deseruerant impie iam non reum sed funus) . . .
When, sick, he [Libo] had been carried away from the senate in a litter, with
few following, for by then everyone associated with him had undutifully
deserted him, now that he was no longer a defendant but a corpse.2
Seneca’s treatment is loaded with stoic conceit—Drusus Libo’s lot
should have held firm against fear. Tacitus, cynical rather than stoical,
displays more sensitivity: ‘every one refused, with different pretexts
but the same fear ( formido)’.3 Dread accompanied the senatorial
investigation, with formido carrying both shock and fear. Such fear
would emerge again for the investigation into acts of sedition by
Cn. Piso in AD 20.4
1 Pliny Ep. VI 29; Cf. Tac. Dial. 7. J. A. Crook, Legal Advocacy in the Roman World
(1995), esp. 119–45, and 172–97.
2 Sen. Ep. Mor. 70.10.4–6; Seneca, furthermore, did not understand the refusal of
Libo’s family since he did not consider Libo to be dangerous.
3 Tac. Ann. 2.29.
4 The case of C. Junius Silanus in AD 23 is a different proposition, though it was also
a case of maiestas. Silanus, governor of Asia in 22, was charged with repetundae for
saevitia and pecuniae captae by the people of Asia, Tac. Ann. 3.66.1 f. Tac. Ann. 3.67.2,
writes: Et ne quis necessariorum iuvaret periclitantem maiestatis crimina subdebantur,
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Cn. Calpurnius Piso was charged with several alleged crimes: en-
gaging in an unauthorized war with Parthia and Armenia while
administering Syria;5 inflicting capital punishment on provincials
without trial;6 the crucifixion of a Roman citizen;7 patronizing sol-
diers under his command and allowing them to call themselves
Pisoniani;8 attempting (conatus) to produce (excito) civil war;9 and
murdering Germanicus by way of poison.10 Most were interpreted
under the lex maiestatis, but the lex repetundarum, the lex Porcia, or
the lex Julia de vimight also have appeared.11 Piso asked five eminent
men to take up the challenge of defending him. Each of them
declined. Three advocates were eventually found; their participation
perhaps secured by Tiberius.12 Germanicus’ popularity, and the vio-
lent reaction of the plebs to his death, provided the five preferred
vinclum et necessitas silendi. ‘And that not a friend might help him in his danger,
charges of treason were added, a bond to guarantee silence.’ That is, that Silanus could
not procure advocates because the charges were too intimidating, R. H. Martin and
A. J. Woodman (1996), 465; cf. D. C. A. Shotter ‘The Trial of C. Junius Silanus’, CP,
67: 2 (1972), 129, with a different interpretation. Charges of treason were registered by
Mam. Aemilius Scaurus [PIR ² A–404; RE 1¹.583–4; S. Rutledge (2001), 186], Junius
Otho (PIR¹ I–788) and Bruttedius Niger [PIR² B–158; RE 3.907; S. Rutledge (2001),
204]. The precedents cited by them were cases of repetundae during the Republic, see
E. Badian, ‘Mam. Scaurus Cites Precedent’, in Studies in Greek and Roman History
(1969), 106–10. Hence Silanus was prosecuted for the same crimes by two separate
parties under two separate laws, Cic. In Piso 21.50 and Marc. Inst. 14 = Dig. 48.4.3 for
acts of repetundae pursued under the lex maiestatis. During the trial Tiberius cited, in
his mind, a parallel case: the recent (AD 13?) prosecution of L. Valerius Messala
Volesus for saevitia and probably seditio, Sen. De Ira 2.5.5; Sen. Contr. 7.6.22. Messala
Volesus, as proconsul of Asia, executed 300 people in one day, and was accused of






10 Tac. Ann. 3.12; Dio 57.18.10 = Zon. 11.2 and Xiph. 135.
11 The charge of murder should have come under the lex maiestatis, since Germa-
nicus held imperium, but Piso allegedly believed the lex Cornelia sicariis et veneficis
was appropriate, Tac. Ann. 2.79.
12 Tacitus Ann. 3.11 says only that three men, Piso’s brother, L. Calpurnius Piso,
M. Aemilius Lepidus (cos. AD 6), and Livineius Regulus (suff. AD 18) ‘came to [Piso’s]
support’. Tiberius is lauded at SCPP 20–2 however for encouraging Piso’s sons to
defend their father: . . . filiosque eius arcessitos hortatus sit, ut patris sui causam
defenderent, ita ut eum quoq(ue), qui ordinis senatori nondum esset, ob eam rem
introduci in senatum vellet et copiam utriq(ue) dicendi pro patre et pro matre ipsorum
et pro M. Pisone faceret, ‘when his [Piso’s] sons had been summoned, he encouraged
them to defend their father’s case, going so far as to be willing for even the one who
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candidates with a manifest reason for unease. The angry mob was
evidently indifferent to philosophical dogma. It was interested how-
ever in ‘justice’, i.e., Piso’s punishment.13 There was no political
advantage to be obtained by helping the perceived enemy of a Caesar.
Indeed, supporting Piso might be dangerous. Eventually, however,
men did help Piso, whereas Drusus Libo remained bereft: Libo sine
patrono introisset.14
Piso’s advocates were assured by reports that the government
‘wanted’ a fair trial. Such pronouncements were not made in the
case of Drusus Libo. His only support (aside from being escorted
into the senate by his brother Lucius and the intercession of
P. Quirinius) came from a group of women whom Tacitus describes
as being primores feminae: women from Rome’s nobility. The cameo
has attracted insufficient attention in modern scholarship:
Libo interim veste mutata cum primoribus feminis circumire domos, orare
adfinis, vocem adversum pericula poscere, abnuentibus cunctis, cum diversa
praetenderent, eadem formidine.
Libo, meanwhile, changed clothes and with women of consular rank went
round from house to house, speaking to his in-laws and asking them to speak
against [his] danger; every one refused, with different pretexts but the same
fear.15
Scribonia, Drusus Libo’s great-aunt, was probably among the pri-
mores feminae. Scribonia is said to have counselled her grand-nephew
on his decision to commit suicide: ‘What pleasure do you find in
doing another’s work?’16 Scribonia may be referring to the executioner,
was not yet of of the senatorial order to be brought into the senate for this business
and to grant each the opportunity of speaking on behalf of their father and mother
and M. Piso’. Tiberius evidently wanted Piso to have defenders, and he may well have
suggested that others might fill the void. Nothing is known of Livineius Regulus, while
fraternal loyalty would explain the appearance of L. Piso the augur, but the presence of
M. Lepidus, a member of Tiberius’ inner circle, suggests a favour for the princeps.
13 At the time of Piso’s ‘trial’ a mob allegedly assailed the doors of the senate house:
Tac. Ann. 3.14.4. Drusus had already been forced to make a public show of modera-
tion by suggesting that justice be allowed to take its course, Tac. Ann. 3.8.2.
14 Tac. Ann. 2.30.1.
15 Tac. Ann. 2.29.1. Scribonia’s identity can be inferred on account of her presence
at Drusus Libo’s house, as can Drusus Libo’s wife, since her relatives (adfines) were the
ones sought out, but we have no other evidence with which to identify other women.
16 Sen. Ep. Mor. 70.10.
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but she also means Tiberius. A commonly held belief that Tiberius
wanted the defendant destroyed would partly explain his decision
to swear an oath, the very next day, that he would have vetoed
the use of capital punishment.17 The efforts of the primores feminae
were, not surprisingly, ineffectual. No one would speak on Drusus
Libo’s behalf when the government was suspected of engineering
his destruction, especially since Tiberius was remaining silent—a
situation radically different from that which developed in AD 20.
This does not mean, however, that the domus Caesaris was united
in agreement. The efforts of the primores feminae—a public protest
by women of consular rank—were probably supported by Livia, now
Julia Augusta. Advertised by the government as the embodiment of
beneficence, Livia was treated as the de facto Mater Patriae; women
from noble houses may have sought her consent.18 The awkward beha-
viour of Drusus Libo’s brother, L. Scribonius Libo, also deserves mention.
17 It is also interesting to note that Drusus Libo was eventually prosecuted only
once the delator L. Fulcinius Trio was involved; he was apparently a close friend of
Sejanus, Dio 58.25.2. We do not know when Sejanus and Trio became friends, but
when Trio prosecuted Drusus Libo his talents were already celebrated: celebre inter
accusatores ingenium, Tac. Ann. 2.28.3. Since the delator was in Rome a public
prosecutor, the two had probably already met. If that is the case, then the prosecution
of Drusus Libo may well have been supported by important elements of the govern-
ment. This further diminishes the possibility that senior figures, i.e., Tiberius, Germa-
nicus’ close friends, Drusus, Sejanus, etc., supported the efforts of the primores
feminae.
18 On Livia and the organization of women in the political arena during the early
Principate, see N. Purcell, ‘Livia and the Womanhood of Rome’, PCPhS, 32 (1986),
78–105. Livia was credited with having saved the conspirator Cn. Cornelius L. f. Cinna
Magnus (cos. AD 5) (Drusus Libo’s maternal uncle) from having to stand trial, Dio
55.22.1; she supported the elder Julia on Rhodes, J. Linderski, ‘Julia in Regium’, ZPE,
72 (1988), 181–200, esp. 187; she provided financial assistance to the younger Julia on
Trimerus, Tac. Ann. 4.71.4. Tacitus goes on to say: quae florentis privignos cum per
occultum subvertisset, misericordiam erga adflictos palam ostentabat, ‘who, having
overcome the prosperity of her step-children by intrigue, publicly offered compassion
to her victims’. Livia also secured a pardon for Piso’s wife Plancina in AD 20, SCPP
115–20. The latter deserves further attention. The SCPP provides the best evidence
for how the government constructed Livia’s image: . . . Iuliae Aug(ustae), optume de
r(e) p(ublica) meritae non partu tantum modo principis nostri, sed etiam multis
magnisq(ue) erga cuiusq(ue) ordinis homines beneficis . . . ‘Julia Augusta, who was
most deserving of the res publica, not only because she gave birth to our princeps
but also because of her many and great kindnesses to men of every order’. Inherent in
the description is a belief that Livia was theMater Patriae, though the impression was
strictly unofficial. See A. Barrett, Livia (2002), esp. 186–214, which includes many
instances of Livia’s benefaction and philanthropy. Livia was a mother not just to
Tiberius but to society at large; a leading example to all women and a source of
comfort to all men.
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Willing to accompany his brother into the senate but unwilling to speak,
L. Libo’s behaviour was that of a man leading a lamb to slaughter.19
Fraternal obligation should have freed L. Libo from the implied prohibi-
tion affecting others, unless he knew the facts. If L. Libo knew that his
brother was guilty it would better explain his remaining silent. He could
bring himself only to accompany his brother into the senate. Drusus Libo
was alone after that. Thus two explanations for the desertion of Drusus
Libo: a belief that he was involved in something serious and a belief that
the government wanted him destroyed. A further point requires con-
sideration.
A search for advocates took place before details of the charge were
publicized.20Adfines therefore responded to a general atmosphere,
not specific knowledge of the allegations.21 The consuls called the
emergency meeting of the senate to discuss the alleged designs of a
young noble in a city alive with news that Agrippa Postumus, as-
sumed dead, was marching towards Rome:
Vulgabatur interim per Italiam servatummunere deum Agrippam, credebatur
Romae; iamque Ostiam invectum multitudo ingens, iam in urbe clandestini
coetus celebrabant, cum Tiberium anceps cura distrahere, vine militum servum
suum coerceret an inanem credulitatem tempore ipso vanescere sineret.
It was meanwhile rumoured throughout Italy that Agrippa had been saved
by heaven, at Rome it was believed; already huge crowds greeted him at
Ostia, already secret meetings were held in the city, while the attention of
Tiberius was distracted with conflicting concerns: should he put down his
own slave by military means or allow idle credulity to vanish over time.22
The government would not have used the phrase Agrippa munere
deum servatus.23 It is probably an authentic record of rebel
19 Not explicit but implicit.
20 The indictments were read to the senate by Tiberius on the first day of the
investigation, Tac. Ann. 2.29.2.
21 Though it cannot be discounted that some were actually complicit and thus
knew too much.
22 Tac. Ann. 2.40.1 and Dio 57.16.3 place the affair after the trial of Drusus Libo, at
the end of AD 16. Since Suet. Tib. 25 treats this period thematically, his ordering of
events is not applicable. If the affair was brought to a close at the end of AD 16,
Clemens and his band of followers must have been traversing Italy while Drusus Libo
was being prosecuted. They would have needed at least six months to march through
northern Italy to Gaul and then back down the west coast of Italy to Rome, all the
while recruiting men.
23 Cf. J. Bellemore, ‘The Death of Agrippa Postumus and escape of Clemens’,
Eranos, 98 (2000), 93–114.
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propaganda.24 Claiming divine support is a common instrument of
persuasion and speaks directly to the true believer, an important
element in any mass movement bent on causing revolution. It also
attempts to persuade those who, being often bored, down on their
luck, or fatalistic, are attracted to new movements offering change.
The sources agree that the message had an effect:
Eodem anno mancipii unius audacia, ni mature subventum foret, discordiis
armisque civilibus rem publicam perculisset.
In the same year the audacity of a single slave, but for prompt measures,
would have struck down the res publica with discord and civil war.25
Dio writes:
. . .ŒÆd K
 	c ˆÆºÆ	Æ KºŁg ººf
 b K	ÆFŁÆ ººf
 b ŒÆd K 	fi B
’	ÆºÆfi o	æ æØÆ	, ŒÆd 	º
 ŒÆd Kd 	c  Å uæÅ ‰
 ŒÆd
	c ÆfiÆ ÆæåÆ IºÅł
. ÆæÆ		ø 	 s Kd 		øfi 	H
K 	fiH ¼	Ø, ŒÆd ıåH ÆP	fiH æ	ØŁø . . .
And having gone to Gaul, he won many to his cause there and many later in
Italy, and finally he set out for Rome as one intending to win back his
grandfather’s domain. And so with those in the city having been excited at
this and with considerable numbers having joined themselves to him . . .26
Suetonius states
Nam et servus Agrippae Clemens nomine non contemnendam manum in
ultionem domini compararet . . .
For a slave of Agrippa, Clemens by name, had organised a not contemptible
force to avenge his master . . .27
The force that assembled between Ostia and Rome cannot have been
in the hundreds, but instead numbered in the thousands. For con-
temporaries to use the language of civil war, Clemens must have
marched with a large group of men and enjoyed the support of
many more throughout Italy and Rome. A few hundred would have
been easily defeated by the 4,500 praetorians and 1,500 urban cohorts
alone.28 This provides an appropriate context in which to explain the
24 A source like Servilius Nonianus might have included things he had heard being
said in Rome, or, the idea may have survived in anonymous political pamphlets. The
latter were particularly common in Rome.
25 Tac. Ann. 2.39.1. 26 Dio 57.16.3. 27 Suet. Tib. 25.1.
28 W. Nippel, Public Order in Ancient Rome (1995), 90 f.
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behaviour of Drusus Libo’s relatives and friends.29 Concerning the
Clemens affair, Tacitus states:
Et quamquam multi e domo principis equitesque ac senatores sustentasse
opibus, iuvisse consiliis dicerentur, haud quaesitum.
Though many from the imperial house, equestrians and senators were said to
have supported [Clemens] with money and assisted with their advice, there
was no public inquiry.30
The imperfect passive of dico indicates a contemporary idea, not a
Tacitean construction. In AD 16 people were saying that important
individuals were supporting Agrippa. Such an opinion would surely
have affected the atmosphere surrounding Drusus Libo’s pending
investigation for acts that concerned the safety of the government; an
effect enhanced by the perceived cold silence of Tiberius. Unfortu-
nately for Drusus Libo, few are ever willing to go down with a
sinking ship.
DRUSUS LIBO IN CUSTODIA
Once a decision was made to sell Drusus Libo’s slaves to the treasury,
an adjournment was allowed and the defendant proceeded home,
where he was met by soldiers in and around his house:
Cingebatur interim milite domus, strepebant etiam in vestibulo ut audiri, ut
aspici possent.
Meanwhile the house was being surrounded by soldiers, and they were even
making a noise in the entrance so that they could be heard and seen.31
Custodia prevented voluntary exile. Provided a defendant did not
present a threat to the res publica, it was in the interests of the
29 The scene is reminiscent of the behaviour of Catiline’s friends as he entered the
senate on 8 Nov. 63 BC. Cicero (ln Cat.1.16) apparently said to Catiline: ‘A short time
ago you entered the senate. Who from that crowd, from all your many friends and
intimates greeted you? If no one else has received such treatment within thememory of
man, are you waiting for condemnation to be voiced aloud, although you have been
convicted by the hostile verdict of their silence?What of the fact that at your arrival the
seats near you emptied, that the moment you sat down all the ex-consuls whom you
had repeatedly marked out for death left the seats around you bare and empty . . . ?’
30 Tac. Ann. 2.40.3. 31 Tac. Ann. 2.31.1.
The Treatment of an Enemy 35
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any 
way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
government and the prosecution that the defendant be allowed to quit
Italy. The State would secure a conviction and the prosecution their
compensation. But if the defendant was suspected of planning vio-
lence contra rem publicam, voluntary exile was untenable. Dignitas
might sometimes demand that suspects be placed in the somewhat
paradoxical ‘free custody’ (libera custodia), but either way, serious
malcontents were usually held against their will.32
On 4 December 63 BC the senate decided that P. Cornelius Lentulus
Sura, M. Cornelius Cethegus, L. Statilius, and M. Caeparius had
attempted to conspire with the Allobroges against Rome, and decreed
that they ought to be kept in libera custodia.33 Cicero further alleged
that they were acting in concert with Catiline, who, it was established,
had gathered an army in northern Italy for the purpose of command-
ing violence (vis) against the State. Cato, in Sallust’s version of his
speech before the senate, put the motion that the nefarious plans of
the wicked citizens placed the res publica in the greatest danger, and
since they had planned caedes, incendia and other crudelia facinora
against the State, they should be put to death, to which Sallust adds
that a senatus consultum was passed ‘in terms of Cato’s resolution’.34
It should be noted that these men were not ‘enemies of the Roman
People’ (hostes populi Romani) but ‘wicked citizens’ (scelesti cives), in
contradistinction to Catiline and Manlius, who were in arms against
the State. The arrested conspirators were nevertheless executed.35
32 Only four explicit examples of libera custodia are recorded before the case of
Drusus Libo: the custody of Dassius Altinius in 213 BC, Livy 24.45.8; the Bacchanalian
priests in 186 BC, Livy 39.19; King Perses of Macedonia in 168 BC, Vell.1.11; and the
arrested leaders of the Catilinarian conspiracy in 63 BC, Sall. Bell. Cat. 47. P. Garnsey
(1970), 148 n. 3 includes the imprisonment of Jugurtha after his defeat by Marius, but
Plut. Mar. 12 suggests actual incarceration, not libera custodia, and Livy Per. 67
actually uses in carcere.
33 Sall. Bell. Cat. 47: . . . itaque Lentulus P. Lentulo Spintheri, qui tum aedilis erat,
Cethegus Q. Cornificio, Statilius C. Caesari, Gabinius M. Crasso, Caeparius nam is
paulo ante ex fuga retractus erat Cn. Terentio senatori traduntur. ‘Lentulus was
therefore handed over to P. Lentulus Spinther, who was then aedile, Cathegus to Q.
Cornificius, Statilius to C. Caesar, Gabinius to M. Crassus, Caeparius, who, having
fled, was recently caught and brought back, was given to the senator Cn. Terentius.’
Cic. In Cat. 3.14; Plut. Cic. 19.
34 Sall. Bell. Cat. 53.
35 Cicero’s use of the term hostes in his fourth Catilinarian of 60 BC (e. g. In Cat.
4.15) was not original, but an apologetic attempt to legitimize his execution of the
conspirators. This is clear from the reaction to the proposal to execute them by Caesar
in 63 BC—evident by the phrasing of Cato’s sententia.
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Lentulus Sura allegedly sought the assistance of various gangs, with
apparent success. The conspirators were thus in alliance with a large
armed force, with whom, it was feared, they would organize riots.
Keeping the conspirators away from their supporters was therefore
crucial.36 I believe that a similar fear inspired senators to order the
urban, or praetorian, prefect to assemble soldiers in and round
Drusus Libo’s house. The conspiracy of Clemens, with the belief
that he possessed noble allies in Rome, again holds the key. Tacitus
writes of secret meetings taking place in Rome, while Dio writes of
many ‘in the city’ joining Clemens’ cause.37 Conspiracies, by defini-
tion, take time to plan; secret meetings must have occurred before
Drusus Libo was indicted. As such, the decision to use armed soldiers
rather than entrust Drusus Libo to one of the senior magistrates is
suggestive. The government suspected that Drusus Libo was part of a
larger conspiracy which might involve still other highly placed nobiles
and took adequate precaution. The presence of soldiers reinforced the
belief that Tiberius supported the defendant’s prosecution.38
DAMNATIO MEMORIAE AND PUBLIC
OFFERINGS OF THANKS
Drusus Libo’s death did not bring the investigation to an end.39 This
phenomenon would later occur only when the defendant was charged
with sedition. During Tiberius’ Principate, however, it was not a fixed
rule in law.40 This is best evidenced by the treatment of Drusus Libo:
36 Indeed, Sallust writes that in response to the senate’s decree, Lentulus Sura’s
freedmen and some associates communicated with the gang leaders to help free their
patron. Cicero, informed of this, summoned the senate to discuss the future of the
prisoners, Sall. Bell. Cat. 50.
37 Tac. Ann. 2.40.1; Dio 57.16.4.
38 As was the case with Piso, Tac. Ann. 3.14.4–5.
39 E. Volaterra, RSDI (1933), 393–416, argues that suicide proved guilt, basing his
opinion on Dig. 48.21.3 pr.; also M. Griffin (1997), 260–3. But Tacitus’ own words
imply that the prosecution had work still to do, i.e., Drusus Libo was not yet guilty.
Having narrated the death of Drusus Libo, Tacitus writes at Ann. 2.31.3: Accusatio
tamen apud patres adseveratione eadem peracta . . .
40 For the belief that post-mortem prosecution is to be identified with sedition, see
comments allegedly made by Marcus Aurelius in the case of Avidius Cassius, Cod.
Just. 9.8.6pr; Ulpian Disp. 8 = Dig. 48.4.11. R. S. Rogers, ‘Treason in the Early Empire’,
JRS, 49 (1959), 90–4, is of the view that post-mortem prosecutions were always a guide
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the State took no part of his confiscated estate.41 The estate, never-
theless, was entirely broken up and shared by his accusers.42 At this
point, Tiberius swore an oath that he would have vetoed a penalty of
death: the death penalty was obviously well supported. Finally, pro-
positions to restrict the Scribonii’s ability to memorialize Drusus Libo
were decreed, public acts of thanks were offered to Jupiter, Mars, and
Concord, and 13 September was declared a holiday.43 I shall deal first
with the decision to control the public memory of Drusus Libo.
The practice of damnatio memoriae occurred in the early and
middle Republic, when the responsibility of sanctions resided in the
familial potestas of the pater familias.44 In the late Republic, however,
the State encroached on this ancient privilege.45 By the time of Drusus
Libo’s conviction, precedent existed to justify punitive measures
against the family as a whole. The first of these measures indicates
that he was considered by a majority of senators to have intended
actual harm against the State.
M. Aurelius Cotta Maximus Messalinus (cos. AD 20) was close to
the domus Caesaris.46 He was with Ovid in AD 8 when news arrived of
the poet’s banishment and afterwards provided material and
to the severity of a charge. I believe he is wrong. Though the jurist Macer applies the
procedure to cases of maiestas while commenting on the senatus consultum Turpil-
lianum of AD 61 (Dig. 48.16.15.3), it should be remembered that he lived after Marcus
Aurelius, so that his comments probably constitute a reassessment of the S. C.
Turpillianum in light of Marcus Aurelius’ innovation. For evidence that post-mortem
prosecution in cases of sedition was not a fixed rule in law in the early Principate, see
esp. the case against Cremutius Cordus in AD 25, Con. ad Marc. 22. Seneca tells us that
‘the big issue in court was whether accused persons lost their legal right to die’.
Obviously there was no extant ruling. Seneca then writes: dum deliberatur, dum
accusatores iterum adeunt, ille se absolverat, ‘while the matter was being debated,
while the accusors were arguiing their case a second time, he gained his acquital [by
suicide].’ A second plea by the prosecution shows that a legal consensus was proving
impossible to establish. The senate finally clarified the situation in law - presumably
good enough for the praetor - by ruling in favour of the heirs, Tac. Ann. 4.30.
41 Tac. Ann. 2.32.1. C. W. Chilton (1955), 70, claims that ‘When Libo Drusus
committed suicide in 16 his property was not confiscated but divided amongst his
accusers’. Libo’s family might not have agreed. Payment of the delatores out of Libo’s
estate surely represents the annulment of his testament.
42 F. R. D Goodyear (1981), 280; cf. R. A. Bauman, (1974), 60 n. 46.
43 Tac. Ann. 2.32.1 f.
44 H. Flower, Ancestor Masks and Aristocratic Power in Roman Culture (1996);
J. Bodel, ‘Punishing Piso’, AJP, 120 (1999), 43–57.
45 Cf. H. Flower (1996), 104.
46 On his nomenclature and various questions surrounding his identity, see
R. Syme (1986), 235 f.
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psychological support to the ‘exile’.47 Friendship with Augustus none
the less remained intact. Ovid believed (as late as AD 11) that Cotta
Messalinus could successfully intercede with the princeps.48 Until at
least AD 32 he remained close to Tiberius.49 His proposal concerning
Drusus Libo is thus politically significant: that the image of Drusus
Libo should not be carried in the funeral procession of any of
his descendants.50 Cotta Messalinus probably anticipated Tiberius’
approval - a prominent noble allied to the government would not
knowingly exasperate the princeps. The history of this particular
punishment shows that Cotta Messalinus held Drusus Libo to be an
enemy of the Roman people (hostes populi Romani).
C. Julius Caesar, in 69 BC, displayed Marius’ imago at the funeral of
his aunt Julia. Plutarch writes that among the spectators: ‘there were
some who shouted that this was the revival of honours which by laws
and decrees had been properly put to rest’.51 Flower and Bodel have
nevertheless taken the view that no sovereign body had ruled against
such action, since Caesar had come to no harm.52 But aside from the
fact that Plutarch mentions explicitly ‘laws and decrees’, that Caesar
was not arraigned for his audacity is evidence only that the senate was
unwilling to supply a judgment (praeiudicium).53 It would probably
have been difficult to find a jury to convict him. Sulla, having declared
Marius a hostis, seems to have sought prohibitions against his mem-
ory from both the senate and comitia.54 The treatment of Brutus and
Cassius is also relevant. Tacitus writes that at the funeral of Junia in
AD 22 the imagines of Brutus and Cassius were the more conspicuous
by their absence.55 The lex Pedia of 43 BC allowed for men to be
47 Tristia 5.9; Ex. Pont. 1.9.25–30; 2.8. The last may imply financial assistance.
48 Ovid Ex. Pont. 1.9.24–30.
49 Tac. Ann. 6.5.
50 Ibid., 2.32.1.
51 Plut. Caes. 5, 6.
52 H. Flower (1996), 58, n. 128, though at 103, n. 68 she states that Sulla had
banned Marius’ imago, and offers no further comment on what this meant; J. Bodel
(1999), 47–8: ‘On what authority the portrait of Marius was banned from funeral
processions in the time of Sulla we do not know, but it must have been a private affair,
for when Caesar reintroduced the imago at the funeral of his aunt Julia in 69 B.C., he
contravened no law and suffered no penalty.’
53 Plut. Caes. 6.
54 Owing to the impotence of the concilium plebis under Sulla, it seems doubtful to
me that ‘law’ could refer to a plebiscite. In 88 Sulla required the senate to outlaw
Marius, App. BC. 1.60; Val. Max. 3.8.5. Plut. Sulla 10.
55 Tac. Ann. 3.76; also Pliny Epist. 1.17.3.
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convicted in absentia for either vis or maiestas, denying the convict
Roman citizenship.56 It probably provided for the treatment of their
imagines also. Augustus is said to have favoured L.Sestius, who: ‘had
always been an enthusiastic follower of Brutus, had fought with him
in all his wars, and even at this time kept his memory alive, preserved
images of him, and delivered eulogies of him’.57 Piety towards the
shade of Brutus does not preclude sanctions. The lex Pedia may have
prohibited only public display, or Octavian may simply have been
exhibiting an extreme tolerance, in the same way that he ‘tolerated’
the history of Cremutius Cordus, who wrote that Cassius was the
‘last Roman’.58 Certainly not every opportunity to prosecute dissent
was taken. A degree of moderatio and clementia by Augustus was
necessary after the violent display of power during the thirties BC and
the reconciliatory government which followed. With these cases - the
rebellions of Marius, Brutus, and Cassius - Cotta Messalinus compared
the conspiracy of Drusus Libo. That he believed Tiberius would agree
with the comparison is more important than whether or not his
belief was correct. The second instance of damnatio memoriae against
Drusus Libo evidences a more complex situation.
The second opinion: ‘that no Scribonii should take the cognomen
Drusus’ was that of Cn. Cornelius Lentulus the Augur (cos. 14 BC).
Owing to his age (in his late sixties or early seventies in AD 16), Lentulus
was probably closer to Tiberius than was the much younger Cotta
Messalinus. Tacitus describes him as a ‘very close friend’ (intimus
amicus).59 When mutiny among the Pannonian legions was reported
in Rome in September AD 14, Lentulus was asked to accompany the
younger Drusus.60 Singled out by the troops for having the most
influence over the young prince, hewas assaulted—with rocks—accord-
ingly (despite the presence of L. Aelius Sejanus).61 As with Cotta
Messalinus, Lentulus should be viewed as having anticipated Tiberius’
approval with regard to the proposal. Prohibiting a family the use of
a nomen always concerned the praenomen; the case of Drusus Libo is
the only instance attested in which a cognomen is involved.62 That the
56 Vell. 2.69.5. 57 Dio 53.32.4, dated 23 BC. 58 Tac. Ann. 4.34.
59 Tac. Ann. 4.29.1; also Dio 57.24.8. 60 Tac. Ann. 1.27.
61 Ibid.; for Sejanus, Ann. 1.24.
62 It must be pointed out that instances of this phenomenon are rare, as noticed by
the editors of L’année épigraphique (1995) 54 adn: ‘Mais ce phénomène est rare et de
telles interdictions n’ont jamais eu un caractère systématique.’ The first recorded
instance is the case of M. Manlius Capitolinus (cos. 392 BC), in which the family
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cognomen was ‘Drusus’ signals a motivating force more complex than
justice; it signals aristocratic politics.
The name Q. Caecilius Drusus Libo survives only on a single
inscription found in the middle of the twentieth century:
M SCRIBONIVS STORAX
Q CAECILI DRVSI LIBONIS
PAEDAGOGVS
TVLLIA CLEOPATRA CONIVGI SVO FEC
M. Scribonius Storax, governor of Q. Caecilius Drusus Libo, put this up for
his wife, Tullia Cleopatra.63
Comprehending the boy’s nomenclature has proved difficult, but the
answer lies within the text.64 It is logical to suppose that the paeda-
gogus was a freedman and that his former master was a certain
M. Scribonius. We know of only one M. Scribonius. Now, if the
paedagogus was a freedman of the boy’s natural father, then the boy
would have been born M. Scribonius Drusus Libo. Adoption by a
Q. Caecilius would therefore produce Q. Caecilius Scribonianus: it
is not a great leap to Q. Caecilius Drusus Libo. Moreover, since
adoption occurred while the boy was still young, a ‘favourite teacher’
might reasonably have remained on duty.
The existence of Q. Caecilius Drusus Libo shows that Lentulus’
proposal was enforced, and that the Scribonii responded accordingly.
Prohibiting the cognomen ‘Drusus’ indicates a political context.
Lentulus wished to deny a noble family use of a name associated
council ruled that no Manlius was ever to assume the name ‘Marcus’, Livy 6.20.14;
Cic. Phil. 1.32 (with emendations by Shackleton Bailey) and Quint. 3.7.20. The next
regards a decision by the Claudii to stop using the praenomen ‘Lucius’ because it had
become sullied by its association with murder and robbery, Suet. Tib. 1. The final
instance is a senatus consultum of 30 BC prohibiting the Antonii from using the
praenomen ‘Marcus’, Dio 51.19.3; Plut. Cic. 49. The Antonii responded with Iullus
Antonius, a praenomen claimed through Antony’s mother, Iulia; a clever irony.
63 AE (1964), 82.
64 J. Scheid, ‘Scribonia Caesaris et les Julio-Claudians. Problèmes de vocabulaire de
parente’, MEFR, 87 (1975), 349–75. Scheid makes him the natural son of a Scribonia,
assumed to be the sister of M. Scribonius Drusus Libo. She thus married a Caecilius,
but that fails to explain the cognomenDrusus in the boy’s nomenclature; E. J. Weinrib,
‘The Family Connections of M. Livius Drusus Libo’, HSCP, 72 (1968), 247–78.
R. Syme (1986), 260, proposed that the boy was born a Caecilius and was adopted
by a Scribonius.
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with supreme power. Drusus Libo, by implication, must have stressed
this aspect of his personality. To Lentulus at least, Drusus Libo had
been attempting to establish himself as a viable substitute or alter-
native to the reigning Claudian dynasty. I have argued in Appendix 1
that the cognomen was not appropriated but inherited from his uncle
on the condition that he take his uncle’s name (condicio nominis
ferendi). The difference is important. Condicio nominis ferendi pro-
vided the heir with the testator’s collection of imagines. On entering
Drusus Libo’s atrium, one would have been confronted by the images
of Claudians, Scribonians, and Pompeians. Lentulus—and I think
Tiberius—perceived in the Scribonii an ambition in direct conflict
with the Claudian monopoly (perhaps then another item to explain
the behaviour of L. Libo). But the child’s adoption shows that con-
solidation of Claudian ‘assets’ was less important than arresting an
immediate Scribonian threat.
Only one Q. Caecilius of sufficient significance is attested for this
period, Q.Caecilius Metellus Creticus Silanus (cos. AD 7), and epi-
graphic evidence connects him to the Scribonii.65 Tacitus believed
that he was perhaps too close to Germanicus, inferred in part from
65 ILS 9433: Q. CAECILIUS CAECILIAE CRASSI L. HILARUS MEDIC CAECILIA
DUARUM SCRIBONIARUM L. ELEUTHERIS EX PARTEM DIMIDIAE SIBI E SUI
‘Q. Caecilius Hilarus, libertus of Caecilia (wife of) Crassus, physician; Caecilia
Eleutheris, liberta of two Scribonian women, part (of his tomb) for themselves and
for their own (i.e. family).” Caecilia Crassi = Caecilia Metella, daughter of Q. Caecilius
Metellus Creticus (cos. 69). Her husband was M. Crassus, eldest son of the triumvir
M. Licinius Crassus (cos. 70). R. Syme (1986) stemma XVIII, has shown that Caecilia
Metella was a great aunt to Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus Silanus. Caecilia Eleutheris
poses a problem. Why she is not Scribonia Eleutheris is unclear. The answer must lie
with rules governing informal manumission: manumissio inter amicos and manumis-
sio iusta ac legitima. Pliny Epist. 7.16 is apposite. See S. Treggiari, Freedmen During the
Late Roman Republic, Oxford (1969), 20–36. Legal curiosities aside, the freedwoman
stands as testimony to a connection between the Caecilii and Scribonii Libones during
the late Republic. Q. Caecilius Drusus Libo evidences the continuation of close ties.
On this inscription, see H. Dessau, ILS, III (1916), addenda 9433: Quomodo liberta
earum Caecilia appellari potuerit incertum; H. Gummerus, Der Arztestand im ro-
mishen Reiche, I, Societas Scientiarum Fennica, Commentationes Humanarum Litter-
arum, III, 6 (1932), 47, no. 163; H. Bloch, ‘The Funerary Inscription of the Physician
of Caecilia Crassi in the Fogg Art Museum’,HSCP, 86 (1982), 141–50; R. Syme (1986),
260, 275. Syme was cautious about the duae Scriboniae: ‘Not necessarily Scribonia
Caesaris and a daughter of old Libo, as suggested by H. Bloch.’ There is, however, no
evidence connecting the Scribonii Curiones with the Caecilii, and the existence of Q.
Caecilius Drusus Libo surely limits our search to within the walls of the domus
Scribonii Libonis. Scribonia Caesaris and her niece are the most obvious candidates
within that house.
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Tiberius’ decision to replace him as governor of Syria with Cn.Piso in
AD 17, but mostly from the fact that a daughter was for a time
betrothed to Germanicus’ eldest son, Nero.66 His parentage is un-
known, but his eventual rank implies close affinity with the Junii
Silani, who profited under Augustus and Tiberius.67 Intimately con-
nected with Tiberius’ dynastic plans, Creticus Silanus stood near the
centre of the aristocracy.68 A formal ceremony cannot have occurred
until Creticus Silanus returned to Rome from Syria, i.e., towards the
end of AD 17. A reconstruction is helpful. Immediately following the
senatus consultum de M. Libone (?) the cognomen Drusus was prob-
ably dropped from the young boy’s nomenclature. The situation
persisted until Creticus Silanus had returned from Syria and a formal
adoption then altered the boy’s agnatic status. No longer a Scribonius,
the boy could again use the cognomen Drusus; a privilege that
adoption did not preclude. But would the adoption have been orga-
nized without the regime’s approval? Based on what we know of
Creticus Silanus, the answer must be no.
The adoption probably had both political and financial dimen-
sions. Drusus Libo’s entire property was confiscated, leaving his
young son nothing to inherit. One year after the affair, when cooler
heads prevailed (instigated perhaps by Germanicus’ return), it may
have been thought decent to ensure that an innocent child of excellent
family did not suffer, financially or politically, on account of his
father’s behaviour.69 If the reconstruction is correct, it would suggest
that Lentulus’ aim was particular; establishing a Claudian monopoly
of the cognomen Drusus was not his intention. Lentulus planned
instead to check immediately a destructive ambition perceived within
the Scribonii. Once the threat had dissolved the child was allowed to
move on, carrying his heritage with him.
Following declarations of damnatio memoriae the senate decreed
votive offerings to Jupiter, Mars, and Concord, the last of which is
66 Tac. Ann. 2.43. 67 R. Syme (1986), 98.
68 For the possible connections between Drusus Libo and the Caecilii, see Appen-
dix 2.
69 Indeed, the adoption may simply have been one of convenience, with little actual
involvement in the child’s life by Creticus Silanus. It is interesting to note that the
child kept a Scribonian paedagogus and that the inscription bearing his name was
found in the Scribonian columbarium. Either way, the government’s position vis-à-vis
the boy may have informed the more generous approach to Cn. Piso’s children in AD
20, to whom the senate decreed their father’s property, SCPP 93–100.
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pregnant with the image of a fractured society.70 Concord had always
functioned as discord appeased; perhaps used most famously by
L. Opimius after suppressing the Gracchans and later Cicero in the
Catilinarian affair. She signalled the end of schism and the restoration
of unity. Her presence in the affair of Drusus Libo is therefore
suggestive. If Drusus Libo acted alone, then votive offerings to Con-
cord were unnecessary. Indeed, Concord’s appearance requires more
than a few accomplices; L. Pituanius and P. Marcius would not by
themselves merit her attention. Concord expresses instead a more
profound suspicion: Drusus Libo shared the hopes of many. We must
again return to the contemporary belief that many from the imperial
house, equestrians, and senators were helping the pseudo-Agrippa.71
That the goddess was not honoured after the Clemens affair is due
perhaps only to the absence of a senatorial inquiry, but that does not
preclude the possibility of the Clemens affair inspiring her summons
vis-à-vis Drusus Libo. If Drusus Libo was suspected of attending
‘secret meetings in the city’ (clandestini coetus in urbe), then Concord
would have been quite appropriate. Moreover, an explicit statement
linking the two items would not have been required. Suspicion could
be left to inference. Indeed, I do not propose that Drusus Libo was
alleged to have participated in the Clemens affair, but that he was
treated as if he had.
As I have so far shown, Drusus Libo was considered dangerous. He
was charged with planning sedition under the lex maiestatis and
treated appropriately. The case against him seemed, on the face of
it, weak, but there was none the less strong suspicion, perhaps knowl-
edge even, that he was guilty. The government certainly perceived
destructive ambition and, despite Tiberius’ show of reticence, desired
the defendant’s downfall. Indeed, Lentulus’ proposal exhibits political
realism. The affair cannot be explained as an attempt by delatores to
bag a ‘big fish’. But it is impossible to explain this conclusion if our
interpretation is limited to facts about the case; an irony which has
70 Tac. Ann. 2.32: Supplicationum dies Pomponii Flacci sententia constituti, dona
Iovi, Marti, Concordiae, utque iduum Septembrium dies, quo se Libo interfecerat, dies
festus haberetur, L. P*** et Gallus Asinius et Papius Mutilus et L. Apronius decrevere,
‘Days of public thanks were constituted on the advice of Pomponius Flaccus, offerings
were given to Jupiter, Mars, and Concord, and 13 Sept., on which day Libo had
committed suicide, was made a public holiday on the motion of L. P[ . . . ], Gallus
Asinius, Papius Mutilus and L. Apronius.’
71 Tac. Ann. 2.40.
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hitherto caused dismissive analyses by most modern scholars. I have
so far argued that the Clemens affair provides the solution. Clemens’
conspiracy, active in Rome during the affair of Drusus Libo, provides
positive explanations: an emergency sitting of the senate; unattained
advocacy; praetorians in and round the defendant’s house; damnatio
memoriae; the execution of Drusus Libo’s accomplices; Concord’s
appearance; and the marking of a holiday. There was, of course, no
direct evidence linking Drusus Libo with Clemens, but that is no bar.
Suspected, or indeed known, collusion would affect senators just as
much. Still, a satisfactory theory must cohere with a broader historical
model. Does the correlation make historical sense? Does it produce
less contradiction or more? These questions cannot be solved by the
approach taken so far, but require now an investigation of political
activity on a larger scale. We have arrived at the question of connect-
ing Drusus Libo with the supporters of the Pseudo-Agrippa. To
answer it, we must consider the history of Agrippa Postumus and
his supporters.
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3
The Adoption of Agrippa Postumus
and the Friends of Gaius Caesar
THE ADOPTION OF AGRIPPA
Marcus Agrippa Postumus was adopted by Augustus on 26 June AD 4.
On this same day Augustus adopted Tiberius Claudius Nero as well.
A lex curiata ratified the arrangements and equipped both with the
filiation Augusti f. Similarities end here.1 While Agrippa could yet
impress with his new name, Tiberius was also given tribunicia potes-
tas for a period of ten years and imperium for battle in Germany.2
Tiberius, moreover, was adopted for the sake of the Republic (rei
publicae causa). Tiberius was to be Augustus’ successor.3 There were
caveats, however. Tiberius was made to adopt Germanicus,4 who in
turn married Augustus’ granddaughter Agrippina.5 The recall of
Tiberius’ ex-wife and Augustus’ daughter from the island of Panda-
teria may also have been discussed at this time. In his study of Julia,
daughter of Augustus, Linderski shows that Suetonius’ statement
about her recall is ambiguous:
1 Vell. 2.104.1; Suet. Aug. 65.
2 Vell. 2.103; Dio 55.13.1a = Zon. 10.36; Suet. Tib. 16.1.
3 Vell. 2.104.1. R. Seager (1972), 31; J. H. Corbett, ‘The Succession Policy of
Augustus’, Latomus, 33 (1974), 87–97, esp. 92f.; B. Levick (1999), 49 f.; R. A. Bauman
(1992), 104 believes that the official rider gave ‘the dynastic arrangement a constitu-
tional force that they had not had before’.
4 Suet. Tib. 15.3; Dio 55.13.1a = Zon. 10.36.
5 Suet. Aug. 64.1; R. Syme (1986), 94, n. 6. Following PIR² J 221, R. A. Birch, ‘The
Correspondence of Augustus: Some Notes on Suetonius, Tiberius 21.4–7’, CQ, 31:.1
(1981), 155–61 and ‘The Settlement of 26 June A.D. 4 and its Aftermath’, CQ, 31:.2
(1981), 443–56, esp. 449, places the marriage of Germanicus and Agrippina in the
spring of AD 5, though he argues that the arrangements belong in AD 4. But as R. Syme
(1986), 94 n. 6, points out: ‘there is no cause for delaying the marriage . . . ’.
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Post quinquennium demum ex insula in continentem lenioribusque paulo
condicionibus transtulit eam.
‘It was not until five years later that he moved her from the island to the
mainland and treated her with less rigueur.’6
Though we can include 2 BC in the quinquennium, registering Julia’s
transfer to AD 3, the Latin also allows us to exclude 2 BC, which would
place Julia’s transfer to Rhegium in AD 4. The softening of Julia’s
conditions may well have been part of the negotiations leading up to
26 June.
Dio and Suetonius cite enthusiastic calls for her full restoration by
the people in the year of her instalment at Rhegium.7 Highly placed
individuals probably were in support of, or encouraged even, the
popular protest. Possibilities include the younger Julia, L. Aemilius
Paullus (cos. AD 1), M. Aemilius Lepidus (cos. AD 6), and L. Scribonius
Libo (cos. AD 16). Age probably excludes Libo, while Aemilius Lepi-
dus’ friendship with Tiberius makes advocacy of Julia unlikely.
L. Aemilius Paullus, Lepidus’ brother, is our best candidate. That he
was chosen to share the consulship with Gaius Caesar evidences the
necessary influence. That his wife was Julia’s eldest daughter shows he
had the motive. The manner of his eventual demise is the best
evidence, however: he was condemned for treason.8 I propose that
L. Aemilius Paullus, either at the request of his wife or in collabora-
tion with her, helped to incite a popular demonstration in support of
his mother-in-law’s full restoration. Dio gives Augustus’ reaction: ‘fire
should sooner mix with water than she should be restored’ but then
adds ‘yet later the people brought such pressure to bear that she was at
least brought from the island to the mainland’.9 If public pressure was
maintained it would provide L. Aemilius Paullus with a legitimate
opportunity to offer Augustus a suggestion, such as ‘perhaps a partial
compromise to placate the people while not damaging your position’.
It would not be given in private, but in a forum like the consilium
principis or the family council. As the younger Julia’s husband, it
would be difficult for him to pretend indifference, but the suggestion
would not be enough to concern the princeps. Indeed, Augustus
6 Suet. Aug. 65.3, J. Linderski (1988), 181–200; Dio 55.13.1 is similarly vague.
7 Dio 55.13.1. = Xiph. 103, 19–28; Suet. Aug. 65.3.
8 Suet. Aug. 19; Scholia in Iuvenalem Vetustoria 6.158.1–2 ed. by P. Wessner
(1967).
9 Suet. Aug. 65.3.
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would have been well aware of Aemilius Paullus’ personal situation.
We can also postulate the inspiration behind the popular protest
in support of the elder Julia: it was said that Tiberius was to become
heir. Scholars have wanted to add another caveat: Agrippa’s
adoption.10
It is clear from the evidence that Tiberius was to succeed Augustus.
Agrippa was only 15, Germanicus was 18, and the younger Drusus 17.
In contrast, Tiberius was almost 46.11 It is true that Gaius and Lucius
were 14 when marked for succession, but at that time Augustus
enjoyed relatively good health, or else the appearance of it. Since
then almost a decade had passed and Augustus probably felt that
too little time remained for appropriate training.12 Tiberius had been
consul twice and had been invested with tribunicia potestas for a
period of five years shortly before his withdrawal to Rhodes; he was
an experienced general and his mother was the indefatigable Livia.
Augustus therefore adopted Tiberius because he was the most likely
candidate.13 Why then did Augustus adopt Agrippa?
Agrippa had not yet received the toga virilis.14 His only superior
qualification was genetic: Augustus’ blood coursed through his
veins.15 With Gaius and Lucius dead, the younger Julia married to
her cousin L. Aemilius Paullus, and Agrippina destined to marry
Germanicus, Agrippa appeared to be in limbo. He was not old enough
to enter public life, his mother was exiled, and his father was dead. It
has therefore been argued that the adoption exhibits Augustus’ senti-
mentality.16 This may in part be true, but ignores an obvious objec-
tion: why did Tiberius not adopt Agrippa instead? It would have
10 B. Levick, ‘The Fall of Julia the Younger’, Latomus (1976), 301–39; R. A. Birch
(1981), 446 f.
11 Tiberius was born 16 Nov. 42 BC; Germanicus was born in 15 BC; Drusus was
born in 14 BC, and Agrippa in 12 BC.
12 One of the reasons Tiberius gave for his desire to quit Rome in 6 BC was the
ascendancy of Gaius and Lucius, Suet. Tib. 11.5.
13 Vell. 2.104.1–2.
14 That occurred in AD 5, Dio 55.24.4.
15 J. H. Corbett (1974), passim, argues that blood connection was not considered
better than adoptive relations, cf. Tacitus’ reaction to the theory that Augustus had
Agrippa put to death, Tac. Ann. 1.6: ceterum in nullius umquam suorum necem
duravit, neque mortem nepoti pro securitate privigni inlatam credibile erat. ‘But he
never became so callous that he would destroy his own grandchildren, nor is it
credible that his grandson died so that his step-son could feel secure.’
16 A. E. Pappano, ‘Agrippa Postumus’, CP, 36 (1941), 30–45, esp. 32–3.
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provided a clearer picture. Augustus ! Tiberius ! Germanicus !
Drusus ! Agrippa: a line of succession ordered by age and experi-
ence. Yet Augustus took Agrippa on himself. A clue lies in the
descriptions of Agrippa provided by the ancient sources.
It was once fashionable to believe that Agrippa was insane or a
dim-witted brute.17 Such descriptions misinterpret the language.
Velleius uses furor, and describes him as possessing a deformed or
perverse character:mira pravitate animi atque ingenii in praecipitia.18
Dio cites a devotion to servile pursuits (ıºæ
) and a propen-
sity for violent anger (	Bfi 	 OæªBfi æ	E KåæB	), and Tacitus and
Suetonius both use the term ferox.19 Contemporaries were said to
have described Agrippa as trux, while Suetonius echoes Dio’s ‘servile
pursuits’ with ingenium sordidum.20 Some scholars perceived in trux
and furor evidence of an unstable mind; Agrippa was subjected to the
psychoanalytic approach.21 But the method was based on a mistaken
premiss. Ancient descriptions reveal moral not mental inadequacy:
Agrippa was deemed deficient in moral character.22 Dismissive ana-
lyses of Agrippa Postumus based on his mental ability can be, there-
fore, dismantled on the grounds of methodology alone.23 Augustus’
treatment of the future emperor Claudius during the same period is
17 M.P. Charlesworth, ‘Tiberius and the death of Augustus’, AJP, 44 (1923), 145–
57, esp. 149; F. B. Marsh (1931), 40; E. Hohl, ‘Primum facinus novi Principatus’,
Hermes, 70 (1935), 350–5. Influenced no doubt by the meteoric rise of psychoanalytic
theory at the time; J. Beranger, ‘L’Hérédité du Principat note sur la Transmission du
pouvoir Impérial aux Deux Premiers Sicles’, REL, 17 (1939), 117 f = Principatus
(1972), 137–152; R. Seager (1972), 37.
18 Vell. 2.112.
19 Dio 55.32.1–2.; Tac. Ann. 1.3; Suet. Aug. 65.1–2.
20 Tac. Ann. 1.4; Suet. Aug. 65.1–2.
21 E. Hohl (1935), 350–5.
22 A. E. Pappano (1941), 37–8, argued that Agrippa was a bitter adolescent, angry at
the unfairness of his upbringing. Pappano may be right, but it cannot be inferred from
the sources. Any reason offered for his behaviour will be purely speculative.
F. Norwood, ‘The Riddle of Ovid’s Relegatio’, CP, 58: 3 (1963), 150–63, esp. 162 n. 18,
nevertheless agrees with Pappano. R. A. Birch (1981), 443–56, interpreted the language
as conveying political not psychological stupidity.
23 R. Detweiler, ‘Historical Perspectives on the Death of Agrippa Postumus’, CJ, 65
(1970), 289–95, nevertheless refutes the psychoanalytic approach on rational grounds.
He points out that Augustus would not have introduced into his dynastic plans
anyone with a hint of clinical insanity.
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instructive.24 Suetonius believed he was in possession of a letter from
Augustus to Livia on the subject of Claudius’ character. Augustus
wrote:
Nam si artius, ut ita dicam, holocleros, quid est quod dubitemus, quin per
eosdem articulos et gradus producendus sit, per quos frater eius productus sit?
Sin autem MºÆ		HŁÆØ sentimus eum et ºçŁÆØ ŒÆd N





 Iæ	Ø	Å	Æ, praebenda materia deridendi et illum et nos
non est hominibus 	a 	ØÆF	Æ Œ	Ø ŒÆd ıŒ	ÅæÇØ NøŁØ.
For if he is, so to say, complete, what reason have we for doubting that he
ought to be advanced through the same grades and steps through which his
brother [Germanicus] has been advanced. If however we feel that he is
inferior and damaged in the fitness of his body and mind, material for
making fun of him and us must not be offered to people accustomed to
mocking and sneering at such things.25
This was written in AD 12, when Claudius was 21.26 It is significant that
Augustus began the letter with ‘I have now discussed with Tiberius
what we should do about your grandson Claudius . . .we agree that a
decision ought to be taken once and for all.’27 Augustus’ position is
unambiguous: Claudius would either have a career or he would not.
Nothing was left to chance. If it was agreed that Claudius was a
problem, he would be hidden from the public’s view and treated like
a child or invalid. It is therefore unlikely that Agrippa was identified as
mentally deranged or defective, but Claudius may yet hold the key:
atque ex contubernio sordidissimorum hominum super veterem segnitiae
notam ebrietatis quoque et aleae infamiam subiit, cum interim, quanquam
hoc modo agenti, numquam aut officium hominum aut reverentia publice
defuit.
And from his intimacy with the most sordid of men he was exposed to the
infamy of drunkenness and gambling, in addition to his old characteristic of
slowness. Nevertheless in the meantime, despite his conduct, he never lacked
either attention from men or respect from the public.28
Though Agrippa was only 15, it is not inconceivable that he sur-
rounded himself with, or was surrounded by, unsuitable people. His
24 B. Severy, Augustus and the Family at the Birth of the Roman Empire (2003),
196, believes it is a useful comparison, but for Agrippa’s abdicatio, not his adoption.
25 Suet. Claud. 4.1–2. 26 Dio 55.27.3.
27 Suet. Claud. 4.1. 28 Ibid., 5.
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‘truculence’ was that of any teenager involved with the ‘wrong’ crowd
and deemed to be ‘uncontrollable’. He was not interested in activities
that were associated with intelligence at Rome (oratory, legal studies,
philosophy, poetry, and history), nor was he a model of discipline and
restraint. Ferox implies ‘wild’ conduct, while ingenium sordidum
encapsulates drinking, gambling, brawling, and low sports. He was
considered idle and unfocused, typified by the story that he ‘spent
most of his time fishing’.29 We can, therefore, use the treatment of
Claudius to postulate reasons for Agrippa’s adoption.
Agrippa was not adopted in order to be put out of the way. Augustus
had decided instead that Agrippa was fit to play some part in the
settlement.30 He was unready for public advancement, but he would
not be obscure. The political situation probably informed Augustus’
decision.31 Popular sympathy for the elder Julia would affect her only
surviving son; Agrippa represented hope to those who had attached
themselves, and thus their political future, to Gaius and Lucius.32 As
with their support for the restoration of Julia from exile, people were
probably asking ‘What about Agrippa?’ L. Aemilius Paullus, the
younger Julia’s husband and Agrippa’s brother-in-law, is again im-
portant.33 His involvement in the recall of Julia from Pandateria was
suggested above, but his connection to Gaius Caesar, with whom he
was allowed to share the consulship, would be a more significant factor
in his decision to cultivate a relationship with Agrippa.34 Gaius died on
24 February AD 4, four months before Agrippa’s adoption.35 It is likely
29 Dio 55.32.1–2.
30 R. Detweiler (1970), 189, argues that Augustus was desperate to maintain a
reserve of successors. But this does not explain why Agrippa was adopted by Augustus
and not by Tiberius. It can hardly be maintained that Agrippa was considered super-
ior to Germanicus.
31 Cf. B. Severy (2003), 190: ‘more private concerns may have led [Augustus] to
accept paternal responsibility for this apparently unruly young man’.
32 This is the argument of B. Levick, ‘The Fall of Julia the Younger’, Latomus, 35
(1976), 301–39, though it will become apparent that the present study differs con-
siderably in its interpretation of the politics.
33 R. A. Birch (1981), seems to argue that L. Aemilius Paullus, upset that he was
overlooked in the settlement of 26 June AD 4, set about using Agrippa to drive his own
political ambition; B. Levick (1999), 54, treats L. Aemilius Paullus and Agrippa as
equals within an anti-Tiberian faction. Both approaches are unlikely—Agrippa was
too young.
34 It is reasonable to assume that Gaius was allowed to choose his colleague, or at
best was allowed to offer his preference to Augustus.
35 ILS 140; Dio 55.10.9; Vell. 2.102.3; Suet. Aug. 65.1.
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that somewho had invested heavily inGaius began to show an interest in
Agrippa. He was only a boy, but so was Gaius when designated consul in
6 BC.36 Agrippa was in fact one year older. Interest in the young Agrippa
might therefore have played a part in Augustus’ decision to adopt. Free
from patria potestas and due to wear the toga virilis, the prospect of a
rich and uninhibited Agrippa entering the Roman political scene sui
iuris would surely have alarmed Augustus and Tiberius, especially if
surrounded by Gaius’ old ‘mates’. Agrippa’s adoption was not forced
on Augustus by vociferous supporters, but was an attempt to control a
potentially uncomfortable situation.
Here is my proposed scenario: Augustus, Tiberius, and Livia were
discussing Tiberius’ adoption. Tiberius agreed to adopt his nephew
Germanicus; Augustus then turned the discussion to Agrippa’s fu-
ture: ‘Agrippa should already have taken the toga virilis. His future
must be planned now’. Agrippa’s behaviour was a concern, as was his
choice of friends. They therefore agreed that Agrippa must be
adopted before the toga virilis was taken. Tiberius would not accept
the responsibility; Augustus said that he would adopt Agrippa him-
self, to keep a close eye on him and act as a personal instructor.
Satisfied, Tiberius and Livia agreed. Finally, in order not to confuse
the line of succession, and perhaps to explain further the decision to
adopt two people at once, it was decided that to Tiberius’ adoption
would be added the phrase rei publicae causa.37 Interest in Agrippa by
Gaius Caesar’s old friends made this conversation necessary.
THE WRONG FRIENDS
Most who invested in Gaius did so at the expense of friendship with
Tiberius. In AD 1 Gaius, during an eastern tour, was faced with a
36 Dio 55.9.2.
37 Again a direct comparison can be made with Augustus’ treatment of Claudius,
Suet. Claud. 4: ‘While you [Livia] are away, I shall certainly invite young Claudius to
dine every day; rather than leave him to the exclusive company of Athenodorus and
Sulpicius. If only he would show greater concentration and behave with less capri-
ciousness in his choice of someone to imitate in his movements, deportment and
gait.’ For the alternative view see R. A. Birch (1981) 446: ‘Tiberius . . .might well have
preferred nothing at all to be done for Agrippa.’
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Parthian coup that affected the political situation in Armenia.38
Before reaching Syria, he stopped at Samos to meet with Tiberius.39
Gaius probably asked Tiberius about his experience with Armenian
politics, and Tiberius enquired about events in Rome.40 Velleius
writes: convento prius Ti. Nerone, cui omnem honorem ut superiori
habuit ‘he first met with Tiberius Nero, whom he treated with all
honour as [his] superior.’ Both observed appropriate decorum.41
Suetonius provides a commentary:
Namque privignum Gaium Orienti praepositum, cum visendi gratia traiecisset
Samum, alieniorem sibi sensit ex criminationibusM. Lolli comitis et rectoris eius.
For when he crossed to Samos to visit his stepson Gaius, who was overseer of
the East, he found him somewhat estranged through the accusations of
Marcus Lollius, a member of Gaius’ staff and his instructor.42
The meeting ended and Gaius travelled to Syria, where he met with
the Parthian king Phrataces on an island in the Euphrates. During the
meeting Lollius was somehow undermined. Velleius was a military
tribune on Gaius’ staff and provides a firsthand account:
Quo tempore M. Lollii, quem veluti moderatorem iuventae filii sui Augustus
esse voluerat, perfida et plena subdoli ac versuti animi consilia, per Parthum
indicata Caesari, fama vulgavit. Cuius mors intra paucos dies fortuita an
voluntaria fuerit ignoro.
It was at this time that there were revealed to Caesar, through the Parthian
King, the treacherous designs, revealing a crafty mind given to stratagems, of
Marcus Lollius, whom Augustus had wished to be the adviser of his still
young son; and rumour spread. Concerning his death, which occurred within
a few days, I do not know whether it was accidental or voluntary.43
‘Caesar’ must here refer to Gaius: Phrataces alleged that he had
information that Lollius was up to no good. The elder Pliny provides
some details:
38 See F.E. Romer, ‘Gaius Caesar’s Military Diplomacy in the East’, TAPA, 109
(1979), 199–214.
39 Suet. Tib. 12.2; Vell. 2.101.1.
40 Tiberius had earlier installed the pro-Roman Tigranes II on the throne, Joseph.
AJ 15.105; Suet. Tib. 9.1; Dio 54.9.5–7, though Vell. 2.94.4 has Artavasdes.
41 Vell. 2.101.1.
42 Suet. Tib. 12.2.
43 Vell. 2.102.1. F. E. Romer (1979), 210, n.33, takes the language to mean
‘treasonable’. Though a whiff of maiestas hovers, it was not necessarily the case.
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Hoc fuit quare M. Lollius infamatus regum muneribus in toto oriente inter-
dicta amicitia a C. Caesare Augusti filio venenum biberet, ut neptis eius
quadringentiens HS operta spectaretur ad lucernas.
It was for this that M. Lollius, having made himself infamous by taking gifts
from kings throughout the orient and having his friendship renounced by
Gaius Caesar, son of Augustus, drank poison, that his granddaughter should
be shown in the lamplight wearing HS 400,000.44
The HS 400,000 was the value of jewels Lollius had received in the
east, apparently one of the many payments which caused his dis-
grace.45 But why pay Lollius? Presumably certain eastern rulers were
hoping to influence his advice to Gaius. If his senior adviser was in the
pay of Parthia’s opponents, or even those who were nominally
‘friends’, it would have proved very awkward for Gaius, who was
negotiating peace with the Parthian king. Gaius was either ignorant of
Lollius’ activities or pretended as much. Payments were either way
deemed insidious once exposed. Given the nature of the negotiations,
however, Phrataces probably used the incident to question the inten-
tions of Rome. Gaius dealt swiftly with his rector, placing himself
above suspicion while protecting others from contamination. But
how was Phrataces informed? Evidence of collusion could have
been noticeable, but Gaius’ claim to ignorance would have been
consequently untenable. It is possible that the information was leaked
from within Gaius’ entourage. Suetonius cites a revealing incident:
. . . familiari quondam convivio mentione eius orta exstiterit qui Gaio polli-
ceretur, confestim se, si iuberet, Rhodum navigaturum caputque exsulis—sic
enim appellabatur—relaturum.
When mention was made of him [Tiberius] at a private dinner party, a man
who was there assured Gaius that if he would say the word he would at once
sail to Rhodes and bring back the head of ‘the exile’, as he was commonly
called.46
Suetonius had information that the episode was the catalyst for
Tiberius’ request to return to Rome, a request supported by Livia.
The story probably reached Tiberius through P. Sulpicius Quirinius.
In his obituary of Quirinius Tacitus writes:
44 Pliny NH 9.118. 45 Ibid. 46 Suet. Tib. 13.1–2.
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. . . datusque rector C. Caesari Armeniam obtinenti. Tiberium quoque Rhodi
agentem coluerat: quod tunc patefecit in senatu, laudatis in se officiis et
incusato M. Lollio, quem auctorem Gaio Caesari pravitatis et discordiarum
arguebat.
He was appointed adviser to Gaius Caesar in Armenia and also actively
cultivated Tiberius who was at Rhodes: He [Tiberius] now disclosed all this
in the Senate, praising the services of him [Quirinius] to himself while
censuring Marcus Lollius, whom he accused of having been the author of
Gaius Caesar’s wrongdoing and disagreeable behaviour.47
Patefacio means that Quirinius’ disclosures had been kept secret.
Moreover, for Rhodus to make sense, the secret correspondence
must belong to a period before Tiberius returned to Rome (which
he did soon after Lollius died). Indeed, datusque rector C. Caesari
Armeniam obtinenti does not exclude the possibility that Quirinius
was already in the camp when made rector.48 It is, therefore, likely
that Quirinius informed Tiberius, through a messenger, about the
hostile atmosphere within the camp. Tiberius blamed Lollius for
everything. Suetonius continues:
Quo praecipue non iam metu sed discrimine coactus est tam suis quam matris
inpensissimis precibus reditum expostulare impetravitque adiutus aliquantum
etiam casu. Destinatum Augusto erat, nihil super ea re nisi ex voluntate
maioris fili statuere; is forte tunc M. Lollio offensior facilis exorabilisque in
vitricum fuit.
This especially brought home to him that his position was not now fearful
but dangerous, and so he pleaded for his return with urgent prayers, in which
his mother joined, and he obtained it, although partly owing to chance. It had
been decided by Augustus that nothing should be determined in this matter
that was not agreeable to his elder son; it happened that Gaius was now at
odds with M. Lollius and so was open and placable towards his step-father.49
When Augustus’ letter reached Gaius, Lollius was disgraced but still
alive. Since we know that only a few days separated Lollius’ disgrace
from his death, Augustus’ message must have reached Gaius imme-
diately after Phrataces’ allegations. Quirinius thus informed Tiberius
47 Tac. Ann. 3.48.
48 He had previously been governor of Galatia, during which time he had won the
insignia of a triumph, Tac. Ann. 3.48. He was, therefore, the type of person Augustus
would have wanted to accompany Gaius in the east.
49 Suet. Tib. 13.2.
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about the threat some months before Gaius and Phrataces met.50
If Quirinius and Tiberius continued to correspond secretly in the
intervening period, then we may have found our whistle-blower.
Quirinius was evidently adept at concealing his correspondence,
and must certainly have opposed Lollius (if only in secret). Moreover,
the only known beneficiaries of Phrataces’ revelations were Tiberius
and Quirinius himself.51 Quirinius’ knowledge of Augustus’ reply is
irrelevant (though he may well have known about a response), for the
benefits of destroying Lollius were self-evident.
It has been argued that the disgrace of Lollius and the rise of
Quirinius signal the ascendancy of Tiberius, but that is too much.52
Quirinius was probably the most experienced individual left, and
since his correspondence with Tiberius was kept secret until after
his death, the alliance went unnoticed. The nature of Tiberius’ recall
shows, moreover, that Gaius’ unease with him persisted, despite the
setting aside of animosity:
Permittente ergo Gaio revocatus est verum sub condicione ne quam partem
curamve rei p. attingeret.
Therefore with Gaius’ permission he was recalled, but on the condition that
he take no part in public life or hold any responsibility.53
The combination of pars with cura seems redundant. But Suetonius
had access to the imperial correspondence, and we know that letters
between Augustus and Gaius survived to the time of Aulus Gellius.54
We may instead have the exact phrase used by Gaius. Gaius was not
being redundant, he was eliminating loopholes. Exclusion from every
50 It would have taken a few days, perhaps almost a week for Quirinius’message to
reach Tiberius. Tiberius’ message would then have to travel over 1,400 km to Rome.
Augustus’ message would then travel well over 2,000 km to Gaius on the Euphrates.
These represent the shortest distances between the points. The real distances travelled
would have been much greater.
51 Quirinius was made Gaius’ rector, Tac. Ann. 3.48.
52 D. C. A. Shotter, ‘Cn. Cornelius Cinna Magnus and the adoption of Tiberius’,
Latomus, 33 (1974), 306–13, esp. 309 f.
53 Suet. Tib. 13.2, also relevant is 15.1: Romam reversus deducto in Forum filio
Druso statim e Carinis ac Pompeiana domo Esquilias in hortos Maecenatianos trans-
migravit totumque se ad quietem contulit, privata modo officia obiens ac publicorum
munerum expers. ‘On his return to Rome, after introducing his son to public life, he
moved at once from the Carinae and the house of the Pompeys to the gardens of
Maecenas on the Esquiline, where he led a very retired life, merely attending to his
personal affairs and exercising no public functions.’
54 Gell. 15.7.3.
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‘part’ of public life and every ‘responsibility’ means attendance in the
senate and all public positions, including those that did not require
senatorial insignia. Obscurity in Rome rather than in Rhodes was
alone conceded. This is not evidence of Tiberius’ ascendancy. It is
evidence of Gaius’ clemency and power. It is also evidence that Gaius’
clemency had limits: he was still suspicious (and perhaps fearful even)
of Tiberius, along with other members of his entourage. Quirinius’
promotion did not bring full cordiality between Gaius and Tiberius.
Suetonius believed that within Gaius’ entourage Tiberius was re-
ferred to only as the exul. Such opinions must be widely held in order
to be both institutionalized and publicly known. Revelations about
the depth of hostility within his own circle forced Gaius to show
clemency; the potential insinuation that he, like members of his staff,
wanted Tiberius dead needed to be promptly dismissed. But deep-set
feelings are put aside; they do not vanish. Having arrived in Rome
with Gaius’ corpse, Gaius’ paedagogus and some ministri were exe-
cuted:
Paedagogum ministrosque C. fili, per occasionem valitudinis mortisque eius
superbe avareque in provincia grassatos, oneratis gravi pondere cervicibus
praecipitavit in flumen.
He [Augustus] ordered that the paedagogus and aides of his son Gaius, since
they had taken advantage of their master’s illness and death to commit acts of
arrogance and greed in his province, be thrown into the river with heavy
weights about their necks.55
The reason for execution is suspect. Gaius died in the coastal city of
Limyra while returning to Italy with his entourage; they probably
cheated some local merchants. Velleius provides a more plausible
explanation. It was believed that a wound suffered in battle severely
affected Gaius’ physical and mental abilities:
Nec defuit conversatio hominum vitia eius adsentatione alentium (etenim
semper magnae fortunae comes adest adulatio), per quae eo ductus erat ut in
ultimo ac remotissimo terrarum orbis angulo consenescere quam Romam
regredi mallet.
Nor was there lacking the companionship of persons who encouraged his
defects by flattery (for flattery always goes hand in hand with high position)
55 Suet. Aug. 67.2.
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as a result of which he wished to live in life long retirement in a remote and
distant corner of the world rather than return to Rome.56
The ‘remote and distant corner of the world’ was apparently Syria.57
The exact location is not known, but Antioch, one of the great cities of
the Mediterranean world and the seat of provincial government, is the
obvious choice.58 It would not have escaped Gaius’ notice that his
father was highly thought of in the area, ‘Agrippa’ being one of the
most common Italian names in Syria.59 Evidently the government
held Gaius’ entourage responsible for his psychological condition,
alleging that Gaius was led astray. This can also be inferred from
the identity of Syria’s next legatus Augusti pro praetore following
Gaius’ death: P. Sulpicius Quirinius.60 Having dismantled Gaius’
entourage in AD 4, Augustus and Tiberius probably sought to dampen
any lingering influence the group held in the east by introducing one
of Tiberius’ most loyal supporters.61 The execution of Gaius’ paeda-
gogus and aides thus signalled a new political order. The sudden
ascendancy of Tiberius, for so long an object of ridicule and derision
for the newly established smart-set, must have seemed to wipe away
the very foundations of an aspiring political order. Young men on the
up, confident that the future was theirs, were of a sudden left un-
certain and feeling vulnerable. Many hitherto influential men in
Rome would no doubt sympathize with king Archelaus of Cappado-
cia’s experience:
Rex Archelaus quinquagesimum annum Cappadocia potiebatur, invisus Ti-
berio quod eum Rhodi agentem nullo officio coluisset. Nec id Archelaus per
superbiam omiserat, sed ab intimis Augusti monitus, quia florente Gaio
Caesare missoque ad res Orientis intuta Tiberii amicitia credebatur.
56 Vell. 2.102.3; also Dio 55.10a.8.
57 Dio 55.10a. 8.
58 Jos. AJ 17.132; CAH 10² 712 f.
59 Jos.AJ 16.25 on Agrippa doing ‘good works’ in the east, and his general popularity;
CAH 10² 725.
60 Jos. AJ 17.355; On the post, see Dio 53.13.5; A. H. J. Greenidge (1911), 434 f;
J. W. Rich (1990), 144 f.
61 The group had fostered anti-Tiberian feeling in the various cities in which they
stayed. Suetonius (Tib. 13.1) tells us that during his Rhodian exile the people of
Nemausus in southern France ‘threw down his statues and busts.’ Gaius’ enmity
may plausibly have enjoyed international recognition, though, as an Augustan veteran
colony, Nemausus had some strong eastern connections (its coinage features the
crocodile). Gaius, moreover, was a patron of the town: CIL XII 3155.
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For fifty years King Archelaus had been in possession of Cappadocia; to
Tiberius a hated man, because while he was at Rhodes Archelaus showed him
none of the respect he deserved. The neglect was due not to arrogance, but to
advice from the intimates of Augustus; for, as Gaius Caesar was then
flourishing and had been sent to settle affairs in the East, the friendship of
Tiberius was believed to be unsafe.62
When, in AD 4, Gaius’ disenfranchised friends transferred their inter-
est to the young but soon-to-be-of-age Agrippa, Augustus probably
decided that an adoption was necessary. It is, therefore, significant
that on receiving the toga virilis in AD 5, Agrippa ‘obtained none of the
same privileges as his brothers’ and a year later suffered abdicatio and
was sent to the town of Surrentum.
62 Tac. Ann. 2.42.
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Growing Pains
AGRIPPA AND THE TOGA VIRILIS
Scholars vest Dio’s remark concerning Agrippa’s lack of ‘privileges’
with importance:








In this very same year Agrippa was enrolled among the youths of military age
but obtained none of the same things as his brothers.1
Dio’s own treatment of the enrolment of Gaius and Lucius is lost. Our
knowledge comes instead from his epitomator Zonaras:
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In the following year, while consul for the twelfth time, Augustus enrolled
Gaius among the youths of military age, and at the same time introduced
him to the senate, declared him First of the Youth, and allowed him to be
cavalry-commander of a division . . .And after a year Lucius too received the
honours which had been given to his brother Gaius.”2
If Zonaras has followed Dio correctly, then these are the ‘things’
implied in Dio’s treatment of Agrippa. Dio understood that Agrippa
was not presented to the senate, declared First of the Youth (Princeps
1 Dio 55.22.4.
2 Dio 55.9.9–10 = Zon. 10.35. Also Res Gestae 14.1: ‘The senate decreed that from
the day in which they were led into the forum they should be included in public
meetings.’
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Iuventutis), or made the commander of a cavalry division (sevir
turmae) upon receiving the toga of manhood (toga virilis).3 We can
add also privileges gained by Gaius the year before his taking the toga
virilis:
ŒÆd 	a 	FŁ ’ ƒæøÅ  	ØÆ ÆP	fiH ŒÆd 	c K
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And after that Augustus granted to Gaius a priesthood and attendance at
senate meetings and the right to sit with the senators at shows and banquets.4
The comparing of Agrippa with his brothers is not necessarily Dio’s
own construction.5 Agrippa’s supporters would have ‘wondered
aloud’ at the difference. They had marked him as an investment for
the future and the lack of paraphernalia was a concern. This should be
credited to the ascendancy of Tiberius.
In 6 BC Tiberius left Rome and retired to Rhodes. The move has
been variously interpreted, both in antiquity and today, but a general
theory has emerged which credits his decision to the political force of
Gaius and Lucius Caesar. The linking of Tiberius’ retirement with the
popularity of Gaius and Lucius was conceived in antiquity.6 But the
interpretation is new: Tiberius retired because he opposed the deci-
sion to designate Gaius consul at age 14.7 Dio implies that Gaius was
elected by the comitia centuriata against the wishes of Augustus:
3 For Sevir Turmae, see S. Demougin, L’ordre équestre sous les Julio-Claudiens
(1988), 217–43.
4 Dio 55.9.4. P. M. Swan (2004), 84, n. 79, makes an interesting point: ‘Why do Dio
and Augustus highlight Gaius’ privilege of attending the senate when, according to
Suetonius, Augustus: “permitted the children of senators, immediately they donned
the toga virilis, to wear the broad stripe [on their tunics] and attend the senate” (Aug.
38.2)’. Swan suggests that Gaius may have been able to speak to a known formula:
‘senators or those with the right to express their opinion in the senate’, cited in the
Cyrene Edict (V. Ehrenberg, and A. H. M. Jones (1955), 139 f.) If Swan is right, then
Gaius was allowed to express political opinions at a very young age. It was probably
the case, however, that Gaius was allowed to express an opinion because he was consul
designate from 6 BC to 1 BC.
5 Cf. J.W. Rich (1990), 227, with a general comment about his treatment of 6 BC:
‘Dio’s interpretation is unconvincing and may be partly his own construction’.
6 Dio 55.9.5–8; Suet. Tib. 10.1–11.1, 5; Tac. Ann. 1.53.1, 6.51; Vell. 2.99.1–2.
7 The general argument of B. Levick, ‘Tiberius’ retirement to Rhodes in 6 B.C.’,
Latomus, 31 (1972), 779–813; cf. F. B. Marsh (1931), 37f. and R. Seager (1972, rev.
2005), 23–9, who suggest that Tiberius simply determined that he had been super-
seded.
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Among other things they [the people] elected Gaius consul while he had not
yet even reached military age. He [Augustus] was irritated and prayed that
no such necessity of circumstances should take place, as had once happened
to himself, that someone younger than 20 should become consul. When the
people continued to press him he said that a man should assume that office
when he was capable of not making any mistake himself and resisting the
impulses of the people.8
Tacitus writes:
necdum posita puerili praetexta principes iuventutis appellari, destinari con-
sules specie recusantis flagrantissime cupiverat.
And though they [Gaius and Lucius] had not yet laid aside the praetexta of
boyhood, he eagerly wished, though with the appearance of declining, that
they be named principes iuventutis and be destined for consulships.9
Tacitus’ analysis is unlikely.10 The election of Gaius was not in
Augustus’ interest; it made ridiculous the proposition that the res
publica was anything but a monarchy.11 Furthermore, had Augustus
really wanted a designated consulship for his son, he would surely
have chosen the elections of 5 BC, when Gaius took the toga virilis.12 It
should also be noted that Augustus took Tiberius’ decision to retire
poorly. If Tacitus’ interpretation is sound, Augustus would more
likely have said ‘good riddance!’13 Instead, Augustus was probably
annoyed with Tiberius for leaving him alone with Gaius and the
8 Dio 55.9.2.
9 Tac. Ann. 1.3.2.
10 Cf. R. Syme (1939), 417, though Syme seems to take a different position in
(1986) 83 f .
11 R. Syme (1939), 417; R. Seager (1972), 29 f.
12 Cf. J. W. Rich (1990), 227, who sees Dio being fooled; P. M. Swan (2004), 84,
follows Dio’s interpretation, at the expense of Tacitus.
13 Tiberius received tribunicia potestas for five years at this time, Dio 55.9.4 f.
Zonaras understood Dio to mean that Augustus hoped that it would ‘bring Gaius
and Lucius to their senses’. It seems to me more plausible that Augustus wished to
make it obvious that he hoped Tiberius would succeed him.
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young ‘radicals’.14 We can use Dio, Tacitus, and the Res Gestae to
postulate Augustus’ response to the people:
I thank you for the support you have shown my house, but according to the
custom of our ancestors such acts are only required when the Republic is in
peril. I ask instead that my son be allowed to mature, and that he take the
consulship in five years time.15
Augustus made the best of a bad situation. He was obviously not
comfortable with a 14-year-old consul, but felt unable to defeat
completely a popular movement in full swing. Tiberius retired in
protest.16 Gaius either interpreted Tiberius’ position as a personal
attack or his supporters offered him the interpretation: ‘Tiberius is
jealous and wants to destroy your career before it can begin’. Such
suggestions can have devastating effects on a 14-year-old (especially if
Tiberius was already an estranged step-father). The interpretation
was perhaps in part correct. Gaius’ designation threatened to cut
short Tiberius’ own special position, though Tiberius no doubt
claimed to be simply unimpressed by the designation of a boy.17 In
AD 20 Tiberius presented his adoptive grandson, Nero, to the senate:
Neronem e liberis Germanici iam ingressum iuventam commendavit patribus,
utque munere capessendi vigintiviratus solveretur et quinquennio maturius
quam per leges quaesturam peteret, non sine inrisu audientium postulavit.
Praetendebat sibi atque fratri decreta eadem petente Augusto.
He [Tiberius] commended Nero, the son of Germanicus who was now
entering manhood, to the senate, and asked, not without laughter from the
audience, that he be freed from having to take an office of the vigintivirate
and that he be allowed to seek the quaestorship five years earlier than the law
14 Cf. R. Seager (1972), 29 f., who argues that Augustus intended for Gaius to
supersede Tiberius, thus making him superfluous. Seager maintains that Tiberius’
proposed mission to Armenia was a convenience: ‘with the princes’ guardian thus
kept occupied, the coast would be clear for the grooming of Gaius and Lucius’.
15 RG 14; J. W. Rich (1990), 227, suggests that the people did not propose that
Gaius be made consul at 14, but understood instead that an interim period would be
required. This is possible, but perhaps diminishes too much the atmosphere which
must have lingered over the comitia by insisting on a level of reason that may not have
been present.
16 Vell. 2.99.2 f.; Dio 55.9.5; B. Levick, (1999), 38 ff.; R. Syme, (1939), 47 f. and
(1986), 83 f.
17 He offered other reasons as well, such as tiredness and a wish to dedicate his
remaining time to studies, Dio 55.9.6 f.; Vell. 2.99.2.
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allowed. His justification was that Augustus had requested the same decree
for himself and his brother.18
Why did senators laugh? The process was not itself funny. Augustus’
nephew Marcellus, Tiberius, his brother Drusus, Gaius, Lucius, Ti-
berius’ nephew Germanicus, and his son Drusus had all received the
dispensation.19 It was a request the audience should have expected.
Senators were instead amused by the irony of the situation; they were
laughing at Tiberius, possible only if Tiberius was acting contrary to a
previously held position. It is suggested here that the previously held
position was opposition to accelerated public careers. But we must be
careful to differentiate the treatment of Marcellus, Gaius, and Lucius
from the treatment of Tiberius, the elder Drusus, Germanicus, and
the younger Drusus. This is apparent by examining the age at which
they reached certain positions.
Augustus reformed the cursus so that the quaestorship could be
reached at 25, the praetorship at 30, and the consulship at 33.20
Twenty-six to 29 are relatively young ages for the consulship, but
they are significantly older than 20–23. A lex Plaetoria and a subse-
quent praetorian edict had been devised, much earlier, to protect
those under 25 who were sui iuris from their own economic ignor-
ance by providing for restitution when the terms of a financial agree-
ment were evidently misunderstood. On reaching 25 the law held that
Quaestor Ornamenta Praetoria Consul
Marcellus 18 23*
Tiberius 18 23 28
Drusus I 20 23 29
Gaius 20
Lucius 20*
Germanicus 21 23 26
Drusus II 23 24 27
* Not taken
18 Tac. Ann. 3.29.
19 Marcellus = Dio 53.28.3–4; Tiberius = Dio 53.28.3–4, Tac. Ann. 3.29; the elder
Drusus = Dio 54.10.4, Tac. Ann. 3.29; Gaius and Lucius = Dio 55.9.2, 10, RG. 14;
Germanicus = Suet. Gaius 1.1; the younger Drusus is a slightly different proposition.
He did not take the quaestorship until he was 23 (Dio 56.25.4), but nevertheless took
the consulship at 28 (Dio 56.28.1).
20 Dio 52.20.1 f.; in actuality the ages were probably much older on average.
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young men were responsible either way.21 Thus, for Augustus, a man
could be trusted with the people’s finances when he could be trusted
with his own. The designation of Marcellus, Gaius, and Lucius before
even the age of 20 was therefore an outrageous innovation both
politically and sociologically, whereas the designation of Tiberius,
the elder Drusus, Germanicus, and the younger Drusus, though still
exceptional, were nevertheless radically different propositions. I pro-
pose that Tiberius was satisfied with the standard used to accelerate
his own career and the careers of his brother Drusus, Germanicus,
and the younger Drusus, but not that of Gaius and Lucius. Tacitus
highlights the boys’ immaturity when designated:
Nam genitos Agrippa Gaium ac Lucium in familiam Caesarum induxerat,
necdum posita puerili praetexta principes iuventutis appelari, destinari con-
sules specie recusantis flagrantissime cupiverat.
For he had brought the children of Agrippa, Gaius and Lucius, into the house
of the Caesars; and though they had not yet laid aside the praetexta of
boyhood, he eagerly wished, though with the appearance of declining, that
they be named principes iuventutis and be destined for consulships.22
Tacitus’ language is pregnant with cynicism and irony. He confirms
their immaturity by reference to a childlike image: puerili praetexta.
More striking than: ‘they were not yet men’. The style is Tacitus’ own,
but probably reflects the amused disbelief of a conservative commen-
tator uncomfortable with the election of a 14-year-old. The designa-
tion of a boy was, after all, evidence that people did not take the
business of government seriously, for voters could not have believed
that Gaius would add value to debate in the senate. Indeed, it under-
mined the very concept of senatorial authority. Either way, Tiberius
was among those startled by the development. But in 6 BC most failed
to recognize the nuance of Tiberius’ position: opposition to Gaius’
accelerated career was interpreted as opposition to all accelerated
careers. Evidently the subsequent careers of Germanicus and the
younger Drusus did not dispel public opinion (even though Tiberius,
as their father, must have acquiesced). When the time came to present
Nero to the senate, Tiberius was forced, for the first time, formally to
21 W. W. Buckland, Textbook of Roman Law, 3rd edn., ed. by P. Stein (1963),
169–73; J. Crook, Law and Life of Rome (1967), 116–18. The lex Plaetoria was passed
sometime in the late third or early second century BC.
22 Tac. Ann. 1.3.2; also Dio 55.9.2.
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request a practice he was thought to have opposed—it was laughable.
But the mockers were wrong, and Tiberius no doubt stood before
them with a clear conscience.
Agrippa had grown up with his brothers in the limelight. Their
election to the consulship and their entrance to manhood would have
been discussed often. He may have remembered both episodes and
probably anticipated similar treatment. The ascendancy of Tiberius
meant that Agrippa would be left wanting and no doubt frustrated.
Agrippa would probably have taken the quaestorship five years in
advance of the legal age had he not suffered abdicatio, while the style
in which he took the toga virilis is evidence only that the title Princeps
Iuventutis and premature designations to the consulship were no
longer considered appropriate (indeed, had they been appropriate,
Germanicus and Drusus might also have expected them).23 Agrippa,
like Germanicus and the younger Drusus, was subject to a new
political order that took the business of governing more seriously.
He was not named Princeps Iuventutis; he was not made the com-
mander of a horse division; he was not allowed to speak at senate
meetings; and, as far as we know, he was not a pontifex. Analysing
from effects to causes, Agrippa may have discovered discrimination.
A consideration of his subjection to abdicatio the very next year
suggests that he was probably right.
ABDICATIO AND AGRIPPA
The elder Pliny and Suetonius both mention abdicatio in relation to
Agrippa Postumus. Pliny wrote:
23 A. Degrassi, Inscr. Ital. (1931), 14.1, 183 quotes a fragment from the Fasti
Ostiensis: Agrippa Caesar . . .Numerous attempts to provide a solution exist. None
is convincing. Degrassi inserted abdicatus est . . . , a solution championed by B. Levick,
‘Abdication and Agrippa Postumus’, Historia, 21 (1972), 674–97, esp. 694, and (1999)
57. In the former Levick wrote: ‘but there are difficulties. The least is that the Ostians
after the event are speaking of Agrippa Caesar.’ Having identified the problem, Levick
provides no plausible explanation, but simply moves on. Others infer a local magis-
tracy: L. Vidman, Fasti Ostienses, 2nd edn. (1982); R. Syme (1986), 113, n. 57. It may
simply represent recognition of his birthday (though a priesthood cannot be
ruled out).
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In divo quoque Augusto, quem universa mortalitas in hac censura nuncupet, si
diligenter aestimentur cuncta, magna sortis humanae reperiantur volumina . . .
abdicatio Postumi Agrippae post adoptionem, desiderium post relegationem.
Also in the case of the divine Augustus, whom the whole of mankind enrols
in the list of happy men, if all the facts could be carefully weighed, great
revolutions of man’s lot could be discovered . . .making Agrippa Postumus
an abdicatus after he had been adopted, and the yearning for him after his
relegation.24
Suetonius wrote:
Tertium nepotem Agrippam simulque privignum Tiberium adoptavit in foro
lege curiata; ex quibus Agrippam brevi ob ingenium sordidum ac ferox
abdicavit seposuitque Surrentum.
He adopted in the forum via a lex curiata his third grandson Agrippa at the
same time as his step-son Tiberius; after a brief period he made Agrippa an
abdicatus because of his raw and wild nature, and he secluded him at
Surrentum.25
Suetonius took his source/s to mean that abdicatio occurred first,
followed by the transfer of Agrippa from Rome to Surrentum. He
continues:
Agrippam nihilo tractabiliorem, immo in dies amentiorem, in insulam trans-
portavit saepsitque insuper custodia militum.
As Agrippa did not become more manageable, but rather each day became
more insane, he transported him to an island and, moreover, surrounded
him with a military guard.26
Transporto corresponds with Pliny’s relegatio, the nature of which
will be considered later. The sequence is nevertheless abdicatio then
sepono and finally relegatio/transporto: Agrippa suffered abdicatio
and was then sent away/packed off to Surrentum, afterwhich he was
relegated to an island.27 Dio, though failing to mention Surrentum,
provides a similar picture:
24 NH 7.147–50.
25 Suet. Aug. 65.1.
26 Suet. Aug. 65.4.
27 S. Jameson, ‘Augustus and Agrippa Postumus’, Historia, 24 (1975), 287–314,
esp. 292, takes Pliny’s pudenda Agrippae ablegatio in the same passage to refer also to
Agrippa Postumus. But Pliny refers not to Agrippa Postumus but his father
M. Vipsanius Agrippa. In 23 BC Vipsanius Agrippa was sent to Syria in the wake of
68 The Republic in Danger
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any 
way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
. . . ÆP	fiH 	 	fiH APª	øfi ººŒØ
 bæ 	H Æ	æfiø KŒºØ. ŒÆd P ªaæ
KøçæÇ	, IŒÅæåŁÅ, ŒÆd l 	 PÆ ÆP	F 	fiH 	æÆ	Øø	ØŒfiH 	ÆØøfi
KŁÅ, ŒÆd ÆP	e
 K
 —ºÆÆÆ 	c æe
 ˚æøfi B KºŁÅ.
. . . and he often accussed Augustus himself regarding his inheritance, and
since he was not of moderate mind he was made an abdicatus and his
property was handed over to the military treasury, and he was himself exiled
to Planasia, an island near Corsica.”28
The nature of abdicatio is disputed. Though a legal force is implied,
its sole appearance in the juristic literature is for the purpose of
denying it such a quality:
Abdicatio quae Graeco more ad alienandos liberos usurpabatur et apokeryxis
dicebatur Romanis legibus non comprobatur.
Abdicatio, which was used in Greek custom to alienate children and was
called apokeryxis, is not approved by Roman law.29
Abdicatio was an alien concept which Roman lawyers rejected. It is
therefore curious that Agrippa’s exposure to abdicatio seems to have
had legal consequences.30 The solution to this paradox requires an
examination of the term’s perceived effects.
Some scholars propose that abdicatio was connected to emancipa-
tio, in that it provided the same effect: the abdicated son ceased to live
under the potestas of his father.31 On that reading, Augustus saw fit
to remove Agrippa from the line of succession and relinquish his
rumour that he and Augustus’ nephew Marcellus had had a falling out, Dio 53.32.1.
Suetonius (Aug. 66.3 and Tib. 10.1) writes, however, that Agrippa left of his own
accord. Velleius 2.93.2 uses elements from both stories. Velleius writes that Augustus
provided Agrippa with a special commission in the East to cover the fact that Agrippa
had decided to leave Rome on account of his poor relationship with Marcellus. There
is some dispute as to the accuracy of these reports, see R. Syme (1939), 342 f.; R. Seager
(1972), 20 f.; J. W. Rich (1990), 167 f.
28 Dio 55.32.2. Cary’s Loeb translation uses ‘not of sound mind’ and is followed
by P. M. Swan (2004), 209. But Dio refers not to insanity but to moderation and
temperance.
29 Cod. Iust. 8.46.6.
30 Some dismiss abdicatio as purely fictional, so W. W. Buckland (1963), 132 n. 6,
and R. Düll ‘Iudicium domesticum, Abdicatio, und Apokeryxis’, ZSS, 63 (1943), 75,
n. 3. They may be right, but Augustus evidently used it with real effects. The case of
Agrippa Postumus must, therefore, be considered separately.
31 H. Volkmann, Zur Rechtsprechung im Principat des Augustus (1935), 109–10;
A. Momigliano, ‘Review of The Cambridge Ancient History Vol. X. The Augustan
Empire 44 B.C.–A.D. 70’, JRS, 34 (1944), 113; J. A. Crook, ‘Oktavian und das Testament
Cäsars byWalter Schmitthenner’, CR, 4.2 (1954), 152–4; B. Levick, (1972), passim. For
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potestas over him, making him sui iuris. This implies that whatever
Agrippa had done, Augustus was satisfied that Agrippa could be
controlled without patria potestas. It is therefore necessary to deter-
mine whether abdicatio was a technical term, which carried within it
the idea of emancipatio.
For a term to have a technical meaning, its usage must be consis-
tently applicable within given parameters; temporal variations in
meaning make parameters important. It is fortunate that the term
abdicatio is most prolific in a writer who lived during the Augustan
period: the elder Seneca. Only a few samples are required:
Si quis me audit adoptari, iam putat abdicatum . . . Laudat me pater, cum
abdicet, laudo ego patrem, cum abdicer; haec una inter nos disputatio est: iste
me dignum putat beato patre, ego me meo.
Those who hear I am to be adopted regard me as having already been
‘abdicated’ . . .My father praises me while ‘abdicating’ me, I praise my father
while being ‘abdicated’. This alone is in dispute between us: he believes that
I deserve a wealthy father, I believe I deserve my own”.32
Abdicatio here prepares the son for adoption, which will, in turn,
dissolve patria potestas.33 The son’s emotional response is the key. If
the son was sui iuris, he could not have been forced into an undesir-
able adoption? Evidently the son was not sui iuris. Seneca later writes
Quos abdicatione non potuit terrere, putat se castigaturum adoptione.Non ille
tuum filium concupiscit: suos corrigit. Cum illos correctos putaverit, me satis
minatum abdicabit.
Those whom he could not scare with ‘abdication’, he believes he can punish
by adoption. But he does not covet your son: he wants to fix his own. When
he believes they have been reformed, he will ‘abdicate’ me, the threat of me
having been sufficient.34
the opposite view, see esp. M. Wurm, Apokeryxis, Abdicatio und Exheredatio (1972),
esp. 22–64.
32 Sen. Cont. 2.1.9.
33 Furthermore, Seneca has produced a situation in which abdicatio is not punish-
ment for a recalcitrant son but is, in fact, a reward. This would have seemed an
extreme case. The clear majority of our examples depict abdicatio as a form of
punishment, Sen. Cont. 2.1.15: Quare abdicas? Numquid dies noctesque inpendo
turpibus conviviis? Plurimum vivo in lupanari? Si nescis quae crimina obiciantur, ab
amico disce, ‘Why do you abdicate me? Do I spend night and day at foul dinner
parties? Do I spend most of my life in brothels? If you do not know the charges that
are usually made, learn from your friend.’
34 Sen. Cont. 2.1.28.
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In this controversia, a father adopts a man in order to punish his own
sons, who are abdicati. Abdicatio is utilized as a short-term solution
to behavioural problems, initiated and later to be revoked by the
father. The sons are still subject to the power of their father; abdicatio
has not made them sui iuris. Importantly the legal status of an
abdicatus was a topic of dispute among rhetoricians. Seneca cites a
question popular in declamatory schools:
an abdicatus non desinat filius esse; an is desinat qui non tantum abdicatus
sed etiam ab alio adoptatus est?
Does an abdicatus cease to be a son? Does he cease [to be a son] who is not
only an abdicatus but is even adopted by another.35
Seneca does not offer his opinion, nor are we offered the general view.
The question is instead left hanging, with no clear answer in sight. If
abdicatio were a form of emancipatio clarity should have prevailed.
Indeed, the question would have been superfluous. The above exam-
ples make it difficult to maintain that where abdicatio is mentioned
the results of emancipatio are meant. Quintilian provides evidence
that abdicatio affected inheritance:
Quibus similia etiam in vera rerum quaestione tractantur. Nam quae in
scholis abdicatorum, haec in foro exheredatorum a parentibus et bona apud
centumviros repetentium ratio est.
Similar methods are also used with questions that occur in real life. For the
question of abdicatio, which occurs in the schools, is related to those who are
disinherited by their parents in the forum and those who reclaim their
property in the centumviral court.36
And
Heredi scripto opponitur lex : ‘abdicatus ne quid de bonis patris capiat.’
The heir by testament is opposed by the law: “an abdicatus shall not receive
his father’s property”.37
35 Ibid., 1.1.13. Adoption evidently inspired much philosophical discussion.
Though adoption dissolved agnatic status, we know that an adopted man could not
marry his former sister: legal constructs did not replace certain ‘natural’ laws even for
the Romans.
36 Quint. 7.4.11.
37 Quint. 3.6.98, also 96: Abdicatus ne quid de bonis patris capiat, ‘An abdicatus
cannot take possession of his father’s estate.’
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Nam quae in scholis abdicatorum does not help with regard to
Agrippa Postumus, but it nevertheless confirms that, in the early
Principate, abdicatio was a fictional device. If, however, this fictional
device provides specific results, it is, probably, that a son was treated
as an exheredatus. This theory alone explains how an abdicatus was
adopted against his will: he was still subject to patria potestas. Three
aspects of Agrippa’s situation are now evident: when Dio writes that
Agrippa’s ‘property was given to the treasury’, he means that Agrippa
was disinherited; sepono evidences the maintenance of patria potestas;
and Agrippa was punished.38 Before considering the ramifications of
this analysis, the details of his disinheritance deserve further com-
ment.
It is likely that on 26 June AD 4 Augustus ceased to administer
Agrippa’s property as tutor, becoming instead its owner. Augustus’
tutorship is likely but not definitely known. He was already the
adoptive father of Gaius and Lucius when Agrippa was born, and
M. Vipsanius Agrippa would surely have wanted his boys to grow up
in the same house; it would have been hazardous to entrust the boy
with anybody else.39 As tutor Augustus would have provided Agrippa
with pocket-money (peculium); he would have continued to provide
assistance after 26 June AD 4, when Agrippa’s property became his.
Agrippa probably held the view that Augustus was too frugal before
and after his adoption.40 It is noteworthy, however, that Augustus
donated Agrippa’s money to the aerarium militare; it must have been
a very large amount. Perhaps Agrippa accused Augustus of avarice
when informed of his impending adoption. Either way, abdicatio, in
the case of Agrippa Postumus, meant dishonour and the withdrawal
of his property. At the same time Augustus ordered his adopted son
to Surrentum: the boy was grounded without funds. Donating Agrip-
pa’s inheritance to the military treasury represents then a moral
38 Dio 55.32.2. Dio must, of course, mean the part of Augustus’ estate left to
Agrippa in a testament, cf. CAH 10² 201. It is important to note, moreover, that
had Agrippa been sui iuris he could have refused the adoption.
39 Suet. Aug. 64.3 is important: Nepotes et litteras et natare aliaque rudimenta per
se plerumque docuit, ac nihil aeque elaboravit quam ut imitarentur chirographum
suum . . . , ‘He [Augustus] himself, for the most part, taught his grandchildren how to
read, swim and other basic skills, and he strived to make them copy his own hand-
writing.’
40 B. Levick (1999), 59–60, places the accusation after Agrippa was ‘abdicated’;
thus, for Levick, once he had left the Julian gens. As has been shown above, however,
this cannot be right; abdicatio did not equal emancipatio for Agrippa.
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point. Augustus did not adopt Agrippa to acquire his wealth, nor was
peculium withheld for private gain: he would not expose himself to
slander from Agrippa or his friends.
The weight of evidence indicates that Agrippa did something
deserving punishment. But it must be significant that Augustus
chose abdicatio instead of emancipatio. The use of a Greek device
with only fictional relevance in Rome reveals a delicate game. Agrippa
was publicly reprimanded, impoverished, and rusticated. The source
of the problem was evidently in Rome, and Agrippa was to stay well
away from it. Augustus probably hoped that Agrippa’s attitude would
eventually improve (he was still a teenager), but retention of patria
potestas signals caution.41 Augustus perceived dangerous potential
within Agrippa, a perception that, as I have argued above, encouraged
his adoption. It would have been more reasonable to place Agrippa
under Tiberius, beside Germanicus and the younger Drusus. By
adopting Agrippa himself, Augustus admitted that his situation was
different. Overdue for the toga virilis and unencumbered by patria
potestas, Agrippa posed a problem; he could one day be used to
symbolize an alternative line of power. It must be significant then
that from the time of Agrippa’s adoption to his becoming an abdica-
tus, Rome experienced social and political unrest. In order to test
whether Agrippa’s abdicatio could be related to wider political events,
we must consider in detail the problems which affected Rome in both
AD 5 and 6.
41 This point is made by S. Jameson (1975), 292. See Sen. Cont. 2.1.28 and Quint.
7.4.27. Some have argued, however, that Agrippa must have been emancipated,
because he is not named by Suetonius (Aug. 101), as a beneficiary, or as an exher-
edatus, in Augustus’ will, see generally A. Momigliano (1944), 112–15; B. Levick
(1970), passim; J. Linderski (1988), 188–200. It was made clear in Roman law that if
a child, whether a heres or exheredatus, was passed over in a will, then the will was
deemed to be void, Inst. 2.13. Since most hold that Suetonius has offered a complete
account of Augustus’ will in so far as it affected his descendants, they therefore argue
that Agrippa must not have been named in the will, i.e. he was no longer in potestate.
Since I have shown that abdicatio cannot mean emancipatio, I believe there is only one
obvious answer. Agrippa was named in Augustus’ will as an exheredatus, but the
reference was ignored by Suetonius, who did not believe that the issue required notice,
since exheredation was established not by Augustus’ will but by the senatus consultum
of AD 7, legalizing the incarceration of Agrippa on Planasia. It should be noted,
however, that no one would surely contest a will, in public, in which the only victim
was thought to be Agrippa Postumus. It may be that Augustus had put together a
defective will knowing that no one would dare challenge. After all, Agrippa’s abdicatio
was hardly by the book!
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5
The Buck Stops Where?
THE CRISIS
The year AD 5 witnessed the antecedents of a crisis that would burden
the years immediately following:
. . . per dies octo Tiberis impetu miseranda clades hominum domorumque
fuit.
. . . for eight horrible days men and homes were destroyed as the Tiber
attacked.1
	 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And so at this time, in the consulship of Cornelius and Valerius Messalla,
enormous earthquakes occurred and the Tiber washed away the bridge and
made the city navigable for seven days; and there was also a partial eclipse of
the sun, and a famine occurred.2
Low crop yields and the flood probably caused decreased supply.3 In
AD 64 a food shortage occurred when fire, sweeping through the city,
destroyed grain stores.4 Given that in AD 5 the city, which could just
1 Cass. Chron. 604.
2 Dio 55.22.3.
3 G. Rickman, The Corn Supply of Ancient Rome (1980), 63; Cass. Chron. 604 links
flood and famine, which is accepted by G. S. Aldrete, Floods of the Tiber in Ancient
Rome (2007), 132. See also Dio 54.1.1–2, for a very similar combination of flood,
plague, and famine.
4 Suet. Nero 38.1; Tac. Ann. 15.39.3; Dio 62.16.5, see P. Garnsey, Famine and Food
Supply in the Graeco-Roman World (1988), 224.
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mean the Aventine, was navigable for a whole week, most stored grain
was probably ruined, stores closest to the river spoiled first.5 Ostia was
no doubt similarly inundated, preventing immediate relief. As with
most major floods, nearly all stored products (not just produce) were
probably destroyed, increasing demand and exposing residents to
very high short-term prices. Jerome had evidence that in AD 5 the
price of grain inflated to HS 110 for one month’s ration to a member
of the plebs frumentaria, extraordinarily high when we consider that
in the wake of the great fire of AD 64, the price was apparently HS 3.6
But very high short-term prices would not have been the only pro-
blem. Water-borne disease, caused by the presence of faecal matter
and general decay, often accompanies the flooding of major popula-
tion centres, and would certainly have caused death in a pre-indus-
trial city of Rome’s size. In an unspecified period of Augustus’ reign,
Pliny connects disease in the city (pestilentia urbis) with famine in
Italy (fames Italiae). Famine and disease are obvious partners, but the
effect was no doubt devastating when combined with large-scale
flooding.7 Swan uses the solar eclipse to date these events to the
beginning of the year, since an eclipse is recorded for 28 March AD
5.8 But another eclipse occurred on 22 September.9 There is no
conclusive evidence for either date. A food shortage in the following
year (AD 6) might suggest one long period of decreased supply from
the end of AD 5 into AD 6.10 Winter generally slowed import rates,
which may explain why low supply persisted despite the receding
5 G. S. Aldrete (2007), 129–41, who adds weakened buildings, injuries, and
drownings. See also his excellent analysis of the extent of flooding on pp. 42–9.
6 Jerome Chron. 170; Tac. Ann. 15.36.
7 Pliny NH 7.149.
8 P. M. Swan (2004), 155. Swan believed that the eclipse was either noticed in
Rome or recorded in Roman Africa and communicated to Rome. It must be under-
stood that the path of the eclipse began where the southern tip of Sudan intersects
with the south-west point of Ethiopia, and stretched across the south of the Sahara to
the southernmost tip of Morocco—a long way from Roman Africa.
9 Recorded by NASA, and can be verified at http://sunearth.gsfc.nasa.gov/eclipse/
Secat/SE0001-0100.html. As with the eclipse of 28 March, this second eclipse could
not be seen in Rome: it was a few hundred miles off the west coast of Indonesia. The
most logical solution is to believe that eclipses were predicted. Indeed, this would seem
to be supported by recent archaeological evidence in the shape of a time-measuring
device that appears to have had a dial specifically associated with accurately predicting
eclipses, J. Marchant, ‘In Search of Lost Time’, Nature, 444 (30 November 2006),
534–38.
10 Dio 55.26.1.
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flood. Piracy in Sardinia and rebellion in North Africa would not have
helped.11
The seriousness of the above situation was exploited by the armies,
who demanded better conditions at the end of AD 5. As with most
other governments, the senate decided not to test the patience and
loyalty of a discouraged military. Members of the praetorian guard
were to therefore recieve 5,000 drachmas upon completion of sixteen
years’ service, while other soldiers were voted 3,000 drachmas upon
completion of twenty years’ service.12 In AD 5 there were 28 legions,
each containing on paper 5,500 men, and 9 cohorts of praetorians,
each with 500 men.13 That gives us 154,000 legionaries and 4,500
praetorians. A very large number had evidently survived their years of
service and expected immediate payment. A soldier’s severance pack-
age would consist of either cash or a plot of land, though land was
more often provided as the government sought to minimize large
money payments.14 Nevertheless, Dio believed that the amount of
money required in AD 5 was enough to threaten the fiscus:
˜Ø’ s 	ÆF	’ IæH åæÅ	ø, ªÅ K
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e
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ı
IçŁø
 KŒ 	H 		Æªø ŒÆd 	c 	æçc ŒÆd 	a ªæÆ ºÆøØ.
And so lacking money for this, Augustus put a motion in the senate for a
sufficient and permanent revenue source to be established to ensure that
11 Vell. 2.116.2; Dio 55.28.1–4; Florus 2.31; Orosius 6.21.18. Dio writes that the
Gaetulians ‘ravaged the neighbouring territory’ while an inscription (V. Ehrenberg,
and A. H. M. Jones (1955), 63) testifies to war: Marti Augusto sacrum auspiciis imp.
Caesaris Aug. pontificis maxumi patris patriae ductu Cossi Lentuli cos. Xxviri sacris
faciundis procos. Provincia Africa bello Gaetulico liberata civitas Lepcitana. ‘Dedica-
tion to Mars Augustus by the city of Lepcis, for, under the auspices of Imperator
Caesar Augustus, Pontifex Maximus, Pater Patriae, and the command of Cossus
Lentulus, consul, XVvir Sacris Faciundis, pronconsul, the province of Africa was
freed from the Gaetulian war.’ Rome had other suppliers, but overall supply would
necessarily have been diminished, or at least interrupted; cf. G. Rickman (1980),
66–71, argues that Africa provided considerably more grain than did Egypt. Thus,
for Rickman, events in North Africa had a great effect upon supply in Rome.
12 Dio 55.23.1–5. 5,000 drachmas equals HS 20,000, and 3,000 drachmas equals
HS 12,000.
13 See basic accounts in H. M. D. Parker, The Roman Legions (1971), 92;
J. C. Mann, Legionary Recruitment and Veteran Settlement During the Principate
(1983); W. Nippel (1995), 92 f.
14 P. M. Brennan, ‘A Rome Away from Rome: Veteran Colonists and Post-
Augustan Roman Colonization’, in J. P. Descoeudres (ed.), Greek Colonists and Native
Populations (1990), 491–502.
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soldiers should receive maintenance and rewards abundantly from fixed
revenues, without injury to any other party.15
Augustus, sensitive to the issue of taxation and concerned about
laying the burden on citizens and provincial taxpayers, delayed mak-
ing a decision until the next year, AD 6, when a new treasury, the
aerarium militare, was created. Dio explains the delay:
. . . KØc Åd
 æ
 IæŒø 	Ød æŒ	, Iººa ŒÆd ı 	
 ‹	Ø
ŒÆd KÇÅ	E	 KÆæ	 . . .
Since no source [of revenue] acceptable to anyone was found, rather abso-
lutely everyone was distressed that one was even being sought . . .16
These must have been a difficult few months for Augustus, who was
confronted with threats by legionaries and praetorians if he did not
improve their conditions of employment, while also facing universal
opposition to any further taxation. Augustus states that he donated
HS 170,000,000 to the new treasury, and Dio adds that foreign kings
and cities also made contributions.17 Revenue was nevertheless in-
sufficient to meet expenditure, and so after much deliberation a 5 per
cent tax on ‘inheritance and legacies left by the dying to anyone
except the closely related or poor’ was initiated and earmarked for
military severance pay.18 The catalyst for this somewhat courageous
decision is not hard to find. In the winter of AD 5/6 parts of Illyricum
became restless; in late January or early February restlessness became
outright rebellion across the entire region. Augustus had no option
but to decide in favour of the troops.
Velleius describes some of the early incidents:
Oppressi cives Romani, trucidati negotiatores,magnus vexillariorum numerus
ad internecionem ea in regione quae plurimum ab imperatore aberat caesus,
occupata armis Macedonia, omnia et in omnibus locis igni ferroque vastata.
15 Dio 55.24.9.
16 Dio 55.25.1.
17 RG 17; Dio 55.25.3. Dio tells us that private citizens were forbidden to make
private donations. Wealthy citizens were happy to part with their money, but not
through taxation. Augustus, for his part, would not countenance wealthy individuals
being identified as patrons of the armed forces: tension between traditional Repub-
lican concepts and new political realities.
18 Dio 55.25.5; ‘closely related’ probably means that heirs in the first degree and
possibly even second degree were not taxed.
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Roman citizens were overpowered, merchants were massacred, a very large
number in the special detachment in the region which was the furthest
distance from the commander, were killed, Macedonia was taken by arms
and everywhere and everything was destroyed by fire and the sword.19
This is followed by Rome’s response:
Quin etiam tantus huius belli metus fuit ut stabilem illum et formatum
tantorum bellorum experientia Caesaris Augusti animum quateret atque
terreret. Habiti itaque dilectus revocati undique et omnes veterani viri femin-
aeque ex censu libertinum coactae dare militem. Audita in senatu vox
principis decimo die, ni caveretur, posse hostem in urbis Romae venire con-
spectum . . . Itaque ut praesidium militum20res publica ab Augusto ducem in
bellum poposcit Tiberium.
For the war inspired such great fear that the spirit of Caesar Augustus, steady
and firm from experience in so many wars, became shaken and terrified.
Thus a levy was held, from every quarter veterans were recalled and men and
women were compelled, according to the census, to give up some freedmen
as soldiers. The voice of the princeps was heard in the senate to say that,
unless precautions were taken, the enemy could come in sight of the city in
ten days . . . and so the State demanded from Augustus the protection of the
soldiers and Tiberius as leader in the war.21
According to Dio, and possibly an inscription found in Tuzla, the levy
(dilectus) included freeborn citizens.22 We can date Rome’s response
to the beginning of AD 6. Velleius states that he, as quaestor designate,
was among those dispatched to the front lines.23 Quaestorian elec-
tions usually occurred early in the year, which means that the levied
forces did not leave Rome until spring at the earliest.24 A terminus
post quem is provided by Velleius, who seems to have reached camp
shortly before summer.25 The senate’s decree should therefore be
19 Vell. 2.110.6; Oros. 6.21.23 f.
20 The word is debated, see A. J. Woodman, The Tiberian Narrative (1977), 161,
for a brief discussion.
21 Vell. 2.111.1–2. I have departed here from my usual practice of supplying the
Loeb text and have used instead that of A. J. Woodman (1977).
22 Dio 55.31.1–2; and V. Ehrenberg and A. H. M. Jones (1955), 168; cf. Suet. Aug.
25.2; Pliny NH 7.149.
23 Vell. 2.111.3.
24 A. J. Woodman (1977), 162; Pliny Ep. 4.15.6.
25 Vell. 2.112.1. The point is disputed. A. J. Woodman (1977), 162–163, provides a
good examination of the various positions, and shows that Velleius must have left
early in the year.
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dated somewhere between March and May. The response was possi-
bly a tumultus declaration. The mobilization of veterans and a dilectus
are certainly suggestive, but Dio supplies evidence of a decree sus-
pending inter alia the activities of the courts.26 Writing about an
earlier period Asconius states:
Bello Italico . . . crebraeque defectiones Italicorum nuntiarentur, nanctus ius-
titii occasionem senatus decrevit ne iudicia, dum tumultus Italicus esset,
exercerentur.
In the Italian war . . . news constantly arrived of rebellions among the Ita-
lians; on taking the opportunity to suspend public business the senate
decreed that the courts should not remain in use for the duration of the
Italic upheaval.27
It is nevertheless possible that the Illyrian rebellion and persistent
famine caused successive emergency decrees with overlapping con-
sequences. Under AD 6 Dio cites the following decisions:
(i) Foreigners (excepting doctors and teachers), gladiators, and
unsold slaves were evacuated to 100 miles distance;28
(ii) Senators were permitted to ‘travel wherever they wished’, and
the decisions reached by those who stayed were considered
valid, i.e. even if there was not a quorum;29
(iii) Most members of Augustus’ retinue and the retinues of other
high officials were dismissed;30
(iv) The courts were put into recess;31
26 Dio 55.26.1.
27 Asc. 73–74C; A. Lintott (1968), 153–5. Augustus’ own words are suggestive,
since tumultus was originally declared when there was a sudden raid of Etruscans or
Gauls, Vell. 2.111.1: ‘The voice of the princeps was heard in the senate to say that,
unless precautions were taken, the enemy could come in sight of the city in ten days.’
28 Dio 55.26.1; Suet. Aug. 42.
29 Dio 55.26.2. This represents a temporary suspension of the rules governing
senators’ movements outside Italy, Dio, 52.42.6 = 29 BC, see R. J. A. Talbert (1984),
139–40. It may be inferred that much of Italy was subject in AD 6 to a low food supply.
Augustus himself suggests that there was something wrong with agricultural produc-
tion, Suet. Aug. 42.3: ut tandem annona convaluit, impetum se cepisse scribit frumen-
tationes publicas in perpetuum abolendi, quod earum fiducia cultura agrorum cessaret,
‘He writes that when the grain supply improved, he was very much inclined to abolish
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(v) Expensive celebrations were to be curtailed, particularly ban-
quets on Augustus’ birthday;32
(vi) Two ex-consuls were appointed to watch over the grain and
wheat supply and produce a fixed ration amount for sale; and33
(vii) Those listed on the grain dole were provided with a double
serve of the new ration amount.34
These are certainly from senatus consulta. Evacuation shows that food
was scarce and that people were on edge. At least some decisions
belong to late August or September, since the effect of Augustus’
birthday (23 September) on food supply was anticipated. I propose
that a tumultus declaration was passed betweenMarch and early May.
Public business ceased until it became clear, perhaps by July, that
Rome was in no immediate danger from an invasion. By then food
supply had slowed dramatically, causing another emergency decree
affecting, inter alia, celebrations for Augustus’ birthday. Extreme
measures tend to harm a population’s general psychology. It could
be that frustration and/or desperation fuelled deliberate acts of de-
struction. Dio states that fire destroyed parts of the city, but Ulpian
provides more useful information: pluribus uno die incendiis exortis,
‘many fires had broken out in one day.’35 Lightning is a possibility,
but arson is more likely.36 Coming not long after severe floods, with
food supply still low, destructive fires must have further tested the
patience of urban residents. People were not only exposed to da-
maged property and disease but inflated prices for staple produce.
32 Ibid., 26.3.
33 Ibid., 26.2. This arrangement lasted only until AD 7, when, as Dio (55.31.4)
writes, two ex-consuls, attended by lictors, were made grain curators. The policy of AD
6 must have been to protect the market from inflationary pressures, see P. M. Swan
(2004), 180, cf. P. A. Brunt, ‘Princeps and Equites’, JRS 73, (1983), 42–75, argues that
the ex-consuls were to acquire more grain not police private contractors; G. Rickman
(1980), 64–6, also suggests that the problem was one of procurement, since private
contractors were proving inefficient in times of hardship.
34 Dio 55.26.3; Suet. Aug. 41.2.
35 Dio 55.26.4–5; Dig. 1.15.1–3; Suet. Aug. 30.
36 Ovid (Trist. 2.267–268) provides us with a contemporary opinion: ‘What is
more useful than fire? For whoever is planning to burn a house arms his criminal
hands with fire.’ The intention of P. Lentulus Sura and his co-conspirators in 63 BC to
deliberately to light fires across Rome is apposite. It was evidently the best method for
causing widespread panic, while diverting public attention from other activities, in
their case the assassination of members of the government, Sall. Bell. Cat. 42.
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The government’s response evinces suspicion and anxiety: a massive
fire-fighting force was mobilized.
Rome had hitherto relied on 600 slaves under the direction of the
vicomagistri to fight fires.37 In AD 6 this organization was abolished
and replaced by a force of either 3,500 or 7,000 liberti, directed by an
equestrian prefect (praefectus vigilum).38 The nature of the task
required officers to undertake policing duties in addition to the
putting out/prevention of fires.39 As a night patrol, the vigiles could
not help but witness a variety of crimes: arson, looting, opportunistic
violence, etc.40 In time the praefectus vigilum could even pass sen-
tence, but during our period criminals were probably handed over to
the city prefect (praefectus urbi), who, unlike the praefectus vigilum,
had use of a gaol.41
The relationship between fire and burglary was topical in Augustan
Rome:
qui sive tectis iniectus est sive fortuitus, ruinae et incendia illa urbium excidia
sunt; quippe non defendunt sua, sed in communi periculo ad praedandum ut
hostes discurrunt appetuntque aliena, et in suis domini a validioribus
37 Organized in 7 BC; Dio 55.8.6–7. For a general discussion on arrangements
before then, see P. K. Baillie Reynolds, The Vigiles of Imperial Rome (1926).
38 Dio 55.26.4–5; for 7,000 see P. K. Baillie Reynolds, (1926), 22; for 3,500 see
J. S. Rainbird, ‘The Fire Stations of Imperial Rome’, PBSR, 54 (1986), 147–69;
R. W. Davies, ‘Augustus Caesar: A Police System in the Ancient World’, in
P. J. Stead (ed.) Pioneers in Policing (1977), 12–32, esp. 14–16; P. M. Swan (2004),
182; W. Nippel (1995), 97.
39 Dig. 1.15.1–5. Some have argued that police duties were a later development, see
especially P. K. Baillie Reynolds (1926), 17 f.; W. Clinton Terry III, and K. V. Hartigan,
‘Police Authority and Reform in Augustan Rome and Nineteenth Century England:
Localizing and Nationalizing Police work in Traditional and Modern societies’, Law
and Human Behavior, 6:3/4 (1982), 295–311, esp. 301f; W. Nippel (1995), 96–7:
‘Their capacity to pursue thieves and runaway slaves should not be overestimated.’
40 Suet. Aug. 25.2: Libertino milite, praeterquam Romae incendiorum causa et si
tumultus in graviore annona metueretur, bis usus est, ‘Only twice were freedmen used
as soldiers, except for use as fire-fighters in Rome and if he was in fear of riots when
grain was scarce.’ The co-ordinating conjunction et need not imply two separate
emergency forces. It could mean that the vigiles fought fires and controlled riots.
Curiously, W. Nippel (1995), 96, understands this passage to mean that ‘Augustus
may have thought of employing the vigiles as a sort of riot police if necessary’, but then
writes: ‘but we have no evidence that they were really used in this way’. But surely
Suetonius provides such evidence.
41 Dig. 1.15: ‘The Prefect of the Vigiles takes cognizance of incendiaries, burglars,
thieves, robbers, and harbourers of criminals, unless the culprit is so savage and
notorious, that he is turned over to the Prefect of the City.’
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caeduntur, accenduntur alia ipsaque cum maxume flagrantia spolium ex
alienis ruinis feruntur.
Whether it [fire] seizes on buildings by arson or accident, these collapses and
these blazes are the ruin of cities. For men do not defend their own property,
but amid the communal danger hurry like enemies to the loot, and take what
belongs to others. In their own homes owners are killed by those stronger than
they. Other things are set alight on purpose, and, still blazing, are carried as
booty from the ruins of others’ houses.”42
An emergency force capable of maintaining order is obviously what
Augustus had in mind.43 To sum up then: Illyricum was in rebellion;
food supply was low owing to destroyed storage, piracy, and rebellion;
the public corn dole was being rationed; public business had ceased;
fires had broken out, causing destruction and looting; people were
probably exposed to extremely high short-term prices; public shows
had been cancelled until further notice; and a 5 per cent inheritance
tax had been imposed. Dio had evidence that people held Augustus’
government accountable:
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And so the people, distressed by the results of the famine and of the tax, and
by the losses resulting from the fire, were horrified, and were discussing
many plans for revolution, even openly, and posted up even more as pamph-
lets by night. And it was said that all these things had come about from the
planning of a certain Publius Rufus, but suspicion was directed against
others, for Rufus could neither have concocted nor accomplished any of
these things. But others, making use of his name, were understood to be
planning revolution. On account of this a search for them was decreed and
42 Sen. Cont. 2.1.11–12.
43 Phenomena that we know well in modern cities perhaps appeared in Rome in
the first century BC, necessitating a range of government interventions. Augustus’
Principate was an attempt at a solution, though incomplete. The vigiles represent an
important step in the direction of a centralized emergency services unit.
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rewards for informants advertised. Information started to come to light, and
because of this, the city was also in a state of commotion.”44
$OØº
 implies a very large group of people: a general dissatisfaction
with the government’s effectiveness had transformed into a public
show of anger and frustration.45 It is doubtful that the creation of the
vigiles calmed angry crowds.46 Hungry, worn-out people who, of a
sudden, face the loss of whatever possessions they have left are not
prone to cool-headed reason. A tradition of resisting taxation, more-
over, should not be lightly dismissed, especially since it was based on the
principle of Rome as the ruling element in the empire.47 Most modern
communities evidence anxiety when a new tax is imposed. Exaggerated
fears set in even when the proposed rate is low, further fuelling popular
resistance. Because the new earmarked tax was set at a flat rate for all
classes in the census (aside from the very poor), complaints would have
come from all sides. But even contemporaries believed that behind the
general protest lay a more sinister motive with political dimensions.
Some scholars view the episode as a single unique affair, while others
place it within the larger theme of dynastic succession.48 Identifying the
organizers of the protest will indicate if either interpretation is correct.
44 Dio 55.27.1–3.
45 Cf. P. M. Swan (2004), 183; also T. Wiedemann (1975), 268: ‘Perhaps we should
not overestimate the extent of opposition to the policies of the Government.’
46 Cf. P. M. Swan (2004), 183.
47 C., Nicolet, The World of the Citizen in Republican Rome (1980), 184–5.
Cf. P. M. Swan (2004), 183, who writes ‘It is anything but clear how he [Dio] thought
the inheritence tax, which he says exempted the poor, exercised the people.’ Swan
seems to suggest here that ‘‹milB’ is to be read as ‘the poor’. He is guided by
Z. Yavetz, Plebs and Princeps (1969), 141. But Yavetz includes in his list populus, ƒ
ºº B
 and ƒ K 	Bfi ºØ. It cannot be maintained that these all refer to the
poor. Importantly, however, there is evidence to suggest that the minimum property
qualification was set very low. J. F. Gilliam, ‘The Minimum Subject to the Vicesima
Hereditatium’, AJP, 73:4 (1952), 397–405, cites papyrus which shows that in the
second century AD a property worth 1,900 drachmas (HS 7,600) could be taxed. If
this were the case in AD 5, it would suggest that a great part of the population was
affected by the tax, including, perhaps, emancipated slaves who had inherited a few
thousand sesterces in their master’s will.
48 It is considered a single and unique affair by T. Wiedemann (1975), 264–71,
esp. 268; R. Syme (1986), 115–27; K. A. Raaflaub and L. J. Samons, ‘Opposition to
Augustus’ in K. A. Raaflaub and M. Toher, (eds.), Between Republic and Empire:
Interpretations of Augustus and his Principate (1990), 417–54. The affair is directly
related to court politics by: F. Norwood (1963), 153 f; B. Levick (1976), 329 f., (1999),
58f.; R. A. Birch (1981), 450 f. The affair is not treated by F. B. Marsh (1931);
A. E. Pappano (1941), 30–45; R. Detweiler (1970), 289–95; R. Seager (2005).
84 The Republic in Danger
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any 
way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Dio states that a certain Publius Rufus was nominally responsible,
and that others were in fact using his name. Publius Rufus is thought
to be the same man referred to by Suetonius in his list of men who
conspired against Augustus:
Lepidi iuvenis, deinde Varronis Murenae et Fanni Caepionis, mox M. Egnati,
exin Plauti Rufi Lucique Pauli progeneri sui . . .
Young Lepidus, then Varro Murena and Fannius Caepio and soon after
M. Egnatius, and next Plautius Rufus and Lucius Paulus, husband of his
granddaughter.49
Suetonius has consciously paired conspirators who he believed
worked together. Publius Rufus and Plautius Rufus are surely the
same man, and Levick is probably right to name him Publius Plautius
Rufus.50 But the reference to L. Aemilius Paullus has fuelled the most
speculation. We have two other references to Aemilius Paullus’ dis-
grace. First from the Scholiast on Juvenal:
Dedit hunc Agrippa sorori: Iuliam neptem Augusti significat, quae nupta Aemilio
Paulo cum [h]is [sic]maiestatis crimine perisset, ab avo relegata est. post revocata
cum semet vitiis addixisset perpetui exilii damnata est supplicio.
Agrippa [Herod] gave this to his sister: He [Juvenal] means Julia, grand-
daughter of Augustus, who having been married to Aemilius Paullus, when
he had perished under a charge of maiestas, was relegated by her grandfather.
After being recalled, when she had abandoned herself to her vices, she was
condemned to the punishment of perpetual exile.51
Next Suetonius, who refers to the cancellation of the future emperor
Claudius’ betrothal to Aemilius Paullus’ daughter:
Priorem, quodparentes eiusAugustumoffenderant, virginemadhuc repudiavit . . .
He repudiated the former before their marriage, because her parents had
offended Augustus . . .52
Suetonius’ quod parentes eius Augustum offenderant would seem to
contradict his previous linking of Aemilius Paullus with Plautius
Rufus, since we know that Julia was finally relegated in AD 8.53 But
connecting the disgrace of Julia and Aemilius Paullus could be
49 Suet. Aug. 19.1. 50 B. Levick (1999), index.
51 Scholia in Iuvenalem: 158.1–2. 52 Suet. Claud. 26.1.
53 Under AD 28 Tacitus, Ann. 4.71, writes that Julia had been exiled for twenty
years: Illic viginti annis exilium toleravit . . .
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thematic.54 Needing to explain the failed engagement of Claudius and
Aemilia Lepida, Suetonius decided to blame both husband and wife.
The Scholiast poses the more difficult problem. He is commenting on
Juvenal Satire 6.157, in which Juvenal mentions a diamond ring once
worn by Queen Berenice:
Hunc dedit olim j barbarus incestae, gestare Agrippa sorori, j observant ubi
festa mero pede sabbata reges j et vetus indulget senibus clementia porcis.
This was given long ago j as a present by the barbarian Agrippa to his
incestuous sister j where kings observe the Sabbath festival bare foot j and
ancient clemency indulges elderly pigs.55
Herod Agrippa, the Jewish king, is meant. The Scholiast has either
made a terrible mistake and confused Herod Agrippa with Agrippa
Postumus, or the manuscript has been garbled in transmission.
But the information is not useless. The Scholiast evidently believed
that the younger Julia was twice exiled. A minority have accepted the
claim, but most reject it as confused, proposing instead that
the Scholiast has conflated the relegation of the elder Julia and the
younger Julia. But the solution is unconvincing. Reference to the
younger Julia’s husband and brother indicate the possession of a
correct profile, as does the phrase neptis Augusti. Norwood has put
forward, in my opinion, the best solution: the younger Julia was sent
away twice: the first a form of quarantine; the second full-blown
relegation.56 An enforced ‘holiday’ is a logical assumption. In the
wake of Aemilius Paullus’ condemnation and the abdicatio of
Agrippa, it would have been sensible to remove the young woman
from the centre of public attention, a policy easily mistaken for tough
punishment by historians with an eye to her final disgrace. But even if
54 T. D. Barnes, ‘Julia’s Child’, Phoenix, 35:4 (1981), 362–3. Cf. R. Syme (1986), 115
f., for whom Suet. Claud. 26.1 is central to proving that Aemilius Paullus was not
punished in AD 6. Syme argues that adulescens refers to Claudius’ seventeenth birthday,
which was 1 Aug. AD 8. But adulescens cannot be treated so precisely, it is too general.
55 Juv. Sat. 6.157–160.
56 Twice exiled: F. Norwood (1963), 153 n. 31, though he considers the first
‘relegation’ to have been an informal arrangement, as with Agrippa Postumus’ stay
in Surrentum; R. Detweiler (1970), 290 n.12 seems to accept Norwood’s view;
B. Levick (1976), 331, and (1999), 59, with caution on both occasions. Exiled once:
E. Meise, Untersuchungen zur Geschicte der Julisch-Claudischen Dynastie (1969),
35–48; R. A. Birch (1981), 454; R. Syme (1986), 123 f.; P. M. Swan (2004), 184 f.
Unsure: T. Wiedemann (1975), 268 n. 3; E. Fantham, Julia Augusti (2006), 110,
162 n.7.
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Aemilius Paullus was exiled before his wife, we are left with a still
more difficult problem. Dio does not mention L. Aemilius Paullus in
connection with the affair.
Dio does not mention a trial in relation to the Rufus affair. Bauman
therefore held that the senatorial investigation must have failed.57 If
Bauman is right, then L. Aemilius Paullus’ conviction for maiestas
cannot belong in AD 6. To return to Dio’s text:
But others, making use of his name, were understood to be planning revolu-
tion. On account of this a search for them was decreed and rewards for
informants advertised. Information started to come to light, and because of
this, the city was also in a state of commotion.58
That information was submitted to the senate is in fact evidence that
the inquiry was not a failure. Much rests on Dio’s belief that the
submission of information caused ‘commotion’ in Rome. Bauman
supposes that the informants, being slaves, caused ‘commotion’. The
inquiry thus collapsed under the weight of anxious criticism.59 But we
do not in fact know what percentage of informants, if any, were
slaves. It is just as plausible that unrest was caused by the fame of
the personality exposed: i.e. L. Aemilius Paullus.
For Bauman, the episode’s only legal result was a senatus consul-
tum, which allowed for the public investigation of future acts of
anonymous defamation, and led eventually to the prosecution of
Cassius Severus in AD 8 for maiestas.60 He argues that a decree cited
by Suetonius is apposite:
Etiam sparsos de se in curia famosos libellos nec expavit et magna cura
redarguit ac ne requisitis quidem auctoribus id modo censuit, cognoscendum
posthac de iis, qui libellos aut carmina ad infamiam cuiuspiam sub alieno
nomine edant.
57 R. A. Bauman (1974), 28 f.
58 Dio 55.27.2.
59 R. A. Bauman (1974), 43 f.; Dig. 47.10.5.11: Et ei, qui indicasset, sivi liber sive
servus sit, pro modo substantiae accusatae personae aestimatione iudicis praemium
constituitur, servo forsitan et libertate praestanda. Quid enim si publica utilitas ex hoc
emergit, ‘And for the person who exposes such offence, whether he be free or slave,
there is provided a reward according the wealth of the accused, to be assessed by the
judge, and in the case of a slave liberty may follow. For it may be that a public good
emerges from the exposure.’ There is, however, no evidence that slaves provided the
bulk of information, if any, in AD 6.
60 R. A. Bauman (1974), 50.
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And he did not even dread defamatory writings about himself scattered in
the Curia, but refuted them with much care, and without searching for the
authors he recommended after this that writing or speech which defames
anybody and is produced under a false name should be investigated.61
I believe Bauman’s hypothesis is wrong. Dio does not describe the
ØºÆ disseminated in AD 6 as being defamatory; he refers only to
their containing revolutionary messages. The solution requires exam-
ination of two relevant defamation cases: those of Cassius Severus and
Titus Labienus.
Tacitus states that Cassius Severus was the first to be charged with
maiestas for defamatory writings:
Primus Augustus cognitionem de famosis libellis specie legis eius tractavit,
commotus Cassii Severi libidine, qua viros feminasque inlustres procacibus
scriptis diffamaverat.
Augustus was the first to drag investigations concerning written libel under
the law [of maiestas]; having been disturbed by the licence of Cassius
Severus, who had defamed distinguished men and women in his shameless
writings.62
61 Suet. Aug. 55.
62 Tac. Ann. 1.72. Jerome Chron. P176 H: ‘Cassius Severus, the outstanding orator,
who had mocked the Quintian proverb dies of starvation in the 25th year of his exile,
covered with hardly a rag over his genitals.’ That places his condemnation in AD 8. The
date is nevertheless disputed. Th. Mommsen (1899), 800; R. E. Smith (1951), 169–79,
esp. 178; G. W. Clarke, ‘Books for the Burning’, Prudentia, 4: 2 (1972), 67–83, and
D. Hennig, ‘T. Labienus und der erste Majestätspozeß de famosis libellis’, Chiron, 3
(1973), 245–54, all place Cassius’ trial in AD 12 by associating it with Dio 56.27.1 f: ŒÆd
ÆŁg ‹	Ø ØºÆ ¼		Æ Kç’ oæØ 	ØH ıªªæçØ	, Ç	ÅØ ÆP	H KØÆ	, ŒÆd
KŒE 	, 	a b K 	Bfi ºØ æŁ	Æ æe
 	H IªæÆø 	a b ø æe
 	H
ŒÆ	ÆåŁØ Iæå	ø, ŒÆ	çº, ŒÆd 	H ıŁ	ø ÆP	a KŒºÆ 	ØÆ
. ‘And learn-
ing that some pamphlets of an insulting nature were being written concerning certain
people, he ordered a search be made for them; and those that were found in the city he
ordered to be burned by the aediles, and those outside by the chief magistrates in each
place, and he punished some of the writers’. None cite Jerome. R. A. Bauman (1974),
29–30, is aware of Jerome, but he too wishes to associate Cassius Severus with Dio
56.27.1. He therefore moves the Dio passage into a lacuna where AD 8 would have been
because, he reasons, AD 8 was apparently a tumultuous year, while AD 12 was too
peaceful to warrant such an episode. This is a poor and self-fulfilling argument.
Logically, Dio’s evidence suggests that AD 12 was not peaceful. It is only if we remove
Dio that the year seems tranquil, an erroneous method for establishing historical fact.
A more recent examination of the evidence has been made by A. D’Hautcourt, ‘L’exile
de Cassius Severus: hypothèse nouvelle’, Latomus, 54:2 (1995), 315–18, who argues
that the intensification of Cassius’ exile to Seriphos mentioned in Tac. Ann. 4.21.6
belongs in 12 AD, and that the note in Tacitus under AD 24 actually refers to a re-
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The elder Seneca was similarly certain about another Augustan
orator, T. Labienus:
In hoc primum excogitata est nova poena; effectum est enim per inimicos ut
omnes eius libri comburerentur: res nova et invisitata supplicium de studiis
sumi . . . Eius qui hanc in scripta Labieni sententiam dixerat postea viventis
adhuc scripta conbusta sunt: iam non malo exemplo quia suo.
It was for him that there was first devised a new punishment: his enemies saw
to it that all his books were burnt. It was a new thing that punishments
should be exacted from literature . . . he who supplied this opinion on Labie-
nus’ writings afterwards had his own writings burnt while still alive: no
longer an evil penalty, once it became his.63
Bauman sidelined the problem of Labienus by tucking him away in a
footnote: ‘It is probable that no formal charges were preferred against
Labienus and that the burning of his books was the only penalty inflicted
on him. An extra-forensic remedy such as this was known in the
Republic.’64 Such extra-judicial remedies did occur during the Republic,
but reference to a senatus consultum indicates a senatorial inquiry and
the fact of a penalty implies that a quaestio followed.65 Labienus suffered
the penalty of a lex and the obvious candidate is the lex maiestatis.66
examination of Cassius’ situation, with a verdict to continue to uphold the prior
judgments. But this is to damage the natural meaning of Tacitus’ words, which
explicitly place Cassius’ move to Seriphos in AD 24. Dio 56.27.1 refers moreover to
multiple authors. The most plausible solution is to place Cassius’ condemnation in AD
8, consider the situation in AD 12 to have been wholly unrelated, and place the
intensification of Cassius Severus’ punishment (from relegatio to deportatio) to AD 24.
63 Sen. Cont. 10 prae. 5–6. Eius is unknown. The editor of the Loeb text suggested
Cassius Severus, but see Sen. Cont. 10 prae. 8: Cassi Severi, hominis Labieno invisissimi,
belle dicta res ferebatur illo tempore quo libri Labieni ex senatus consulto urebantur:
nunc me, inquit, vivum uri oportet qui illos edidici, ‘Cassius Severus, who was the
greatest enemy of Labienus’, had a beautiful saying that was in circulation at the time
when Labienus’ books were burnt by decree of the senate: ‘Now they should burn me
alive; I know those books by heart’. Severus was frankly impressed by Labienus’ works,
but his comment, as well as being witty, is critical of the decision to burn Labienus’
books. Indeed, it points out the futility of such action, since ideas can transcend mere
paper. Seneca, on the other hand, is clear that the individual who proposed the penalty
was the one who lived to see his works burn. G. W. Clarke (1972), 77, placed Labienus’
condemnation in AD 6, but there is no evidence to support this belief.
64 R. A. Bauman (1974), 31, n. 42.
65 Sen. Cont. 10 prae. 8.
66 Inferred also by the nature of Labienus’ death, Sen. Cont. 10 prae. 7: Non tulit
hanc Labienus contumeliam nec superstes esse ingenio suo voluit, sed in monimenta se
maiorum suorum ferri iussit atque ita includi, veritus scilicet ne ignis qui nomini suo
subiectus erat corpori negaretur: non finivit tantum se ipse sed etiam sepelivit,
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The decision to burn his books would have been discretionary, as
was often the case when various forms of damnatio memoriae were
implemented. But how can both Tacitus and Seneca be correct?
The most important evidence for Labienus comes from Seneca’s
Controversiae. The first is a reminiscence:
Memini aliquando, cum recitaret historiam, magnam partem illum libri
convolvisse et dixisse: haec quae transeo post mortem meam legentur. Quanta
in illis libertas fuit quam etiam Labienus extimuit!
I remember that once, when he was reciting his history, Labienus rolled up a
good part of the book, saying: ‘The sections I pass over will be read after my
death’ How great must have been their libertas if even Labienus was frigh-
tened of it!67
Seneca was impressed by Labienus’ reluctance, not simply because it
was out of character, but because at least one other had already recited
a politically sensitive history. Cremutius Cordus praised Cassius,
Caesar’s assassin, without reprimand from Augustus: Labienus’
work must have been especially shocking.68 The subject of his history
is unknown, but reference to a Pompeian spirit, a signpost for ideo-
logical opposition, is noteworthy.69
Yet a sympathetic Pompeian history does not sufficiently explain
his fate. Such things were an accepted activity, and were openly
encouraged by Augustus.70 Labienus must have gone well beyond
sympathy and explicitly stated that the wrong side had won the civil
war, and shown them as unworthy.71 That Labienus refused to recite
parts of his work publicly does not stand in the way of my hypothesis,
‘Labienus did not take this insult nor did he wish to outlast his own genius, but he had
himself carried into the tomb of his ancestors and walled-up, fearing that the fire
which engrossed his books would be denied his body: he not only finished his own life,
he burried himself.’ Labienus’ fear that fire might be denied to his own body, and his
desire to bury himself, suggest a charge ofmaiestas, which would have brought with it
either death or exile, which both prevented cremation and burial. Indeed, his suicide
can be explained as an attempt to protect his testament from interference by the State,
see also D. Hennig (1973), 251 f.
67 Sen. Cont. 10 prae. 8.
68 Tac. Ann. 4.34; Dio 57.24.2.
69 Sen. Cont. 10 prae. 5. G. W. Clarke (1972), 77: ‘an inveterate supporter of
Pompey’s cause’.
70 Tac. Ann. 1.10.1 on Augustus: simulatam Pompeianarum gratiam partium.
71 i.e. it was possible to sympathize with Pompey’s cause, but openly to lament the
victory of Caesar, and later Octavian, was an entirely different matter. Both evidence a
‘Pompeian spirit’.
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for they could have been seized after information was laid by a friend
or slave, or even leaked after circulation among intimates. Either way,
Labienus’ histories were not merely defamatory but were interpreted
as an incitement to sedition. An intention to incite sedition would
usually have come under the heading maiestas, though the penalty of
having one’s literary works destroyed might still have been novel.72
Cassius Severus, on the other hand, was charged with maiestas for
libel, but not, contra Bauman, for anonymous libel.73 Tacitus blames
Cassius Severus’ ‘writings’; he makes no mention of them being
anonymously written. Anecdotes of Cassius Severus show him to be
openly vicious, to the point of enjoying his reputation as a slanderer.74
His ego would not submerge even in exile!75 Cassius Severus marked
a far more insidious development because he was charged with
overt defamation, action that had always been examined through a
civil procedure under the lex Cornelia de iniuriis. The prosecutors
probably argued that some people (alique) - a group of people who could
72 Cf. D. Hennig (1973), passim, who posits a charge de famosis libellis. The case of
Cremutius Cordus does not contradict my approach. Tac. Ann. 4.34: Cornelio Cosso
Asinio Agrippa consulibus Cremutius Cordus postulatur novo ac tunc primum audito
crimine, quod editis annalibus laudatoque M. Bruto C. Cassium Romanorum ultimum
dixisset, ‘In the consulships of Cornelius Cossus and Asinius Agrippa, Cremutius
Cordus was prosecuted for the new and hitherto unheard of crime of writing a history,
praising Brutus and calling C. Cassius the last of the Romans.’ The charge against
Cordus cannot have been that of simply writing a history (which would have set an
impossible precedent to police), but writing a history in which, by praising Brutus and
calling Cassius the last of the Romans, he had diminished the majesty of the Roman
people and its government, since it could be argued that he had de-legitimized the
government. The charge was novel and obviously constructed for the purpose of
delation, as is made clear in Seneca’s Consolatio Ad Marciam; cf. R. H. Martin and
A. J. Woodman (1989), 177 f. The commentators take Tacitus to mean that Cordus
was the first to be charged with ‘writing a history’. Aware that this contradicts Seneca’s
note concerning Labienus, they argue that Labienus was charged not with writing but
with oratory. That is unlikely. Seneca states of Labienus’ punishment: ‘It was an
unheard of novelty that punishment should be exacted from literature.’ If he had
been charged with offensive oratory, why were his books burned?
73 R. A. Bauman (1974), 48 f.
74 We know of at least two of Augustus’ friends being attacked. Cassius Severus
apparently wrote that Quintus Vitellius, a quaestor under Augustus and the father of
the future emperor, was descended from a cobbler whose son, given to making money
from confiscated estates, married a common wife (mulier vulgaris) Suet. Vit. 2; see also
Sen. Cont. 2.4.11, and the preface of Cont. 3; Sen. Suas. 6.11; Quint. Inst. 10.1.116,
12.10.11 and 6.3.27, where jests are described asperam.
75 Tac. Ann. 4.21.
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be categorized - were subsumed under the maiestas of the Roman
people.76 This interpretation better explains a quote attributed to
Tiberius some years later:
Sed et adversus convicia malosque rumores et famosa de se ac suis carmina
firmus ac patiens, subinde iactabat in civitate libera linguam mentemque
liberas esse debere; et quondam senatu cognitionem de eius modi criminibus
ac reis flagitante: ‘Non tantum’ inquit ‘otii habemus, ut implicare nos pluribus
negotiis debeamus; si hanc fenestram aperueritis, nihil aliud agi sinetis;
omnium inimicitiae hoc praetexto ad vos deferentur.’
But he was firm and patient even against insults, evil rumours and defama-
tory songs about himself and his own people; he sometimes let out that in a
free society speech and thought should be free; and once, when the senate
was demanding jurisdiction on crimes and criminals of that sort, he said: We
do not have so much free time that we ought to get ourselves involved in
extra business; if you open this window, you will leave room for no other
business; the private enmities of everyone will be brought before you on this
pretext.77
Fenestra shows that it is a question of interpreting the law. Clearly a
‘loophole’ was left which made prosecution possible; it is also obvious
that overt libel is meant, especially omnium inimicitiae. It is not hard
to envisage the evolution. Cassius Severus’ prosecution rested on
subsuming specific classes (senators, priests, decurions, etc., i.e.
those later termed honestiores) under the maiestas of the State.78
A window (fenestra) for senators to destroy personal enemies thus
opened. Tiberius perceived the inherent dangers and in turn did not
observe the precedent, with a ‘take your personal squabbles else-
where!’79 That overt (or indeed anonymous) libel is never treated as
maiestas in the juristic literature, but continued to be treated under
76 Anonymous libel therefore never attracted a charge of maiestas, unless, of
course, the victim were a magistrate or the princeps. It could be investigated in a
public tribunal, but it made the perpetrator intestabilis. The idea that someone could
be subjected to a public tribunal and yet suffer a penalty prescribed by a civil
procedure is best explained by Paulus’ reference to an actio mixto iure, PS. 5.4.8.
Here, the action comes between the iudicium publicum and the iudicium privatum.
77 Suet. Tib. 28.
78 See P. Garnsey (1970), 221 f.
79 Tac. Ann. 1.72 does not contradict this approach: Mox Tiberius, consultante
Pompeio Macro praetore an iudicia maiestatis redderentur, exercendas leges esse
respondit. Hunc quoque asperavere carmina incertis auctoribus vulgata in saevitiam
superbiamque eius et discordem cum matre animum, ‘Soon after Tiberius, to an
inquiry put to the praetor, Pompeius Macer, whether the maiestas court should be
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the heading iniuria,80 is evidence that Tiberius’ position was sus-
tained. Only seditious writings/speeches and the defamation of the
princeps or a magistrate remained within the cognizance of the
quaestio maiestatis.81 Bauman’s argument that events in AD 6 led to
the lex Cornelia de iniuriis being extended to cover the publication of
anonymous defamatory writings, and that, two years later, such
writings were judged to have diminished the majesty of the Roman
people is probably wrong. Events in AD 6 were unrelated to the
question of defamatory writing. They were related instead to the lex
maiestatis in so far as it was the appropriate law for prosecuting acts
of treason.
THE SEDITION OF TIBERIUS ’ RIVAL
L. AEMILIUS PAULLUS
As with the interpretation of T. Labienus’ works, the ØºÆ circulated
by P. Rufus were held to be seditious (ø	æØ
), not defama-
tory.82 There was no need to pass a decree extending the scope of the
lex de iniuriis, for the lex maiestatis already covered such behaviour.
restored, responded that the law should carry on. Poems of unknown authorship
satirising his savagery, arrogance, and his broken relationship with his mother, had
also exasperated him.’ The statement belongs to AD 15. It relates simply to seditious
libel (was the princeps cruel) rather than private contumelies; see also Suet. Tib. 58.
Pompeius Macer may have been asking whether senatus consulta relating to investi-
gations into treason had superseded his courts’ judgment; Tiberius said ‘no’.
80 A fragment of Cicero (De re publica 4.10.12), which is found in Augustine (De
Civit. Dei 2.9) shows that defamation was a crime during Cicero’s childhood: nostrae
contra duodecim tabulae cum perpaucas res capite sanxissent, in his hanc quoque
sanciendam putaverunt, si quis occentavisset sive carmen condidisset quod infamiam
faceret flagitiumve alteri, ‘Our twelve tables, on the other hand, though they provided
the death penalty for only a few things, did provide it for any person who sang or
composed a song which contained a slander or insult to anybody else.’ Sulla probably
included it in his lex Cornelia de iniuriis, at which point the penalty was perhaps
downgraded.
81 Cf. Seneca De Beneficiis 3.26.1. Seneca probably refers to the final period of
Tiberius’ Principate, or at least to the period of Sejanus’ rule. For a case of written and
spoken libel against the emperor as maiestas, see Tac. Ann. 14.48, for a recent
discussion, see A. Yakobson ‘Maiestas, the Imperial Ideology and the Imperial Family:
The Evidence of the Senatus Consultum De Cn. Pisone Patre’, Eutopia, 3: 1–2 (2003),
75–107.
82 Dio 55.27.1.
The Buck Stops Where? 93
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any 
way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
This approach better suits the mood. A highly stressed community
will usually blame government when the conditions of life fail to
improve. When Rome was gripped by famine in 40 BC, the triumvirs
produced an edict establishing a tax on the sale of slaves and
inheritance of legacies. People were furious. The edict was torn
down amid violent protest. Octavian, while attempting to assuage
an angry and bewildered crowd, was pelted with stones.83 Fierce,
even violent, resistance to taxation is not unusual during or in the
wake of an economic disaster. But Rome had a history of such
resistance even during periods of economic prosperity. Roman
citizens had been exempt from most forms of taxation since
167 BC. Revenue was sourced instead from the taxation of provin-
cials and the spoils of war.84 As with protestors in 40 BC, the authors
of the ØºÆ probably treated the implementation of the inheritance
tax within a discourse of oppression. Augustus had already asked
senators to find a sufficient revenue source for the aerarium mili-
tare. Dio then adds:
IºØ ¼ººø ¼ººÆ KÅªÅÆø KŒø b Pb KŒÆ, 	c ’
NŒ	c 	H 	 Œºæø ŒÆd 	H øæH, L
 i ƒ 	ºı	H	
 	ØØ ºc
	H ı ıªªH j ŒÆd 	ø ŒÆ	ÆºøØ, ŒÆ		Æ	, ‰
 ŒÆd K 	E

	F ˚ÆÆæ
 ÆØ 	e 	º
 	F	 ªªæÆ æ· KBŒ	 b
ªaæ ŒÆd æ	æ 	, ŒÆ	ÆºıŁb b 	a 	ÆF	Æ ÆsŁØ
 		 KÆåŁÅ.
Of course when other men had proposed different schemes, he approved of
none, but he established the vicesima on inheritances and legacies left by the
dying to anyone except very close relatives or the poor, as though he had
found the tax written down in Caesar’s memoranda. For it had in fact been
introduced once before, and having been abolished, was again introduced at
this time.85
Senatorial submissions steered away from the taxation of citizens as a
viable policy, as is evident from Augustus’ response. Establishing an
archaeology for the tax is a defensive manuvre; unnecessary if the
solution was widely held to be reasonable. That Augustus was ob-
viously responsible for initiating the policy could not be disguised, but
his invocation of Caesar (now deified and so beyond criticism) shows
83 App. BC 5.67–8.
84 Cic. De Off. 2.76; Plut. Aemilius Paullus 38; Val. Max. 4.3.8. The tributum was a
direct tax on those citizens who could take up arms. It was a ‘direct contribution
assessed as a proportion of declared wealth’, C. Nicolet (1980), 157.
85 Dio 55.25.5–6.
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an unwillingness to take full responsibility. The bolstering of legisla-
tion with forty-five-year-old credentials implies criticism. Senators
with alternative revenue solutions and opposed to an inheritance tax
on principle would be the most likely antagonists. At least one senator
is linked to the critical ØºÆ published a few months later:
L. Aemilus Paullus.
In Dio’s narrative rumour alone implicated P. Rufus, and the
rumour was considered to be implausible.86 ‘Others’ were thought
to have been using Rufus’ name.87 If ØºÆ were anonymous, then
‘others’ were evidently spreading the rumours. Nevertheless, as Sue-
tonius makes clear, Rufus was unable to shake public suspicion.88 He
fell either as a double-crossed conspirator or an innocent victim. The
only way to fit L. Aemilius Paullus into the picture is to count him as
one of the ‘others’. This would better explain the ‘commotion’ which
followed the laying of information by informants. Allegations that an
important member of the government had orchestrated the popular
unrest would have been sensational, embarrassing many senators
with close ties to the consul of AD 1.89 Prior objection to the inheri-
tance tax (whether in senatorial meetings or the consilium principis)
would lend credence to the testimonies of informants. On this read-
ing, his opponents in the senate argued that, on the basis of informa-
tion from witnesses and in consideration of his manifest sympathy
with ideas present in the ØºÆ, Aemilius Paullus should be con-
demned for intending to incite sedition. The quaestio maiestatis,
86 Dio 55.27.1.
87 Ibid., 27.2.
88 Suet. Aug. 19.
89 Dio’s silence is still a problem. I can only conclude that Dio either passed over
the results of the inquiry or more likely followed a tradition which conflated the exile
of Paullus with his wife the younger Julia (there is a lacuna in Dio’s text for AD 8). The
conspiracy of Cn. Cornelius Cinna Magnus (cos. AD 5) is an appropriate example. The
younger Seneca placed the affair somewhere between 16 and 13 BC, while Dio placed it
in AD 4. Badian is sceptical: ‘On Cinna, his [Dio’s] date of AD 4 is usually thought to be
wrong, though Seneca’s main reference is so full of mistakes in names, dates, ages and
even the sequence of other conspiracies that it would be hazardous to believe him,’
E. Badian (1982), 20–1. Significantly Dio is thought to have used Seneca as a source,
M. Adler, ‘Die Verschwörung des Cn. Cornelius Cinna bei Seneca und Cassius Dio’,
ZÖG, 60 (1909), 193–208; F. Millar, Study of Cassius Dio (1964), 78–9; M. T. Griffin,
Seneca: A Philosopher in Politics (1976), 410 ff.; P. M. Swan (2004), 147–8. In both Dio
and Seneca, Cinna Magnus plotted against Augustus. As with Cinna Magnus, Aemi-
lius Paullus’ story may have suffered in transmission; the details of his trial were
obscured.
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again in operation, agreed.90 Most protestors probably wished only
for a policy reversal and increased government assistance, but men
like Aemilius Paullus had other motives.
Commotion in Rome apparently lasted until the food supply
recovered and events to celebrate the memory of the elder Drusus
were organized.91 All public spectacles had been cancelled in August/
September: games (provided by the elder Drusus’ sons, Germanicus
and Claudius) were probably supposed to alleviate general anxiety
and restlessness.92 Games were followed by a dedication of the temple
of Castor and Pollux by Tiberius.93 The dedication can be dated to
27 January AD 7, which, if correct, means that Tiberius returned to
Rome from Illyricum to participate in some of the celebrations.94 Dio
knew of a more sinister interpretation:
	 	 ªaæ 	H ºø –Æ ØfiŒØ, ŒÆd K
 	c ºØ, ›	 ÆæåØ, ıåH

Kç	Æ, 	e  	Ø æÆª	ø 	ØH ŒÆ, 	e b c ºE	 ç
 c
› Ahªı	
 ¼ºº 	Øa Ææa 	c IıÆ ÆP	F æ	Øfi Å.
And indeed, at the same time, Tiberius was carrying on with the business of
war and was continually visiting the city, whenever he had the chance; this
was partly on account of his business affairs, but mostly because he was
afraid that, on account of his absence, Augustus would show preference to
somebody else.95
Velleius returned to Rome late in AD 6 to enter the quaestorship, but
was soon off to Tiberius in Illyricum as legatus Augusti.96 Quaestors
90 Scholia in Iuvenalem 6.158.
91 Dio 55.27.3–4.
92 Suet. Claud. 2.2; Pliny NH 2.96, 8.4.
93 Dio 55.27.4; Suet. Tib. 20; Fasti Praenestini = V. Ehrenberg and A. H. M. Jones
(1955), 46; Ovid Fasti 1.705–8.
94 Suet. Claud. 2.2. Levick, B.; (1976), 327, n. 102; Dio places the dedication at the
very end of AD 6, the Fasti Praenestini (V. Ehrenberg and A. H. M. Jones (1955), 46),
and Ovid Fasti 1.705–8 give only the date: 27 Jan. P. M. Swan (2004), 185–6 postulates
that Dio has erred by linking thematically two episodes concerned with the elder
Drusus, i.e. dedication of the temple by Tiberius and the gladiatorial games put on by
Germanicus and Claudius at end of AD 6. Swan thus dates the dedication to 27 Jan. AD
6. It is similarly possible however that Dio has dragged back to the end of AD 6 an event
which in fact took place at the very beginning of AD 7, i.e. events were organized to
celebrate the life of the elder Drusus over a period of 2–3 months.
95 Dio 55.27.5.
96 Vell. 2.111.4; at 2.104.3 Velleius tells us that towards the end of AD 4 he joined
Tiberius in Germany as a praefectus equitum and that ‘for nine continuous years . . . I
was a spectator of his superhuman achievements’.
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designate were formally invested on 5 December, so that Tiberius
must still have been in Illyricum when Velleius set out from Rome.
Tiberius thus left camp for Rome no later than the first week of
January. His policy in the years preceding is instructive. Velleius
writes that in December AD 4: pietas sua Caesarem paene obstructis
hieme Alpibus in urbem traxit, ‘piety drew Caesar to the city, though
the Alps were almost blocked because of winter’; in December AD 5
Tiberius: eadem qua priore anno festinatione urbem petens, ‘sought
the city with the same haste as the previous year’.97 Returning to
Rome ‘with haste’ in December AD 5 is understandable. The city was
in chaos and the soldiers were threatening to strike. Remaining in
camp until late December–January AD 6, regardless of the situation
in Rome, was, however, intelligent policy. The stability of north-east
Italy was uncertain, with Dalmatians having recently invaded Mace-
donia a second time.98 Yet a contemporary opinion, surviving in Dio,
shows that Tiberius’ position was a topic of dispute:
#ÆŁg s 	ÆF	Æ › Ahªı	
, ŒÆd 	Æ
 K
 	e ØæØ ‰
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	Æ
b i Øa 	Æåø ÆP	f
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 . . .
And so Augustus having learned these things, suspecting that Tiberius could
have quickly defeated them but was delaying deliberately so that he might be
under arms as long as possible on the pretext of war, sends out Germanicus
[to Illyricum] although a quaestor, having granted him not only freeborn but
also freedmen soldiers . . .99
Tiberius’ enemies, who must have put forward this interpretation,
were playing games.100 Far from destabilising Tiberius’ position,
Germanicus was probably in the same boat as Velleius; both were
quaestors attached to Tiberius as legati Augusti. To depict Tiberius
as the new Salvidienus, desiring to possess the northern legions, was
to assault his supporters in the senate and his relationship with
Augustus.101 The accusation ought to be considered in relation to
97 Vell. 2.105.3; 2.107.3. 98 Dio 55.30.6. 99 Dio 55.31.1.
100 B. Levick (1999), 327 f. E. Koestermann, ‘Der pannonisch-dalmatinische krieg
6–9n. Chr.’, Hermes, 81 (1953), 345–78 argues that Dio uses, intermittently, an anti-
Tiberian source for this period, but P. M. Swan (2004), 204, points out that Dio’s
coverage of these years is, on the whole, pro-Tiberian.
101 Appian BC 5.66; Dio 48.33.1; Suet. Aug. 66.1.
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the circumstances of Tiberius’ power. Not even a year had passed
since senators had voted him the command, citing a need to protect
the commonwealth from a full-scale northern invasion.102 Augustus
agreed, describing Tiberius in a letter as the ‘sole defence of the
Roman People’ (unicum p. R. praesidium).103 Since Illyricum already
had a governor, Tiberius’ maius imperium was extended to cover a
larger region.104 He was put in charge of every legion engaged in
the action, which numbered ten of a total for the empire of twenty-
eight.105 Even if this extraordinary command was unanimously
supported in the senate, Tiberius’ opponents would necessarily have
harboured serious misgivings. I propose that the anti-Tiberian
rumours, attested for the end of the year, result from these misgivings.
People were given to understand that Tiberius planned to seize power
in a throwback to the civil wars.
The image of Tiberius the potentate was manipulated to insinuate a
strained relationship with both Augustus and Germanicus. When
Velleius described Tiberius’ return to Rome in December AD 4 as
pious, we must have the counter-argument.106 Tiberius’ enemies
portrayed him as dishonest and his position weak; his supporters
countered by insisting on a close and loyal relationship with Augus-
tus. The accusation that he was planning rebellion appeared in the
winter of AD 6/7, to which Dio attached his general explanation for
Tiberius’ behaviour: ‘he was afraid that Augustus might take advan-
tage of his absence to show preference to somebody else’.107 Dio’s
statement is born, I believe, from a contemporary account which held
that Tiberius faced a serious political rival. But identifying the rival
has proved difficult. Levick suggests Agrippa, but that is a stretch.108
Even with support he was too young, and others were above him in
102 Vell. 2.111.2.
103 Suet. Tib. 21.3.
104 Tiberius’ already possessed maius imperium in upper and lower Germany and
possibly Gaul, but there is no evidence to suggest that it extended originally to
Illyricum.
105 Vell. 2.113.1; Dio 55.32.1; Suet. Tib. 16.1 puts the number at 15, but Velleius ought
to be preferred.
106 A. J. Woodman (1977), 141 suggests that Velleius intends to ‘magnify this
pietas by emphasising the difficulty of the winter journey’. It is certainly reminiscent
of Tiberius’ rushed journey to see his dying brother ( Livy Per. 142; Pliny NH 7.48)
and later his dying father (Vell. 2.123.1; Suet. Tib. 21.1).
107 Dio 55.27.5.
108 B. Levick (1976), 327 f. and (1999), 58 f.
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the pecking order, ‘viz’. Germanicus.109 But Germanicus was also too
young and, as his position as a subordinate legatus shows, could not
yet be described as a threat. We require instead somebody with an
impressive pedigree, sufficient experience, and in opposition to Ti-
berius. The most obvious candidate is again L. Aemilius Paullus.
If Aemilus Paullus had been close to Gaius Caesar, and then sought
out his brother-in-law Agrippa, the hypothesis makes sense. Faced
with irrelevance and obscurity, oppositional groups often turn to the
manipulation of public fear and excitement as a weapon. Thus Ae-
milius Paullus used general discontent with the new tax and the war
to erode public support for the administration. BØºÆ were distrib-
uted in combination with talk that Tiberius harboured seditious
intent and that Augustus no longer trusted him. This was a trap: if
Tiberius stayed in winter camp it was because he desired supreme
power; if he came to Rome it was because Augustus favoured another.
Tiberius nevertheless returned to Rome to expose the rumours as
baseless. This was probably at the instigation of Augustus. Suetonius
writes that during the Illyrian rebellion Tiberius was often recalled
(saepius revocaretur).110 Augustus probably decided to refute rumour
with evidence; the people must see with their own eyes that Tiberius
harboured no wicked scheme and that his relationship with Augustus
was strong.111 Dedicating the temple of Castor and Pollux served to
reinforce the happy picture. Dio writes that Tiberius inscribed the
temple with his and his brother’s name. But he wrote his name as Ti.
Iulius Augusti f. Caesar Claudianus.112 No other extant inscription or
text attests the use of the former gentilicium by Tiberius.113 He was
109 R. A. Birch (1981), 451.
110 Suet. Tib. 16.2.
111 Rumours suggesting a weakened relationship must be placed within a wider
context. Suetonius, Tib. 21.2, knew of a tradition which believed that Augustus was
unimpressed with Tiberius and secretly ridiculed him: Scio vulgo persuasum quasi
egresso post secretum sermonem Tiberio vox Augusti per cubicularios excepta sit:
‘Miserum populum R., qui sub tam lentis maxillis erit!, I know that it is commonaly
believed that after Tiberius had left the room, following the secret conversation,
Augustus’ voice was heard by the servants: “What misery for the Roman people, to
be crushed by such slow moving jaws!” The influence of a late tradition aside, a belief
that Augustus tolerated Tiberius would, logically, have appeared owing to the nature
of Tiberius’ retirement in 6 BC. Scepticism would have been a natural reaction to
Tiberius’ adoption.
112 Dio 55.27.4.
113 P. M. Swan (2004), 186.
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evidently keen, at this moment, to advertise his Claudian ancestry,
believing it to be, or hoping to make it, popular with the people - a
Claudian event, putting on show even the future emperor Claudius,
the family embarrassment. The symbolism, it was hoped, would be
unmistakable: Augustus had made his choice; the future of Rome
would rest with Livia’s descendents, i.e. not Agrippa or, more im-
portantly, Aemilius Paullus.114 The fall of Aemilius Paullus provides
us with a plausible explanation for the abdicatio of Agrippa and his
transportation to Surrentum.
When dealing with the abdicatio of Agrippa, Dio wrote:
e b c ˆæÆØŒ, Iºº’ P 	e ’AªæÆ Kd 	e º K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 ˚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He sent Germanicus and not Agrippa to the war because the latter was low
minded and spent most of his time in fishing, on account of which he used to
call himself Poseidon; and he used to give way to violent anger and insulted
Livia as ‘stepmother’, and he often accused Augustus himself regarding his
inheritance, and since he was not of moderate mind he was made an
abdicatus and his property was handed over to the military treasury, and
he was himself exiled to Planasia, an island near Corsica.115
Dio has telescoped Agrippa’s life from AD 5–7 into one episode, but,
by reference to Germanicus’ commission as a legatus Augusti, Agrip-
pa’s demise can be tentatively dated. If Germanicus was commis-
sioned between December AD 6 and early AD 7, we can place Agrippa’s
abdicatio towards the end of AD 6, i.e. about the time that Aemilius
Paullus was exposed and prosecuted. A close relationship with his
much older brother-in-law would explain why Agrippa was removed
114 It is interesting to note that by highlighting Claudianus Tiberius could point
out a historical connection to the Cornelii, Valerii, Fabii, and even the Aemilii. Julia’s
children had no such Republican tradition and had to draw on Aeneas and his
offspring. Perhaps L. Aemilius Paullus advertised himself as a superior candidate on
account of his heritage, or compared himself to one of his famous ancestors, most
notably the consul of 182 and 168 BC. For a discussion of this family in late Republican
politics, see T. P. Wiseman, ‘Rome and the Resplendent Aemilii’, in T. P. Wiseman
(ed.), Roman Drama and Roman History, (1988), 106–20.
115 Dio 55.32.1 f.
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200 km from Rome but not from patria potestas.116 Poor behaviour
was declared the reason for abdicatio, but behind the pretext lay
concern that Agrippa was a liability. He was almost 18, old enough
to have strong political opinions, no matter how naïve. He was
deemed unsuitable for a high profile public career. He could not be
trusted in Rome, or, indeed, anywhere as a free man. It was soon
evident to Augustus, however, that Agrippa posed an even more
serious threat. He was relegated to the island of Planasia and placed
under military guard.
116 Cf. R. A. Birch (1981), 451: ‘The first punishment—‘abdicatio’ and removal to
Surrentum—was a curious mixture of extreme severity and surprising leniency . . .
exile in Surrentum was presumably comfortable, probably very comfortable, and as
favourable a sentence of this kind as could have been imposed.’ Birch has erred by
relying on Levick’s interpretation of abdicatio.
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Augustus’ Final Arrangements
THE RELEGATIO OF AGRIPPA
Abdicatio denied Agrippa an income, while confinement in Surren-
tum prevented interaction with the happenings of Rome. The deci-
sion then, after a mere several months, to transport Agrippa to an
isolated island off the coast of Corsica and place him under military
guard signals a dramatic change in the political climate. It was
evidently agreed by Augustus and Tiberius that Agrippa could under-
mine, or be used to undermine, their plans. We must keep this in
mind when considering the evidence.
Velleius writes
Hoc fere tempore Agrippa . . .mira pravitate animi atque ingenii in praecipitia
conversus patris atque eiusdem avi sui animum alienavit sibi, moxque cres-
centibus in dies vitiis dignum furore suo habuit exitum.
About this time Agrippa . . . alienated from himself the affection of his father
who was also his grandfather, falling into reckless ways by an amazing
depravity of attitude and intellect; and soon, as his vices increased daily, he
met the end which his madness deserved.1
Plutarch writes:
ŒÆd ‹	Ø 	H b ıE ÆP	fiH ŁıªÆ	æØH Iºøº	ø —	ıı [sic] ’ n

	Ø ºØ
 K	Ø KŒ ØÆºB
 	Ø
 K çıªBfi . . .
‘Two of his [Augustus’] grandsons being dead and Postumus, the one
surviving, being in exile because of some false accusation . . . ’2
1 Vell. 2.112.7. 2 Plut. De Garrul. 508.
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Tacitus writes
Nam senem Augustum devinxerat adeo, uti nepotem unicum, Agrippam
Postumum, in insulam Planasiam proiecerit, rudem sane bonarum artium
et robore corporis stolide ferocem, nullius tamen flagitii conpertum.
For she [Livia] had tied down the aged Augustus to such an extent that he
flung on the island of Planasia his only grandson, Agrippa Postumus, who
was uncultivated in the arts of virtue and stupidly wild in the strength of his
body, but who had nevertheless been convicted of no crime.3
Suetonius writes
Agrippam nihilo tractabiliorem, immo in dies amentiorem, in insulam trans-
portavit saepsitque insuper custodia militum. Cavit etiam s.c. ut eodem loci in
perpetuum contineretur.
As Agrippa became no more manageable, but rather each day became more
uncontrollable, he [Augustus] transported him to an island and, moreover,
confined him in military custody. He even took the precaution, by senatus
consultum, that Agrippa should be confined in that same place for all time.4
Aurelius Victor writes
Quamquam alii scribant dolo Liviae exstinctum metuentis, ne, quia privignae
filium Agrippam, quem odio novercali in insulam relegaverat, reduci comper-
erat, eo summam rerum adepto poenas daret.
Yet some write that [Augustus] was killed by a deception of Livia, who, since
she had gained information that Agrippa (the son of her stepdaughter,
whom, as a result of his mother-in-law’s hatred, she had relegated to an
island)5 was to be recalled, feared that, when he had obtained control of
affairs, she would be punished.6
And finally the Scholiast on Juvenal writes
Post revocata cum semet vitiis [Julia] addixisset, perpetuo exilio damnata est
supplicio. Huius Agrippa frater propter morum feritatem in Sicilia <insulam>
ab Augusto relegatus est, post cuius mortem iussu Tiberii interfectus est. 2)
Berenice, soror Ptolom<a>ei; verum neptis Augusti Iulia, cum qua (Agrippa)
commisit incestum et propterea ab Augusto relegatus est.
3 Tac. Ann. 1.3.
4 Suet. Aug. 65.4.
5 It is possible to read ‘she had relegated to an island’. If so, it would be evidence of
a moral argument.
6 Epitome de Caesaribus 1.27.
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After being recalled, when she [Julia] had abandoned herself to her vices, she
was condemned to the punishment of perpetual exile. Augustus relegated her
brother Agrippa to an island near Sicily for wildness of conduct, after whose
death he was put to death by order of Tiberius. 2) Berenice the sister of
Ptolemy; but Julia, granddaughter of Augustus, with whom Agrippa com-
mitted incest and for that reason was relegated by Augustus.7
It is important to note the following: (i) Agrippa was at Surrentum
when events causing his relegation occurred; (ii) behavioural pro-
blems were somehow linked to Agrippa’s relegation; (iii) a tradition
held that Livia was somehow to blame; (iv) Tacitus was certain that
Agrippa was not convicted of a crime; (v) Plutarch believed that a
false accusation played a part; and (vi) a senatus consultum was used
to legalize Agrippa’s incarceration. The evidence is obviously contra-
dictory. The reasons provided for Agrippa’s relegatio do not satisfac-
torily explain his treatment. A military guard indicates a political
dimension, but our evidence cites only family quarrels. Tacitus was
sure that Agrippa was convicted of no crime, and he is supported by
Suetonius’ belief that a senatus consultum provided official weight to
what was, in fact, the punishment of a son by his father (the senate
was probably cognizant on the issue of military custody).8 The reason
given at the time by Augustus must be a pretext, beneath which lay
more sensational information. It is simply unbelievable that an insult
hurled from Surrentum attracted a senatus consultum approving
incarceration on an island. We must therefore revisit the existing
political climate.
Dio states that in AD 7 the public was distressed by both war and the
continuing food shortage. He continues:
ŒÆd K ª 	Bfi Ø	Æfi  ÆsŁØ



















 ØFØ KŒ 	F Åı Ø KŒºı ÅŒ	’
IÆºŒŁÆØ.
7 Scholia in Iuvenalem 6.158.
8 Cf. W. Weber Princeps I (1936), 37 f.; J. D. Lewis, ‘Primum facinus novi princi-
patus?’ in Auckland Classical Essays presented to E. M. Blaikock (1970), 165–84;
S. Jameson (1975), 309f., who all take the senatus consultum plus exile to equal
maiestas and interdiction.
Augustus’ Final Arrangements 105
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any 
way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
And in view of the dearth of grain he appointed two ex-consuls as super-
visors of the grain supply with lictors. And since he needed money for the
wars and for the support of the vigiles he introduced a two per cent tax on the
sale of slaves and ordered that the silver being given from the aerarium to the
praetors producing gladiatorial shows no longer be expended.9
An inscription dated to August implies widespread anxiety about the
food supply:
feriae quod eo die arai Cereri Matri et Opi Augustae ex voto suscepto
constituta[e] sunt Cretico et Long. C[os].
Holidays, because on this day altars of Mother Ceres and Ops Augusta, in
accordance with a vow having been undertaken, were consecrated while
Creticus and Longus were consuls.10
Dio’s notice can be assigned to July and August. A low crop yield is
implied by a dedication to the goddess of agriculture, while employ-
ing commissioners evidences a rationalization of the market.11 More-
over, 2 per cent on the sale of slaves no doubt caused resentment and
cries of abuse, especially if the burden was passed on to consumers.12
More importantly, however, Dio’s ‘distressed by war’ could compress
in a few words the enduring success of the anti-Tiberian position as it
developed throughout the previous year: it was still held that Tiberius
harboured evil ambition. If criticism of Augustus’ government and
the implementation of the new tax do belong to July and August AD 7,
it may explain a violent election season.
Dio explains how in AD 8 Augustus’ ill health reduced his capacity
for full participation in public life:
		 b 	Bfi  ªæıÆfi ŒÆd ¼ı Æı	F 	a ººa ØŒÇØ K	æ, K
 b




9 Dio 55.31.4. The vigileswere paid from theAerariumSaturni (Dio 55.26.5), as were
the praetors, to put on gladiatorial shows. Increased revenue and spending cuts
show that the Aerarium Saturni was under considerable stress; mention ofOps Augusta
on 10 Aug. might indicate that Augustus put in some money of his own.
10 Fasti Amiternini = V. Ehrenberg and A. H. M. Jones (1955), 50.
11 G. Rickman (1980), 63 f.
12 Tac. Ann. 1.78, in AD 15, is a good example: Centesimam rerum venalium post
bella civilia institutam, deprecante populo edixit Tiberius militare aerarium eo subsidio
niti . . . ,‘When the 1 per cent tax on auctioned goods, which was instituted after the
civil wars, caused popular protest, Tiberius stated that the military treasury depended
on it . . . ’.
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ÆP	
, KØæ K	ÆØÇ	, IØ, 		øfi b ŒÆd 	E
 Ø	Æ ªæÆ	
	ØÆ KŒ	ØŁd
 ı	Å 	fiH 	 ºŁØ ŒÆd 	fiH øfi ‹ı
 KÆÇ.
At this time Augustus was allowing the senate to try most cases without him,
and he no longer went out before the people, but in the year before he had
himself declared all those who were to hold office, because there was dis-
order, but in this and the following years, having posted up certain bulletins,
he would recommend to the plebs and to the people those whom he
supported.13
%	Ø
 can mean ‘sedition’ and ‘discord’, or even describe a party
with a revolutionary platform. Popular anger at the carrying out of
the war, the low food supply, and taxation are possible causes. With
public spectacles again suspended owing to stress on the treasury,
elections provided the one opportunity for most citizens to publicize
frustration.14 Disgust with electoral legislation passed two years ear-
lier, which lessened the impact of the popular vote, may have fuelled
the outpouring of violence.
THE LEX VALERIA CORNELIA
Five fragments from an inscription found in Etruria in 1947 and
1951, which make up the so-called Tabula Hebana, cite electoral
legislation passed in AD 5 titled the lex Valeria et Cornelia. Augustus
is credited with reinstating the popular elections of the Republic in
27 BC. Most elections were in theory open contests, though it should
be noted that Augustus continued to hold the consulship until 22 BC.
In practice, however, the power of Augustus’ personality set apart the







 b ŒÆd Kd
	fiH øfi 	fiH 	 ›Øºøfi ŒÆ	a 	e IæåÆE Ø
 KºE	 ‹ø
 	’
IØ	ØØ 	’ KŒ ÆæÆŒºø
 j ŒÆd ŒÆF IØŒø	ÆØ.
And so as for those who were to hold office, he would select some himself
and nominate them; and leaving others to the people and to the plebs,
13 Dio 55.34.2. 14 Dio 55.31.4.
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according to ancient tradition, he would take care that no one should be
appointed who was unsuitable nor as a result of faction or bribery.15
‘Traditional way’ refers to the electoral process after the reform of the
‘Servian’ system in or after 241 BC.16 The electoral procedure during
the Republic is a topic of dispute, and, as such, will not be examined
here.17 It is enough to say that there were 193 centuries, drawn from
juniors and seniors in five property classes. One century was chosen
by lot from the juniors in the first property class to vote first, known
as the praerogativa.18 Since Romans counted units (i.e. centuries),
rather than the number of votes overall, candidates were elected in
descending order from the first to win 97 units to the last, which
apparently required, at the very least, the support of the first and
second property class.19 Importantly, the praerogativa was thought to
have influence over the voting of those that followed.
The property qualification of the first class in the late Republic is
unknown; scholars have suggested figures from HS 100,000 to HS
25,000.20 It no doubt included a range of socio-economic levels
from the extremely wealthy to those of modest prosperity well
below the equestrian level. The lot, a neutralizing agent thought to
reflect divine will, ensured that the privilege of voting in the praer-
ogativa was shared by many.21 Dionysius of Halicarnassus described
15 Dio 53.21.7, trans. by J. W. Rich (1990), 51.
16 Livy 1.42.4, 1.43.13; Cic. De Re Pub. 2.39–40; Dion. Ant. 4.16–21, 7.59.2–8. For
discussion, see Th. Mommsen, Staat.³ (1887–8), 240–99; E. S. Staveley, ‘Cicero and the
Comitia Centuriata’, Historia, 11 (1962), 299–314; L. R. Taylor, Roman Voting
Assemblies (1966), 85 f.; A. Yakobson, Elections and Electioneering in Rome, Historia
Einzelschriften Heft, 128 (1999), 54 f.
17 A good discussion of the various views can be found in A. Yakobson (1999).
18 For its influence, with some exaggeration, see Cic. Pro Plancio 20.49: An tandem
una centuria praerogativa tantum habet auctoritatis ut nemo umquam prior eam
tulerit, quin renuntiatus sit aut iis ipsis comitiis consul, aut certe in illum annum, ‘The
century which votes first carries of itself such weight that no candidate for the
consulship has ever secured its vote without being ultimately declared first consul
either at that very election or at any rate for the following year.’ Cicero would not
make this statement if it were held by many to be obviously false. People must
necessarily have believed it to be at least partially true.
19 Cic. Phil. 2.82–3.
20 A. Yakobson (1999), 44, esp. n. 62, provides an assessment of the various hypo-
theses.
21 R. Stewart, Public Office in Early Rome: Ritual Procedure and Political Practice
(1999), ch 1, and L. R. Taylor (1966), 73 f., show evidence that the lot is taken to be
divine. Cf. N. Rosenstein, ‘Sorting Out the Lot in Republican Rome’, AJP, 116:1
(1995), 43–75.
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the reformed system as ‘more democratic’ (than the Servian system),
(N
 	e Å	ØŒ	æ).22
Dio understands his source/s to mean that the above system was
again used after 27 BC and that the system was somehow transformed
to accommodate the discretionary power of Augustus. —æºº	
is a disputed term. Most scholars refer to it as commendatio, but
Swan has shown that Dio uses the term to mean ‘nominate’ rather
than ‘commend’, for which ıØ	ÆØ is used.23 Whatever Dio
had in mind, it is clear that ‘some’ canvassed with imperial
sponsorship. These are probably the Candidates of Caesar (candidati
Caesaris), of whom there were usually four.24 Aside from the appear-
ance of candidati Caesaris, elections under Augustus before AD 5 were,
therefore, conducted in a fashion similar to those of the Republic. The
lex Valeria Cornelia altered this ‘more democratic’ system. Ten cen-
turies, voting simultaneously, were employed as a prerogatory
group. They were known as the centuriae C. et L. Caesarum after
Gaius and Lucius and were made up of 600 senators and 3,000
equites, not the equites equo publico but older men who were eligible
to judge criminal cases.25 The reform was, in effect, a throwback to
the timocratic principle of the Servian system. A wealthy class was
privileged and their dominance made structural.26
22 Dion. Ant. 4.21.3. Some have taken this to be a reference to the lex Valeria
Cornelia: G. Tibiletti Principe et Magistrati repubblicani (1953), 60 f.; P. Fraccaro,
‘La Procedura del voto nei comizi tributi romani’, Opuscula, 2 (1957), 235–54;
E. S. Staveley, Greek and Roman Voting and Elections (1972), 129.
23 P. M. Swan, ‘—æÆººŁÆØ in Dio’s Account of Elections under Augustus’, CQ,
32:2 (1982), 436–40. —æÆººŁÆØ=Dio 44.11.4; 54.17.1; 54.30.2; 55.13.3; 60.3.2;
60.15.1: %ıØ	ÆØ=37.44.3; 55.34.2; 58.20.3.
24 Vell. 2.124.4. Tac. Ann. 1.15: . . .moderante Tiberio ne plures quam quattuor
candidatos commendaret sine repulsa et ambitu designandos, ‘ . . .Tiberius limiting
himself to the recommendation of no more than four candidates, to be designated
without rejection or competition.’ Tiberius must here be following an Augustan
precedent, see A. H. M. Jones, ‘The Elections under Augustus’, JRS, 45 (1955), 9–21;
D. C. A. Shotter, ‘Elections under Tiberius’, CQ, 16:2 (1966), 321–32; A. J. Holladay,
‘The Election of Magistrates in the Early Principate’, Latomus, 37 (1978), 874–93,
esp. 88.
25 M.H. Crawford (ed.), Roman Statutes I, BICS Supplement 64 (1996), 507–47, for
Tabula Hebana, see specifically 519–21 and 530–2. On the status of the eligible
equestrians, see A. H. M. Jones (1955), 15 f. We do not know how the change affected
other parts of the comitia centuriata. Senators and many equites had voted in the first
class, but the first class was not necessarily reduced by ten centuries. Either way the
innovation had definite consequences.
26 The emergence of this oligarchy was organic, not grounded in the Augustan
period. Many new equestrians in the Augustan age probably owed their station to the
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Brunt supposed that the law was introduced to satisfy equestrian
pride, but that is implausible.27 The beneficiaries of the legislation
posed no threat to the government, indeed, they had already profited
greatly from Augustus’ administrative revolution. A band of elderly
equestrians demanding the right to vote first at elections would have
been quickly, and safely, ignored. It makes more sense to believe that
Augustus was attempting to take greater control of the elections.
Brunt based his criticism of this approach on the consul lists for the
period immediately before AD 5: they show, as far as we can tell, that
Augustus would have been pleased with those elected.28 But this is
inadequate. We possess the names of relatively few praetors, aediles,





 ŒÆd 	e ºBŁ
 Æs ıºª	̇ P 	Ø ŒÆd
Kæ			 	Ø n c ŒÆd KŒE XæŒ . . . KºE	 ‹ø
 	’ IØ	ØØ
	’ KŒ ÆæÆŒºø
 j ŒÆd ŒÆF IØŒø	ÆØ.
The people and plebs were still meeting for elections, but nothing was done
which did not please him (Augustus) also . . . he took care that no one should
be appointed who was unsuitable or as a result of faction or bribery.29
Two points are necessary. First, no example of Augustus removing
a candidate from the ballot is recorded before the inception of the
lex Valeria Cornelia. The only instance recorded in which Augustus
personally chose the candidates is, in fact, the elections of AD 7;
an episode which survives only in Dio. Dio has probably erred by
inferring a substantive policy from an isolated episode. The removal
of candidates for bribery or factional violence is, moreover, unrelated
to the removal of ‘undesirables’. Accusations of bribery could be used
as a pretext, but evidence suggests that bribery did, in fact, occur and
was cause for concern.30 We should not consider the removal of
candidates on suspicion of criminal activity as evidence for Augustus’
ambitions of their father, grandfather, or great-grandfather. C. Nicolet, L’Ordre
équestre à l’époque républicaine (312–43 av. J.–C.), I (1996); S. Demougin (1988),
passim; E. Gabba, ‘The Roman Professional Army from Marius to Augustus’, in
Republican Rome: The Armies and the Allies, trans. by P. J. Cuff, (1976), 20–69.
27 P. Brunt, ‘The Lex Valeria Cornelia’, JRS, 51 (1961), 71–83.
28 Ibid., 74 f. He points out that the proportion of established nobiles and new
nobiles who reached the consulship remained the same in the periods 5 BC to AD 5 and
AD 6 to AD 15; as did the number of novi homines in the suffect consulship.
29 Dio 53.21.6–7.
30 Tac. Ann. 1.15.
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ability to control the comitia every year. The second point refers to
the comment: ‘nothing was done that did not please him also’.
Augustus would have surely congratulated all the successful candi-
dates. To rebuke the comitia for electing an eligible candidate would
have made ridiculous his claim that free elections had been restored.
Dio is confused. He accepts the claim that free elections were
reintroduced, but interprets Augustus’ public approval of those
elected as proof that he was secretly pulling the strings.31 If we accept
that Augustus’ power over the comitia was not certain, then the
introduction of the lex Valeria Cornelia explains itself. A passage
from Velleius describing events in 19 BC is instructive:
Praeclarum excellentis viri factum C. Sentii Saturnini circa ea tempora con-
sulis ne fraudetur memoria . . . tum in comitiis habendis praecipuum egit
consulem: nam et quaesturam petentes, quos indignos iudicavit profiteri
vetuit, et, cum id facturos se perseverarent, consularem, si in campum descen-
dissent, vindictam minatus est, et Egnatium florentem favore publico speran-
temque ut praeturam aedilitati, ita consulatum praeturae se iuncturum,
profiteri vetuit et, cum id non obtinuisset, iuravit, etiam si factus esset consul
suffragiis populi, tamen se eum non renuntiaturum.
The admirable deed of an excellent man, C. Sentius Saturninus, who was
consul around this time [19 BC], should not be lost to memory . . . in holding
the elections he acted as a distinguished consul: for he would not allow those
seeking the quaestorship whom he judged unworthy to put forward their
names as candidates, and when they persevered, he threatened that if they
31 An approach subsequently accepted by modern scholars. It is commonly held
that Augustus could have controlled the elections, but chose not to: A. H. M. Jones
(1955), 11 f. P. Brunt (1961), 78 f.; B. Levick, ‘Imperial Control of the Elections Under
the Early Principate: Commendatio, Suffragatio, Nominatio’, Historia, 16 (1967),
207–30, esp. 226–7; A. J. Holladay (1978), 885 f. But even if Augustus was able to
control, de facto, the list of successful candidates read by the presiding magistrate, it
does not follow that he could control the comitia. Any eligible candidate could write
themselves into, or be writen into, the election without prior approval from the
presiding magistrate, thus Tiberius’ policy described at Tac. Ann. 1.81: Plerumque
eos tantum apud se professos disseruit, quorum nomina consulibus edidisset; posse et
alios profiteri, si gratiae aut meritis confiderent, ‘Generally he declared that no one had
applied to him for nomination, except those whose names he had divulged to the
consuls; others were still able to apply, if they had confidence in their influence or
merits.’ Tacitus was sceptical, but his scepticism is tempered by his own admission of
confusion: De comitiis consularibus, quae tum primum illo principe ac deinceps fuere,
vix quicquam firmare ausim: adeo diversa non modo apud auctores, sed in ipsius
orationibus reperiuntur, ‘Concerning the consular elections, from the first to the last
of this Principate, I can hardly provide any positive statement: so different is the
evidence, not only in the authors [of history] but in Tiberius’ own speeches.’
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came down to the Campus Martius he would exercise his consular power to
punish them, and he would not allow Egnatius, who was flourishing in
popular favour and was expecting his consulship to immediately follow his
praetorship as his praetorship had immediately followed his aedileship, to
register his name as a candidate, and when this would not work, he swore an
oath that if Egnatius was made consul by the votes of the people he would not
publicly declare him elected.32
Refusing to receive ‘unworthy’ candidates had little effect. Candidates
could ‘write’ themselves into, or be written into, the election. But the
presiding magistrate could not be made to announce a result. Satur-
ninus was thus forced to use his power as the presiding officer to
thwart a popular movement in full swing. Dio’s narrative shows why
obstruction was deemed necessary:
‘&	ı b c K 	fiH 	Ø KŒøfi ˆØ
 %	Ø
̇ Kd b ŒÆd 	e ıæ	Æ
ÆP	fiH æÆØåŁBÆØ Ø (› ªaæ Ahªı	
 Pb 		 	ÅæÅŁE ƒ 	c
Iæåc KÆ	), 	Ø
 	 ÆsŁØ
 K 	Bfi ‘ fi Å ıÅåŁÅ ŒÆd çÆªÆd
ıÅÆ, u	 	f
 ıºı	a
 çæıæa 	fiH %	øfi łÅçÆŁÆØ. KØ
	 c MŁºÅ ÆP	fi B åæÆŁÆØ, æØ
 æe
 	e Ahªı	, 	a 
ÞÆåø ŒÆ	, łÆ.
Indeed, Gaius Sentius was consul that year. And when it became necessary to
have a colleague appointed in addition to him (for Augustus did not accept at
that time either the office which had been kept for him), disorder again broke
out in Rome and killings occurred, such that the senators voted for a guard
for Sentius. When he refused to use it, they sent envoys to Augustus, each
with two lictors.33
The election of a replacement consul probably occurred early in the
year, which would explain why the quaestorian elections were also
troublesome. The motive behind Egnatius’ rejection was political, but
the explanation was legal. He had breached the lex annalis.34 Velleius
states that Egnatius’ praetorship followed immediately (continuare)
after his aedileship, and that he was hoping for the consulship to
32 Vell. 2.92. 33 Dio 54.10.1.
34 Dio 55.20.1 f.Dio, in what is certainly a reconstructed speech put into the mouth
of Augustus in 29 BC, tells us that Augustus made alterations to the lex annalis. The
quaestorship could be reached at 25 and the praetorship at 30. We are told also that
the aedileship or tribunate were to be held in the intervening years (though patricians
were exempted), see G. V. Sumner, ‘The Lex Annalis under Caesar’, Phoenix, 25:3
(1971), 246–71. A biennium had never been required for plebian offices; a one-year
interval sufficed: the minimum age for the tribunate or aedileship was thus 26.
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follow his praetorship immediately.35 Similarly, Dio writes: ‘he had
been elected praetor illegally’.36 Egnatius must have held the aedile-
ship in 21 BC and the praetorship in 20 BC.37 Though he did not
participate in the consular elections of 20 BC for the consular year
19 BC, his participation in the extraordinary election of January 19 BC
defied the required biennium stipulated by the lex annalis. This
provided just grounds for Saturninus’ intervention, which was not
an abuse of arbitrary power. Egnatius had simply not satisfied the
legal requirements.38 This tells us nothing about arbitrary interfer-
ence in the elections.
The quaestorian elections, on the other hand, are more instructive.
If the quaestorian elections were held around the same time as the
election for a replacement consul, they may have been affected by the
violence and murders cited byDio. Egnatius was a popular figure, and
may have supported candidates for the quaestorship. Either way,
when Saturninus threatened those who set foot inside the Campus
Martius with consular power, he was no doubt acting pro re publica.
A senatus consultum providing an armed escort certainly looks like an
emergency. For a government seeking popularity, this option was
untenable in the long term. The lex Valeria Cornelia was supposed to
be the final solution. Faith was placed in equestrians, who were
qualified to dispense justice, to vote responsibly. That their role
became fixed is significant. Every election by the comitia centuriata
would be led by the same people from the same cross-section of
35 Vell. 2.91.3, 92.4; Dio 53.24.4–6.
36 Dio 53.24.4–5.
37 H. A. Andersen, Cassius Dio und die Begründung des Principates (1938), 29,
n. 74, argues for an aedileship in 22 and a praetorship in 21. J. W. Rich (1990), 159,
following Andersen, concludes that ‘Egnatius did not literally seek to join the consul-
ship to the praetorship, but his candidature was in breech of the legal two-year
interval.’ But that is to read Velleius contra naturam; he clearly means the next
year. Andersen’s approach is an attempt to reconcile Dio and Velleius, since Dio,
though he places Egnatius’ aedileship in 26 BC, seems also to provide a place for
Egnatius’ aedileship in 22, the year in which, according to Dio, Augustus gave
instruction to the aediles about fire-fighting (54.2.4). Dio’s dating is clearly a mess
on this point, and I believe we are best served by sticking with Velleius.
38 When members of the imperial family were in breach of the lex annalis, they
received the senate’s dispensation. The election of Gaius to the consulship in 6 BC is
anomalous, but even he had to wait while a senatus consultum was procured which
allowed him to take the consulship five years hence. Egnatius was infringing what had
become the privilege of the domus Caesaris alone.
Augustus’ Final Arrangements 113
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any 
way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
society every year. The elimination of the lot as a neutral device is
important.
The lot could inspire voters to interpret the vote of the praerogativa
as the will of destiny. The vote of the centuriae Caesarum, on the
other hand, could not be interpreted in this way. It must have been
viewed as a timocracy tied to the government: the ‘democratic’ tradi-
tions of the Republic set aside to gratify and co-opt a wealthy class. It
no longer represented the will of the gods, but the will of the domus
Caesaris (they were indeed the centuriae Caesarum). The legislation
may not have been implemented in time for the elections in AD 5,
while the elections in AD 6 may have suffered from the emergencies
affecting Rome. It is, therefore, conceivable that the elections in AD 7
were the first to experience the full force of the legislation. %	Ø

attested for the election season of AD 7 could evidence a popular
backlash.
THE ELECTIONS OF AD 7
We do not know what election was affected or at what point in the
election process Augustus intervened. I nevertheless propose that
Augustus intervened only after the centuriae Caesarum had voted.
Dio uses the verb IØ to explain the manner of Augustus’
intervention. Cary, in the Loeb edition, translates it with ‘appointed’,
while Swan, in his recent commentary, uses ‘designated’.39 The dis-
cretionary power implied by the terms ‘appoint’ or ‘designate’ has led
some to argue that Augustus could circumvent electoral procedure in
a time of crisis.40 But if we translate IØ as ‘declared’, an alter-
native solution presents itself.41
39 P. M. Swan (2004), 220.
40 A. H. M Jones (1955), 12; P. A. Brunt (1961), 78; B. Levick (1967), 207 and n. 3;
A. J. Holladay (1978), 878. Clause four of the Lex de Imperio Vespasiani (ILS 244)
states that the princeps’ commendati and suffragati were treated extra ordinem. Levick
(213) argues that the absence of a precedent associated with this clause implies that it
was created especially for Vespasian. But that does not account for Tac. Ann. 1.15,
where Tacitus writes that Tiberius’ commendationes were to be accepted sine repulsa.
Levick rejects the historicity of Tacitus’ words, but that is a self-fulfilling approach.
Nevertheless, F. R. D. Goodyear (1972), 194, seems to agree with Levick.
41 To be taken as Greek for renuntio.
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Dio remarks, while commenting on elections in AD 32, that when
there was an insufficient number of candidates or electoral strife
(çØºØŒÆ) fewer candidates were chosen.42 Tacitus knew of a simi-
lar policy. During the praetorian elections of AD 60, when acrior
ambitus broke out, Nero intervened by appointing to legionary com-
mands the supernumerary candidates. The number of remaining
candidates, therefore, equalled the number of vacancies.43 Should a
similar policy have been adopted in AD 7, it would have been im-
plemented in one of two ways. Augustus could have eliminated the
last few names from a list compiled by the presiding magistrate, or
eliminated those coming last after the centuriae Caesarum had voted.
I believe the second is more likely. If the presiding magistrate devised
his list arbitrarily, then simply eliminating those candidates at the
bottom would invite an accusation of corruption. Implied improbity
might be dispelled if the ranking of candidates was determined by lot,
which was often employed as a neutral mechanism to avoid conflict,
but since all candidates were necessarily equal at the beginning of an
election, the use of a device with the potential to imply divine support,
before votes were even taken, is unlikely.44 It was for this reason that,
during the Republic, elections were postponed until such time as an
orderly vote could be taken.45 We are, therefore, left with the second
option: eliminating superfluous names after the centuriae Caesarum
had ‘destined’ certain candidates.
At the praetorian elections of AD 7 about 16 candidates, 4 being
candidati Caesaris, would compete for 12 vacancies.46 On the day of
election the centuriae would assemble, the names of the candidates
would be written up, and after the usual ceremonies the centuriae
42 Dio 58.20.4–5.
43 Tac. Ann. 14.28.1.
44 Dio 58.20.3. Commenting on Tiberius’ policy in regard to praetorian, quaestor-
ian, and minor elections, Dio writes: ‘he selected as many as he wished and referred
them to the senate, some with his recommendation, in which event they were chosen
unanimously, but in the case of others conditioning their selection upon the merit of
their claims, upon mutual agreement, or upon the lot’. But Dio is ambiguous. We
know that some minor posts were filled by lot, but there is no explicit evidence that the
lot was used for the quaestorship or praetorship. Moreover, if an election was marred
by violence owing to an ‘undesirable’ candidate, the lot would not ensure his defeat,
unless, of course, he was proved to be complicit.
45 Such as the postponed consular and praetorian elections for 52 BC, marred
by gang violence, Asc. 30C.
46 Dio 56.25.4.
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Caesarum would have been asked to vote. A crier would then declare
the results of the prerogative vote, with some apparently ‘destined’
and some not.47 At this point indignation may have erupted. Those
ranked last had faithful support in the lower classes, causing shouts
that the centuriae Caesarum were out of touch. For citizens painfully
aware that the government no longer belonged to them, this would
have been too much. Violence ensued.48
It is not sufficiently appreciated that the ranking of successful
candidates was perceived to be a gauge of dignitas.49 Brunt argues
that the centuriae Caesarum did not alter the type of person elected,
but a defeated candidate would not have been consoled by the fact
that the winners were the same type as he!50 Where plebs and equites
had once dominated the ranking of candidates, that power now
resided chiefly within the centuriae Caesarum. But indignation le-
velled at the new equestrian oligarchy, which swamped the senators,
would come from each of the orders. The senatorial order was
witnessing the creation of a rival elite, other equestrians were made
to feel left out and forgotten, while the plebs were further alienated
from power by an equestrian oligarchy they did not identify with
and who owed them no favours—a primitive Tory mob. %	Ø
 was a
reaction to the early election results inasmuch as they represented the
inequitable and untraditional nature of the new electoral legislation.
Since people were voting when unrest developed, a few hundred
malcontents would have been sufficient to force the presiding magis-
trate to order the centuriae to disband and people to go home. The
consilium principis would then have been convened, where, according
to this interpretation, it was decided that the supernumeraries should
47 For the crier announcing the results of the prerogative vote, see Cic. Phil. 2.82–3.
The nature of destinatio is unclear. Destinati cannot have been automatically elected
since a candidate could be ‘written’ into an election at any moment. Perhaps the term
was simply a way of distinguishing those selected by the centuriae Caesarum - a badge
of honour for those selected and a signpost for conservative voters who tend to follow
a lead. Perhaps in an election that involved 16 candidates and 12 spaces, there were 12
destinati after the prerogative vote, i.e. those chosen to fill the number of spaces. The
comitia would still vote on all 16 candidates, but the 12 destinati would have an
advantage.
48 Anger was not universal, since Augustus was obviously able to gather enough
support to pass the laws in the first place. Nevertheless, the law only had to infuriate a
few thousand people for a disturbance to become dangerous.
49 Asc. 92C; the opening chapters of Cic. De Lege Agraria 2.
50 P. A. Brunt (1961), 73 f.
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be eliminated from the list. With the list equalling the number of
places, the comitia would again be called to vote. The process would
necessarily have been a rubber stamp, and any disturbance treated as
seditious, since the entire Principate was being placed in question. If a
pamphlet critical of Augustus and written using Agrippa’s name was
published at this time, we may have the political dimension inherent
in, but not explicitly connected to, Agrippa’s relegatio.
Suetonius states that Augustus fined a plebeian, Junius Novatus,
who was caught circulating a letter attributed to Agrippa Postumus:
Cum ille Agrippae iuvenis nomine asperrimam de se epistulam in vulgus
edidisset.
When he had circulated a letter among the people which was very critical of
Augustus under the name of the young Agrippa.51
The letter must have: (i) appeared to be Agrippa’s work; (ii) criticized
Augustus; (iii) allowed for Augustus to treat Novatus leniently; and,
(iv) included material that warranted Agrippa’s relegatio and incar-
ceration. Convincing the public that Agrippa authored such a docu-
ment would not have been difficult. Humiliation often breeds
resentment. Reconciling the final two criteria is more difficult, how-
ever. A fine seems too lenient if the contents of the letter were
seditious. But a letter merely critical of Augustus is not enough to
warrant Agrippa’s incarceration. Criticism of Augustus and Livia in
general, or even an accusation that Augustus used adoption to get at
Agrippa’s money, might explain abdicatio and possibly even relegatio,
but surely not incarceration. Of the two options, it is more reasonable
to suppose that Augustus underplayed his hand against Novatus than
overplayed his hand against Agrippa. If the case was discussed in the
senate, Augustus may have decided to give his opinion first. Since
Augustus was the chief victim, the case could have been heard in the
quaestio maiestatis, but he may have suggested that Novatus, being
guilty of publishing covert libel, ought to be tried de iniuriis instead.
Augustus deemed Novatus an insignificant threat, and so clemency
51 Suet. Aug. 51. B. Levick (1976), 332, also places the Novatus letter between the
abdicatio and relegatio of Agrippa. Curiously, the episode is not discussed by
R. A. Bauman (1974), in his chapter on defamation, though he shows on p. 30 that
he is aware if it.
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was advertised at no great expense to the government.52 Probably the
letter attacked Augustus and put forward a strong anti-government
position. For the letter to appear authentic, the author must have
known Agrippa, opposed Augustus and, no doubt, Tiberius, and had
the support of those who had been involved with Aemilius Paullus
but survived the fireworks of AD 6. As the evidence is arranged here,
criticism of the war effort, a food shortage, 	Ø
 at the elections, and
the circulation of a letter highly critical of Augustus all occurred
around the same time. This was not a coincidence but a sustained
attack on the government by malcontents constantly seeking to whip
up popular fear and resentment. Reeling from the effects of the lex
Valeria Cornelia and frustrated by the government’s inability to
improve the basic conditions of life, many citizens were no doubt
vulnerable to such propaganda. But what were the authors hoping to
accomplish by using Agrippa’s name?
Many scholars have assumed that Agrippa was a central figure in
an anti-Tiberian ‘faction’.53 The basic theme in almost every ap-
proach, no matter how the evidence is assembled, is that Agrippa
was relegated and incarcerated for involvement in an anti-Tiberian
conspiracy. Levick and Norwood have had the greatest impact on
recent scholarship. Levick noted that Surrentum is only about 25 km
from Misenum, a naval base that Agrippa’s father had created.54
Levick assumed that fishing occurred on the open water, and, in
turn, that Agrippa had crossed the harbour and visited the naval
base. The focus of his visit was to stir up revolt and hinder foreign
grain from reaching the capital and, in doing so, weaken Augustus’
position.55 Meanwhile, at Rome Agrippa’s supporters attempted to
‘write’ him into the consular election. The attempt was thwarted when
52 S. Jameson (1975), 301: ‘Augustus let him off lightly with a fine, which suggests,
perhaps, that the incident was one which proved useful to Augustus in providing a
reason for Agrippa’s removal’; R. A. Birch, (1981), 450.
53 A. E. Pappano (1941), 40; F. Norwood (1963), 154 f.; E. Meise (1969), 35 f.;
R. Detweiler (1970), 290: ‘perhaps Augustus was seeking to prevent any civil dissen-
sion which might arise from political plots centering on Agrippa’; J.H. Corbett (1974),
94; B. Levick (1976), 332 f. and (1999), 56 f. Cf. R. Seager (1972), 40: ‘It is unlikely
anyone could have considered him a serious contender for the Principate’; R. A. Birch
(1981), 451: ‘It would be rash to infer that Agrippa—still only 17—was a prime
mover’.
54 Outlined in B. Levick (1999), 59 f. and more fully developed in (1976) 333 f.
55 A view seemingly supported by R. A. Birch (1981), 452, support which some-
what undermines his concern not to be “rash”.
118 The Republic in Danger
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any 
way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
Augustus took control of the elections and appointed the magistrates
himself. There is nothing to disprove this theory, but neither is there
any way to test its veracity. Indeed, there are far too many assumptions:
(i) we are not sure the reference to Neptune refers to Agrippa’s stay at
Surrentum, he could easily have been fishing in the Tiber, or any
country estate;56 (ii) owing to difficulties experienced throughout the
empire, such as piracy near Sardinia, we cannot be sure how much of
the fleet was at Misenum; and (iii) we do not know the nature of
Agrippa’s stay at Surrentum, i.e. was he free to move about, or was he
subject to libera custodia?57 It is furthermore unlikely that Agrippa’s
election was a viable goal. Had Agrippa won in absentia, the presiding
magistrate could simply declare Agrippa ineligible, on account of age,
and refuse to declare him as the winner. Aside from public support,
which was already evident, no strategic advantage would be gained.
An even more extreme position was taken by Norwood, who
accepts the evidence of the Scholiast on Juvenal as authentic.58 The
Scholiast apparently believed that Julia’s final exile was caused by an
incestuous relationship with Agrippa (cum qua (Agrippa) commisit
incestum).59 From this Norwood produced a marvellous tale, in
which Agrippa and Julia were both sent to Surrentum because of
the cloud hanging over Aemilius Paullus. While in Surrentum, Julia
employed Ovid to act as Agrippa’s tutor. Ovid taught Agrippa his Ars
Amatoria; the result was a sexual awakening between brother and
sister, which left Julia pregnant. While in Surrentum the two became
embroiled in the revolutionary designs of Paullus’ faction, and were
accidentally caught by Ovid discussing seditious plans. Rumour
reached Augustus and Agrippa was banished, followed in AD 8 by
Julia and Ovid. Though Norwood’s approach is based on evidence,
56 A. E. Pappano (1941), 35, first associated the reference to fishing with Agrippa’s
stay in Surrentum. It has since become an established fact, E. Fantham (2006), 106:
‘Dio reports that Agrippa spent his exile fishing . . . ’. Dio does not say this.
57 The nature of Agrippa’s stay in Surrentum depends upon one’s view of abdicatio.
R. A. Birch (1981), 451, following Levick’s interpretation of abdicatio, writes: ‘Exile in
Surrentumwas presumably comfortable, probably very comfortable, and as favourable a
sentence as could have been imposed.’ As this thesis has shown, this interpretation
cannot be right. Agrippa may have been physically comfortable, but he was probably
supervised closely, see M. Wurm (1972), 54, 60.
58 F. Norwood, ‘The Riddle of Ovid’s Relegatio’, CP, 58:3 (1963), 150–63.
59 Scholia in Iuvenalem 6.158.
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his interpretation is unsatisfactory.60 At the crux of Norwood’s thesis
is the statement possibly in the Scholiast that Agrippa and Julia were
lovers. It is true that Julia was eventually found guilty of adulteria, and
that she gave birth to a child who was later abandoned, but this does
not necessarily support the Scholiast.61 I accepted above the Scho-
liast’s belief that Paullus was indicted for maiestas, since Suetonius
links Paullus with conspiracy against Augustus. The Scholiast, more-
over, does not confuse Paullus with a character from Juvenal, making
cross-contamination unlikely. In the case of Julia and Agrippa’s
sexual relationship, there is clear evidence for cross-contamination.
The Scholiast comments on Juvenal’s treatment of the Jewish king
Herod Agrippa and his sister Berenice, whose relationship Juvenal
describes as incestuous.62 Juvenal’s message has been evidently
garbled, either by the Scholiast or a copyist. The Scholiast may, it is
true, have known of a tradition which described Agrippa and Julia as
incestuous, but that is an argument from silence. Indeed, the absence
of incest in any other source, especially Suetonius, is surely the last
nail in the proverbial coffin. Norwood’s hypothesis should, therefore,
be rejected: Agrippa was probably not an ‘active’ participant in any
plot. He was 200 km away from Rome, no doubt in one of Augustus’
villas. Furthermore, since abdicatio was not accompanied by emanci-
patio, Agrippa was probably surrounded by a host of Augustus’
servants and freedmen, and was controlled by a rector. The idea,
inherent in the approach of some scholars, that his stay at Surrentum
was recreational cannot be right. Abdicatio evidences Augustus’ anger
with Agrippa; retention of patria potestas shows that he did not trust
Agrippa; dismissal to Surrentum indicates that Agrippa was to have
no contact with Rome. We should hence assume that Agrippa was
socially isolated.63 In this way, Agrippa was not relegatus because of
what he did, but because of what people wanted him to do or to be.
Aemilius Paullus’ supporters were left isolated, vulnerable, and
under heavy scrutiny at the beginning of AD 7. His exile seems to
have left a vacuum.His credentials are impressive: noble blood; ‘royal’
60 R. A. Bauman (1967), 243, n. 134 seems to misinterpret Norwood when he
writes: ‘(he) may be right to suggest that the Agrippa whom the Scholiast attests as
having corrupted her was not her brother, Agrippa Postumus, but Herodes Agrippa’.
61 Suet. Aug. 65.4.
62 Juv. Sat. 6.157–160.
63 The suggestion made above that Julia might have been ‘sent’ on a holiday at this
time does not contradict this theory. She was probably sent to the other side of Italy.
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wife; a daughter in the direct line from Augustus; a successful political
career; and support among the people. Those are hard shoes to fill.
Agrippa seems to have been the preferred replacement. The libellous
letter made Agrippa a mouthpiece for the opposition, whether he
liked it or not. He was just 18, unready for such a role, but he was
older than his brothers when designated to be consuls and only
slightly younger than Gaius as consul in office and commander in
the east.64 Agrippa’s personality may have become inextricably linked
to unrest. Thus, Augustus did not use relegatio and incarceration
because Agrippa had committed a crime, hence Tacitus’ nullius
flagitii compertum, but because he now represented a dangerous
potentiality.65
It has been argued above that Agrippa was abdicatus because of
manifest sympathy with Tiberius’ political opponents; a position
perhaps revealed within the walls of the domus Caesaris. A son
exhibiting such sympathies was a potential embarrassment and he
was packed off accordingly. Once Agrippa was the opposition mouth-
piece there was no option left but to pack him off for good. That
military custody was held to be necessary implies that Surrentum was
no longer safe. Perhaps a desire, or a plan even, to retrieve Agrippa
had become known to Augustus, causing understandable alarm. This
was probably the point at which Livia, whose involvement in the
banishment of Agrippa was either known or suspected by later
historians, was made to enter the scene. Her decision to support the
64 Augustus is, of course, the elephant in the room. His position at the age of 19
was celebrated.
65 Nullius flagitii compertum stands against theories which hold that Agrippa was
tried for maiestas. A. E. Papanno (1941), 36: ‘It can hardly be doubted that the
immediate cause for severe punishment visited upon Agrippa was his violent and
tactless accusation of Augustus. If so, then Tacitus’ “nullius flagitii compertum” is not
strictly true’ (my italics). But a false accusation hardly requires incarceration.
F. Norwood (1963), 154, alters Tacitus’ meaning to fit a schema: ‘Tacitus going so
far as to say he had been discovered in no crime’ (my italics). Tacitus does not say this.
R. A. Bauman (1974), 31: ‘A senatus consultum . . .makes it certain that the transfer to
Planasia was pursuant to a trial’ (my italics). To introduce to the senate a question
concerning Agrippa does not make a trial; S. Jameson (1975), 302 f. argues that
confiscation of property must relate to interdiction not relegation, and takes this to
mean that Agrippa’s offence was ‘loosely embraced under the law ofmaiestas’ but that
he ‘appears not to have stood trial’. First, how can Agrippa’s property have been
confiscated if he was not sui iuris? Agrippa owned no property to confiscate. Secondly,
how can an offence ‘loosely’ embrace maiestas? It was either maiestas or it was not.
Thirdly, if a person were interdicted for offences under the heading maiestas, then
there must have been a trial, if only a show. Probably there was no trial.
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exile of Agrippa, as well as his incarceration, in a forum such as the
family council may well have been explained as sinister interference,
something like: ‘I have heard it said that many people want him
returned from Surrentum.’ Blaming Livia for the entire mess certainly
fits with a desire to portray Agrippa as a viable alternative to Tiberius.
Whatever Livia’s involvement, Agrippa was ultimately punished by
Augustus via patria potestas, not by a public trial. The senatus con-
sultum that followed performed at least two functions: (i) it provided
that Augustus’ death would have no effect upon Agrippa’s situation;
becoming sui iuris would not free Agrippa from military custody; and
(ii) the decree may have been procured with a view to the uncertain
future. Perhaps it was designed to take from Tiberius the invidia of
keeping Agrippa in exile on Augustus’ expected death - he was soon
to be 70. It was certainly held that Agrippa was a threat to the
succession policy and that perpetual exile with military custody was
the only effective means, short of execution, of preventing his inter-
fering. A great deal of scholarship, however, attempts to connect the
younger Julia to the ‘revolutionary’ supporters of Agrippa. Indeed,
she is often portrayed as a dominant figure within an anti-Tiberian
movement. This image is born out of a political interpretation of
Julia’s exile in AD 8.
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7
The Exiles of the Younger Julia, D. Junius
Silanus, and the poet Ovid
Many link Agrippa’s exile with the exile of his sister Julia.1 The
approach is logical. Her husband was the conspirator Aemilius Paul-
lus; her exile occurred less than one year after her brother’s; she was
exiled to an island; her daughter’s betrothal to the future emperor
Claudius was cancelled; her house was razed to the ground; and she
was refused burial in the Julian mausoleum.2 These facts have been
used to construct an a posteriori image of the younger Julia as
conspirator, suspected of plotting against Augustus.3 The image is
wrong. Julia was punished for unchaste conduct, not conspiracy,
though her behaviour admittedly had political consequences. Aside
from the Scholiast on Juvenal, whose details we rejected already,
Tacitus supplies the best evidence when treating the return to Rome
of D. Junius Silanus:
Ut valida divo Augusto in rem publicam fortuna, ita domi improspera fuit ob
impudicitiam filiae ac neptis quas urbe depulit, adulterosque earum morte aut
fuga punivit. Nam culpam inter viros ac feminas vulgatam gravi nomine
laesarum religionum ac violatae maiestatis appellando clementiam maiorum
1 J. C. Tarver (1902), 257 f.; F. Norwood (1963), 154 f.; E. Meise (1969), 35 f.;
R. Detweiler (1970), 290 f.; B. Levick (1976), passim, and (1999), 60 f.; R. A. Birch
(1981), 455 f.; I. Cogitore, ‘Mancipii Unius Audacia (Tac, Annals II, 39, 1): Le Faux
Agrippa Postumus Face au Pouvoir de Tibère’, Revue Des Études Latines, 68 (1991),
123–35; R. A. Bauman (1992), 120 f.; E. Fantham (2006), 111.
2 Tac. Ann. 4.71.4 supplies the date and location of her exile; see Suet. Claud. 26.1
for her daughter’s betrothal; for the destruction of her house and the decision to refuse
her burial in the Julian mausoleum see Suet. Aug. 72.3.
3 As K. A. Raaflaub and L. J. Samons (1990), 430 note: ‘Scholars generally agree
that the charges of adultery against Julia . . .were only pretexts designed to conceal
political and conspiratorial involvement . . . ’.
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suasque ipse leges egrediebatur . . .D. Silanus in nepti Augusti adulter, quam-
quam non ultra foret saevitum quam ut amicitia Caesaris prohiberetur,
exilium sibi demonstrari intellexit . . .
Though a powerful fortune was with the divine Augustus in state affairs, his
fortune was less prosperous at home on account of the unchaste conduct of
his daughter and granddaughter, whom he expelled from the city and
punished their adulterous lovers with death or exile. For calling a common
fault between men and women by the serious name of sacrilege and violated
maiestas he went outside the clemency of our ancestors and his own
laws . . .D. Silanus, the adulterous lover of the granddaughter of Augustus,
although he did not suffer anything more severe than the loss of Caesar’s
friendship, understood it to mean his exile.4
He later writes
Per idem tempus Iulia mortem obiit, quam neptem Augustus convictam
adulterii damnaverat proieceratque in insulam Trimerum, haud procul Apu-
lis litoribus. Illic viginti annis exilium toleravit Augustae ope sustentata . . .
About this time Julia died; Augustus had condemned his granddaughter on a
charge of adultery and flung her on the island of Trimerus, not far from the
shores of Apulia. There she endured twenty years of exile, sustained by the
resources of Augusta [i.e. out of Livia’s purse].5
Suetonius writes
Iulias, filiam et neptem, omnibus probris contaminatas relegavit . . . ex nepte
Iulia post damnationem editum infantem adgnosci alique vetuit.
He relegated the Julias, his daughter and granddaughter, who had been
contaminated by every form of infamy . . . and he did not allow the child
born to his granddaughter Julia after her condemnation to be recognized and
nourished.6
Julia’s husband, L. Aemilius Paullus, was condemned in AD 6 under
the title of maiestas. If Julia was charged with actual adultery, then
Aemilius Paullus suffered not interdictio but relegatio, i.e. their mar-
riage survived his condemnation.7 But this cannot be right. Seditious
4 Tac. Ann. 3.24.
5 Tac. Ann. 4.71.4.
6 Suet. Aug. 65.
7 The status of L. Aemilius Paullus is a topic of dispute. B. Levick (1976), 331,
believes he was executed late in AD 6 or early in AD 7. Her view was accepted by
E. Fantham (2006), 110. R. A. Birch (1981), 453 noted the inherent problem of
Levick’s thesis: how could Julia be charged with adultery if Paullus was dead? He
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acts proved to have diminished the maiestas of the Roman People
would have attracted interdictio aqua et igni.8 Since, as has been
shown already, Julia’s disgrace was separate from that of her husband,
only one plausible solution remains: Julia was not charged with
suggested exile, but did not consider whether that meant relegation or interdiction.
R. Syme (1986), 115–27, argues that Aemilius Paullus was in fact alive until AD 14.
Minutes of the Arval Brethren, (ILS 5026) state that on 12 May they chose Drusus
Caesar to replace ‘L. Paullus’. Syme convincingly argues that Drusus replaced
L. Aemilius Paullus (cos. AD1), not an unattested son. Syme, however, places his
condemnation in AD 8; that time frame was rejected above.
8 Aqua et igni interdictio was the statutory penalty formaiestas in the late Republic,
replacing voluntary exile, Cic. Phil. 1.9.23. See also Tac. Ann. 3.50.4 and P. S. 5.29. It
meant, among other things, loss of Roman citizenship. For general discussion, see
A. H. J. Greenidge (1901), 510 f.; J. E. Allison and J. D. Cloud, ‘The Lex Julia
Maiestatis’, Latomus, 21 (1962), 711–31. Some have argued that aqua et igni inter-
dictio did not mean loss of citizenship, J. L. Strachan-Davidson II (1912), 39 f.;
A. H. M. Jones (1972), 109; B. Levick, ‘Poena Legis Maiestatis’, Historia, 28 (1979),
358–79; G. P. Kelly, AHistory of Exile in the Roman Republic (2006), 45 f. Three pieces
of evidence are put forward to show this: Cic. Pro. Caec. 34.100 states explicitly that
citizenship cannot be taken away from him, but is abandoned by the exile only when
he takes up the citizenship of another community. But it is dangerous to use Cicero
here as a guide to the law. It was in his interest to argue that he remained a citizen
while in exile. Cic. Har. Resp. 17, shows Cicero replying to Clodius’ question cuius
civitatis es? by suggesting that he belongs ‘to a State which could not exist without me’
and then states that he could have said ‘Rome’. Again, however, the context is
problematic; Cicero was trying to save his house by arguing, inter alia, that he had
remained a Roman citizen in exile, and therefore the legal owner of the house.
Incidentally, Clodius was pointing out that it was the intention of his law (by which
Cicero was banished) to deem Cicero a non-citizen; otherwise his question is self-
defeating. Cicero’s specious approach is exemplified by his response to Antony’s
intention to allow an appeal to those interdicted, Phil. 1.23: ‘Does this not annul
Caesar’s laws that bid that those convicted of violence and treason be interdicted from
fire and water’, i.e. on this occasion Cicero argues that those interdicted were not
protected by the various appeal laws (such as the lex Porcia) - they had no citizen
rights. Q. Pompeius Rufus was interdicted in 51 BC, and we are told that while in exile
he took his mother to court for withholding a fideicommissum, Val. Max. 4.2.7. This
appears to be the best evidence in favour of Stachan-Davidson’s interpretation, but it
is not clearcut. A fideicommissum was not a signpost to citizenship in this period - it
was not subject to formalization until the Augustan era (Iust. Inst. 2.23.1) and even
then it could be used to circumvent the lex Falcidia until the time of Vespasian
(J. Crook (1967), 125–7). It was a device for providing a legacy to those whose ability
to inherit was restricted, e.g. by the lex Voconia. As to the fact that Pompeius Rufus
was allowed to ‘have his day in court’, albeit in absentia, this was probably due to a
belief that his mother had acted outrageously - the verdict in his favour a legal
anomaly. It was commonly held that even exiles should live out their lives in relative
comfort. R. A. Birch (1981), 453, and T. D. Barnes (1981), 362–3, seem, nevertheless,
to believe that Paullus suffered relegatio since both insist that Julia committed
adultery.
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adultery. In Roman law interdictio dissolved marriage; a wife was sui
iuris or returned to the potestas of her father. It is universally held that
Julia was sui iuris.9 As such, any sexual relationship developed after
that moment would be stuprum, not adulterium.10 The crime of
stuprumwas treated under the title lex Iulia de adulteriis: Lex stuprum
et adulterium promiscui et ŒÆ	ÆåæÅ	ØŒ	æ appellat. ‘The law
refers to adulteria and stuprum indiscriminately and with rather a
misuse of terms.’11 Tacitus thus records the law by which Julia was
condemned, not her actual crime. This interpretation better explains
the treatment of Julia’s lover, D. Junius Silanus.
Theories which take Julia’s crime to have been adulterous, or
seditious even, fail to explain Augustus’ treatment of Junius Silanus.12
If suspicion of conspiracy dogged the younger Julia, it is untenable to
hold that Augustus considered Junius Silanus an innocent bystander.
What did he think they discussed while together in bed? Similarly, if
Julia had committed adultery, then Junius Silanus should have ex-
perienced at least relegatio.13 Paulus writes concerning the lex Iulia de
adulteriis:
Adulterii convictas mulieres dimidia parte dotis et tertia parte bonorum ac
relegatione in insulam placuit coerceri: adulteris vero viris pari in insulam
relegatione dimidiam bonorum partem auferri, dummodo in diversas insulas
relegentur.
It has been held that women convicted of adultery shall be punished with the
loss of half of their dowry and one third of their estates, and by relegation to
an island. The adulterer, moreover, shall be deprived of half his property, and
9 PIR² I 421.
10 G. Rizzelli, ‘Stuprum e adulterium nella cultura e la lex Iulia de adulteriis’,
Bullettino dell’Istituto di Diritto Romano, 29 (1987), 355–88; E. Fantham, ‘Stuprum:
Public Attitudes and Penalties for Sexual Offences in Republican Rome’, EMC, 10
(1991), 267–91.
11 Papinian Adulterers Book 1 = Dig. 48.5.6.1.
12 B. Levick (1999), 61, accepts that Augustus was mild toward Junius Silanus. She
sees it as a function of the Government’s confidence. But if Julia was a political player
worthy of exile, then the Government was evidently not confident. E. Fantham (2006),
110, wonders whether Junius Silanus informed against his lover. But that is unlikely if
the child was his and there is no evidence that Julia had other lovers.
13 A. J. Woodman, in R. H. Martin, and A. J. Woodman (1996), 226, notes that
Junius Silanus ‘in fact paid a lesser penalty than the lex demanded’. It is improbable
that Junius Silanus would have escaped trial had the charge been adultery proper with
a princess of the domus Caesaris.
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shall also be punished by relegation to an island; provided the parties are
exiled to different islands.14
Amicitia Caesaris prohiberi would have been a significant reduction
of the statutory penalty for violating a marriage, especially one ar-
ranged, probably, by Augustus for a princess of the imperial house.
That Augustus’ own law was contravened and his moral programme
repudiated would have made his treatment of Junius Silanus seem
even more absurd. Only a charge of stuprum provides a satisfactory
solution. But if Julia had committed stuprum, then we must explain
the confiscation of her entire property, the demolition of her house,
and Augustus’ decision to deny her burial in the family mausoleum;
we must explain why Tacitus mentions violated maiestas and laesae
religiones.15 Ovid’s exile now enters the discussion.
Ovid insists that his relegation, in the very same year, was caused
by a poem and an error (carmen et error).16 Carmen is the Ars
Amatoria, but Ovid will not disclose the error. His reason is obvious.
The Ars Amatoriawas defensible; his error was not. This, he tells us, is
not because he was guilty of a crime (scelus) but because he was partly
at fault (culpa), i.e. he did not show intent.17 That he was relegated by
neither senatus consultum nor lex, but was instead ordered to Tomis
by Augustus, did not lose citizen status, and that he kept his property
supports his claim.18 The error was instead the real force behind his
relegation:
14 PS. 2.26.14; P. Garnsey (1970), 116. O. F. Robinson, The Criminal Law of
Ancient Rome (1995), 66, 138, n. 185 takes Paulus to mean that relegatio was added
to the statute in the 3rd century AD. But see Pliny Ep. 6.3.5–6.
15 The confiscation of Julia’s entire estate is implied by Livia’s financial assistance.
Perhaps, despite Julia being sui iuris, the house belonged to Augustus, who thus
destroyed a house now polluted. Why, however, was Julia considered for burial in
the Julian mausoleum when she should have been buried with the Vipsanii? J. Lin-
derski (1988), 191, argues that Augustus’ tomb was open to all of his decendants, not
simply those with agnatic connection, basing his conclusion on the work of F. De
Visscher, Le Droit de tombeaux romains (1963), 93–138. It is moreover important to
note that Agrippa was buried in the Julian Mausoleum, Dio 54.28.5: ‘Augustus . . .
buried him [Agrippa] in his own [Augustus’] mausoleum, though Agrippa had taken
one for himself in the Campus Martius.’ It is probably the case, therefore, that
Augustus had meant in his will for all of Agrippa’s children to be buried in the Julian
Mausoleum. In his final will, drawn up in AD 13, Augustus took care to state explicitly
that this was no longer the case for the younger Julia, or indeed her mother.
16 Trist. 2.207.
17 Trist. 3.1.52; Ex Pont. 1.6.25–6.
18 Trist. 2.130.
Exiles of the Younger Julia, D. Junius Silanus, and poet Ovid 127
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any 
way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
nec quicquam, quod lege vetor committere, feci: j est tamen his gravior noxa
fatenda mihi. j neve roges, quae sit, stultam conscripsimus Artem. j Innocuas
nobis haec vetat esse manus. j Ecquid praeterea peccarim? quaerere noli, j ut
lateat sola culpa sub Arte mea.
I have committed no act which is forbidden by the law j I must however
confess a more significant offence j you must not ask what it is; we have
composed a silly ‘Art’; j this forbids our hands from being innocent; j have
I sinned further? Do not ask this, j so that my fault may hide behind my Art
alone.19
Ovid wants us to know that his error was not an illegal act. Whatever
the pleas of the condemned are worth, Ovid would have us believe
that his fault was passive in nature:
Cur aliquid vidi? cur noxia lumina feci? j cur imprudenti cognita culpa mihi? j
inscius Actaeon vidit sine veste Dianam: j praeda fuit canibus non minus ille
suis. j Scilicet in superis etiam fortuna luenda est, j nec veniam laeso numine
casus habet.
Why did I see something? Why did Imake my eyes guilty? jWhy was a fault
convicted in me without my own intention? j Actaeon was unwitting when
he saw Diana without clothes: j he was none the less the prey of his own
dogs. j Obviously when you are dealing with gods even chance is punishable,
j nor does accident receive pardon when a divine power has been harmed.20
That which Ovid witnessed is elsewhere described as a crime (crimen)
and evil actions ( facta mali).21 Celebrities allegedly filled the scene.
Extolling the virtues of a discreet social life, Ovid warns against
socializing with great names: si quicquam credis amico vive tibi et
longe nomina magna fuge, ‘If in anything you believe a friend, live for
yourself and flee far away from great names.’22 If this alludes to
circumstances surrounding his error, then Ovid was attending a
party when he witnessed a crime by accident.23 The crime affected
Augustus directly:
19 Ex Pont. 2.9.71–6.
20 Trist. 2.103–108 f.
21 Trist. 3.6.28. Thus a recent attempt to equate Ovid’s error with having written
the Metamorphoses cannot be right, S. G. Nugent, ‘Tristia 2: Ovid and Augustus’, in
K. A. Raaflaub and M. Toher (1990), 239–57.
22 Trist. 3.4.1–4. Used by F. Norwood (1963), 156; B. Levick (1999), 60.
23 Trist. 3.6.11–13.
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Perdiderint cum me duo crimina, carmen et error, j alterius facti culpa silenda
mihi: j nam non sum tanti, renovem ut tua vulnera, Caesar, j quem nimio plus
est indoluisse semel. j altera pars superest, qua turpi carmine factus j arguor
obsceni doctor adulterii.
Though two charges, a poem and an error, have ruined me, j of the circum-
stances of the second fault I will remain silent; j for I am not of such
importance that I would renew your wounds, O Caesar, j for whom it was
more than too much to have pained once. j The other crime remains, that
through a disgraceful poem j I am accused of becoming the teacher of foul
adultery.24
The relevance of the allegorical laeso numine cited above is here
exposed. Augustus, described elsewhere by Ovid as a god, is held to
have been injured. This calls to mind Tacitus’ laesae religiones. That
Ovid unwittingly saw Julia in a compromising position which, when
it was later made known, was held to have embarrassed Augustus, is
the most plausible scenario. That Julia was with Junius Silanus at the
time is also probable. Thus, sometime after the exile of her husband,
Julia was discovered in a relationship with D. Junius Silanus; a ‘baby
bump’ probably gave it away.25 Hell broke loose when Augustus
found out. He treated dynastic alliances with extreme care, and
frowned severely upon this particular match. But the baby posed
the greatest problem: Julia had really messed things up. The senate
was notified and a public inquiry set up, with the lex Iulia de adulteriis
providing the terms of reference. As Brunt has shown, this lex
provided for the sale of slaves to the state for the purpose of inter-
rogation.26 Ovid seems to suggest that slaves were interrogated:
Causa meae cunctis nimium quoque nota ruinae j indicio non est testificanda
meo. j quid referam comitumque nefas famulosque nocentes?
The cause of my ruin, which is only too well known by all j must not be
revealed by my own evidence. j Why refer to the wickedness of friends and
guilty slaves?27
Famuli nocentes is reminiscent of an Augustan edict from the second
half of AD 8:
24 Trist. 2.207–12.
25 As pointed out by T. D. Barnes (1981), passim.
26 P. Brunt, ‘Evidence Given under Torture in the Principate’, ZSS, 97 (1980),
256–65.
27 Trist. 4.10.99–101.
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Edictum divi Augusti, quod proposuit Vibio Habito et Lucio Aproniano
consulibus, in hunc modum exstat: ‘Quaestiones neque semper in omni
causa et persona desiderari debere arbitror, et, cum capitalia et atrociora
maleficia non aliter explorari et inuestigari possunt quam per servorum
quaestiones, efficacissimas eas esse ad requirendam veritatem existimo et
habendas censeo.’
An edict of the deified Augustus, which he issued to the consuls Vibius
Habitus and Lucius Apronianus, is extant as follows: ‘I do not think that
interrogations are required in every case and person, but when capital and
more horrible crimes cannot be explored and investigated in any other way
than through the interrogations of slaves, I am of the opinion that [such
interrogations] are most effective for the purpose of investigating the truth,
and I declare that they must be held.”28
The edict was cited by Paulus in his De Adulteriis. ‘Capital’ has
puzzled some scholars, since adultery was not a capital offence.29
Bauman relates the edict to the case of Cassius Severus.30 But that
does not explain why Paulus saw fit to place it under the title
adulterium. Moreover, it has been shown already that Cassius Severus
was indicted for overt libel; such an edict would have been unneces-
sary. The key is not capital but the nebulous atrociora maleficia. The
absence of a device to strengthen the comparative, i.e. etiam, implies
equality: ‘capital crimes or other more horrible crimes’, where ‘more’
does not imply a greater quality than ‘capital’.31 This is logical, for
what can be more severe than a capital offence, since capital offences
carried the severest penalty? Augustus, then, had in mind offences
that he held to be grave but, nevertheless, were not capital. Stuprum
involving a princess plus an unplanned pregnancy in the domus
Caesaris is a good candidate. If the law de adulteriis limited the
28 Paulus Adulterers Book 2 = Dig. 48.18.8pr.
29 P. Brunt (1980), 258; Dio 55.5.4 writes that in 8 BC Augustus proposed a bill,
which was passed, allowing for slaves to be sold to the actor publicus in certain
criminal cases. The bill was justified on the grounds that ‘it was necessary because
the loophole had enabled many to conspire both against Augustus himself and the
magistrates’. J. W. Rich (1990), 223, and P. M. Swan (2004), 61, both take this to be a
reference to the lex maiestatis. They are probably right. The practice was used in the
case of Drusus Libo in AD 16, Tac. Ann. 2.30.3, and C. Junius Silanus in AD 22, Tac.
Ann. 3.67.3. The loophole to which Augustus seems to have been referring is the
manumission of slaves before they could give evidence in caput domini in significant
cases; the case of Milo’s slaves as recounted by Asconius 34C is a good example.
30 R. A. Bauman (1974), 43 f.
31 So P. Garnsey (1970), 214: ‘more serious and capital crimes’.
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interrogation of slaves to cases of adultery proper, then perhaps the
legality of interrogating slaves in a case of stuprum was questioned;
Augustus replied that this particular offence must be treated as if it
were capital.32 The inquiry was obviously not set up to discover
whether stuprum had occurred; Julia was pregnant. But as Ovid’s
experience shows, Augustus was determined to clear away the rot.
Perhaps, as Levick supposes, Ovid witnessed, or took some part in,
the impromptu wedding of Julia and Junius Silanus.33 Whatever
occurred, Julia’s condemnation for a sexual offence was not a pretext
to disguise seditious behaviour. We must therefore explain Tacitus’
violated maiestas and laesae religiones:
For calling a common fault between men and women by the serious name of
sacrilege and violated maiestas he went outside (egredior) the clemency of
our ancestors and his own laws.34
Egredior means ‘to pass outside of ’ or to ‘diverge from’. Law is, of
course, interpretative, but Tacitus means for us to understand that
Augustus transgressed the rule of law and custom; that his interpreta-
tion of the crime was cruel and self-serving.35 By what right did he do
this? Augustus cannot have argued that the maiestas populi Romani
was diminished by Julia’s affair. If he had, Silanus should have been
more seriously punished. Similarly, Augustus cannot have argued
that the act of stuprum in and of itself caused him injury. Patria
potestas was no doubt used for the elder Julia, but what device was
used to punish the younger Julia? My preferred solution is radical,
32 Cod. Iust. 9.9.3 states that interrogation was not allowed in a case of incest, but
for adultery proper alone. O. F. Robinson (1995), 64, is probably right to conclude
that stuprum was exempted also.
33 B. Levick (1999) 54 f., supported, perhaps, by E. Fantham (2006), 111. The act
could still be interpreted as stuprum. This view is based on a corrupt and fragmentary
text —æd 	F ˚ÆØÆæ ªı
, written around the time of Nero, which states: ˜
Łıª	æ
 ’ıºÆ NºÆø (ed. Lamporos supplies %ØºÆfiH) ªÆÅŁEÆ ŒÆd AªæØEÆ 
K	a 	ÆF	Æ ˆæÆØŒfiH 	fiH ˜æı. ‘(There were) two daughters, Julia, who was
married to Silanus, and Agrippina, who after these events (was married to) Germa-
nicus, son of Drusus.’ Admittedly the idea makes sense. A marriage might have been
considered logical with a child ‘on the way’, while Junius Silanus would have
been innocent of any charge: it was not an offence to court and marry a woman.
Renuntiatio amicitiae is therefore an obvious solution for Augustus: ‘you have com-
mitted no crime, but you have offended me and my house.’
34 Tac. Ann. 3.24.
35 Thus some are of the opinion that Augustus’ voluntas was the motivating force
for all criminal legislation during the period, B. Biondi, ‘La legislazione di Augusto’,
Scritti Giuridici, 2 (1965), 61–98, esp. 85 f.
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but, I believe, best explains the nature of the younger Julia’s con-
demnation: she was Augustus’ daughter by adoption.
The second edition of the Prosopographia Imperii Romani had for
Julia: IULIA (Vipsania Iulia sine dubio, sed gentilicium reticetur). This
is, so far as I can tell, accepted universally by modern scholors. But
sine dubio is a careless phrase. Why was Julia not Vipsania Agrippina?
By what right did she claim the nomen Julia?36 If she was sui iuris, by
what right did Augustus confiscate her property? By what right did
Augustus order the death of Julia’s child? Surely these questions
evoke serious doubt. Each question, left unanswered by her being
sui iuris, is explained perfectly by patria potestas.37 Moreover, ‘vio-
lated maiestas’ and laesae religiones are appropriate if Augustus were
Julia’s father by adoption: Julia should have revered Augustus as her
pater, while Silanus had only the officium of amicitia to observe.
Perhaps patria maiestas is here relevant.38 The term is of no interest
to the jurists, but appears only in a few writers of the early Princi-
pate.39 As with abdicatio, Augustus may have employed a nebulous
device for the purpose of punishing severely moral defects exposed in
his children: Julia did not violate the maiestas populi Romani, but the
maiestas of her pater familias.
It remains possible, however, that Julia was sui iuris. The effect of
this interpretation is quite different. If Julia were sui iuris, then
Augustus evidently held her to be, as a direct descendant, subject to
his potestas, if not in law, then certainly in fact.40 As was the case in
36 I note, however, that the daughter of Nero Claudius Drusus and Antonia was
named Livia Julia. Thus, the question of Julia’s nomen is perhaps not as important as
questions concerning her treatment by Augustus. Nevertheless, that no ancient source
attests an adoption for Julia is no bar. Aside from Livia, when do we ever hear of
female adoptions in the early Principate?
37 Contra L. F., Raditsa, ‘Augustus’ Legislation concerning Marriage, Procreation,
Love Affairs and Adultery’, ANRW II, 13 (1980), 279–339, esp. 290–5, who argues that
the adulterous affairs of the elder Julia were deemed to have injured the pater patriae,
who was the moral guardian of Rome. Raditsa believes that Augustus had no choice
but to appear as a martyr. But if the title pater patriae protected Augustus from all
forms of injury, then everybody would have been vulnerable; this was clearly not the
case.
38 Woodman’s comments are given as his own in R. H. Martin and
A. J. Woodman, (1996), 227 f.
39 Livy 4.45.8; Val. Max. 5.1 ext. 2; Quint. Decl. Min. 376.3.
40 For the idea that the domus Augusta was treated as a civic institution see
B. Severy (2003), passim, and A. Yakobson (2003). I do not hold that the domus
Augusta was a civic institution, only that it was being treated as such. This postulated
maiestas of the domus Augusta is not to be confused with the unreal concept produced
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my preferred scenario above, Silanus, in contradistinction, had only
the officium of amicitia to observe.41 Since, however, Julia was sui
iuris, Augustus was forced to deal with her transgression in a public
setting. Though the crime was stuprum, Augustus nevertheless se-
cured her relegation and the confiscation of her property: he had
transgressed, egredior, the penalties imposed by his own law and mos
maiorum. In addition, he demolished a house now polluted by for-
nication and refused Julia burial with her father, grandfather, cousins,
and siblings. Augustus argued that Julia’s unplanned pregnancy vio-
lated the majesty of his own house, the domus Augusta. Whichever is
correct, Julia had problematized a well thought-out and balanced
dynasty. The world was introduced to another child with a direct
connection to the pater patriae. But the affair, as the evidence
assembled here shows, was unconnected to the exile of Agrippa or
Aemilius Paullus even. It was an entirely independent event and of
little interest to the history of Agrippa Postumus, aside from its
relevance to the overarching theme of Augustus’ dynastic plans and,
perhaps, his belief in the domus Augusta as a civic institution.
by R. A. Bauman (1967), 243 f. I do not accept his belief that violated majesty was a
type of treason developed by Augustus as an alternative to the crimen maiestatis
imminutae to protect himself and the domus Caesaris and treated in an imperial court.
It would have been awkward and immodest for Augustus to argue that Julia had
violated his majesty as princeps and thus committed sacrilege. That he was the pater
patriae probably made his situation all the more embarrassing. Cf. J. E. Allison and
J. D. Cloud (1962), 721 f., who argue that the case was heard under the lex Iulia de
adulteriis, but that Augustus used the language of violated majesty and sacrilege to
justify extra-ordinem penalties. If, however, Julia’s crime had violated the maiestas
populi Romani, Silanus would have suffered interdictio, or at least relegatio. Silanus
suffered only amicitia Caesaris prohiberi precisely because the maiestas populi Ro-
mani was not violated.
41 In the case of Agrippa, Augustus decided that his de facto influence was
inadequate and so secured patria potestas. The case of the younger Julia shows the
inherent problem with Augustus’ approach to those members of his family who were
not subject to his potestas.
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Novus Principatus: An Imperial
Co-operative
The setbacks that began to pile up in AD 5 wore away at the govern-
ment’s confidence, since only lack of confidence explains treating
Cassius Severus’ public outbursts as maistas in AD 8. But Augustus’
frailty cannot have helped. He had withdrawn from attendance at the
assemblies and senatorial investigations, and entrusted foreign em-
bassies to a board of three ex-consuls.1 Three years later, in AD 11, his
already poor health deteriorated; a boon for those who claimed
special knowledge of the future. In addition to cracking down on
the activities of seers, Augustus also published his personal horo-
scope.2 Publication of an official horoscope is evidence that ‘false’
copies were in circulation. People were obviously excited by the
prospect of Augustus’ death and what it would bring. A passage
from Dio concerning events concurrent with Augustus’ edict may
be important. At the praetorian elections of AD 11, all 16 candidates
were elected, though there were not 16 spaces to fill:
. . .˚Æd 	æÆ	Åªd ŒŒÆŒÆ qæÆ, KØc 	F	 	 	B
 IæåB

I	ØÆ	 ŒÆd PÆ ÆP	H ºıBÆØ › Ahªı	
, xÆ K 	Ø	Ø
 J,




 	Ø 	ÆP	e Kª	, Iºº ƒ
ŒÆ Kd ºf ŒÆ		ÅÆ.
Sixteen praetors held office since that number had competed for the posi-
tions and Augustus, being in such difficult circumstances, was not willing to
offend any of them. The same was not the case however for the years
immediately following, but twelve [praetors] were appointed for a long time.3
1 Dio 55.33.5 = Xiph. 114.15–30; Dio 55.34.2.
2 Dio 56.25.5.
3 Dio 56.25.4.
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How was this achieved? Augustus could not tell the centuries how to
vote, nor were they compelled to follow his suffragia or commenda-
tiones.4 He must, therefore, have increased the number of vacancies
for that year to 16, thereby allowing the election to continue without
interference while ensuring that all were successful.5 The election was
thus perfunctory. Striking is Dio’s belief that Augustus had no other
option. What was so difficult about Augustus’ situation? The praetor-
ian elections might usefully be linked to the decree on horoscopes.
A widely held belief, or simply chatter, that Augustus would soon die
would explain the pressure being exerted by candidates - they were
unsure of support in the post-Augustan era. Beneath Dio’s account
lies an implicit logic: Augustus was threatened by men who would
only take yes for an answer, i.e. Augustus’ auctoritas was made to
serve their selfish ends and not his own.6 The nature of the threat is
not known, but it is surely not a coincidence that both Tiberius and
Germanicus were away from Rome; they had missed the violent
elections of AD 7 as well.7 Augustus’ solution was meant to arrest
anxiety, made acute by the widely held belief that a succession was
imminent. He was probably too weak to fight and felt that violence
must be avoided at any cost. Still, it was made known that he was not
ready to give up the ghost. A modern scientific mind has freed many
from the bondage-like determinism of astrological charts, but in AD 11
a great part of the population believed in their predictions. The
‘official’ horoscope was no doubt unspecific about the time of death,
highlighting instead his extraordinary destiny.8
The belief that Augustus was near death can also be linked to
legislation passed in AD 12 concerning the regulation of exiles. Dio
4 B. Levick (1967), passim.
5 As supposed by A. E. Astin, ‘Nominare in Accounts of Elections in the Early
Principate’, Latomus, 28 (1969), 863–74, esp. 872; A. J. Holladay (1978), 881.
6 Even if the candidates were fighting for legionary commands in the wars, or, indeed,
the year simply witnessed unusually tense rivalry, it does not explain why Augustus was
unable to ‘offend any of them’, which implies a weakened position.
7 Dio 56.25.1–3 states that both were in Germany for most of AD 11, celebrating
Augustus’ birthday (23 Sept.) north of the Rhine.
8 So the famous story of a young Octavian and Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa having
their horoscope read, the latter promised a great and glorious future, the former
presented with a prostrated astrologer. Suetonius tells us that after this incident
Augustus made public his horoscope, but this does not mean Dio is wrong. It could
be that the horoscope was made public twice. Indeed, how many copies would survive
more than fifty years? Suet. Aug. 94.12.
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provides some details. Those who had suffered aqua et igni interdictio
could no longer live on the mainland or any island within 50 miles;
they could not cross the sea, possess more than one transport and two
oared boats, employ more than 20 slaves or freedmen, and own more
than HS 500,000.9 The decree provided for the punishment of exiles
who infringed the new rules and, more interestingly, non-exiles who
aided infringements. Some exiles, Dio says many, were evidently
living outside their allotted districts in a manner that irked the
government.10 A limit of HS 500,000 signals the social standing of
those in question; the life of an exul seemed more like an extended
vacation than a punishment, and by AD 12 was too paradoxical to
ignore.11 The development of these rules may have been in response
to the discovery of plans to rescue a few high-profile exiles.
It must be significant that Augustus’ death triggered an attempt to
rescue Agrippa Postumus from Planasia; it was probably always the
plan. In AD 11 the declining health of Augustus provided individuals
9 Dio 56.27.2–3.
10 R. A. Bauman, (1974), 28–30, and B. Levick (1979), 358–79, both view this
legislation as the point at which aqua et igni interdictio became deportatio in insulam.
They are followed by P. M. Swan (2004), 288f; cf. J. L. Strachan-Davidson II (1912),
55f., and A. H. M. Jones (1972), 109–10, both of whom place the development firmly
in the Tiberian period. These views require some revision. Dio’s language shows that
change had occurred already: ‘As there were many exiles who were either living
outside of the districts to which they had been banished or living too luxuriously in
the proper places . . . ’. In the Republic interdiction from fire and water did not specify
a place of exile, only that the exile could not set foot on Roman soil. On the effects
during the Republic, see in general Th. Mommsen, Straf. (1899), 972–9;
A. H. J. Greenidge (1901), 512f; G. P. Kelly (2006), 17–65. On the other hand, we
have evidence that in the Republic relegatio - banishment by magisterial coercitio -
might carry with it a specific area of exile. Augustus probably merged the effects of
relegatio with interdictio early in his Principate. It should be remembered that
Sempronius Gracchus, who was evidently charged with a capital offence in 2 BC,
was exiled to the island of Cercina in the Gulf of Gabes, Africa.
11 The rulings would have allowed for confiscation of property. Confiscation can
be found accompanying exile as early as 212 BC, Livy 25.4.9–10. In 26 BC Cornelius
Gallus had his entire property confiscated, as did Drusus Libo in AD 16. In 52 BC,
T. Annius Milo was exiled for his part in the murder of P. Clodius. We are told that his
property was confiscated, Plut. Cic. 35; Dio 40.54.2; Cic. Ad Att. 5.8.2. Nevertheless,
Milo’s friends ensured that he was provided with either income and/or capital. More
strikingly, C. Verres, exiled in 70 BC for repetundae, apparently took with him into
exile a boatload of goods gained while governor of Sicily, Lact. Inst. Div. 2.4.35–6, Cic.
In. Ver. 5.44, Pliny NH 34.6. But in the case of Cn. Piso’s accomplices, Sempronius
Bassus and Visellius Karus, their property was sold in AD 20 ‘by the praetors in charge
of the treasury’, SCPP, 120f. Obviously, the statute provided guidance; details varied
from case to case. Suet. Iul. 42.3 is problematic, see G. P. Kelly (2006), 25f.
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opposed to Tiberius with cause for concern. While Augustus lived,
the supreme power of Tiberius was a potentiality only - albeit the
likely one. The plan to rescue Agrippa in AD 14 is evidence that some
were desperate enough to bet against the odds. I propose that a
similar attempt was made in late AD 11 or early AD 12. Stress should










Having threatened to punish both these [exiles] themselves and others who
had in any way assisted them in contravention of these [rules].12
It is possible that in response to a single catalytic episode, the govern-
ment formed a broad sweeping policy to resolve a systemic problem
in the treatment of exiles. I believe that this episode was the attempted
rescue of Agrippa Postumus and his mother, Julia, by L. Audasius and
Asinius Epicadus, irrespective of the fact that their places of exile had
not been breached.13 Suetonius lists the men among those who had
conspired against Augustus:
L. Audasi falsarum tabularum rei ac neque aetate neque corpore integri, item
Asini Epicadi ex gente Parthina ibridae . . .Audasius atque Epicadus Iuliam
filiam et Agrippam nepotem ex insulis, quibus continebantur, rapere ad
exercitus . . .
L. Audasius, who had been accused of falsifying documents and was old and
feeble, and Asinius Epicadus, a half-breed from the Parthini . . .Audasius and
Epicadus [planned] to seize Julia, daughter [of Augustus], and Agrippa,
grandson [of Augustus], from their islands, where they were being held,
and rush them off to the armies . . .14
Levick dates the episode to AD 8, arguing that the younger Julia was
instrumental in its planning and attempted execution.15 This is in
part because Levick requires a political dimension to explain the exile
of the younger Julia, and also because the younger Julia is not named
by Suetonius as a target for the conspirators. Conspiracy, however,
was not part of the younger Julia’s disgrace, nor is it necessary to
12 Dio. 56.27.3.
13 S. Jameson (1975), also proposes a connection. It must be noted also that there
were evidently many exiles, of whom we know the names of very few.
14 Suet. Aug. 19.
15 B. Levick (1999), 61.
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believe that Suetonius has supplied, or even knew, every fact. The two
men may have been arrested before they were able to leave Italy or
Rome even. Nor would a subsequent investigation bring to light every
detail. Much would have relied on the information of slaves and
informants, and by the time the two were sentenced, all that could
be said was that it was believed they were attempting to free Agrippa
and his mother.16 There were others who might have been consid-
ered; L. Aemilius Paullus and the elder Julia’s lover, Sempronius
Gracchus, being the most obvious candidates. Indeed, both - with
Agrippa - died during the succession of Tiberius. Sempronius died
perhaps towards the end of AD 14. He was put to death by milites on
the island of Cercina, off the coast of Africa. Tacitus does not provide
a date, supplying only the general eodem anno.17 Tiberius shifted
blame for the execution onto L. Asprenas, proconsul of Africa. The
execution was probably performed on hearing that Augustus was
dead; as was the case with Agrippa Postumus. The demise of
L. Aemilius Paullus is even more suggestive. Syme has shown that
L. Aemilius Paullus is the same man who was replaced by Drusus
Caesar as an Arval Brother on 12 May AD 14—three months before
Augustus finally died.18 It reads: in locum L. [ . . . ] Paulli.19 As Syme
points out, membership was not extinguished by exile but by death
alone.20 Though L. Aemilius Paullus possibly died from complica-
tions arising from the nature of his exile, the timing is suspicious.
Asinius Epicadus had Illyrian heritage. Some connection to the
Asinii is evident and Levick may be right when she suggests that
Asinius Pollio took him in war.21 Of all the attested Audasii,
the overwhelming majority come from the same 130 km stretch of
highway in Cisalpine Gaul, including Mediolanum, Bergomum,
Brixia, and Verona.22 Though excavations indicate the existence of
Augustan veteran colonies in the area, there is also evidence for
16 It is plausible even that the younger Julia was not named because she was not
part of this group; a member of the smart set with her own concerns, interested not in
politics but socializing at parties, or simply, in a different political group (which
included Junius Silanus).
17 Tac. Ann. 1.53.3.
18 R. Syme (1986) 123f.
19 ILS 5026.
20 Pliny NH 18.6; Pliny Ep. 4.8.1; Plut. Quaest. Rom. 99.
21 B. Levick (1976), 337, n. 135.
22 Mediolanum = CIL V² 5749; Bergomum = CIL V² 5150; Brixia = CIL V² 8879;
Verona = CIL V² 3503, 3504, 3505.
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disaffection.23 But Audasius’ criminal record is the most revealing:
he was a forger. The conspirators were not planning to attack the
prison on Planasia but to use falsified release documents instead.
A parchment, with what appeared to be Augustus’ seal, containing
instruction for Agrippa’s release, written in the princeps’ style and
type and presented by an appropriate looking individual, is a neces-
sary postulation. Rhegium, moreover, might have been a naval base,
which would explain Augustus’ decision to send his daughter Julia
there when attempting to appease angry crowds in AD 4.24 It would
also explain why the conspirators were not interested in causing a stir.
It was believed, or argued in court, that the escapees were to be taken
to the armies; no legions are specified. A clue is furnished if we take
this conspiracy to have been the prototype for Clemens. In that case
they were to be taken to the German legions; either way civil war was
to be the result.25
In AD 11 Tiberius and Germanicus campaigned in Germany, dis-
patched for the purpose of re-establishing a northern defence wea-
kened by the Varian disaster.26 Both men celebrated Augustus’
birthday on 23 September while north of the Rhine, and Velleius
adds that Tiberius later made winter camp.27 Dio has both in Rome
by January.28 The conspirators would not have approached the le-
gions while both Tiberius and Germanicus were present - they would
have waited until the onset of winter, making their expedition to
Planasia and Rhegium even more dangerous. A late date would
explain why legislation was not passed until AD 12; the plan was
23 A story survives in Plutarch (Comp. Dion. and Brut. 5) of the magistrates of
Mediolanum being thrown into confusion when Augustus happened to stop by and
was greeted with statues of Brutus and Cassius. Augustus is said to have laughed,
using the episode to advertise the government’s tolerance, but the fact that the story
exists suggests that not all were convinced by an eloquent smile. A story with a similar
theme is cited by Suet. De Rhet. 6, who states that within the forum in Mediolanum
there was a statue of Brutus, to which a famous orator declared: ‘once again Italy was
being reduced to the form of a province’. G. C. F. Chilver, Cisalpine Gaul: Social and
Economic History from 49 B.C. to the Death of Trajan (1941), 9f., argues that the entire
region was chosen for colonization by Augustus in order to stamp out disaffection, but
such tendencies would not necessarily dissolve in a melting pot of new and old
citizens.
24 J. Linderski (1988), 184, esp. n. 10.
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discovered during the early stages of its operation, or was exposed
before the conspirators had even left Rome. An inquiry was held, the
names of Audasius and Epicadus were brought to light and both were
sentenced at subsequent trials, though precise details never surfaced.
As with the Clemens affair, the government was left with small-fry
con–artists, rumour, and suggestive testimony.29 Still it was supposed,
or established in court, that at least Agrippa and his mother, Julia,
were the targets of an attempted rescue. The government was left to
wonder about other exiles. A sweeping review was held, exposing
fundamental problems within the system. Those opposed to the
coming succession kept up their attack regardless.
Dio records under AD 12 the distribution of vituperative pamphlets
aimed at prominent members of the government:
ŒÆd ÆŁg ‹	Ø ØºÆ ¼		Æ Kç’ oæØ 	ØH ıªªæçØ	, Ç	ÅØ ÆP	H
KØÆ	, ŒÆd KŒE 	, 	a b K 	Bfi ºØ æŁ	Æ æe
 	H IªæÆø
	a b ø æe
 	H ŒÆ	ÆåŁØ Iæå	ø, ŒÆ	çº, ŒÆd 	H ıŁ	ø
ÆP	a KŒºÆ 	ØÆ
.
And learning that some pamphlets of an insulting nature were being written
concerning certain people, he ordered a search be made for them; and those
that were found in the city he ordered to be burned by the aediles, and those
outside by the chief magistrates in each place, and he punished some of the
writers.30
The nature of the authorship and the extent of publication are
unknown. The arrest of authors indicates overt authorship, but may
also follow an extensive investigation condensed into a single para-
graph by Dio.31 ‘Those outside’ is similarly ambiguous. The range of
publication may have been a region of Italy, the whole of Italy, or
perhaps even empire-wide. Obscurity, however, does not preclude
contextualization. The reaction implies anger (searching for pamph-
lets, perhaps door-to-door, burning them, punishing authors) and
anxiety. Anger presumably because the victims were important peo-
ple; anxiety because the criticisms were widely held and/or believable.
A combination of Augustus’ ill health with the prospect of succession
is a plausible context. It was certainly the most pressing concern for
29 As with rumour surrounding Clemens’ insurrection, Tac. Ann. 2.40.3.
30 Dio 56.27.1.
31 As was shown above, contra R. A. Bauman (1974), 29–30, and A. D’Hautcourt
(1995), 315–18, Cassius Severus was not involved.
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Tiberius’ bitterest enemies. A relatio read on the first sitting day of the
senate is evidence for such a connection:
› b c Ahªı	
 KŒE 	 ‰
 ŒÆd Kd ªæø
 J 	fi B ıºfi B ŒÆd 	Æ	Å 	fiH
Øæøfi ÆæÆŒÆ	Ł	. Iªø b 	e Øº PŒ ÆP	
 (P ªaæ x
 	 q
ªªøŒØ) Iºº › ˆæÆØŒ
, uæ NŁØ.
But Augustus, giving his old age as the reason, entrusted Germanicus to the
senate and the senate itself to Tiberius. Augustus himself did not read the
letter (since he could not make himself heard) but Germanicus did, as was
usual.32
Scholars have not considered associating the defamatory pamphlets
with Augustus’ letter. The timeframe is, however, acceptable. In Dio’s
treatment of AD 12, the pamphlets are placed after the letter of
Augustus to the senate but before the Ludi Martiales, which occurred
on 10 May. If Dio simply recounts events as they appeared in the
senatorial acta, or a senatorial historian, the pamphlets were pub-
lished sometime between January and May. The time between pub-
lication and senatorial inquiry may only have been a week; at most it
was a month. The pamphlets could certainly have been written as
early as January. Augustus’ central message would have certainly
aroused protest and indignation from those already dissatisfied.
Entrusting Germanicus to the care of the senate is fair enough, but
entrusting the senate to Tiberius is outrageous. Hammond translates
ÆæÆŒÆ	Æ	ŁÆØ as ‘to commend’, but he is mistaken.33 Its literal
meaning is ‘to place alongside’; its usual sense is to ‘entrust’, as when a
father entrusts his son to the care of a guardian in a will. When Dio
means ‘commend’, he uses ıØ	ÆØ.34 The treatment of Germani-
cus’ children Nero and Drusus in AD 23 is here instructive. In AD 20
Nero was commended (commendare) to the senate on taking the toga
virilis; his brother Drusus followed suit at the beginning of AD 23.35
After the death of Germanicus, the boys were placed in the care of
their uncle, the younger Drusus. When Drusus died on 14 September
AD 23, Tiberius approached the senate thus:
32 Dio 56.26.2.
33 M. Hammond, The Augustan Principate in Theory and Practice during the Julio-
Claudian Period (1933), 273, n. 15.
34 Dio 37.44.3; 58.20.3. Both instances refer to elections, but the idea is the same.
Tacitus uses ‘commendare’ for both elections and the sponsorship of imperial youths
on taking the toga virilis.
35 For Nero, see Tac. Ann. 3.29; for Drusus, see Tac. Ann. 4.4.
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Erepto Druso preces ad vos converto disque et patria coram obtestor: Augusti
pronepotes, clarissimis maioribus genitos, suscipite regite, vestram meamque
vicem explete. Hi vobis, Nero et Druse, parentum loco.
Drusus has been taken away and so I direct my prayers towards you and
I implore you before the gods and the fatherland: take up and direct the
grandchildren of Augustus, scions of most illustrious ancestors, and fulfil
your duty and mine. Nero and Drusus, these men will take the place of your
parents.36
Since both Nero and Drusus had already been ‘commended’ to the
senate, this occasion supplied an entirely different theme.37 The
senate, in a moral sense, adopted the boys. The terms suscipio, rego,
and expleo are important.38 They imply the moral authority of a
father, and thus the immature and incomplete nature of a child.
Treating the same episode Dio uses ÆæÆŒÆ	Æ	ŁÆØ:
 ˇ b s o	ø
 Øº	, ›  ª ØæØ
 N
 	e ıæØ IçØŒ

KŒE 	 IøæÆ	 ŒÆd 	e ̋æøÆ 	 	 æ̃F 	f
 	F ̂æÆØŒF
ÆEÆ
 	fi B ªæıÆfi ÆæÆŒÆ	Ł	.
Thus he [Drusus] perished; but Tiberius, having arrived at the senate house,
both lamented him publicly and entrusted Nero and Drusus, the sons of
Germanicus, to the senate.39
Treating Augustus’ letter of AD 12, Dio must mean that Tiberius was
‘entrusted’ with the senate as if he were a guardian exercising moral
authority over an orphan.40 This is a surprising approach by Augus-
tus.41 The letter presented Augustus’ res publica as nothing less than
monarchic, bringing into question his long-standing claim that the
senate was supreme. Since Augustus remained princeps senatus until
death, he evidently wanted the senators to extend to Tiberius the
same level of respect he had himself received. Tiberius was to be
treated as a pater! Curiously, this piece of evidence is absent from
notable biographies of Tiberius and, more surprisingly, from the most
36 Tac. Ann. 4.8.
37 Cf. B. Levick (1999), 162: ‘Nero and Drusus were brought in and commended
to the patres.’
38 A father ‘takes up’ (suscipio) a baby to accept it into the family.
39 Dio 57.22.4ª = Zon. 11.2.
40 Since Dio seems to be following the acta senatus he has likely used the correct
term. Indeed, as with Nero and Drusus in AD 23, Germanicus had already been
‘commended’ to the senate. Dio ought to be trusted on this.
41 P. M. Swan (2004), 285, describes it as ‘remarkable’.
Novus Principatus: An Imperial Co-operative 143
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any 
way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
important modern works on the ‘constitution’ of the early Princi-
pate.42
Scholars look to senatus consulta in AD 12 and 13 that provided
Tiberius with imperium equal to that of Augustus and reinstated his
tribunicia potestas for another term.43 But the emphasis is superficial.
Augustus was, in fact, organizing his powers over time into a defined
totality; on each occasion that Tiberius received a form of power a
new aspect of the Principate was established: statio imperii.44 Aside
from Augustus’ personal charisma, which afforded the princeps a
certain type of power, by AD 13 Augustus and Tiberius were equal; the
position of pontifex maximus alone separated them. Augustus was
manufacturing a structure with which to guide succession.45 What,
then, was he hoping to achieve in his address to the senate in AD 12?
Keeping in mind the prospect of succession, the answer must lie in
the distinction made between Tiberius and Germanicus.
At 26, Germanicus represented the long-term future. Tiberius was
in his fifties and might be expected to last another decade or so, but
42 The passage is not considered by: Th. Mommsen Staat. (1888), esp. his section
on the relationship between princeps and Senate, III 2, 894–902; A. H. J. Greenidge
(1901); W. Weber (1936); J. Crook, Consilium Principis (1955); Sattler, P. Augustus un
der Senat (1960); J. Bleicken, Senatsgericht und Kaisergericht (1962); F. Miller, The
Emperor in the Roman World (1977); R. J. A. Talbert (1984), and ‘Augustus and the
Senate’, Greece and Rome, 31:1 (1984), 55–63; P. A. Brunt ‘The Role of the Senate in
Augustus’ Government’, CQ, 34:2 (1984), 423–44; W. K. Lacey, Augustus and the
Principate (1996); cf. M. Hammond, (1933), 273, n. 15.
43 Dio 56.28.1; Vell. 2.121.1; Suet. Tib. 21.1. Velleius writes that Tiberius received
imperium equal to that held by Augustus ‘in all provinces and armies’. Suetonius adds
that the lex also allowed for Tiberius to hold a census with Augustus, and perform a
lustrum. In RG 8. Augustus writes: ‘In my sixth consulship with Marcus Agrippa as
colleague, I carried out a census of the people, and I performed a lustrum after a lapse
of 42 years.’ Agrippa and Augustus were both consuls in 28 BC. He goes on: ‘I
performed a lustrum with consular imperium, with Tiberius my son, as colleague
(conlega), in the consulship of Sex. Pompeius and Sextus Appuleius.’ Conlegus
indicates that Tiberius also had consular imperium. Moreover, Tiberius was able to
summon and use the praetorians within Rome in the first weeks of September, a right
that required imperium. That it was within the pomerium indicates consular imperium
(Tac. Ann. 1.7.5; Suet. Tib. 24). Cf. P. A. Brunt, ‘C. Fabricius Tuscus and an Augustan
Dilectus’, ZPE, 13 (1974), 161–85 who dates Tiberius’ consular imperium to AD 4; also
A. H. M. Jones, Studies in Roman Government and Law (1960), and D. Hoyos ‘The
Legal Powers of Augustus: Some Modern Views’, Ancient Society Resources for
Teachers, 8:1 no.1 (1983), 42–6, who date it to 17 Sept. AD 14.
44 Vell. 2.124.2; SCPP 129–30.
45 The position of pontifex maximus was not essential to supreme power, but
preferred. Augustus waited until 12 BC (RG 10.2); Tiberius waited until 15 March AD
15 (ILS 154; V. Ehrenberg and A. H. M. Jones (1955), 47).
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Germanicus would potentially enjoy dominance for thirty to forty
years, perhaps more. That Drusus was not named shows only that his
position did not require definition.46 The letter of AD 12 shows that
interest in Germanicus caught Augustus’ and Tiberius’ attention; it
was made clear who was to succeed. That people might have held
positive expectations about Germanicus’ consulship is not surprising.
A self-imposed exile on Rhodes from 6 BC to AD 2, interdiction from
public activities from AD 2 to AD 4, and continual campaigning from
AD 4 to AD 12 must have affected Tiberius’ relationship with the
senate. Between AD 4 and AD 12 Tiberius could only have attended
the senate from January to perhaps April. He would then leave Rome
for the northern provinces, and would not return again until winter
(sometimes late October, generally early December), by which time
the senate was already in recess until January. If Tiberius attended the
senate from January to April, and the senate met twice a month, then
Tiberius attended approximately 64 out of a possible 216 senate
meetings. If we take into account his Rhodian exile, then from 6 BC
to AD 12 Tiberius attended 64 of a minimum 432 senate meetings (15
per cent); he probably attended even fewer. In Tiberius’ absence,
senators would have formed alliances, friendships, cliques that did
not include Augustus’ heir. Indeed, methods for transactiong sena-
torial business would have been developed that required very little
imput from Tiberius, or none at all. Only his closest allies would have
kept his interests alive. It is, therefore, very possible that senators
became more comfortable around the young consul Germanicus than
Augustus’ intended successor: this would have been a problem for
Augustus, as well as Tiberius. Augustus’ letter prevented Germanicus
from unintentionally fostering a relationship with the senate which
could prove awkward for Tiberius, and parts of the senate from
intentionally fostering such a relationship with Germanicus. Indeed,
though we have highlighted a division between those who supported
Agrippa and those who supported Augustus’ succession plan,
46 G. V. Sumner, ‘Germanicus and Drusus Caesar’, Latomus, 26 (1967), 413–35,
takes it to mean that Germanicus was, at this time, preferred over Drusus. I believe he
is right. It was probably the case that Drusus’ position structurally renewed the
relationship of L. Caesar to his brother C. Caesar. Nevertheless, Drusus, on this
occasion, was omitted because he was not consul, i.e. there was no reason for
confusion on any level. Cf. B. Levick, ‘Drusus Caesar and the Adoptions of AD 4’,
Latomus, 25 (1966), 226–44, argues that both were treated as equals; they were to
serve as dual principes.
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political divisions are rarely symmetrical. We should not assume that
men loyal to Augustus were happy to transfer support to Tiberius;
some would have looked to Germanicus instead, while still others
would have hoped for Drusus to succeed Tiberius at the expense of
Germanicus. For those opposed to Tiberius, Germanicus and Drusus,
the image of the domus Caesaris divided would be used to satisfy their
own political agenda. Augustus’ letter was meant to right a faltering
ship, but as the evidence is assembled here, the immediate result was
the publishing of dissent.
The government’s theatrical reaction evidences the seriousness of
the criticism. Something like calling Tiberius a new dominus, or a rex
even, would have been both defamatory and seditious.47 The senate,
along with the comitia and quaestiones, provided the appearance of
continuity with the free past: as symbols they were central to Augus-
tus’ new res publica. As with Labienus’ histories, the regime reacted
because the pamphlets threatened to destabilize support for an in-
secure government sensitive to accusations of tyranny. Concerning
senatorial freedom under Augustus, Suetonius writes:
Sententias de maiore negotio non more atque ordine sed prout libuisset
perrogabat, ut perinde quisque animum intenderet ac si censendum magis
quam adsentiendum esset.
Concerning more important business he asked senators to give their opi-
nions not in the customary order but pretty well as he fancied, so that each
man might direct his thoughts towards the business, as if he was using
judgement more than acquiescing.48
Dio provides an appropriate example when treating a debate that
emerged in AD 13 concerning the vicesima hereditatium. Augustus
sent a Øº to the senate on the issue when an uprising seemed
imminent (ŒÆd KŒØ 	Ø 	æ ŁÆØ); he was evidently too weak
to attend in person. Dio continues:
47 As has been shown already, it would bemaiestas on account of the ruling against
Cassius Severus in AD 8 and the fact that he held magisterial imperium. But it might
also be held that the succession plan was part of the statio imperii. Indeed, Tiberius’
adoption was accompanied by an official rider. Any attempt to undermine the
succession might, therefore, have been interpreted by the government as contra rem
publicam.
48 Suet. Aug. 35.4; see also Dio 56.41.1.
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ŒÆd ‹ø
 ª c 	F ˆæÆØŒF 	F 	 ˜æı ªÅ 	Øa N	ø
	ø 	 KŒ 	B
 ÆP	F K	ºB
 	F	 ªªÆØ ŒÆd I	Æ	
ÆP	c ºø	ÆØ, æ	Æ Å	æ ÆP	H Åb NE.
Also to keep the senators from suspecting that some view of Germanicus or
Drusus was said on his instructions and from preferring it uncritically,
Augustus instructed them both to say nothing.49
Direct taxation was contentious, and for that reason alone Augustus
was keen to include senators in discussions and make them share
responsibility. Thus, as Suetonius points out, senators were given a
say on the big issues. Concerning ordinary business, however, Au-
gustus was happy to affect debate.50 But Suetonius supplies evidence
that his approach had critics:
In senatu verba facienti dictum est: ‘Non intellexi’, et ab alio: ‘Contra dicerem
tibi, si locum haberem.’ Interdum ob immodicas disceptantium altercationes e
curia per iram se proripienti quidam ingesserunt licere oportere senatoribus de
re p. loqui.
Speaking in the senate, it was said to him: ‘I do not understand’ and by
another: ‘I would speak against you, if I had the opportunity.’ Sometimes,
while he was rushing out of the House in anger because of the excessive
wrangling of the disputants, some shouted at him that senators ought to be
allowed to speak on public affairs.51
De re publica does not refer to maius negotium, but all matters
brought before senators. Offering a summation of Augustus’ Princi-
pate, in order to advertise an ideal mixed constitution, Dio has
Tiberius say:
. . . h	 K 	ÆE
 ØÆªÆØ
 	c KıÆ 	B
 ØÆłÅçø
 ŒÆ	ºı, Iººa




50 Tiberius is said to have stated at the funeral of Augustus: x
 K Yı ŒÆd ÆP	e

	c ªÅ Kı ŒÆd Ł’ z ıŁ	Æ	 (Dio. 56.41.1). J. Crook (1955), 131,
erroneously states ‘What is important is that Augustus did not waste his time and
vocal powers on everyday matters (except merely to give his sententia, which is quite
different).’ As was shown above, Augustus’ sententia was treated as the deciding
opinion, which in fact made his use of it in ‘everyday matters’ autocratic. Far from
wasting his time, he was controlling the administration of the empire.
51 Suet. Aug. 54.
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Nor did he abolish their [senators’] power of deciding matters by vote in
their deliberations but in addition he gave them the security to speak
frankly.52
That senators were allowed to vote on issues is hardly worthy of
praise. Dio would have us believe that senators voted by the grace of
Augustus, who could have abolished the right altogether. (çºØÆ,
moreover, does not mean that senators were merely allowed to give
their opinion, but that they were allowed to speak frankly without
worrying about recriminations, i.e. their careers and lives were safe
from harm. As with the right to vote on issues de re publica, the
implicit suggestion that this was a privilege offered by Augustus
shows just how superficial the façade had become. —ÆæÆŒÆ	Æ	ŁÆØ
momentarily made visible the true autocratic nature of Augustus’ res
publica, leaving some, perhaps many, shocked and disapproving.
Such disapproval, or anger even, may have informed Tiberius’ future
relationship with the senate. Tiberius’ performance in the senate
between AD 14 and AD 20 is a topic of dispute precisely because his
approach was ambiguous. It has been described in both ancient Rome
and modern scholarship as hypocritical, naïve, sinister, or Republi-
can. It was certainly awkward; awkwardness caused by, or perhaps
made worse by, his infrequent attendance.53 A brief examination of
Tiberius’ relationship with the senate is here instructive.
We are told that as princeps Tiberius brought most matters, no
matter how insignificant, to the senate, and that when a matter was
being discussed he generally remained silent or gave his opinion out
of turn.54 Both Suetonius and Dio state that Tiberius lost debates, and
Dio cites an instance in AD 16 when a tribune vetoed a motion that
had been passed against Tiberius’ advice.55 Tiberius’ style was
52 Dio 56.40.3.
53 B. Levick (1976), passim, held that Tiberius was to some extent misunderstood by a
weak and incompetent senate; G. Kampff, ‘Three Senate Meetings in the Early Princi-
pate’, Phoenix, 17: 1 (1963), 25–58, goes further: Tiberius wished to restore Republican-
ism, but was foiled by a self-interested elite. A somewhat weaker conclusion is drawn by
R. Seager (1972), 248: ‘Tiberius made repeated efforts in the early years of his reign to
force the senate to assume its responsibilities, and his sincerity cannot bedoubted.’ Seager
blamed Augustus’ heavy-handed approach, which left the senate unable to respond to
Tiberius’ ‘Republicanism’. R. Syme (1986) (see index under Tiberius) agreeswithTacitus:
Tiberiuswas hypocritical. These are, of course, simply a sample ofwhat is a very extensive
bibliography.
54 Dio 57.7.3; Suet. Tib. 30.1.
55 Suet. Tib. 31.1; Dio 57.7.5; 57.15.9.
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distinctive, and perhaps disturbing.56 He was not, however, ‘Repub-
lican’. He was inclined simply to let debate run its course by suppres-
sing his opinion or else speaking out of turn. A senatorial inquiry into
an allegation of treason against Granius Marcellus in AD 15 is a good
example:
Ad quod exarsit adeo, ut rupta taciturnitate proclamaret se quoque in ea
causa laturum sententiam palam et iuratum, ‘quo’ ceteris eadem necessitas
fieret. Manebant etiam tum vestigia morientis libertatis. Igitur Cn. Piso ‘quo’
inquit ‘loco censebis, Caesar? Si primus, habebo quod sequar: si post omnis,
vereor ne inprudens dissentiam. ’
At this his fury blazed forth so that it ruptured his taciturnity and he
proclaimed that in this case he would himself also give his opinion, openly
and under oath, that the others might be under the same obligation. There
lingered even then remnants of expiring freedom. And so C. Piso said:
‘In which place will you vote Caesar? If first, I shall have something to follow,
if last, I fear differing from you unawares.’57
Se quoque implies that his general policy was silence, but Piso’s
interjection, itself telling, shows the inherent power of Tiberius’
opinion; senatorial freedom of expression relied almost solely on
Tiberius remaining silent.58 The strength of a Piso or an Asinius
Gallus alone could defy the unwritten law. Though the policy seems
to have been borrowed from Augustus, there was, in fact, a significant
difference. Where Tiberius’ general policy was to be silent or speak
out of turn, Augustus limited such behaviour to important business of
the house only.59 Tiberius’ approach was probably a reaction both to
56 Or else it was sinister. Dio 57.7.5 writes that sometimes, after division on an issue,
Tiberius would say: ‘If I had been giving my views, I should have proposed this or that.’
This is intimidation. Why would an opinion be offered post eventum, if not to advertise
a difference of opinion? It would only place those who had voted contrary to his stated
desire on edge. Otherwise it evidences a severe lack of tact and an inability to appreciate
the nature of his position: in a word, naivety.
57 Tac. Ann. 1.74.4–5.
58 For various interpretations of this passage, see F. R. D. Goodyear (1981), 162f.
Goodyear, on p. 164, takes se quoque to mean that Tiberius remained silent only
sometimes, but Tacitus’ point is that Tiberius has ‘ruptured’ a standard practice.
59 J. Crook (1955), 129, writes ‘This must imply that when major issues were afoot
he took over the function of the consuls and made the relatio himself.’ Perrogo at Suet.
Aug. 35.4 certainly suggests that Augustus made the relatio, but the logic of the
sentence suggests that in it he refrained from giving his opinion. Crook argues that
‘Maiora negotia he certainly proposed [his own measures], and with a formal,
dignified and perhaps long set speech.’ If Crook means that Augustus’ relatio on
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criticism of Augustus and to his own infrequent exposure to the
senate from 6 BC to AD 12.60 But for many, Tiberius’ policy was a
façade, albeit with a milder complexion. Suetonius was not fooled:
Quin etiam speciem libertatis quandam induxit conservatis senatui ac magis-
tratibus et maiestate pristina et potestate.
And he even introduced the appearance of liberty by maintaining the ancient
majesty and power of the senate and magistrates.61
Species is loaded with cynicism, and may reflect contemporary opi-
nion; the res publica was a contradiction, no matter how libertas was
explained. Tiberius’ awkwardness, or guile, made the growing mag-
netism of Germanicus an issue. At the beginning of AD 13, a decision
to reconfigure and strengthen one of the primary advisory councils,
the semenstre consilium, should be interpreted, along with the letter of
AD 12, as Augustus’ and Tiberius’ response to lingering doubt. Dio
writes under AD 13:
˚Æd ıºı
 e 	F ªæø
, ç yæ P’ K
 	e ıºı	æØ 	Ø ºc
ÆØ	Æ	Æ ıç	Æ, YŒØ K	Åı
fi M	Æ	· æ	æ ªaæ ŒÆŁ  ŒÅ
	ŒÆŒÆ æ	Ł	.˚Æd æłÅçŁÅ, Ł ‹Æ i ÆP	fiH 	 	 	F
Øæı ŒÆd 	’ KŒø 	H 	 Id Æ	ı	ø ŒÆd 	H K
 	F	
IØªø, 	H 	 Kªªø ÆP	F 	H ØÅ	H Bº ‹	Ø, 	H 	 ¼ººø
‹ı
 i Œ		 æÆæÆºfi Å, ıºıøfi fi Å, ŒæØÆ ‰
 ŒÆd fi Å 	fi B
ªæıÆfi IæÆ	Æ rÆØ.
Because of his age, on account of which he was no longer attending the
senate except very rarely, he asked for twenty annual counsellors. For pre-
viously he would take fifteen every six months. It was also voted that all those
measures—which were deemed right by him, in his consultation with Tiber-
ius, and with those counsellors, and with the current consuls, and with the
these occasions included his opinion, Suetonius’ point is made redundant, i.e. Au-
gustus asked for senators to give their opinions out of order in order to ensure that his
opinion was not immediately accepted.
60 Cf. Pompey’s parliamentary inadequacy—despite the desire of most senators to
accommodate him.
61 Suet. Tib. 30.1; see also Tac. Ann. 1.77.3. For the alternative interpretation, see
Vell. 2.126.2, who writes that under Tiberius the maiestas of the senate was regained:
accessit . . . senatui maiestas. A. J. Woodman (1977), 240, points out that this device
(i.e. the restoration of senatorial freedom) was to be a topos throughout the Principate;
cf. B. Levick (1999), 92f., who believes that Velleius reflects Tiberius’ actual goal, i.e. it
was not cynical marketing.
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consuls designate, and with his own offspring (obviously the adopted ones),
and with however many others he might include on each occasion—that
these measures be valid, as if having been ratified by the whole senate.62
The council was provisional. It is not attested after AD 14.63 Where
the original groups, both the consilium principis and the semenstre
consilium, had been probouleutic, the new committee was invested
with the authority to pass decrees. Evidently Augustus wished to
remain intimately involved with the empire’s administration, not
happy on the sidelines. But why make the change now? During the
period AD 8–12 the two councils (which Tiberius must have partici-
pated in whenever in Rome) no doubt ensured that Augustus was kept
informed, despite his absence from the senate, and indeed, was able to
shape policy.64 Dio’s belief that by early AD 12 Augustus was too weak
to be heard, and seemed close to death, should be taken as evidence
that his contribution was diminished, though certainly not abandoned.
As was stated above, Tiberius spent the years AD 4–12 on campaign -
his first full year in Rome was to be AD 13; the new consilium allowed a
select group, led no doubt by Tiberius, to effect a smooth transition.65
To sum up, then, in January AD 12 the senate was publicly placed in
Tiberius’ care; in late AD 12 the senate and people invested him with
imperium equal to that of Augustus; in October AD 12 he was allowed to
triumph and offer a largess to the people (activity Augustus had
jealously made his own); his period of tribunicia potestaswas extended;
he was given the right to hold a census with Augustus; and, finally, at
the beginning of AD 13, he was provided with a machine with which
senatorial debate, on most occasions, could be circumvented.66 It is not
coincidental that Augustus’ testament was finalized on 3 April AD 13;
Tiberius was now armed for sole leadership.67
62 Dio 56.28.2.
63 J. Crook (1955), 16f.; P. M. Swan (2004), 295; cf. A. Magdelain, Auctoritas
Principis (1947), 89f.; R. J. A. Talbert (1984), 488.
64 For Augustus’ absence, see Dio 55.33.5–34.3.
65 J. Crook (1955), 15f.
66 A senatus consultum and lex is attested by Vell. 2.120.1for imperium. The SCPP
33–4, states that Germanicus’ imperium in the east was founded on a ‘law put before
the people’ in AD 18. For providing largesse, see Suet. Tib. 20. In 11 BC he had similarly
fed the people, Dio 55.2.4, but significantly, he did not supply gifts of money. The year
is disputed, but AD 12 is the most suitable since Tiberius was away from Rome for all of
AD 11. See A. J. Woodman (1977), 212. For the ability of the consilium to pass decrees
there is no direct proof, but logically the consilium would not be given the power to
pass decrees if it did not intend to pass them. We should assume that Augustus
authored the new arrangements at Tiberius’ (or possibly Livia’s) request.
67 Suet. Aug. 101.1.
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In reformulating the consilia, Augustus exhibited a lack of faith,
or outright distrust, in sections of the senate to ensure a stable
political environment and he must have had good reason. That the
re-organization of consilia coincided with a renewed opposition to
the inheritance tax cannot be coincidental. Immediately after discuss-
ing the semenstre consilium Dio writes:
K 	 Kd 	fi B NŒ	fi B 	
 ‰
 NE KÆæ	 ŒÆd KŒØ 	Ø 	æ
ŁÆØ, ł Øº K





Since everybody, so to speak, was disturbed about the vicesima and it seemed
there was about to be an uprising, he sent to the senate a letter urging it to
look for some alternative sources of revenue.68
Augustus asked Germanicus and Drusus not to provide an opinion
but to report to him on the senate’s deliberations:
ŒÆd KºåŁÅ b ºº, ŒÆ 	ØÆ ŒÆd Øa Øºø 	fiH APª	øfi KÅºŁÅ·




, K 	 	f
 Iªæf
 ŒÆd Kd 	a
 NŒÆ
 	c ı	ºØÆ XªÆª, ŒÆd
ÆæÆåæBÆ Å N, Ł’ ‹ Ł’ ‹ø
 ÆP	e ıØ, ł ¼ººı





 ÇÅØøŁÅØ øØ ŒÆd 	c NŒ	c 	ºE IŁºø	ÆØ.
Many views were stated; while some were even communicated to Augustus
through letters. Having learned from these that senators were ready to
submit to all other forms of tax rather than that the one in force, he
transferred the levy to lands and buildings and immediately, having said
nothing about either how much or in what way they would pay it, sent
different people to different places to register the properties of individuals
and cities, in order that they should fear suffering even greater losses, and so
be content to pay the five percent tax.69
Dio understood his source/s to mean that discontent with the inheri-
tance tax was developing into civil unrest. Since it was not in Augus-
tus’ interest to exaggerate, or indeed invent, opposition, the reports
are probably true. The tax had survived for almost eight years, and
this is the first evidence we have for spirited opposition to its im-
plementation since AD 7. Why the sudden outburst? Swan suggests
68 Dio 56.28.6.
69 Dio 56.28.5–6.
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that ‘it perhaps took some years for enough heirs to be affected to fuel
a crisis.’70 But the tax cannot have destroyed confidence in the
economy; in principle oppressive, the tax was in reality a trifle. We
should not suppose that losing HS 5,000 to the government seriously
affected someone inheriting HS 100,000. Objections were politically
rather than economically inspired, and the only plausible political
explanation for the re-emergence of opposition to the tax is the
permanent presence of Tiberius in Rome.71 Protestors were testing
the future princeps.
Dio mentions only the attendance of Germanicus and Drusus at
the relevant senatorial debate/s. Tiberius’ absence from the meeting,
at first sight remarkable, makes sense. The presence of his two sons
indicates how deeply Tiberius was affected, but his absence suggests
caution. He was quarantined from the inevitable unpleasantness that
would accompany an open defence of the government’s position. It is
important to note that while debate ran its course in the senate, policy
was being implemented by the reconstructed semenstre consilium, at
which Tiberius was probably present.72 Communication between
Augustus and the senate was conducted via letters, but Augustus
must here refer to his consilium. It was the consilium that reacted to
the threat of violence by bringing the matter before the senate. As was
shown above, on sensitive issues such as taxation, the government
advertised senatorial self-determination. But importantly, when it
became obvious that senators ‘were ready to submit to any form of
tax’ other than the inheritance tax, the consilium used its new power
to decree an audit of land and buildings. We lose the full text of Dio at
NØø	H ŒÆd, but his epitomator, Xiphilinus, understood him to mean
that the government’s strategy was to limit outcomes to two separate
70 P. M. Swan (2004), 296.
71 C. Nicolet (1980), 184–5, distinguishes the vicesima from tributum on the
ground that the latter was an exceptional measure. As a permanent feature the
vicesima hereditatium signalled a significant break from Republicanism.
72 A papyrus dated to AD 13 attests Tiberius’ attendance at the meeting of a
consilium, listening to Alexandrian envoys. Tiberius is named immediately after
Augustus in the official minutes. Though this could refer to the board of three ex-
consuls formed to listen to foreign envoys, that Alexandria is concerned makes the
semenstre consiliummore likely. P. Oxy. 2436 = R. K. Sherk, Rome and the Greek East
to the Death of Augustus (1984), no.111; P. M. Swan (2004), 295: ‘[this papyrus] may
be an audience of Alexandrian envoys before our consilium’.
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proposals. Xiphilinus writes only that Augustus wanted senators to
fear even greater losses under the new tax, and so accept the 5 per cent
tax on inheritances as the better option. He then adds ‘and this is
what actually happened’.73 Tenants, and not landlords, tend to bear
such burdens, but landlords are usually held responsible.74 The
counter-proposal would, therefore, have attracted popular and elite
resistance: it was much easier to pay 5 per cent on windfalls.75
Despite the protest’s popular dimensions, dissent was none the less
artificial. The initial protest in AD 6, though sponsored by persons
within the imperial house like Aemilius Paullus, was understandable;
resistance to taxation is attested in most societies. Resentment no
doubt lingered, but passionate violence had given way to subdued
indifference. The crescendo of discontent allegedly threatening Rome
in AD 13 was surely manufactured. People certainly talked about the
unfair nature of the tax and the possibility of large-scale riots-
perhaps gangs of men were paid to cause unrest. The troublemakers,
however, were not interested in new policy proposals. They wished to
place Tiberius in an uncomfortable and unpopular position at a time
when he was poised to succeed Augustus - Tiberius was kept away
from the fight.
Tiberius was marked out as successor in AD 4, but the details were
not secured until AD 13. Augustus’ death was the final requirement. It
must have been clear to most observers that Augustus was close to the
end. A popular tumult regarding the tax was, therefore, a reaction to
the penultimate process of succession. Those opposed to Tiberius
complained that the inheritance tax was unfit for Roman citizens,
implying that they were being treated like subjects. Men on the street
73 Augustus’ ‘threat’ was, in fact, a return to fiscal policy during the triumvirate, see
Dio 47.14.2–3for a tax on houses and country estates.
74 Landlords would also be exposed to the unpopularity of collecting higher rents.
A rental crisis in England in 1549 contributed to Kett’s rebellion, in which the rebel
manifesto singled out revenue-raising as a chief concern for the commons. Signifi-
cantly, Kett was a landlord. Indeed, each Tudor rebellion evidenced a symbiotic
relationship between landlords and commons; landlords required the physical pre-
sence of the commons while the commons required the landlords for political
legitimation, A. Fletcher (1968), see index.
75 D. Kienast (1999), 407, took the alternative seriously. He argues that Augustus
wanted a tax on land and buildings. That would have been very risky. It is illogical to
believe that Augustus would make a precarious situation even worse by suggesting a
tax that was sure to upset people. Augustus cannot have believed that such a tax would
be less odious. Rather than evidence naivety, the situation shows that Augustus was
expert at intimidation.
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perhaps used the language of tyranny. The government, with Tiberius
hiding behind the lines, reasserted its position. This is not a surprise.
War was an expensive endeavour and required ever-increasing levels
of public administration. Since Augustus did not want individual
citizens to offer voluntary payments, thereby feudalizing the govern-
ment, taxation was the only alternative. This is an area of tension for
all governments, but especially authoritarian governments uninter-
ested in private philanthropy. The government alone paid for public
utilities and services, and costs soon blew out once the defence and
organization of the entire empire was considered. The opposition was
utilizing a philosophical doctrine relevant to city-state Republicanism
to counter the pragmatic policy decisions of a government adminis-
tering an empire. This contest is relevant to the final accession of
Tiberius and his famous hesitation.
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The Hesitation of Tiberius
Augustus died at Nola on 19 August AD 14.1 Tiberius alone now held
imperium both inside and outside Italy, as well as tribunician power.2
Auctoritas equal to that of Augustus was alone lacking. Tiberius
utilized his position immediately. Tacitus writes:
simul excessisse Augustum et rerum potiri Neronem fama eadem tulit.
The same single report carried news that Augustus was dead and that Nero
was in control of things.3
and
Sed defuncto Augusto signum praetoriis cohortibus ut imperator dederat;
excubiae, arma, cetera aulae . . .
But on the death of Augustus he had given the signal to the praetorian
cohorts as imperator, he had guards (of watch), weapons of war, and every
aspect of a royal court . . .4
Dio writes:
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1 Suet. Aug. 99.2–100.1; Vell. 2.123; Tac. Ann. 1.5; Dio 56.30.5f.
2 D. Hoyos (1983), 43f., has argued that Tiberius did not have, in Sept. AD 14,
consular imperium valid inside Italy. According to Hoyos, the law of AD 12 provided
Tiberius only with imperium equal to that of Augustus in the provinces. But Tiberius’
ability to command the praetorians inside the pomerium in the first weeks of Sept.
surely rested on a legal right, and Tacitus makes specific reference to his giving orders
within Rome ‘as Imperator’, that is, as someone who held imperium (Tac. Ann. 1.7.5).
The obvious type of imperium is consular.
3 Tac. Ann. 1.5.
4 Ibid., 1.7.
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And so indeed he, being a man of this sort, sent a letter immediately, as
emperor, from Nola to all the legions and provinces, though not claiming to
be emperor . . .5
Suetonius writes:
Principatum, quamvis neque occupare confestim neque agere dubitasset, et
statione militum, hoc est vi et specie dominationis assumpta . . .
Although he did not hesitate to seize immediately and exercise the Princi-
pate, and with a guard of soldiers, that is with the power and appearance of
domination having been assumed . . .6
In response to the report, an oath of allegiance to Tiberius was
immediately sworn:7
Sex. Pompeius et Sex. Appuleius consules primi in verba Tiberii Caesaris
iuravere, apudque eos Seius Strabo et C. Turranius, ille praetoriarum cohor-
tium praefectus, hic annonae; mox senatus milesque et populus.
The consuls Sex. Pompeius and Sex. Appuleius were the first to swear an oath
to Tiberius Caesar and in their presence so did Seius Strabo, prefect of the
praetorian cohorts, and C. Turranius, prefect of the corn supply; next the
senate, the soldiers and the people (did the same).8
And when news of Augustus’ death reached Germanicus in Gaul:
seque et proximos et Belgarum civitates in verba eius adigit.
To himself, those around him, and the Belgic cities he [Germanicus] admi-
nistered the oath of allegiance to Tiberius.9
Dio notes further:
5 Dio 57.2.1. It must be remembered that Dio’s Greek does not capture
the imperator/emperor dichotomy in the Latin.
6 Suet. Tib. 24.1.
7 It is not necessary here to discuss the nature of this oath. It is important simply
to point out that Tiberius’ position was necessarily perceived as superior and required
suitable recognition. A brief discussion, with bibliography, is given by F. R.
D. Goodyear (1972), 138f. T. E. J. Wiedemann in CAH 10², 203, argues that the
oath was a private affair, neither public nor constitutional. That the consuls swore the
oath together in the presence of the two most powerful public servants suggests that
Wiedemann is wrong. Tacitus’ narrative implies public organization, with the consuls
in the lead. Moreover, the idea that a political act is unconstitutional is problematic for
Roman history. Rome had no defined constitution.
8 Tac. Ann. 1.7.2.
9 Ibid., 1.34.1.
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For he [Tiberius] had won over those who were in Italy by means of the oaths
that were established by Augustus . . .10
Fama in Tacitus means literally a rumour, i.e. ‘it was said that . . . ’.
But there must have been an official letter, replete with Tiberius’
formal title. This was his right as holder of imperium in every
province. Tiberius’ note was in part an assumption of power.11
Though the desired effect was witnessed almost immediately, i.e. an
empire-wide oath, we should suspect prior orchestration. Augustus
had invested heavily in Tiberius and surely planned for the moment.
It is reasonable to suppose that key stakeholders - the consuls, the
senior prefects, Germanicus and Drusus - knew in advance what was
expected of them and acted accordingly. By the time Tiberius reached
Rome most of the empire would have pledged allegiance. Effects were
evident once he was in Rome: miles in forum miles in curiam comi-
tabatur, ‘soldiers accompanied him in the forum, soldiers accompa-
nied him in the curia.’12 By miles, Tacitus must mean that a
bodyguard of praetorians occupied civic spaces disarmed under the
Republic. Contemporaries interpreted this public show of force as the
definition of real power, echoed perhaps in Suetonius: ‘and with a
guard of soldiers, that is with the power and appearance of domina-
tion having been assumed . . . ’.13 Thus, in the weeks following
Augustus’ death, Tiberius possessed tribunicia potestas, consular
imperium inside and outside Italy, the allegiance of the legions,
praetorians, vigiles, and urban cohorts, as well as the consuls, the
social orders, and the various administrative branches, and armed
soldiers accompanied him everywhere: Tiberius was the unques-
tioned ruler of Rome. Further to his position within the body politic,
he was also now the pater familias of the domus Caesaris. As Wiede-
mann points out, Tiberius was in control of the most extensive supply
of assets in the empire.14 The number of freedmen paid out of
10 Dio 57.3.2.
11 Perhaps fama is a deliberate distortion by Tacitus, or his source, meant to
thrown suspicion on an act that was in fact legal and appropriate.
12 Tac. Ann. 1.7.5.
13 Suet. Tib. 24.
14 CAH 10² 202f.; this point formed the basis of Millar’s criticism of D. Timpe
Untersuchungen zur Kontinuität des frühen Prinzipats, Historia Einzelschriften, Heft
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Augustus’ fortune while working in the public interest was enormous,
while the number of families engaged in a patron–client relationship
with the domus Caesaris, including foreign monarchs, provided a
means for social control ‘with which no other household could
compete’. Nevertheless, for a period of weeks following Augustus’
death, Tiberius seemed hesitant when speaking in the senate about
the prospect of being princeps, or as the contemporary Velleius put it,
of accepting the Principate (principatus).15 Velleius writes:
Una tamen veluti luctatio civitatis fuit, pugnantis cum Caesare senatus
populique Romani, ut stationi paternae succederet, illius, ut potius aequalem
civem quam eminentem liceret agere principem. Tandem magis ratione quam
honore victus est, cum quidquid tuendum non suscepisset, periturum videret,
solique huic contigit paene diutius recusare principatum, quam, ut occuparent
eum, alii armis pugnauerant.
There was however one civil dispute, as it were, when the senate and people
of Rome fought with Caesar to make him succeed to the position of his father
while he (countered) that he would prefer to be allowed to be an equal citizen
rather than be singled out in the role of princeps. At last he was conquered
more by reason than by the offered honour since he saw that whatever he did
not take under his protection would perish. He is the only one to whose lot it
has fallen to refuse the principate for a longer time, nearly, than others had
fought to secure it.16
Ovid, responding to the news some time after the event, writes:
Nam patris Augusti docui mortale fuisse j corpus in aetherias numen abisse
domos j esse parem virtute patri qui frena rogatus j saepe recusati ceperit
imperii . . .
For I have taught that the body of father Augustus was mortal, j that his
godhead has departed for celestial abodes, j that equal in virtue to his father is
5 (1962), in his review article ‘The Early Principate’, CR, 13:3 (1963), 327–9. Millar
argues that the key to understanding the Principate lies not in its ‘constitution’ but the
process by which the ‘Roman world came to accept so easily and so quickly the
existence of a ruling house.’Millar’s position essentially leads to analysis which places
heavy significance on patron–client relationships as they operated in the Republican
period.
15 On what it was that Tiberius was refusing/hesitating to accept, see: T. Hillard
(2010) 163 n. 27, ‘Velleius 2.124.2 and the Reluctant Princeps: The Evolution of
Roman Perceptions of Leadership’, in Cowen, E. Velleius Paterculus: Making History
(2010) (I would like to thank Tom Hillard for allowing me to see an advanced copy of
his paper). Cf. D. Hoyos (1983), 42–6.
16 Vell. 2.124.2.
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he who, having been asked, has taken the reins j of the often refused
imperium.17
Tacitus writes:
Litteras ad exercitus tamquam adepto principatu misit, nusquam cunctabun-
dus nisi cum in senatu loqueretur.
He sent letters to the army as if he had obtained the Principate, and being
hesitant nowhere except when speaking in the senate.18
Suetonius writes:
Diu tamen recusavit, impudentissimo mimo nunc adhortantis amicos incre-
pans ut ignaros, quanta belua esset imperium, nunc precantem senatum et
procumbentem sibi ad genua ambiguis responsis et callida cunctatione sus-
pendens, ut quidam patientiam rumperent atque unus in tumultu procla-
maret: ‘Aut agat aut desistat!’ Alter coram exprobraret ceteros, quod polliciti
sint tarde praestare, sed ipsum, quod praestet tarde polliceri.
For a long time however he refused, with a most shameless mime now
reproaching friends who encouraged him, saying that they were ignorant
how beast-like supreme power was, and now with ambiguous responses and
cunning delay leaving in suspense the senate praying and prostrate at his knees,
so that some lost patience and one shouted in the turmoil: ‘Let him take it or
leave it!’ Another openly taunted that others were slow to perform what they
promised, but that he was slow to promise what he was already delivering.”19
Dio writes:
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And so he did these things in this way and, while actually administering all
the business of the empire, he declared he did not want any of it.20
Persistent hesitation did yield finally to acceptance.21 Suetonius
possessed evidence that Tiberius eventually agreed to act as the
17 Ex. Pont. 4.13.25–8. The sitting consul, Sex. Pompeius, was a source of informa-
tion to Ovid while the latter was in exile.
18 Tac. Ann. 1.7.5.
19 Suet. Tib. 24.1.
20 Dio 57.2.3.
21 Cf. B. Levick (1999), 248, n. 24. Levick has argued that Tiberius never accepted
supreme power, and rejects the concept of a dies imperii (day of power assumed).
Suetonius’ passage is relegated to a footnote and treated as ‘misleadingly positive’.
Ovid is not discussed.
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supreme power, while the contemporaries Ovid and Velleius both
employ words that indicate positive action:
Tandem quasi coactus et querens miseram et onerosam iniungi sibi servitu-
tem, recepit imperium; nec tamen aliter, quam ut depositurum se quandoque
spem faceret.
Finally, as if forced, and complaining that a miserable and onerous slavery
was being forced upon him, he accepted imperium; in such a way however
that he expressed the hope that he might someday lay it down.22
Suetonius had in front of him a source which included part of
Tiberius’ speech: Ipsius verba sunt: Dum veniam ad id tempus, quo
vobis aequum possit videri dare vos aliquam senectuti meae requiem,
‘His own words are: Until I come to that time, in which it may seem
right to you to give some rest to my old age.’ The speech was probably
recorded by a senatorial historian, such as Servilius Nonianus, or else
the daily records of the senate.23 As I shall show later, the declaration
was made sometime between 17 September and the praetorian elec-
tions of AD 14.
How can Tiberius have assumed power and engaged in a recusatio
concurrently? The situation is a topic of dispute because it is a
question of psychology. The historical sources provide three main
causes for Tiberius’ hesitancy: (i) the execution, sometime between 19
August and early September, of Agrippa Postumus; (ii) the popularity
of Germanicus; and (iii) the mutiny, in late August early September,
of the German and Pannonian legions.24 Suetonius alone adds a
fourth reason: Drusus Libo.25 Modern scholars on the whole reject
the idea that Tiberius was responding to emerging political threats.
Abstract nouns are preferred to real phenomena. The first edition
of the Cambridge Ancient History, for instance, uses moderatio to
explain Tiberius’ reluctance; the recent second edition focuses on
22 Suet. Tib. 24.2.
23 A. Macé, Essai sur Suétone (1900), 363–58, puts forward Servilius Nonianus as a
candidate; H. Lindsay, Suetonius: Tiberius (1995), adds Aufidius Bassus. Even with a
positive declaration, however, Tiberius’ propensity for obscuration meant that ambi-
guity remained even four months later in AD 15: Tac. Ann. 1.72.2; also Dio 57.8.4–5
and 58.17.3.
24 On Agrippa Postumus, see the next chapter. For Germanicus, see Tac. Ann.
1.7.6; Suet. Tib. 25.2; Dio 57.4.1, 6.2–7.2. For the mutiny, see: Suet. Tib. 25.1; Dio
57.4.1.
25 Suet. Tib. 25.1.
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dissimulatio.26 The result is the triumph of two opposite views:
(i) Tiberius wanted power but was required to engage in a show of
what has been termed ‘decent papal reluctance’; or (ii) Tiberius was
forced to take power but in fact wished to reorganize the State
along more Republican lines. Various theories lie between these two
interpretations.27
The idea that Tiberius, to use a convenient term, was Republican,
and that his rhetoric reflected a deep-seated philosophical conviction,
should be abandoned. As senators were quick to point out, Tiberius
did not hesitate to use the instruments of supreme power, i.e. the
legions and praetorians. Actions tend to speak louder than words, and
Tiberius showed, beyond doubt, that he was interested in the main-
tenance of authoritarian power. ‘Decent papal reluctance’, on the
other hand, has some value. Romans, as with most peoples, distrusted
political leaders who seemed to covet power, and so a manœuvre was
used to overcome native prejudice: emergency powers were refused
when first offered and were finally accepted only through a discourse
of reluctance.28 Tiberius was himself familiar with the art. In AD 4 he
was voted tribunicia potestas ‘in spite of his continued objection both
in private and in the senate’.29 The situation in AD 14 was, however,
different, in so far as Tiberius was not refusing new powers but
showing a reluctance to keep powers that already belonged to him.
The occasion was reminiscent of the so-called Augustan settlement of
27 BC. In a long speech to the senate, Octavian proposed to abdicate
his unprecedented public position and return to life as a normal
citizen. The essence of his speech, as it was known to Dio, is instruc-
tive when compared to that attributed to Tiberius in AD 14:
26 CAH 10¹ (1934), 611 f. CAH 10² 205 f.
27 See, e.g., F. B. Marsh (1931), 45; CAH 10¹ (1934), 611 f.; J. Béranger ‘Le refus du
pouviur’,MH, 5 (1948), 178–96; F. R. D. Goodyear (1972), 169 f.; M. M. Sage, ‘Tacitus
and the Accession of Tiberius’, Ancient Society, 13/14 (1982/1983), 293–321;
A. Wallace-Hadrill, ‘Civilis Princeps: Between Citizen and King’, JRS, 72 (1982),
32–48; R. Syme (1939) 438–439, and (1986), 449; CAH 10², 205. Cf. H. H. Scullard
(1976), 278 f.; G. Kampff (1963), 25–58; R. Seager (1972), 56: ‘to deny Tiberius’
sincerity is perverse”; B. Levick (1999), 68f. T. Hillard (2004), seems to accept the
view that the act was not ritual without the corollary that Tiberius was sincerely
disinterested in power. Nonetheless, Hillard does not believe that he was responding
to political threats.
28 For a general history of the phenomenon, see U. Huttner, Recusatio Imperii: Ein
Politisches Ritual Zwischen Ethik und Taktik (2004).
29 Vell. 2.103.3.
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For to you, best and most mindful of men, I entrust all the public affairs . . .
and as for myself, indeed, I have both laboured and suffered, and no longer
can I withstand it, neither in my mind nor in my body . . . and because of this,
I choose to live in glory as a private citizen, rather than to live in danger as a
monarch. And as for public affairs, they would be far better administered
publicly, since they would be handled by many men acting together, and not
be dependent on a single man.30
By ‘public affairs’ Augustus is said to have meant the armies, laws,
and provinces, both traditional provinces and those acquired by
Octavian while acting in the interest of the State.31 Contemporary
interpretations of his motive were varied: he honestly wished to
restore Republican praxis; or he was deceiving the senate and in fact
wished to hold on to power. During the debate Octavian’s supporters
were said to have been: ‘shouting out . . . begging for monarchy and
putting forward all the arguments in its favour, until they compelled
him . . . to accept autocratic power.’32 Octavian’s power was subse-
quently sustained, albeit in part diminished. He was to administer
some provinces, while the rest were to remain with the people of
Rome, the so-called senatorial provinces.33 The events of 17 Septem-
ber AD 14 were markedly similar to those of 27 BC.34 In his relatio, one
of the consuls put the motion that Tiberius be recognized as leader of
30 Dio 53.8.5–8.
31 Ibid., 4.4.
32 Dio 53.11.4. Octavian’s friends would hold that he sincerely wished to restore
Republican practice, and would then argue that the res publica needed him to remain
in an extraordinary position. Thus, Octavian is made to appear genuinely sympathetic
to Republicanism, while being saved the invidia of justifying his own favoured
position as supreme ruler: he was forced by passionate argument to remain in a
dominant position. It should be noted, however, that some of Octavian’s friends may
well have desired the restoration of Republican praxis.
33 Ibid., 12.2–8. F. Millar, ‘Senatorial Provinces: An Institutionalized Ghost’, An-
cient World, 20 (1989), 1–5; J. W. Rich (1990), 140 f.
34 This is an often made comparison. R. Syme (1939), 439; J. Béranger, ‘Recherches
sur l’aspect idéologique du principat’, Schweiz. Beitr. Z. Altertum swissenshaft, 6
(1953), 152 f.; G. Kampff (1963), 39; T. Hillard (2004), passim.
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the res publica.35 The wording of the motion is lost, but its essence
remains in Velleius, Suetonius and Tacitus.36 Tacitus writes:
Dixit forte Tiberius se ut non toti rei publicae parem, ita quaecumque pars sibi
mandaretur eius tutelam suscepturum. Tum Asinius Gallus ‘Interrogo’ inquit,
‘Caesar, quam partem rei publicae mandari tibi velis’ . . . respondit nequa-
quam decorum pudori suo legere aliquid aut evitare ex eo cui in universum
excusari mallet.
Tiberius said that he himself was unequal to [the task of governing] the entire
res publica, but would undertake to look after whichever part might be
committed to him. Asinius Gallus then said: ‘I inquire, Caesar, which part
of the res publica do you wish to have committed to you’ . . . and Tiberius
responded that it was by no means appropriate to his personal sense of
propriety to choose or avoid any part of something from which he would
prefer to be excused completely.37
It was probably at the same meeting that Quintus Haterius allegedly
said ‘Quo usque patieris Caesar non adesse caput rei publicae’, ‘how
long, Caesar, will you let the res publica lack a head’; and Mamercus
Scaurus pronounced that ‘spem esse ex eo non inritas fore senatus
preces quod relationi consulum iure tribuniciae potestatis non inter-
cessisset’, ‘There was hope that the senate’s prayers might not be in
vain, since he had not vetoed the relatio of the consuls by the use of
his Tribunician power.’38 Dio writes:
˚Æd 	e b æH	 ŒÆd AÆ ÆP	c Ø 	 	c ºØŒÆ (£ ªaæ ŒÆd








, h	Ø ª ŒÆd 	ø ŒÆŁÆ uæ K OºØªÆæåÆfi ,
Iºº’ K
 	æÆ æÅ ø ÆP	, fi X	Ø, ŒÆd 	e b ÆP	e
 åØ Mı, 	H b
	æø ¼ººØ
 ÆæåæØ. q b 	ÆF	Æ £ b l 	   Å ŒÆd  ¼ººÅ ’	ÆºÆ,
	æ b 	a 	æÆ	Æ, ŒÆd 	æ ƒ ºØd ŒØ.
And at first he kept saying that he would retire from all of it on account of his
age (for he was aged fifty-six) and on account of his near-sightedness (for,
though he saw very well in the dark, he saw very poorly in the day); and after
that he asked for some associates and colleagues, though, indeed, he did not
35 F. R. D. Goodyear (1972), 174 f.
36 I agree with Levick (1999), 78 f., that the relatio contained an idea like that
expressed in statio paternae, as preserved by Vell. 2.124. It did not ask that Tiberius
take new powers (imperia), but that he accept the Principate (principatus).
37 Tac. Ann. 1.12.1–2.
38 Ibid., 1.13.
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intend for them [to rule] over everything, as in an oligarchy, but, dividing it
into three parts, that he was to keep one part himself, while he would give
over the remaining parts to them. And one of these parts consisted of Rome
and the rest of Italy, another of the legions, and another of the remaining
subject-peoples.39
Every element of the Augustan discourse is present: Tiberius is
tired; Tiberius would prefer to be a private citizen; the empire cannot
be administered effectively by one man; administration ought to be
shared by treating the empire as a sum of independent parts. These
were not throwaway lines. They possessed real historical meaning
within Roman politics.40 It is important to note, however, that at the
senate meetings on 17 September, Tiberius did not so much accept
the Principate as cease to refuse it:
Fessusque clamore omnium, expostulatione singulorum flexit paulatim, non
ut fateretur suscipi a se imperium, sed ut negare et rogari desineret.
Exhausted by the universal clamour and the insistence of individuals he
changed his attitude little by little, not so as to admit that he had taken up
supreme power but so as to cease to refuse and to be asked.41
Modern audiences can appreciate why this failed to satisfy those
hoping for closure; evasion is a skill important to politicians. Thus,
accusations of ‘feigned hesitancy’ persisted: ‘trepida civitas incusare
39 Dio 57.2.4–5.
40 J. W. Rich (1990), 136, believes Dio has invented Augustus’ speech, noting that
the structure evidences typical signs of artifice, especially echoes of Thucydides. He
notes also that such speeches (i.e. resignation of powers by a supreme magistrate
holding an extra-ordinary command) were common in rhetorical schools, citing
Quint. Inst. 3.8.53. Even so, this was a famous occasion, records of which surely
survived well into the Principate. The style and phraseology may not be authentic, but
the underlying message should not be doubted. P. M. Swan, ‘Cassius Dio on Augustus:
A Poverty of Annalistic Sources?’, Phoenix, 41: 3 (1987), 272–91, shows that Dio’s
main source was written in the Augustan era or shortly after. Moreover, as U. Huttner
(2004) has shown, the discourse of reluctance had a long history in Rome. That
Augustus would not have utilized such a discourse at that moment is unlikely. Indeed,
the discourse is present in the Res Gestae (5–7), and, interestingly, is very much
present in Livy’s first pentad, such as the famous story of Cincinnatus (Livy 3.21).
41 Tac. Ann. 1.13.5–6. Tacitus does not state explicitly that Tiberius’ message
changed on the 17th, but the date can be inferred from a combination of evidence.
Tacitus implies that Tiberius’ position changed at the same meeting of the senate at
which Augustus was declared a god. The Fasti Amiternini and the Fasti Oppiani state
that a decree was passed making Augustus a god on 17 Sept. (V. Ehrenberg and
A. H. M. Jones (1955), 52). Cf. K. Wellesley, ‘The Dies Imperii of Tiberius’, JRS, 57
(1967), 23–30, and M. Sage (1982/83), 310.
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Tiberium quod dum patres et plebem invalida et inermia cunctatione
ficta ludificetur . . . ’ ‘The terrified citizenry accused Tiberius ‘while
with his fictional hesitation he was ridiculing the senate and plebs,
weak and unarmed . . . ’42 Tiberius was able to alter his message but
not able to offer a positive declaration. Though ‘decent papal reluc-
tance’ partly explains Tiberius’ attitude between Augustus’ death and
17 September, it does not explain his transition to silence. Silence in
the face of a request being, after all, a condition pregnant with more
than a polite sense of moderation; the hallmark of reluctance decently
offered. It indicates uncertainty. Senators no doubt remembered that
Tiberius had once before abandoned his post, on the grounds that he
was tired and in need of rest, when faced with an awkward political
landscape in 6 BC.43 Tiberius’ silence would have seemed both frus-
trating as well as unnerving because his recusatio was not a nod to
mere formality: he was actually hesitant in the face of something or
someone. A standard concentration on philosophical mindsets within
modern scholarship devalues the explicit evidence of Suetonius con-
cerning the cause of Tiberius’ approach:
Cunctandi causa erat metus undique imminentium discriminum . . .Nam et
servus Agrippae Clemens nomine non contemnendam manum in ultionem
domini compararet et L. Scribonius Libo vir nobilis res novas clam moliebatur
et duplex seditio militum in Illyrico et in Germania exorta est.
The cause of his hesitation was fear of the imminent dangers all around
him . . . For a slave of Agrippa’s, Clemens by name, had put together a not
contemptible force to avenge his dead master; L. Scribonius Libo, a nobilis,
was secretly planning revolution; and in two places, Illyricum and Germany,
sedition broke out among the troops.44
The following chapters will show that it is possible to construct a
coherent model using Suetonius’ interpretation while explaining the
42 Tac. Ann. 1.46.1.
43 Suet. Tib.10.
44 Suet. Tib. 25.1. A. Lang (1911), 32, calls it ‘improbable’ and ‘exaggerated’: it is
rejected by A. Passerini (1948), 224 f.; G. Kampff (1963), 45, criticizes Suetonius for a
complete unconcern about chronology; R. Seager (1972), 89, calls it false, but admits
that both Clemens and Drusus Libo were possibly active in AD 14; F. R. D. Goodyear
(1972), 173, n.1, calls this list a ‘muddle’, and (1981), 307 ‘careless misunderstanding’;
Levick (1999) 150, 224 f: “Suetonius’ idea we need not accept”; M. Sage (1982/83), 299,
calls it ‘impossible’; H. Lindsay (1995), 110, describes the list as ‘implausible’. Cf.
U. Silvagni, L’Impero e le donne dei Cesari, II (1909), 270; F. B. Marsh (1926), 298,
accepts Suetonius’ chronology but not his interpretation; R. S. Rogers (1935), 12 f.
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gradual nature of Tiberius’ position vis-à-vis the senate. In particular,
that Drusus Libo was an issue for Tiberius in the early weeks of
September AD 14. Before dealing with the debate on 17 September,
however, we must consider the death of Agrippa Postumus. Though
Suetonius refers only to Clemens, Agrippa’s death lies at the heart of
the story; the event by which Tacitus defined the Tiberian Principate.
We must, therefore, return to Agrippa.
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“Did You Hear About Agrippa?”
Where was Tiberius when Augustus died? According to the extant
sources he was either on his way to Illyricum or sitting inside a Nolan
villa as Augustus breathed his last. In his research Dio found that
most ‘respectable’ historians preferred the first scenario:
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These things, indeed, are attested by most writers, and by the more trust-
worthy ones; for there are some who claim that Tiberius was present for his
[Augustus’] illness, and that he received some instructions from him.1
Tacitus is equivocal:
Utcumque se ea res habuit, vixdum ingressus Illyricum Tiberius properis
matris litteris accitur; neque satis conpertum est spirantem adhuc Augustum
apud urbem Nolam an exanimem reppererit.
Whatever the truth was, having just entered Illyricum, Tiberius was sum-
moned by an urgent letter from his mother; it is not really known whether
near the city of Nola he discovered Augustus as yet still breathing or lifeless.2
A belief that Tiberius was absent is associated with a tradition that
accused Livia of murdering Augustus because he considered pardon-
ing Agrippa. Plutarch writes:
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1 Dio 56.31.1. 2 Tac. Ann. 1.5.3–4.
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Fulvius [sic], the friend of Caesar Augustus, heard the emperor, now an old
man, lamenting the desolation of his house: two of his grandsons were dead,
and Postumius [sic], the only one surviving, was in exile because of some
false accusation, and thus he was forced to import his wife’s son into the
imperial succession; yet he pitied his grandson and was planning to recall
him from abroad. Fulvius [sic] divulged what he had heard to his own wife,
and she to Livia; and Livia bitterly rebuked Caesar: if he had formed this
design long ago, why did he not send for his grandson, instead of making her
an object of enmity and strife to the successor to the empire.3
Though lacking detail the elder Pliny includes elements of the story in
his list of miseries which affected Augustus:
inde suspicio in Fabium arcanorumque proditionem, hinc uxoris et Tiberi
cogitationes, suprema eius cura.
Then his suspicion of Fabius and the betrayal of secrets, and the intrigues of
his wife and Tiberius that tormented his last days.4
Tacitus writes:
Quippe rumor incesserat paucos ante mensis Augustum, electis consciis et
comite uno Fabio Maximo,5Planasiam vectum ad visendum Agrippam; mul-
tas illic utrimque lacrimas et signa caritatis spemque ex eo fore ut iuvenis
penatibus avi redderetur: Quod Maximum uxori Marciae aperuisse, illam
Liviae.
For a rumour went around that a few months before, Augustus, with a
few chosen friends in the know and one companion, Fabius Maximus, had
sailed to Planasia to see Agrippa; with many tears shed, signs of affection
and hope that the young man was about to be returned to the household of
his grandfather. Maximus told this to his wife Marcia, who in turn told
Livia.6
3 Plut. Moralia: De Garrul. 11.
4 Pliny NH 7.150.
5 For this ambiguous sentence, see F. R. D. Goodyear (1972), 131.
6 Tac. Ann. 1.5.
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Dio elaborates:
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And so Augustus fell ill and passed away. And Livia incurred some suspicion
over his death, since he had sailed over to the island to see Agrippa in secret,
and seemed to be about to be reconciled with him in every way. For in her
fear, as they say, lest Augustus might restore Agrippa to sovereignty, she
smeared with poison some figs which were still on trees, from which Augus-
tus was accustomed to pick by hand. She herself ate the good ones and
offered the poisoned ones to him.7
Aurelius Victor writes:
Quamquam alii scribant dolo Liviae exstinctum metuentis, ne, quia privignae
filium Agrippam, quem odio novercali in insulam relegaverat, reduci comper-
erat, eo summam rerum adepto poenas daret.
Yet some write that [Augustus] was killed by a deception of Livia, who, since
she had gained information that Agrippa (the son of her stepdaughter,
whom, as a result of his mother-in-law's hatred, he/she had relegated to an
island) was to be recalled, feared that, when he had obtained control of
affairs, she would be punished.8
The alternative scenario, i.e. Tiberius witnessed Augustus’ final
moments, appears in Velleius and Suetonius (who ignore the exis-
tence of the first altogether), and is acknowledged byDio and Tacitus,
though the latter two undercut its validity by seeming to prefer the
first. Velleius writes:
Et ingravescente in dies valetudine, cum sciret, quis volenti omnia post se salva
remanere accersendus foret, festinanter revocavit filium; ille ad patrem patriae
expectato revolavit maturius. Tum securum se Augustus praedicans circum-
fususque amplexibus Tiberii sui, commendans illi sua atque ipsius opera nec
quidquam iam de fine, si fata poscerent, recusans, subrefectus primo conspectu
alloquioque carissimi sibi spiritus, mox, cum omnem curam fata vincerent, in
sua resolutus initia Pompeio Apuleioque consulibus septuagesimo et sexto
anno animam caelestem caelo reddidit.
7 Dio 56.30.1. 8 Epitome de Caesaribus: 1.27.
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As his health daily worsened, he knew for whom he must send if he wished to
leave everything after him secure, he sent in haste for his son to return;
[Tiberius] hurried back to the father of his country earlier than he was
expected. Then Augustus, pronouncing himself secure and enfolded in his
dear Tiberius’ embraces, commending to him their joint work and no longer
refusing to meet his end if the fates should require it, revived a little at the
first sight of Tiberius and the greeting of the spirit most dear to him, but
soon, since destiny conquers every care, he resolved into his own elements
and in the consulship of Pompeius and Apuleius in his seventy-sixth year
rendered his heavenly soul to heaven.9
Suetonius writes:
Sed in redeundo adgravata valitudine tandem Nolae succubuit revocatumque
ex itinere Tiberium diu secreto sermone detinuit, neque post ulli maiori
negotio animum accommodavit.
But as he was returning his illness was aggravated and he finally succumbed
at Nola, and recalling Tiberius from his journey, he detained him for a long
time in private conversation, after which he did not attend to any important
business.10
The first scenario is comparable to the story of Nero’s accession: an
unpopular Nero is adopted by the princeps; the adoption is engi-
neered by Nero’s scheming mother, Agrippina; Agrippina murders
the princeps after a dispossessed heir re-enters the picture; Agrippina
orders the house to be surrounded by guards.11 This last image
mirrored Livy’s treatment of the accession of Servius Tullius.12
Some scholars have, therefore, assumed that the interpretation
emerged after AD 54, and is not therefore relevant to Tiberius’
reign.13 I believe that this interpretation is wrong and that the
9 Vell. 2.123.1–2. 10 Suet. Aug. 98.5.
11 The comparison was discovered by M. P. Charlesworth, ‘Tiberius and the Death
of Augustus’, AJP, 44:2 (1923), 145–57.
12 Livy 1.41; M. P. Charlesworth, ‘Livia and Tanaquil’, CR, 41 (1927), 55–7;
R. H. Martin, ‘Tacitus and the Death of Augustus’, CQ, 5 (1955), 123–8;
F. R. D. Goodyear (1972), 128.
13 B. R. Motzo, ‘I Commentari di Agrippina madre di Nerone’, Studi di Storia e
Filologia, 1 (1927), 38 f.; F. B. Marsh (1931), 50, seems to follow Charlesworth;
R. S. Rogers (1935), 3 f.; W. Allen Jun. ‘The Death of Agrippa Postumus’, TAPA, 78
(1947), 131–9; R. H. Martin (1955), passim; C. Questa, ‘La Morte di Augusto Secondo
Cassio Dione’, PP, 14 (1959), 41–53; J. D. Lewis (1970), 176 f., agrees that the story is
not a product of the Tiberian period, but cannot believe it was invented by the
younger Agrippina. Lewis simply dates its construction to after Tiberius’ death;
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tradition was in fact contemporary.14 The conspiracy of Clemens, the
Pseudo-Agrippa, in AD 16 is the evidence.15
The conspirators required evidence that Agrippa was the legitimate
heir of Augustus, since the senatus consultum of AD 7 - by which
Agrippa was incarcerated - necessarily proved Augustus’ repudiation
of his estranged son. Agrippa obviously had supporters, but his exile
was still a problem. A rumour that Agrippa and Augustus were, in
fact, reconciled shortly before Augustus’ death was the solution.16
Fabius Maximus was an ideal character. Official records attest that he
and Augustus had left Rome together in May AD 14; he had subse-
quently committed suicide because of some dispute with Augustus.17
Neither Fabius nor Augustus could be called on to verify or dispute
the story. There was, moreover, sufficient circumstantial evidence to
evince plausibility.18 Livia was known to have hated Agrippa, and if
her involvement in his exile was popularly believed, it would not have
been difficult to convince people of her guilt. Livia’s poor reaction to
news of Augustus’ trip to Planasia was therefore crucial to the story,
as was her subsequent decision to murder him. The role of Livia
allowed the conspirators to argue that Agrippa’s full restoration was
prevented only by the schemes of a wicked stepmother.19 The
F. R. D. Goodyear (1972), 126, with some reservations; R. Mellor, Tacitus (1993), 44 f.;
A. Barrett (2002), 243 f.
14 My position is not to be mistaken for that adopted by R. A. Bauman (1992),
127f., and ‘Tanaquil-Livia and the Death of Augustus’, Historia, 43 (1994), 177–8,
who locates the stories firmly in the Tiberian Principate, but takes them to be
historically accurate, i.e. not hostile rumour lacking substance.
15 R. Detweiler (1970), 291, says that most scholars hold this view (he does not); in
all my research I have found only one scholar who explicitly connects Agrippa’s
execution with the story of Clemens. A. E. Pappano (1941), 41, makes the connection,
but we differ considerably in detail. Pappano conflates the conspiracy of Clemens with
that of Audasius and Epicadus cited at Suet. Aug. 19. Furthermore, Pappano suggests
that the story appeared while the conspiracy was being planned. That is unlikely. The
story would necessarily come after the event.
16 It is accepted as historical by V. Gardthausen, RE 10, 183–5; S. Jameson (1975),
310; B. Levick (1999), 64.
17 Acta Fratrum Arvalium 1, 29 (ed. Henzen).
18 The death of Princess Diana is a modern example. Some continue to believe that
Princess Diana and Dodi Al Fayed were murdered in a palace-sponsored plot. This
thinking has found traction in the pages of ‘gossip magazines’ and ‘tabloid’ newspapers,
which have subsequently affected the thinking of, no doubt, many people.
19 Tac. Ann. 1.72.3 states: Hunc quoque asperavere carmina incertis auctoribus
vulgata in saevitiam superbiamque eius et discordem cum matre animum, ‘Poems of
unknown authorship satirising his savagery, arrogance, and his broken relationship
with his mother, had also exasperated him.’ These ‘poems’, if Tacitus supplies a
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presence of this interpretation in several historical sources shows that
some people accepted the story as true—I believe it was invented in AD
16. When Tacitus wrote his Annals, rumour had evidently become
valid history (as Dio observed), providing historians interested in the
symmetry of history with a device through which the reader could
predict tyranny.20 Suetonius, however, was still able to follow the
alternative, and no doubt official, history. But we need not accept
that particular version as true.
Aside from satisfying a human need for last-goodbyes, Tiberius
had little reason to speak with Augustus on 19 Augustus AD 14; the
occasion of Augustus’ death must have been well planned. For two
and half years Augustus and Tiberius had been organizing the appro-
priate powers for transition. It is untenable to think that the family
council (or the semenstre consilium) had not discussed, and in fact
agreed on, the appropriate course of action. Augustus’ careful plan-
ning of his own funeral evidences such a mindset.21 Tiberius’ position
was, moreover, beyond question.He was certainly Augustus’ heir and
chosen successor. Velleius’ commendo is suspect. It seeks to justify the
continuation of the Principate as an intermediate structure: ‘there is
still work to do; continue on the path we have both been following’. It
is not uncommon for governments to manufacture history in order to
counter the claims of revolutionaries. But, more importantly, the
official version sought to exculpate Livia and Tiberius while rubbish-
ing claims that Agrippa was preferred: (i) Augustus did not change
his mind. He commended the Principate to Tiberius; and (ii) Livia
could not have intervened because Tiberius was already present to
receive Augustus’ last instructions. This reaction to popular rumour
cannot be trusted. That Tiberius’ absence was held to be true by the
‘best’ historians (which probably includes those who lived at the time)
suggests that it was. But it was a decision made in Rome that caused
coherent chronology, appeared before AD 15 (which begins at Ann. 1.55). That
Tiberius and his mother were probably on good terms would not have prevented
his enemies from constructing a malicious image, perhaps built upon Tiberius’
decision not to allow Livia to be officially titled mater patriae. The same methodology
is used today by all gossip magazines. Cf. F. R. D. Goodyear (1981), 153, who believes
the passage is not datable.
20 Thus the same mechanisms were associated with Nero.
21 Suet. Aug. 101.4; Dio 56.33.1.
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Tiberius problems. The sources must be quoted in full, starting with
Tacitus:
Primum facinus novi principatus fuit Postumi Agrippae caedes, quem
ignarum inermemque quamvis firmatus animo centurio aegre confecit. Nihil
de ea re Tiberius apud senatum disseruit: patris iussa simulabat, quibus
praescripsisset tribuno custodiae adposito ne cunctaretur Agrippam morte
adficere quandoque ipse supremum diem explevisset. Multa sine dubio saeva-
que Augustus de moribus adulescentis questus, ut exilium eius senatus con-
sulto sanciretur perfecerat: ceterum in nullius umquam suorum necem
duravit, neque mortem nepoti pro securitate privigni inlatam credibile erat.
Propius vero Tiberium ac Liviam, illum metu, hanc novercalibus odiis, sus-
pecti et invisi iuvenis caedem festinavisse. Nuntianti centurioni, ut mos
militiae, factum esse quod imperasset, neque imperasse sese et rationem facti
reddendam apud senatum respondit. Quod postquam Sallustius Crispus par-
ticeps secretorum (is ad tribunum miserat codicillos) comperit, metuens ne
reus subderetur, iuxta periculoso ficta seu vera promeret monuit Liviam ne
arcana domus, ne consilia amicorum, ministeria militum vulgarentur, neve
Tiberius vim principatus resolveret cuncta ad senatum vocando: eam condi-
cionem esse imperandi, ut non aliter ratio constet quam si uni reddatur.
The first act of the new Principate was the slaying of Agrippa Postumus,
who, though surprised and unarmed, was nevertheless executed by a
centurion of resolute spirit with some difficulty. Tiberius did not discuss
the matter in the senate: he simulated orders from his father, which
instructed the tribune in charge of the prison not to delay the death of
Agrippa once he himself had met his final day. Without doubt Augustus
had many times complained bitterly of the young man’s character, and he
had procured a senatus consultum to sanction his exile: but he never steeled
himself to the killing of any of his relatives, and it was incredible that the
death of a grandson had been brought about for the security of a stepson.
It was closer to the truth that Tiberius and Livia, the one from fear the
other from a stepmother’s enmity, hurried on the destruction of a youth
whom they suspected and hated. When the centurion reported, according
to military custom, that he had ‘executed the command’, Tiberius replied
that he had given no order, and that accountability for the act must be
supplied to the senate. When afterwards Sallustius Crispus, a partner in
imperial secrets (he had sent the letters to the tribune) found this out,
fearing that he would be falsely substituted as the defendant, and that the
danger would be the same whether he spoke the truth or lied, he warned
Livia that the secrets of the imperial house, the counsels of its friends, or
any services performed by the soldiers should not be divulged, and that
Tiberius should not weaken the power of the Principate by referring
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everything to the senate, for ‘the condition’ he said ‘of holding power is
that an account cannot be balanced unless it is rendered to one person.’22
Suetonius writes:
Excessum Augusti non prius palam fecit, quam Agrippa iuvene interempto.
Hunc tribunus militum custos appositus occidit lectis codicillis, quibus ut id
faceret iubebatur; quos codicillos dubium fuit, Augustusne moriens reliquisset,
quo materiam tumultus post se subduceret; an nomine Augusti Livia et ea
conscio Tiberio an ignaro, dictasset. Tiberius renuntianti tribuno, factum esse
quod imperasset, neque imperasse se et redditurum eum senatui rationem
respondit, invidiam scilicet in praesentia vitans. Nam mox silentio rem
obliteravit.
The death of Augustus was not made public before the young Agrippa had
been done away with. A military tribune, appointed to guard him, killed him
on reading a note, in which he was ordered to do the deed. It was not known
whose the letter was, whether the dying Augustus left it, to remove a source
of uprising after his death; or whether Livia wrote it in Augustus’ name, and
in that case, whether Tiberius was cognizant or ignorant. Tiberius replied to
the tribune, who reported that he had carried out his order, that he had given
no such order and that he (i.e. the tribune) must provide an account to the
senate, obviously attempting to avoid odium for the time being. For soon he
buried the matter in silence.23
While Dio writes:
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And, having immediately sent from Nola, he put Agrippa to death; and he
continued to say that this had not occurred as a result of his own order(s), and
made threats against the perpetrator; yet he did not impose any punishment
on him at all, but allowed men to make up stories, some to the effect that
Augustus had put him out of the way just prior to his death, and others to the
effect that the centurion, who was charged with his protection, had slain him
on his own initiative for some revolutionary activity, and still others to the
effect that Livia, rather than Tiberius, had given the order for him to perish.24
22 Tac. Ann. 1.6. 23 Suet. Tib. 22. 24 Dio 57.3.5.
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Tiberius’ desire to hold a senatorial inquiry into Agrippa’s execu-
tion is the key. Tiberius’ ignorance of the execution is implied as is his
earnest desire for exoneration. Tiberius knew that a public inquiry
would clear his name. But its survival in sources with obvious anti-
Tiberian elements indicates that it was held to be true, rather than
constructed post factum. Such a complicated story that allowed for a
positive interpretation of Tiberius would surely have been eliminated
by his opponents had it not been widely held to be true. Unable to
navigate round such an obvious fact, opponents chose instead to
present it in the worst possible light. Tiberius was probably informed
while alone (the messenger would not blurt the information out while
Tiberius was in the presence of other people, no matter their rank),
but soon after declared before witnesses that he had received the
information and would lay it before the senate. The presence of
witnesses ensured its place within the mainstream histories.25 Tiber-
ius’ decision not to bring the matter before the senate was thus
interpreted as evidence of deceit, but this is probably wrong. If
Tiberius was in any way complicit, then his request for a public
inquiry was stupid and reckless. Unlike modern government inqui-
ries, a senatorial inquiry could not be whitewashed. The silence and
co-operation of Tiberius’ enemies was not assured. The most logical
explanation is, therefore, the one provided by Tacitus: someone
convinced Tiberius not to have an inquiry.
Sallustius Crispus’ involvement appears only in Tacitus. He was
about 70 in AD 14 and seems to have been, at that time, Augustus’
chief adviser.26 In an obituary Tacitus remarks that Crispus possessed
greater potentia than ‘many who triumphed or held the consulship’.27
A tradition, known only to Tacitus, evidently knew of Crispus’
involvement.28 Indeed, Tacitus believed that Crispus was in trouble
25 Evidently, Crispus was not with him at the time. It is clear from Tacitus’
narrative that Tiberius was not immediately convinced to remain silent. That this
quote was accepted as fact almost immediately by both contemporaries and historians
tells against the position of some modern scholars who argue that Agrippa did not die
in AD 14 or, at least, was not executed: W. Allen Jun. (1947), passim; J. Bellemore
(2000), passim.
26 Tac. Ann. 3.30; A. Stein, RE 18 2097; H. W. Benario, ‘The End of
Sallustius Crispus’, CJ, 57: 7 (1962), 321–2.
27 Tac. Ann. 3.30.2.
28 Contra D. C. A Shotter, ‘The Problems in Tacitus’ Annals I’, Mnem., 18 (1965),
359–61. Shotter argues that Tiberius attempted to shift blame onto Crispus. But
Tiberius could not blame Crispus. That would involve damaging his mother’s
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‘whether he spoke the truth or lied’, i.e. the truth was an admission of
guilt, while a lie would seriously embarrass the government. Who
would be affected by a lie? It cannot have been Tiberius, for the
reasons given above. We should instead look to Augustus. If Tiberius
were genuinely ignorant of the execution, which I believe he was, then
Augustus cannot have been complicit; he would not have withheld
such a plan from his successor.29 It is furthermore irrational to believe
reputation and, more importantly, admitting that he was convinced not to have an
inquiry. Tacitus shows in his obituary of Crispus that biographical material was
available. Sallustius Crispus had an adopted son, C. Sallustius Crispus Passienus
(suff. 27). Suetonius, Nero 6.3, writes that Passienus was for a time married to the
younger Agrippina. Would the story have entered her memoirs? J. D. Lewis (1970),
181, n. 13, 183, n. 52, believes it did; D. Kehoe (1985), disagrees. The Scholiast on
Juvenal, 4.81, writes that Passienus was poisoned by Agrippina. R. Syme (1986),
160, n. 33 dates his death to pre AD 47. Whether or not the death was suspicious, it
would have allowed Agrippina to treat her ex-husband’s father with impunity. Some
modern historians would reject this approach, holding that Agrippina’s work was pro-
Julian (as argued by Charlesworth). This is problematical. Agrippina’s situation
depended not on Agrippa Postumus but her father, Germanicus. Germanicus would
not have sympathized with Agrippa’s claim. Agrippina’s memoirs would have treated
Agrippa as a pretender, an illegitimate force. Nevertheless, it would explain why
Tacitus is the only extant historian who treats Crispus’ involvement. Dio and Sueto-
nius would mention Crispus if they knew about him. Since we know Dio and
Suetonius have read various sources, we must conclude that Tacitus, in using the
private memoirs of the younger Agrippina, has landed a scoop, and he wants us to
know it. This is especially clear at Tac. Ann. 4.53.2, when writing about a different
episode: Id ego, a scriptoribus annalium non traditum, repperi in commentariis
Agrippinae filiae quae Neronis principis mater vitam suam et casus suorum posteris
memoravit. ‘This, not noticed by writers of history, I found in the memoirs of her
daughter Agrippina, mother of Nero, who recorded for posterity her life and that of
her house.’ This is Tacitus gloating. But Agrippina’s evidence put Tacitus into a twist.
He at first seems to follow mainstream thinking: ‘Augustus is said to have done it, but
I think Tiberius and Livia were guilty.’ But he then introduces his scoop, and the effect
obfuscates the entire passage.He knows Crispus did it, but he still wants Tiberius to be
guilty. Cf. H. Furneax (1896), 31, n. 1, wonders whether Sallustius Crispus may have
authored his own memoirs, which stayed within his family. If he did, Agrippina would
certainly have had access to them. The ramifications of this conclusion extend,
however, beyond the memoirs of the younger Agrippina: it weakens the belief that
Tacitus seriously affected either Suetonius or Dio. It would suggest that where
Suetonius and Dio seem to echo Tacitus, they in fact echo an earlier common source,
not Tacitus himself. They have both skipped over Tacitus, probably preferring
Servilius Nonianus, Aufidius Bassus, Cluvius Rufus, Fabius Rusticus, and perhaps
even the elder Seneca.
29 Cf. A. Spengel, ‘Zur Geschichte des Kaisers Tiberius’, Sitzungsberichte der
K. B. Akademie der Wissenschaften zu München (1903), 5–11; M. P. Charlesworth
(1923), 156; E. Hohl (1935), 352–3; F. Norwood (1963), 163; R. Seager (1972), 42;
B. Levick (1999), 65 f.; T. E. J. Wiedemann, CAH, 10², 202; nor can Augustus have
ordered the execution as an emergency measure before Tiberius arrived at Nola. Livia,
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that Augustus incarcerated Agrippa in AD 7 only to have him executed
a few days before he died in AD 14. The contemporary analysis was
probably correct: Augustus could not bring himself to execute family.
Evidence could nevertheless be produced which made Augustus a
suspect; it must have been the written order to execute.
A soldier, no matter what rank, would not execute a member of the
imperial family without formal orders; only Augustus’ or Tiberius’
seal was probably sufficient.30 If both are innocent, then someone
must have ordered the execution on their behalf. Since Tiberius
believed an inquiry would exonerate him the sealmust have belonged
to Augustus: Crispus ordered the execution of Agrippa on Augustus’
behalf, using Augustus’ seal. It would not have been an original idea,
but an interpretation of the effects of the senatus consultum of AD 7, by
which Agrippa was incarcerated. The order was not sent from Nola,
but from Rome. If Crispus had been at Nola when Tiberius arrived, he
would have informed Tiberius immediately. Indeed, even if he had
left, others, such as Livia, would have known and told Tiberius. It is
clear that Tiberius was first told about Agrippa’s death by a centurion
holding the instructions in his hand. This implies that no one at Nola
knew of Agrippa’s execution; that Livia was therefore innocent; and
that Crispus was somewhere else. Rome is the best bet. As Augustus’
chief minister, Crispus probably stayed in Rome to continue day-to-
day business while Augustus toured Italy. To perform this function,
Crispus would require a copy of Augustus’ seal.31 This approach
perfectly explains Crispus’ belief that an inquiry would ruin him,
and the fact that some were able to attribute the order to Augustus.32
who would have been privy to such an order if it was sent from Nola by Augustus,
would have told Tiberius immediately on his arrival, i.e. Tiberius would not have been
informed by a centurion a week later.
30 Otherwise it would have been in the government’s interest to have an inquiry.
Tac. Ann. 1.5.3; Suet. Tib. 22; Dio 57.3.5 all attest written instruction for Agrippa’s
execution.
31 Dio’s belief that a letter was sent from Nola to Planasia is not a problem. It
comes from a tradition that blamed Tiberius, and therefore held that the instructions
must have come from Nola.
32 Indeed, if the execution was grounded in an interpretation of the senatus consultum
of AD 7 (which seems likely) then Crispus could argue that he acted according to the
terms of the decree, in line with Augustus’ intentions when he sponsored its passage
through the senate. It would be argued that Augustus had intended Agrippa to be
executed were the rules pertaining to his incarceration to be breached. This idea may
have become distorted within a hostile historical tradition, producing in Tacitus a
sentence which seems, on the face of it, to be contradictory, Tac. Ann. 1.6: Nihil de ea
“Did You Hear About Agrippa?” 179
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any 
way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
But, more importantly, it explains why some suspected Livia. Livia
probably possessed Augustus’ seal between his death and Tiberius’
arrival in Nola. If Crispus were to lie at an inquiry, then suspicion
might leave Livia vulnerable. Thus Suetonius and Dio knew of an
alternative history in which Livia wrote the letter herself. Tiberius
would have known that Livia was innocent; if she knew anything, she
would have told him immediately on his arrival at Nola. Tiberius and
Livia were probably unaware of Crispus’ guilt; Tiberius was right to
demand an inquiry. If we accept the historicity of Crispus’ and Livia’s
conversation, then Tiberius abandoned his plans for a public inquiry
only once he was in Rome. Interestingly, Tacitus had evidence that
Tiberius’ relationship with Crispus subsequently soured:
interficiendi Postumi Agrippae conscius, aetate provecta speciem magis in
amicitia principis quam vim tenuit.
He knew of the death of Agrippa Postumus, but with advancing years he held
more the appearance than the reality of the princeps’ friendship.33
By agreeing not to hold an inquiry, Tiberius denied himself an
opportunity for public exoneration; he may never have forgiven
Crispus for placing him in such a position. It is important to note,
however, that despite Suetonius’ statement: Nam mox silentio rem
obliteravit, ‘for soon he buried the matter in silence’, Dio’s belief that
Tiberius continued to deny his involvement suggests that some offi-
cial statement was made.34 Since the matter was never discussed in
the senate, the statement was probably something like: ‘Agrippa
Caesar was put to death on account of a disturbance affecting the
security of the res publica’. The recent actions of Audasius and
Epicadus made it at least plausible for the regime to allege conspira-
cies and disturbances around Agrippa. But governments that produce
equivocal statements invite popular speculation. Some blamed Tiber-
ius and interpreted his request for an inquiry as deceitful, basing their
analysis on a logical but defective test: cui bono? Others were happy to
re Tiberius apud senatum disseruit: patris iussa simulabat, quibus praescripsisset tribuno
custodiae adposito ne cunctaretur Agrippam morte adficere quandoque ipse supremum
diem explevisset, ‘Tiberius did not discuss the matter in the senate: he simulated orders
from his father, which instructed the tribune in charge of the prison not to delay the
death of Agrippa once he himself had met his final day.’
33 Tac. Ann. 3.30.3.
34 Once people were talking, some official statement was necessary. Cf. J. Bellemore
(2000), 99; and I. Cogitore (1991), 133.
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blame the centurion, while still others looked to either Augustus or
Livia. But revelations about Crispus probably surfaced much later.35
It is important to note, however, that Tiberius never withdrew
friendship from Crispus.36 Crispus must have convinced Tiberius
that his actions were justified; Tiberius agreed and used him again
on Clemens.
Justification for execution precludes arbitrary action as a plausible
explanation; Crispus cannot have said: ‘Well, Tiberius always said
Agrippa was an inconvenience.’ An order for execution would not
have been given without just cause; a belief that people were planning
to free Agrippa is the obvious solution, especially since an actual
attempt had already been made. Dio’s report may contain traces of
the original language when he writes ‘the centurion who was guarding
him had slain him on his own responsibility because of some revolu-
tionary dealings’. The government could not, at the time, publicly
blame the centurion; had it been possible, a public inquiry would have
been beneficial. There were probably too many witnesses. It was
nevertheless in the regime’s interest to let rumour circulate. The
question of sources is here relevant.
The death of Agrippa Postumus would not have been treated in a
historical work while Tiberius still lived. Velleius, by placing the affair
firmly in Augustus’ reign, shows what was expected of those who
cared about Tiberius’ opinion.37 But holding the centurion respon-
sible necessarily frees the government from blame - we need a pro-
Tiberian source able to engage with the subject during the Tiberian
Principate. I believe we can do no better than Tiberius’ own works.
Suetonius refers to commentarii and acta which survived at least to
the time of Domitian.38 Tiberius, moreover, wrote an autobiography,
a commentarius de vita sua, which, though apparently brief, touched
on the execution of Sejanus39 and possibly Sempronius Gracchus
in AD 14:
35 J. D. Lewis (1970), 168; W. Allen Jun. (1947), 133; P. Sinclair, Tacitus the
Sententious Historian: A Sociology of Rhetoric in Annales 1–6 (1995), 5 f., treat the
episode as unhistorical.
36 As demonstrated by H. W. Benario (1962), 321–2.
37 Cf. A. J. Woodman (1977), 170.
38 Suet. Dom. 20.
39 Suet. Tib. 61.1.
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Quidam non Roma eos milites, sed ab L. Asprenate pro consule Africae missos
tradidere auctore Tiberio, qui famam caedis posse in Asprenatem verti frustra
speraverat.
Some [state] that the soldiers were sent not from Rome but from L. Asprenas,
pronconsul of Africa; Tiberius authored this view, who had hoped in vain
that the infamy of murder could be transferred to Asprenas.40
The work was perhaps designed to exonerate Tiberius from the most
shocking aspects of his Principate, of which Agrippa’s death was the
first and perhaps most famous. It represents, therefore, a historical
revision written almost twenty years after the fact.
Dio’s passage: ‘the centurion who was guarding him had slain him
on his own responsibility because of some revolutionary dealings’,
thus conflates two separate messages: (i) Tiberius was not responsible
for Agrippa’s execution, and (ii) the execution was justified because
Agrippa had revolutionary designs.41 The first came much later and
from Tiberius. The government used the second in AD 14. Justification
was necessary. Dio provides anecdotal evidence which may be related
to the question of Agrippa:
XÅ b ªaæ XŒıÆ ‹	Ø, KØc  ¸ØıÆ ¼Œ	
 	F APª	ı 	c Iæåc
ÆP	fiH æØØÅŒÆØ Kºª	, æÆ		, ‹ø
 c Ææ’ KŒÅ
 (ŒÆd ªaæ ı




 ŒÆd ŒÆ	a Iæ	 çø
æŒø, Ø ÆP	c NºÅçÆØ.
Now, in fact, I have heard that, when it began to be said that Livia had,
against Augustus’s will, brought about the rule for Tiberius, he contrived so
as to appear not to have received it from her (and indeed he was utterly
hateful towards her), but under compulsion from the senate, since he was
superior to them in excellence.42
Two ideas are present. The first comes from Agrippa’s supporters,
and relates to the message reconstructed above: Livia murdered
Augustus, sponsored Agrippa’s execution, and thus provided Tiberius
with the Principate. The other is quite separate: Tiberius despised his
mother, and thus removed himself from the suspicion that sur-
rounded her. An attempt to undermine the public’s perception of
Tiberius’ relationship with his mother is attested for the period.43
40 Tac. Ann. 1.53.6.
41 Of course, Dio is probably not responsible for the conflation, which may well
have begun with Tiberius.
42 Dio 57.3.3. 43 Tac. Ann. 1.72.
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Dio’s source understood that innuendo and dissent, manufactured, in
my view, by Agrippa’s supporters, affected Tiberius’ behaviour fol-
lowing the death of Augustus. In concert with other events, it com-
pelled him to seek out senatorial support - not to make legal the
execution of Agrippa but to legitimize further his own position. But
there was more than public relations at stake. Dio cites an exchange
between Tiberius and an unknown senator at the first senatorial
meeting following Tiberius’ return from Nola. Tiberius called the




 Iç’ Æ	e XÅ åø KE	 c 	B
 ªæıÆ

ıæÆŁÆ ƒ u	 Åb ÆØ K 	fi B 	F Æ	
 ÆP	F 	Æçfi B ÆŁE·
KØ ªaæ BŁ  	Ø
 ÆP	e ±æÆ	
 K 	fi B IªæAfi , uæ 	e 	F
˚ÆÆæ
, ŒÆøØ. ŒÆd KØ ª Œłı
 	Ø
 Kd 		øfi çæıæa
ÆP	fiH ‰
 PŒ å	Ø ŁBÆØ KÅªÆ	, 	 	 åºıÆe ÆP	F ıBŒ, ŒÆd
çÅ ŒÆd ‹	Ø “ƒ 	æÆ	ØH	ÆØ PŒ Kd Iººa ÅØ NØ.”
And while he already had bodyguards around him, he in fact asked the senate
to give him assistance, so that he might not suffer any violence at the burial of
Augustus’ body; for he was afraid, in truth, lest people, having seized
Augustus’ body in the forum, as they had seized Caesar’s, would burn it.
And when somebody, making a joke, suggested that a guard be given to him,
as though he had none, he understood the man’s irony and actually said that
‘the guards do not belong to me, but to the State.’44
Tiberius would hardly have asked for State troops to replace those
already in his service (praetorians), which he believed were also State
troops. ‘Assistance’ cannot refer to the urban cohorts. Tiberius must
have been asking senators to join him in person. His response to the
comedian was a veiled request: ‘I would prefer that this were a public
rather than private initiative’. The image is profound: Tiberius fol-
lowed by a train of 600 senators, flanked by praetorian guardsmen,
and accompanied by the equites in full military array. If news of
Agrippa’s execution was made public the morning after Tiberius
reached Rome, the above request, made on the very same day,
indicates actual distress.45 Universal solidarity beyond that evidenced
44 Dio 57.2.2–3.
45 According to Dio (56.31.3), the senate met the day after the funeral procession
(in which Tiberius participated) reached Rome. Rome would have been informed of
Augustus’ death by the 21st or 22nd. Crispus’ letter would reach Ostia within a day.
From Ostia it would be taken, by boat, to Planasia in 1–3 days. If the report reached
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by an oath was required: he wanted action, not mere words. Tiberius’
approach to the senate following the death of Augustus was thus
affected by emerging political situations. As I have so far suggested,
the personality of Agrippa, hijacked by those who had formerly
supported Gaius, had been persistently used to foster a demagogic
reaction to Tiberius - now, as Augustus’ legacy was being carried out,
serious questions were asked about Tiberius’ involvement in Agrip-
pa’s demise. Kampff may be right to associate the picture of a nervous
capital painted by Velleius with news of Agrippa’s demise:
Quid tunc homines timuerint, quae senatus trepidatio, quae populi confusio,
quis urbis metus, in quam arto salutis exitiique fuerimus confinio, neque mihi
tam festinanti exprimere vacat neque cui vacat potest.
Of the fear of men at this time, the trepidation of the senate, the confusion of
the people, the fears of the city, of the narrow boundary between safety and
destruction on which we found ourselves, I have not the time to describe as
I hasten along, and nor could he [describe these things] who had the time.46
As Woodman has pointed out, the recusatio confirms the historicity
of that which Velleius refuses to describe.47 Velleius has dressed
censorship up as a virtue. But even more interesting is cui vacat
potest. Even an historian with space to give a full account of the
situation still cannot do so! But Agrippa’s death was not the only
problem for Tiberius. While Tiberius tried, awkwardly, to overlook
Agrippa’s unauthorized execution, news reached Rome of sedition in
lower Germany and unrest within the nobility. Scholars agree that
Tiberius’ behaviour in the senate on 17 September was not affected by
events in lower Germany. I believe this is wrong.
Planasia on the 24th or 25th, Agrippa would have been executed immediately. The
letter was returned not to Rome but to Tiberius, who was somewhere between Nola
and Rome as part of the funeral procession.
46 Vell. 2.124.1; G. Kampff (1963), 27.
47 A. J. Woodman (1977), 221. Cf. R. Syme (1939) 437: “[Velleius’] exaggeration is
palpable and shameless”.
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Germanicus: Successor to Tiberius
or Augustus?
Three legions camped at Emona in Pannonia and four legions cam-
ped near Cologne in Lower Germany mutinied on hearing that
Augustus was dead and Tiberius was in control of things.1 Their
respective locations vis-à-vis Rome indicate independent situations.2
All seven legions none the less wanted the same things: an increase in
the normal pay rate; better severance conditions; reduction in the
length of service; and an immediate release from the standards for
those who had served twenty years. Further to this, the legions in
Lower Germany demanded immediate payment of the donatives left
them by Augustus, while some troops even tried to co-opt Germani-
cus by declaring him Imperator and offering him supreme power.
It was with this in mind that Tacitus wrote concerning Tiberius’
‘hesitation’:
Causa praecipua ex formidine ne Germanicus, in cuius manu tot legiones
immensa sociorum auxilia, mirus apud populum favor, habere imperium
quam exspectare mallet.
The chief cause of fear was that Germanicus, in whose hands were so many
legions, such large auxiliaries of the allies and such wonderful popular
goodwill, might prefer to have the Empire, rather than wait for it.3
1 Tac. Ann. 1.16, 31.
2 News probably reached Pannonia by about 25–7 August, if modern predictions
are correct that a courier carrying an emergency note could travel as much as 150 km
per day. See W. M. Ramsay, ‘The Speed of the Roman Imperial Post’, JRS, 15 (1925)
60–74; N. J. E. Austin and N. B. Rankov, Exploratio: Military and Political Intelligence
in the Roman World from the Second Punic War to the Battle of Adrianople (1995),
124f. Cf. K. Wellesley (1967), 25 n. 9, who suggests a top speed of 125 miles per day.
3 Tac. Ann. 1.7.6.
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Connecting the mutinies—particularly mutiny in Lower Germany—
with Tiberius’ behaviour in the senate is an ancient interpretation
rejected by modern scholars.4 There are two reasons for this: one is
chronological; the other is psychological. Wellesley and Levick posit
that news of the mutiny, especially mutiny in Lower Germany, cannot
have reached Rome before the first senatorial meeting, which must
have occurred between 30 August and 4 September.5 But Wellesley’s
placing of Tiberius’ acceptance of supreme power in early September
is not supported by evidence, while Levick’s belief that Tiberius’
decision cannot have been affected by the mutinies, since his ‘hesita-
tion’ ceased before they had settled down, ignores the possibility that
unforeseen issues emerged hastening a final solution, despite the
ongoing nature of the mutiny.6 In terms of psychology, it has been
suggested that had Tiberius feared mutiny he would not have hesi-
tated at all, but would have wrapped himself in power immediately.7
But this, too, is weak. Debate in the senate centred on Tiberius
recognizing powers that already belonged to him, not his accepting
them. Tiberius had, moreover, shown a propensity to retreat when
threatened: to Rhodes when threatened with political irrelevance; and
from Rhodes when threatened with his life. Equivocation was central
to the exercise. Chronological and psychological objections can,
therefore, be put aside. It can be shown instead that the mutinies
did affect the political situation in Rome, and thus Tiberius’ perfor-
mance in the senate on 17 September AD 14.
4 The link is accepted by: F. B. Marsh (1931), 57f. It is rejected by G. Kampff
(1963); K. Wellesley (1967); B. Levick (1999), 68–81; M. Sage (1982/83); CAH, 10²,
206.
5 K. Wellesley (1967), passim; B. Levick (1999), 68–81. Dating the first senatorial
meeting depends on our dating the arrival of Augustus’ body in Rome. Suet. Aug.
100.2 states that the procession travelled only at night, during the day Augustus’ body
was kept indoors at ‘each town’. Levick has counted 13 towns between Nola and Rome
in which she believes the body rested. Though Suetonius’ ‘cuiusque’ implies every
town, he may have meant ‘each town they stopped at’. The distance between Nola and
Rome is roughly 200 km, so that Levick estimates the cortege travelled 15.4 km a
night. If we assume that by ‘night’ Suetonius means that the procession marched from
say 6 p.m. to 5 a.m, then Levick would have it that the procession moved at about 1.4
km/h, this is perhaps too slow. The cortege which carried Tiberius’ body in AD 37
seems to have taken 10 days to cover almost the same distance, which would give us a
speed of about 1.8 km/h. Either way, if the procession began between 21st and 22nd, it
would have reached Rome anywhere between 1 and 4 Sept.
6 B. Levick (1999), 75.
7 Ibid., 71.
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A belief that the situation in Lower Germany was reported in Rome
only after 17 September is central to Levick’s argument that it had no
effect on the succession debate.8 She cites Tacitus as evidence, but he
implies the opposite:
At Romae nondum cognito qui fuisset exitus in Illyrico, et legionum Germa-
nicarum motu audito, trepida civitas incusare Tiberium quod, dum patres et
plebem, invalida et inermia, cunctatione ficta ludificetur, dissideat interim
miles neque duorum adulescentium nondum adulta auctoritate comprimi
queat. Ire ipsum et opponere maiestatem imperatoriam debuisse cessuris ubi
principem longa experientia eundemque severitatis et munificentiae summum
vidissent.
At Rome meanwhile, while the outcome in Illyricum was not yet known, and
having heard about the mutiny of the German legions, the fearful citizen-
body reproached Tiberius that while he was mocking the senate and people,
elements lacking strength and arms, with assumed hesitation, in the mean-
time the troops were in mutiny and could not be put down by the immature
auctoritas of two young men. He should have gone himself and confronted
with the imperial majesty those who would have submitted once they saw a
princeps with long experience and supreme in his ability to dispense severity
and reward.9
Having left Rome on 17 or 18 September, Drusus reached the Pan-
nonian legions, stationed at Emona, on 26 September, and the situa-
tion was already settled by the 27th.10 On the morning of the 27th
8 Ibid., 73f.; also M. M. Sage (1982/83), 305, but strangely, Sage holds that news
nevertheless arrived in Rome before 17 Sept., 305 n. 70.
9 Tac. Ann. 1.45. Tacitus purports to provide public opinion, i.e. what people were
saying at dinner parties and on the street. In so doing, his narrative is necessarily a
construction. But this does not mean the message is artificial. Tacitus places the
episode within a chronological structure. This would imply that he is working from
an analytical source. It is plausible that a source such as Servilius Nonianus or
Aufidius Bassus provided a clear and analytical account of various criticisms of
Tiberius made during these few weeks; a more extensive exposition was condensed
by Tacitus for the purpose of dramatic effect: a showdown between the people and the
princeps.
10 Tac. Ann. 1.14 states that the senate voted (on 17 Sept., see V. Ehrenberg and
A. H. M. Jones (1955), 52) that Germanicus should be given proconsular imperium
and that a commission be sent to Lower Germany to confer it in person and to offer
condolences for Augustus’ death. Tacitus adds that the same things were not voted for
Drusus: ea causa quod designatus consul Drusus praesensque erat. Since Drusus was
consul designate, he did not require a proconsular command. He did not require
official condolence by proxy because he was present in the senate, ‘praesens’, see
H. H. Schmitt, ‘Der pannonische Aufstand d. J. 14 und der Regierungsantritt des
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Drusus promised to send a letter to Tiberius concerning the legions’
requests. It probably informed Tiberius and the senate that the situa-
tion was, for now, under control.11 If dispatched on 28 September,
Drusus’ letter, revealing the upshot of events in Illyricum, should
have reached Rome no later than 3 or 4 October. The above attack on
Tiberius therefore occurred between 17 September and 4 October.
Tacitus places the episode after the delegation to Germanicus, which
had left for Cologne on the 18th, had reached their destination and
inspired further violence.12 But the phrase et legionum Germani-
carum motu audito cannot refer to the nature of their arrival. Fifteen
days is insufficient for the delegation to reach Cologne and for news
of their arrival to reach Rome.13 The phrase must instead mean
something like: ‘and having heard (already) about the mutiny of the
German legions . . . ’. A clue is provided by the tense of the final
sentence: ‘He should have gone . . . ’. The clause ‘while the outcome
in Illyricum was not yet known’ implies moreover that something was
known about the outcome in Lower Germany, or at least the direction
in which events were expected to run. Tacitus’ notice thus suggests
the existence of an initial report by Germanicus on the situation in
Germany, which probably arrived in Rome before 17 September;
political manœuvring on 17 September was the result.14
Approximately 22,000 Roman soldiers were stationed in Lower
Germany when mutiny broke out; that represents a formidable
threat.15 Germanicus was somewhere in Gaul when informed.16 On
Tiberius,’ Historia, 7 (1958), 378–83; R. Seager (1972), 60, and B. Levick (1999), 72.
Cf. M. Sage (1982/83).
11 Tac. Ann. 1.25.3.
12 Tac. Ann. 1.39f.
13 Since the delegation comprised a large group, necessarily with protection, 150
km per day is out of the question. Even if the group traveled between 7 a.m. and 6 p.m.
at a healthy 5 km/h it would have taken 20 days to reach Cologne. They probably
reached Cologne between 8 and 18 Oct. An emergency courier back to Rome would
have taken a further 7–10 days.
14 G. V. Sumner review of E. Koestermann ‘Cornelius Tacitus: Annalen, Band 1:
Buch 1–3’, Phoenix, 20. 1 (1966), 76–85, believes that the decision to send a senatorial
delegation to Germanicus on the 17th is proof that Rome was ignorant of the situation
in Lower Germany. That is illogical. The news which reached Rome told of both the
rebellion and its pacification by Germanicus. Tiberius would have considered the
situation settled. Sending a senatorial delegation to Lower Germany is, therefore, an
attempt to shore-up an already improved situation.
15 Tac. Ann. 1.31.1; H. M. D. Parker (1958), 118f.
16 Tac. Ann. 1.34.1f.
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arrival at the camp, Germanicus was apparently confronted by many
soldiers, who persisted, in spite of Germanicus’ imperium, in their
insubordination.17 Germanicus spoke immediately but his rhetoric
failed to placate. Indeed, it incited further indignation:
Ut seditionem attigit, ubi modestia militaris, ubi veteris disciplinae decus . . .
rogitans, nudant universi corpora, cicatrices ex vulneribus, verberum notas
exprobrant.
But when he touched on the sedition and asked: where was the military
composure? Where the discipline of ancient renown? . . .They all tore off
their clothes and reproachfully exhibited the scars of battle and the imprints
of the lash.18
By questioning the soldiers’ virtue he underestimated the prevailing
psychology; these soldiers were not concerned with duty or loyalty, but
justice.Nevertheless, during this exchange someproclaimedGermanicus
‘emperor’ and offered to support him against Tiberius.19 Wiedemann
states: ‘we may be sceptical about how serious this offer was’, while
Levick has: ‘the attempt to proclaim Germanicus was not seriously
meant . . . ’.20 But it cannot have been a joke, or a half-hearted/lukewarm
proposal. The men who shouted imperator and offered Germanicus
supreme power were gambling with their lives; intended sedition
and willingness for civil war is always serious business. Germanicus’
response, a threat to commit suicide to evidence loyalty, shows that
he took the offer very seriously.21 Having retreated to his tent for
consultation with advisers, Germanicus decided on a settlement:
Igitur . . . placitum ut epistulae nomine principis scriberentur: missionem dari
vicena stipendia meritis, exauctorari qui sena dena fecissent ac retineri sub
vexillo ceterorum inmunes nisi propulsandi hostis, legata quae petiverant
exsolvi duplicarique.
Therefore . . . it was agreed that a letter should be written in the name of the
princeps: those who had served 20 years were to be given discharge; those who
had completed 16 years were to be released from duty and retained under the
standard with immunity from everything else except holding off an enemy; the
legacies which they had asked for were to be paid and doubled.22
17 Tac. Ann. 1.34.
18 Tac. Ann. 1.34–5.
19 Tac. Ann. 1.35.3; Dio 57.5.1–2; Suet. Tib. 25.2; Vell. 2.125.
20 CAH 10² 208; similarly B. Levick (1999), 247, n. 6.
21 Tac. Ann. 1.35.3f. 22 Tac. Ann. 1.36.
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The letter was probably read out between 2 and 4 September. Ger-
manicus cannot have wanted the legions to believe that Tiberius was
responding to their demands; that possibility was beyond their tech-
nology. The letter must instead have been presented as arriving with
those Tiberius had sent from Nola. Tiberius had meant to improve
the conditions of employment even before the mutinies!23 This evi-
dences naivety and desperation; the soldiers, not surprisingly, were
unimpressed.24 If Tiberius had written the letter, why did Germani-
cus not refer to it immediately on arrival? The terms were never-
theless accepted and the legions were ordered to depart for their
respective winter camps, but Legions V and XXI refused until Au-
gustus’ legacy was paid to them: ex viatico amicorum ipsiusque
Caesaris pecunia.25 Germanicus then left for Upper Germany,
where, perhaps for the second time in a matter of weeks, the oath of
allegiance was administered to Legions II, XIII, XIV, and XVI.26 The
report from Germany, alluded to by Tacitus, was probably sent by
Germanicus shortly after the troops in Lower Germany had left for
their winter camp, i.e. once the situation was considered settled. If
sent between 4 and 6 September, it would have reached Rome before
the 17th. Hence, prior to 17 September, Tiberius and the senate were
probably aware of the fact of mutiny, the legions’ demands, and
Germanicus’ response. They were also aware that four legions had
offered to support Germanicus against Tiberius.27 Some in the crowd
were reportedly hostile to Germanicus, but the image which formed
in the minds of those in Rome lacked nuance.28 Velleius, in Rome
when Germanicus’ report arrived, understood that the soldiers:
23 Perhaps he meant to shame the legions by his reconstructed chronology.
24 Tac. Ann. 1.37; cf. Dio 57.5.5–6.
25 Tac. Ann. 1.37.1.
26 Tac. Ann. 1.37.3.
27 It would have been dangerous for Germanicus to not include in his report the
offer of supreme command by sections of the legions. It was far better to be open and
honest with Tiberius, lest he should invite suspicion when the story finally broke.
Indeed, aside from Germanicus’ letters to Tiberius and the senate, one would expect
that various companions would include the episode in their letters home: in the same
way Q. Cicero had sent letters to his brother M. Cicero from Caesar’s camp in Gaul.
Though Q. Cicero’s letters took some time to reach Rome, officers in AD 14 might have
sent them with the couriers carrying Germanicus’ letters.
28 CAH 10² 208: ‘We may be sceptical . . . ’; R. Seager (1972), 64: ‘Only a small,
minority among the mutineers attempted to push Germanicus into rebellion . . . ’.
There is no evidence to support Seager’s ‘smallminority’. On the contrary, we possess
only evidence that suggests a large number of soldiers nominated Germanicus for
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novum ducem, novum statum, novam quaerebant rem publicam,
‘wanted a new leader, a new order of things, and a new res publica’.29
The situation was analysed in Rome to a high degree of sophistication.30
The belief that legionaries wanted a dux, rather than a princeps, is
telling. It implies a militarization of power. But the idea of ‘constitu-
tional’ reform is best evidenced by the distinction made between
status and res publica: a ‘state of things’ and the ‘State’. This is not
Republican language. Dux signals instead the presence of a military
dictator, in opposition to the civilian Principate then being enacted in
Italy. Velleius, with his contemporaries, believed that the legions were
aiming to dismantle the balanced structure built by Augustus—the
optimus status in Augustus’ own words—and replace it with militant
demagogy: a novus status and hence nova res publica.31 For Velleius,
this was best evidenced by their approach to the legitimate organs of
power: quin etiam ausi sunt minari daturos se senatui daturos principi
leges, ‘they even dared to threaten to give laws to the senate and
princeps.’32 Most senators and equestrians would share Velleius’
opinion, whether they supported Tiberius or not.
supreme power, Vell. 2.125.2 (non qui sequerentur)’. Velleius, admittedly, treats both
the situation in Lower Germany and that in Pannonia together, but dux (qui contra
rem publicam duceret) again reminds us of Germanicus. M. M. Sage (1982/83), 315,
holds that Velleius’ comments are ambiguous because they lack detail. But Velleius
was writing while Tiberius still lived. Rumours about Germanicus would not be
described in detail; unable to ignore the issue completely he did the next best thing.
29 Vell. 2.125.1.
30 It is dismissed as unhistorical by A. Spengel (1903), Heft 1, 18; M. M. Sage
(1982/83), 315, though Sage’s position is not entirely clear. That people in Rome were
discussing the situation of Germanicus is accepted by E. Koestermann, ‘Die Feldzuge
des Germanicus 14–16 n.Chr’, Historia, 6 (1957), 429–79; D. C. A. Shotter ‘Tacitus,
Tiberius and Germanicus’, Historia, 17 (1968), 194–214; R. Seager (1972), 64;
B. Levick (1999), 247, n. 6, seems to accept it as historical, but with reservations.
31 The soldiers, with cynical realism, would not tolerate a universally accepted
facade. They knew the reality of power. They knew with whom they must deal.
Moreover, SCPP, 160f. shows that the soldiers were treated as belonging to the
princeps, and were encouraged, or reminded, to view the domus Caesaris as their
patron house: qui sub auspicis et imperio principis nostri milites essent, quam fidem
pietatemq(ue) domui Aug(ustae) p[raesta]rent, eam sperare perpetuo praestaturos,
cum scirent salutem imperi nostri in eius dom[u]<s> custodia posita<m> esse{t}.
‘That all soldiers under the auspices and command of our princeps would forever
display the fidelity and devotion that they were displaying to the house of Augustus,
since they knew the safety of our empire had been placed in the custody of that
house.’ For Optimus Status, see Suet. Aug. 28.2.
32 Vell. 2.125.
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It must be accepted that Tiberius cannot have known how many
supported Germanicus before 17 September. As with modern parlia-
mentary leaders, the true extent of support is often unknown until the
day of a leadership ballot. Tiberius, of course, was not facing a
leadership ballot, but the situation in Cologne, known to the public,
made Germanicus’ situation topical.33 As Tacitus notes, Germanicus’
performance in Lower Germany was attacked.34 It was argued that
Tiberius should have dealt with the matter instead.Despite the critical
language, the theme is pro-Tiberian. Its essence no doubt appeared
soon after Germanicus’ report reached Rome; Tiberius benefited the
most whether the scene was orchestrated or not. Tiberius, of course,
had nothing to fear from Germanicus. The latter needed only to wait.
But attempts had been made as recently as AD 12 to destabilize
Tiberius’ position by advertising Germanicus as a viable alternative.
The troublemakers were not necessarily Germanicus’ friends.35 From
AD 4 to AD 14 Tiberius’ enemies consistently attempted to drive a
wedge between Tiberius and Augustus: from AD 4 to AD 7 Tiberius was
accused of fostering the northern legions in order to seize power; after
AD 6 it was said that Augustus preferred Germanicus.36 Tiberius’
awkwardness in AD 14 shows that persistent insinuation was effective.
The moment lent itself to the Augustan discourse of shared respon-
sibility. Suetonius’ decision to link the question of Germanicus’ posi-
tion within the res publica with Tiberius’ ‘reluctance’ is telling:
Quem maxime casum timens, partes sibi quas senatui liberet, tuendas in re. p.
depoposcit, quando universae sufficere solus nemo posset nisi cum altero vel
etiam cum pluribus.
33 This is made clear by Augustus’ letter to the senate in AD 12 and the constant
references to Germanicus in this episode. Some modern scholars have attempted to
make such references inventions of Caligula’s reign, but that ignores the logicality of
the situation. Being called Imperator by soldiers evidences a wider discussion about
the nature of Germanicus’ position vis-a-vis the domus Caesaris. To ignore the
potential for such a dynamic within a society of nobles is naive.
34 Though Tac. Ann. 1.45 refers to a period later than 17 Sept., criticism of
Germanicus would necessarily have occurred when news of the situation first broke.
35 Contra E. Ciaceri (1944), 271f., and I. Cogitore (1991), 128f., who seem to argue
that Agrippina was leading a circle of Julians in opposition to Tiberius, despite the fact
that Germanicus was ‘next in line’.
36 What was insinuation between AD 4 and 20 was presented as fact by the pro -
Germanicus tradition, established after Tiberius’ death and encouraged by Gaius, i.e.
they did not make these stories up, but re-cast them within a new discourse.
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This, his greatest fear, caused Tiberius to require the senate to assign him a
part in the res publica, to be looked after by him, since no one could bear
everything unless with [the help of] another or even more.37
Suetonius takes alter to be a veiled reference to Germanicus; I believe
he is right. The senate might register under pluribus, but if the task
were to be limited to one other, then Germanicus was the only
plausible candidate.38 In response, Tiberius’ supporters stacked the
debate, praising Tiberius as the most fit to govern while insinuating
that others were not qualified. Our sources record very little dissent.
The most vehement comment attested is ‘Let him take it or leave it’,
and it is inconceivable that anyone would have said: ‘Perhaps you
should share power with Germanicus’, or ‘Germanicus could lead us,
if you would prefer to retire from politics’.39 The pro-Tiberian mes-
sage swept away all before it, silencing critics while leaving heavy-
weights like Asinius Gallus floundering. Tiberius had thrown down a
challenge, aware that no one would dare accept.
Once the possibility of having to share supreme power was elimi-
nated, Tiberius was able to stop refusing it. Secure, Tiberius put the
motion that imperium proconsulare should be conferred on Germa-
nicus, advertising his trust and support but stopping short of granting
tribunicia potestas.40 Anyone hoping to use Germanicus to trip up
Tiberius was thus confronted, wedged, and overcome. This marked
the point at which Tiberius ceased actively to refuse supreme power.
He felt, however, that he could not yet explicitly recognize his posi-
tion and positively accept its moral consequences. With the ‘Germa-
nicus question’ settled on the 17th, we need another factor to explain
Tiberius’ ongoing behaviour in the senate. ‘Decent Papal reluctance’
is weak. It does not account for the subtle change in message on the
17th, nor adequately explain the long delay. Levick’s belief that
Tiberius never formally accepted the Principate is contradicted by
actual evidence; while Woodman’s position, that Tiberius did not in
37 Suet. Tib. 25.2.
38 As was the case in AD 12, Drusus’ position does not seem to have become a topic
of discussion.
39 Suet. Tib. 24.
40 Since Augustus conferred tribunicia potestas on Vipsanius Agrippa (Dio 54.12.4;
54.28.1) and Tiberius (Dio 55.9.4–5; Vell. 2.103f.) only once they were well into their
thirties and forties, it would have been easy for Tiberius simply to cite the Augustan
precedent: Germanicus and Drusus were still too young.
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fact want supreme power, fails to account for the fact that Tiberius
had immediately possessed and utilized the instruments of violent
coercion, i.e. the praetorians and the armies.41 I propose that
M. Scribonius Drusus Libo provides the solution.
41 A. J. Woodman, Tacitus Reviewed (1998).
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Was M. Scribonius Drusus Libo a problem for Tiberius in September
AD 14? Suetonius thinks he was. Tacitus and Dio are ambiguous.
Suetonius writes:
L. Scribonius Libo [sic] vir nobilis res novas clam moliebatur . . . Libonem, ne
quid in novitate acerbius fieret, secundo demum anno in senatu coarguit,
medio temporis spatio tantum cavere contentus; nam et inter pontifices
sacrificanti simul pro secespita plumbeum cultrum subiciendum curavit et
secretum petenti non nisi adhibito Druso filio dedit dextramque obambulantis
veluti incumbens, quoad perageretur sermo, continuit.
L. Scribonius Libo, a nobleman, was secretly planning revolution . . .Not
wanting to make things too difficult at the beginning [of his reign], Tiberius
waited two years before attacking Libo in the senate; in the meantime,
however, he was content to be on his guard; for, when sacrificing together
among the pontiffs, he took care to substitute the sacrificial knife for a lead
one, and when he [Libo] sought a private audience he [Tiberius] gave it only
if his son Drusus was present and leaning, as it were, on his right arm as he
walked, held it until the conversation had finished.1
Tacitus writes:
Firmius Catus senator, ex intima Libonis amicitia, iuvenem inprovidum et
facilem inanibus ad Chaldaeorum promissa, magorum sacra, somniorum
etiam interpretes impulit, dum proavum Pompeium, amitam Scriboniam,
quae quondam Augusti coniunx fuerat, consobrinos Caesares, plenam imagi-
nibus domum ostentat . . .Ut satis testium et qui servi eadem noscerent
1 Suet. Tib. 25.3. Suetonius has evidently made a mistake by conflating the consul
of AD 16, L. Scribonius Libo, and his brother M. Scribonius Drusus Libo.
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repperit, aditum ad principem postulat, demonstrato crimine et reo per
Flaccum Vescularium equitem Romanum, cui propior cum Tiberio usus
erat. Caesar indicium haud aspernatus congressus abnuit: posse enim eodem
Flacco internuntio sermones commeare. Atque interim Libonem ornat prae-
tura, convictibus adhibet . . .
Firmius Catus, a senator and close friend of Libo’s, urged the short-sighted
and stupid young man to resort to the promises of astrologers, the rites of
magicians, and also dream interpreters, and to boast about his great-grand-
father Pompeius, his paternal aunt Scribonia, former wife of Augustus, his
imperial cousins, his house crowded with ancestral images . . .When he
found enough witnesses and slaves who had the same information, he
asked for access to the princeps, having indicated the charge and the defen-
dant through Vescularius Flaccus, a Roman knight who was more intimate
with Tiberius. Caesar, not rejecting the information, declined an interview: ‘it
was possible for the information to be passed on via the same intermediary
Flaccus.’ Meanwhile he distinguished Libo with a praetorship and invited
him to dinner parties.2
Dio writes:
	F	 	 s På ›ºª æÆ, ŒÆd ¸ŒØ %ŒæØØ ¸øÆ,
ÆŒ PÆ	æÅ Æ	 	Ø ø	æÇØ, 	ø
 b ææø	, PŒ ŒæØ,
	Æ b KØŁÆ	  	 ŒØøfi ŒÆ	Æ	ªøfi , ›øfi Æƒ 	H
ıºı	H ªıÆEŒ
 åæH	ÆØ, K
 	c ªæıÆ KŒØ . . .
And so he did this, acting inconsistently; likewise for Lucius Scribonius Libo,
a young noble who appeared to be undertaking some revolutionary activity;
as long as he was healthy, he did not bring him to trial; but when he was ill to
the point of death, he had him brought into the senate in a covered litter, of
the kind that the wives of senators use . . .3
Suetonius separates by two years the initial suspicion of Drusus Libo
from his eventual demise, while Tacitus and Dio describe a time-
lapse. Most scholars reject Suetonius’ account, preferring Tacitus
instead. But Tacitus’ account does not necessarily invalidate Sueto-
nius: dating Drusus Libo’s praetorship is the key. Three options are
available to us: a praetorship in 15; a praetorship in 16; a praetorship
in 17. Alternatively, Drusus Libo may have been a candidatus
2 Tac. Ann. 2.27.2.
3 Dio 57.15.4; Dio, too, has erred by naming the consul of 16 rather than his
brother. An early source has obviously confused the two brothers, though Tacitus
shows that correct information was nevertheless at hand.
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Caesaris for an election that had not yet taken place.4 I prefer a
praetorship in 15, and hence election to the praetorship in AD 14.
That Drusus Libo was praetor, or praetor-designate, when prose-
cuted in AD 16 is unlikely. Prosecution of a magistrate, or magistrate
designate, is unusual, and usually commented on by the sources.
Moreover, as Weinrib has shown, a prosecution would only go
ahead once the magistrate had abdicated from office.5 In AD 21 two
men brought a charge of maiestas against the praetor Magius Caeci-
lianus.6 Tacitus, who, it should be added, does mention Magius’
praetorship, writes only that Tiberius charged the delatores with
calumnia.7 Dio, who is similarly brief, adds that on hearing the
charge, Magius ‘left the senate and having taken off his robe of office
returned, demanding as a private citizen to have the complaint lodged
at once’—i.e. Magius abdicated from office.8 Dio records many other
instances of the phenomenon.9 That the sources, and especially Dio,
do not mention Drusus Libo’s abdication or his being arraigned while
praetor, or praetor-designate, is evidence, ex silentio as it is, that the
first two options are unlikely. On the other hand, a candidatus
Caesaris for a future election requires a relatively late date for the
praetorian elections, and distorts the natural sense of our sources,
especially Tacitus (it should be noted that a natural reading of the text
also suffers frommaking Drusus Libo a praetor-designate).10 Weinrib
supports his view that Drusus Libo was a candidatus Caesaris by
suggesting that the praetorian elections in AD 16 occurred after Libo’s
trial. The argument is based on the fact that elections in AD 14
4 For praetor in AD 16 or 17 see PIR¹ S 214; R. Syme (1958), 1.399, and (1986), 256;
E. Koestermann (1963), 300; G. V. Sumner (1966), 81; E. J. Weinrib, ‘The Prosecution
of Roman Magistrates’, Phoenix, 22:1 (1968), 32–56, with some variation;
F. R. D. Goodyear (1981), 270–1, esp. 271, n. 3; S. Rutledge (2001), 371, n. 5. For
praetor in AD 15, see R. Seager (1972), 90; B. Levick (1999), 270, n. 114; M. M. Sage
(1982/83), 299, n. 34.
5 G. V. Sumner (1966), 81; E. J. Weinrib (1968), passim. It should be noted,
however, that a designate was not immune from prosecution, E. J. Weinrib (1968),
51 f.
6 Tac. Ann. 3.37.1; Dio 57.21.1.
7 Tac. Ann. 3.37.1.
8 Dio 57.21.1.
9 Dio shows consistent interest in the prosecution, or attempted prosecution, of
magistrates, for instance: Dio 37.34.2; 39.7.3; 39.18.1; 40.55.1; 46.49.1; 55.10.15;
56.24.7; 57.21.1; 58.8.3; 59.23.8. Tacitus also mentions the subject on occasion: Tac.
Ann. 12.4; Ann. 13.44; Ann. 14.48.2; Ann. 4.22.1; Hist. 3.35 f.; Vell. 2.124.4.
10 E. J. Weinrib (1968), 33 n. 7.
Alternative Government 197
This is an open access version of the publication distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-
NonCommercial-NoDerivs licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/), which permits non-commercial 
reproduction and distribution of the work, in any medium, provided the original work is not altered or transformed in any 
way, and that the work is properly cited. For commercial re-use, please contact academic.permissions@oup.com 
occurred in late September/early October. But the elections of AD 14
should not be used to date elections in AD 16.11 When Augustus died,
his commendationes were already published, suggesting that the elec-
tions were to be held in late August or early September.12 Augustus’
death and funeral caused public business to cease, a situation that
would have affected the timing of the praetorian election as well.
That the elections were overdue is perhaps also suggested by the fact
that Tiberius turned his attention to their re-organisation immediately
on accepting the principate.13 Moreover, Tacitus (who mentions din-
ner parties), Suetonius (who mentions religious ceremonies and in-
formal meetings), and Dio (who suggests that Tiberius bided his time)
all imply that more than a few weeks separate the initial entrapment by
Catus and Drusus Libo’s final destruction.14 Indeed, Tacitus’ ‘origin,
stages, and end of this affair’ (eius negotii initium, ordinem, finem
curatius disseram . . . ) seems to describe a lengthy process, the natural
sense of which is seriously damaged by a chronology which places the
whole episode inside a month or two.15 We are therefore left with a
praetorship in AD 15 and, hence, election to the praetorship in AD 14.
Designation as a candidatus Caesaris in AD 14 accords with Vel-
leius’ description of his own election to the praetorship in that year:
proxime a nobilissimis ac sacerdotalibus viris destinari praetoribus
contigit, ‘were together destined for the praetorship immediately
after those from the noblest houses and those who had held
priesthoods’.16 Both nobilissimus and sacerdotalis cover Drusus
11 Weinrib further argues that Tac. Ann. 2.36, in which Asinius Gallus proposed a
decree to the effect that ‘elections should determine the magistrates for the next five
years . . . ’ refers to the praetorian elections of AD 16. Though Tacitus goes on to
mention aspects of the proposal that would affect the praetorship, it is conceivable
that the intention was to determine for five years all magistracies. Moreover, as F. R.
D. Goodyear (1981), 270, points out, the episode is loosely dated by Tacitus. It is
connected thematically (et certamen Gallo adversus Caesarem exortum est) to Ann.
2.35.1: Res eo anno prolatas haud referrem . . .Tacitus may have felt that the dispute
was not suitably placed between the close of action in Germany and the prosecution of
Drusus Libo; he chose instead to register in succession disputes that had taken place in
the senate from Ann. 2.33.1 to Ann. 2.38; a totality without a precise chronological
structure.
12 This is the view of C. J. Simpson, ‘Tacitus and the Praetorian Elections of A.D. 14’,
La Parola Del Passato, 36 (1981), 295–311, esp. 299.
13 Vell. 2.124.3–4.
14 Tac. Ann. 2.28.2; Suet. Tib. 25.3; Dio 57.15.4.
15 Tac. Ann. 2.27.1 f.
16 Vell. 2.124.4.
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Libo.17 Velleius adds that he and his brother were ‘the last to be
commended by Augustus and the first to be commended by Tiber-
ius’.18 Tiberius, who limited himself to four recommendations, would
not have repudiated or added to Augustus’ commendationes while
they remained valid.19 Since Augustus would not have preferred a
pair of Velleii to an important young aristocrat of impeccable family,
Drusus Libo, like Velleius and his brother, was probably commended
by Augustus and Tiberius.20 He was possibly praetor suo anno. It has
been argued, nonetheless, that a praetorship in 15 causes problems for
our understanding of the affair.
Scholars seem to agree generally that if Suetonius is to be believed,
and the praetorship is to be placed in AD 15, then one must hold that
the plot which was discovered in September AD 16 was formed in
AD 14.21 But opposition often seems consistent, even though its
manifestations appear intermittently. That which is termed a ‘plot’
is very often nothing more than a collection of separate decisions
(often reactive) artificially linked owing to a common theme. I believe
the best solution is to treat Drusus Libo’s activities in AD 14 and AD 16
separately. On that reading, a tradition endeavouring to understand
the final damnation of Drusus Libo, or, better, those trying to
17 Cf. W. K. Lacey, ‘Nominatio and the elections under Tiberius’, Historia, 12
(1963) 167–76, esp. 170, and C. J. Simpson (1981), 303, who take ‘a’ to mean ‘by’
rather than ‘after’. See R. Frei-Stolba,Untersuchungen zu denWahlen in der römischen
Kaiserzeit (1967), 143–4; and A. J. Woodman (1977), 227, for argument in favour of
‘after’.
18 Vell. 2.124. 4.
19 Tac. Ann. 1.15.
20 That Tacitus mentions only Tiberius’ commendatio vis-à-vis Drusus Libo is not
a problem. He is interested in the fact that Tiberius agreed to commend a political
rival. Indeed, introducing Augustus’ commendatio would cause problems for his
approach, which is to present Tiberius as two-faced.
21 F. R. D. Goodyear (1981), 270; cf. R. S. Rogers (1935), 14: ‘Libo’s plot had been in
progress since the commencement of Tiberius’ rule’; R. Seager (1972), 90; B. Levick
(1999), 150; cf. the suggestion of U. Silvagni (rev. 1909), 270, that Drusus Libo was
behind the mutinies in Illyricum, a theory seemingly based on an incorrect reading of
Suetonius Tib. 25. Goodyear also believes that ‘the earlier we put his praetorship, the
more puzzling becomes our sources’ emphasis on Libo’s youth’. But the sources only
use general terms which have no specific meaning: Tacitus uses iuvenis, Seneca uses
adulescens, and Dio uses neansk. Goodyear posits an accelerated cursus, i.e. Drusus
Libo was treated as if he were an imperial youth. But this surely would interest at least
one of our sources. As was shown above, dispensation required the approval of the
senate in response to a personal request from the princeps, an extraordinary privilege
extended only to members of the domus Caesaris. A dispensation for Drusus Libo,
passed over in silence by the sources, is simply improbable.
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destroy him in AD 16, telescoped two separate incidents; a synthesis
convenient and provocative. Suetonius’ clam is thus a device to
explain the long delay; it reflects an interpretation not historical
fact. When put this way, objections to a praetorship in AD 15 dissolve.
What, then, occurred in September AD 14 to deserve Suetonius’
treatment, and in particular, his use of language appropriate to
revolution (res novas clam moliebatur)?
Astrology is a key topic for the prosecution in AD 16. Drusus Libo’s
accusers may have argued, or proved, that he had first consulted
astrologers in AD 14. If this is correct, then Suetonius’ clam may, in
fact, relate to the senate’s findings. It was in the prosecution’s interest
to establish one coherent plan, rather than a mixed bag of offences.
The story of Firmius Catus seems, however, authentic. Catus is said to
have collected witnesses and slaves and taken their information to
Vescularius Flaccus, Tiberius’ close friend.22 News that witnesses
(who were not slaves) were being collected would spread quickly,
especially within the senatorial class; notoriety that would prove
useful to the prosecution in September AD 16, something like: ‘Two
years ago Firmius Catus had evidence that Drusus Libo was plotting
revolution; he was saved only by the clemency of our princeps . . . ’
Catus could not construct a serious charge from ambitious spirit;
maiestas was possible only once the necromantic parchment surfaced
in AD 16. But the essence of Catus’ accusation is not entirely obscure.
Drusus Libo is said to have meditated on his Pompeian ancestry
and his imperial cousins, (consobrini Caesares).23 Both are relevant to
the political atmosphere of September AD 14. At Ann. 1.10 Tacitus
purports to record criticisms of Augustus which surfaced in the weeks
following his death. Though the structure is probably Tacitean, we
need not reject the contents. Defamation concerned Augustus in his
final years; criticism, of what was essentially authoritarianism, should
not surprise us. Tacitus writes that people accused Augustus, inter
alia, of having feigned a Pompeian spirit. If this reflects a contem-
porary idea, then Pompeism (an anachronistic but useful label),
which had come to mean the principle of Republican government,
was evidently topical in the weeks following Augustus’ death: ‘our
leaders talk of a free Republic . . . etc.’24 Tiberius’ use of the Augustan
22 Tac. Ann. 2.28.1. 23 Tac. Ann. 2.27.2.
24 Suet. Tib. 57.2, writes that Tiberius, at the beginning of his reign, made reference
to Pompeiani in the senate: Nec multo post in senatu Pompeio cuidam equiti R.
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discourse of shared responsibility on 17 September is here apposite.
As was the case in 27 BC, the rhetoric was necessary because the topic
was relevant. The Principate was enacted as an emergency structure
and this was not forgotten. As Velleius admits, people did not know
what to expect of the post-Augustan era.25 Tiberius was in a position
of supreme power, but some probably wondered: ‘Do we really need
him?’ It is conceivable that during these few weeks Drusus Libo was
somehow made to represent a Pompeian position, a hypothesis
supported by Tacitus’ belief that he had spoken out about something:
cunctaque eius dicta factaque, cum prohibere posset, scire malebat . . . ,
‘He [Tiberius] could have checked his every word and action, but
wished instead to know them’.26 Reference to consobrini Caesares is
significant: Gaius, Lucius, Agrippa, Julia, and Agrippina (and thus
Germanicus by marriage) are the most likely candidates, being sec-
ond-cousins by blood.
Men who had formerly supported Gaius, Aemilius Paullus, and
finally Agrippa embraced the politics of reform to destabilize a
government moving firmly into Tiberius’ grasp. Perhaps they took
up, or were already associated with, the Republican ideology earlier
ascribed to the elder Drusus and later taken up by his grandson
Caligula, but their aim was nevertheless to defeat Tiberius.27 As
quiddam perneganti, dum vincula minatur, affirmavit fore ut ex Pompeio Pompeianus
fieret, acerba cavillatione simul hominis nomen incessens veteremque partium fortu-
nam, ‘Not long afterwards, when a Roman knight named Pompeius opposed some
business in the senate, he threatened him with chains and declared that from a
Pompeius he would make him a Pompeian, a cruel pun on the man’s name and the
fortune of the old party.’
25 Vell. 2.124; At Ann.1.10 Tacitus writes that ‘not a few began to talk of libertas’.
Cf. R. Syme (1939) 437.
26 Tac. Ann. 2.28.2. Tacitus means that Drusus Libo’s words and actions could
have been checked by Tiberius in AD 14, who decided, instead, to gather more
information. It should also be noted that his grandfather L. Scribonius Libo
(cos. 34), wrote a history probably from the Pompeian perspective (App. BC 3.11).
Even if the history was obscure (though it need not have been), it would have been
known to those inside the Scribonian house. For a general discussion of this work see
L. Canfora, ‘Appiano ed il « Liber Annalis » di Libone’, Studi Classici Orientali, 12
(1963), 207–11. For the view that Libo’s work was not obscure see K. Welch, ‘Alter-
native Memoirs: Tales from the ‘Other Side’ ‘of the Civil War’, in C. Smith and A.
Powell (eds.) The Lost Memoirs of Augustus (2009), 195–223.
27 Suet. Claud. 1.4: ‘Drusus was, they say, no less eager for personal glory than
devoted to Republicanism . . .He also openly announced that, as soon as he came to
power, he would restore the old form of government’; Tib. 50.1: ‘He [Tiberius] first
showed his hatred of his kindred in the case of his brother Drusus, producing a letter
of his, in which Drusus discussed with him the question of compelling Augustus to
restore the Republic.’
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recently as AD 12 libellous pamphlets had described Tiberius, prob-
ably, as a future ruler and suggested that Augustus had established
de facto monarchy. Violent protests had been engineered to oppose
the vicesima hereditatium on a principle grounded in city-state Rep-
ublicanism: ‘We are not vanquished foreigners; we are Roman citi-
zens!’ This approach had been advocated by Aemilius Paullus and
artificially associated with Agrippa. Agrippa’s continued existence, in
exile, had allowed his supporters to hope; his execution was a serious
blow to them. I believe that these men now turned their attention to
Drusus Libo, the prospect of which weighed on Tiberius’ mind as he
approached the senate on 17 September AD 14.
My hypothesis depends upon dating (in relative terms) the praetor-
ian elections of AD 14. Having discussed the debate on 17 September,
Tacitus writes:
Candidatos praeturae duodecim nominavit, numerum ab Augusto traditum;
et hortante senatu ut augeret, iure iurando obstrinixit se non excessurum.
Tum primum e campo comitia ad patres translata sunt . . .
He nominated 12 candidates for the praetorship, the number handed down
by Augustus; and when the senate pressed him to increase [that number], he
bound himself by an oath that he would not exceed [it]. Then for the first
time the elections were moved from the Campus to the senate . . .28
Does tum mean ‘at that time’ or ‘next’? Velleius’ treatment of the
same occasion is important:
Post redditum caelo patrem et corpus eius humanis honoribus, numen divinis
honoratum, primum principalium eius operum fuit ordinatio comitiorum . . .
Quo tempore mihi fratrique meo, candidatis Caesaris, proxime a nobilissimis
ac sacerdotalibus viris destinari praetoribus contigit, consecutis quidem, ut
neque post nos quemquam divus Augustus neque ante nos Caear commen-
daret Tiberius.
After heaven had received his father, and human honours had been paid to
his body as divine honours were paid to his numen, his first imperial task was
the organization of the comitia . . .At which time my brother and I, as
Caesar’s candidates, were together destined for the praetorship immediately
after those from the noblest houses and those who had held priesthoods and
indeed, we were the last to be commended by Augustus and the first to be
commended by Tiberius Caesar.29
28 Tac. Ann. 1.14.6–15.1. 29 Vell. 2.124.3–4.
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The first sentence refers both to Augustus’ funeral and his deification
on 17 September. It was only afterwards (post) that Tiberius went
about changing the electoral procedure. Scholars nevertheless hold
that these occurred, along with Tiberius’ proclamation (as it is de-
scribed at Ann. 1.14.6), on the one day: 17 September.30 Velleius’ post
and Tacitus’ tum thus refer to procedural progression: matter (a), was
discussed, then (b), and (c), etc. But Velleius should not be read this
way. He is clear that the rationalization of electoral procedure was
Tiberius’ first task as princeps, i.e. Tiberius had by then formally
accepted supreme power: this did not happen on 17 September.
Rationalization of electoral procedure therefore occurred sometime
after the 17th.
As Velleius suggests, Tiberius may have formally accepted the
Principate on the same day that he sponsored a rationalization of
the electoral procedure. Senators were then asked to vote on the
candidates for that year. Velleius, his brother, and Drusus Libo were
all successful.31 Their election required only ratification by the cen-
turiae Caesarum and the people.32 The situation described by Tacitus
at Ann. 1.14.6 and Velleius at 2.124.3–4 therefore occurred after 17
September but before the final election. Tacitus’ description of this
event is a topic of great dispute. Leaving aside the contested term
nominatio (a book in itself), I nevertheless accept the view put for-
ward by Jones that men did not ask for more candidates, but more
praetorships.33 A tactic that had proved successful in AD 11 was now
30 W. K. Lacey (1963), 167–76, esp. 171; F. De Visscher, ‘Tacite et les réformes
éléctorales d’Auguste et de Tibère’, Studi in Onore di V. Arangio-Ruiz, II (1953), 428;
B. Levick (1967), 218 f; C. J. Simpson (1981), 299; cf. M. M. Sage (1982/83), 308 f.
31 This perfectly explains ILS 944: . . . viacure . . . [q.tr.p.] l. pr. leg.[pro pr. Imp. C]
aesaris Augusti [i]ter. per commendation. Ti. Caesaris ab senatu cos. dest. patrono.
Here, a man has been commended by Tiberius and destined by the senate. Since the
senate had de facto superseded the centuriae Caesarum, candidates were right to think
of themselves as destinati once the senate had voted them in.
32 Inscriptional evidence shows that the people continued to assemble to vote in
the Comitia Centuriata. They would have been voting, however, on a fixed number of
candidates provided by the senate. The real election was, therefore, in the senate. The
Comitia was now a rubber stamp.
33 A. H. M. Jones (1955), 19; I do not agree with Jones that Tacitus has misunder-
stood his source, or that he had made a mistake, but simply that he has used clumsy
language. See also Ann. 2.36: princeps duodecim candidatos in annos singulos nomi-
naret. It is quite obvious that Tacitus is not interested in providing a technical
interpretation of these events, but that does not mean he failed to understand them.
On the contested term nominatio, see Th. Mommsen, Staat. II³ (1887/88), 917 f.;
H. Siber, ‘Die Wahlreform des Tiberius’, Festschrift Paul Koschaker, I (1939), 171 f.;
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employed against the ‘new guy’ - Tiberius, unlike Augustus, stood
firm: ‘Augustus intended 12 praetorships, and that’s how many you’ll
get!’34 Perhaps the empowerment of the senate as a prerogative body
was offered as compensation: ‘You cannot have more praetorships.
But how about determining the election results?’ The reforms would
have enjoyed the support of many within the senatorial order, espe-
cially those lacking popular standing.35 It was probably on this day
that Tiberius published his recommendations, among them being
Drusus Libo.
We do not know how many days, or weeks, separate the meeting
on the 17th from Tiberius’ proclamation concerning praetorships.
‘Days’ are nevertheless more appropriate than ‘weeks’. Augustus
published his commendationes for the praetorian elections in August;
his death would have caused the elections to be postponed. Elections
would remain in abeyance for Augustus’ funeral and then for his
deification on the 17th. The senate’s failure to secure a positive
declaration from Tiberius on the latter occasion would not, however,
M. Hammond, The Antonine Monarchy (1959), 266; W. K. Lacey (1963), 167–76;
D. C. A. Shotter (1966), 321–23; B. Levick (1967), 207–30; andA. E. Astin (1969), 863–74.
34 Cf. J. A. Crook, ‘The Election of Magistrates in the Early Principate’, CR, 20: 1
(1970), 65–8, esp. 67.
35 Vell. 2.124.3 f., writes that the rationalization of the electoral process was
managed in concert with written instructions left behind by Augustus. Most take
this to mean that Augustus authored the measures outlined by Tacitus at Ann. 1.15.1.
Though Velleius is explicit, there is good reason to question his information. As
Velleius’ own election shows, the elections were in full swing when Augustus died. It
is, therefore, hard to believe that Augustus intended to change the election process but
had not done so before 19 August. Why would he sit on such a proposal only for
Tiberius to use it immediately and claim that it was Augustus’ desire that it be
implemented? On the other hand, it could be a public relations device. In AD 6
Augustus linked the implementation of the vicesima hereditatium to papers left
behind by the now divine Julius (Dio 55.25.5–6). No one would dare ask to see the
papers. Indeed, it is worth noting that Augustus had recently been made a State-
sponsored God. It was, therefore, in Tiberius’ interest to associate a potentially
unpopular proposal with the now-divine Augustus. How could anybody refuse a
proposal created by a man that everybody had recently agreed deserved deification?
Velleius would certainly accept Tiberius’ proposed archaeology without question. Cf.
A. J. Woodman (1977), 227, argues that instruction for the change was found in the
three or four books left behind by Augustus, Suet. Aug.101.4; Dio 56.34.3. But
Woodman’s suggestion fails to explain Augustus’ decision not to institute the change
before he had published his commendationes, which probably occurred shortly before
the day of election. As C. J. Simpson (1981) points out, Augustus’ active schedule at
this time, and Tiberius’ decision to leave for Illyricum, suggest that death came as a
surprise.
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justify their continued suspension. Indeed, when Tacitus writes that
Tiberius ‘ceased to refuse and to be asked’, he implies that the senate
moved on with other business, leaving Tiberius’ situation unan-
swered. According to this interpretation, Tiberius turned his atten-
tion to the now overdue praetorian elections soon after the debate on
the 17th. Catus thus began to supply information against Drusus Libo
shortly before 17 September, i.e. Tiberius went into the meeting
unsure of Drusus Libo’s support.36 We need not speculate on a
‘real’ plot to commit violent acts against the State.
As was noted previously, Tiberius had relatively little experience in
the senate from 6 BC to AD 13, a period of almost twenty years! He
was, no doubt, well represented by friends and allies, but his absence
would still have caused problems. Cliques, relationships, alliances,
and factions would have formed by necessity in his absence: they are
the hallmark of any deliberative body. Indeed, they are the mechan-
isms by which a great deal of work gets done. When Tiberius finally
returned to Rome to lead the senate in AD 13, he may have found
himself on the outside looking in. No doubt he could rely on a great
number of senators, but there would have been many with whom he
had no connection or familiarity: they may have found his presence
an annoyance at best, and at worse a threat to the established order of
things. Certainly, he would not have known which, and his skill in the
senate betrays his lack of confidence. That an important aristocrat
like Drusus Libo, who advertised Claudian, Scribonian, Julian, and
Pompeian connections, might consider an alliance with Gaius’ old
friends would have concerned Tiberius greatly—that is, it would have
made him hesitate. It is thus naïve to think that only a ‘real’ plot could
or would have worried Tiberius. A coalition of Drusus Libo’s
36 Contra R. Seager (1972), 90, who argues, despite Tacitus, that Drusus Libo was
designated praetor before Catus laid his information. He places Catus’ attack in
October-December. B. Levick (1999), 150, holds that Tiberius was first aware of a
problem with Drusus Libo ‘immediately after Tiberius’ accession to the Principate’.
I am unsure what Levick means by this, since she has elsewhere argued that Tiberius
never formally accepted the Principate. Levick agrees with Seager that Tiberius was, in
Tacitus’ narrative, clearly princeps when Catus laid his information. Tacitus does use
the term ‘princeps’, but that proves nothing. Tacitus reflects the reality of power, an
approach made obvious with his treatment of Tiberius’ accession; he does not concern
himself with strict legal definitions. Moreover, Tacitus followed a tradition which
telescoped the events of AD 14 and AD 16; Drusus Libo was for Tacitus not relevant to
the question of Tiberius’ hesitation. He was uninterested therefore in clarification.
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supporters with those who had formerly supported Gaius, Aemilius
Paullus and Agrippa posed danger to Tiberius, Germanicus, and
Drusus, and would be seen as provocative. If the coalition were to
solidify, then Tiberius’ position would destabilize. His control of the
instruments of power would remain, but his legitimacy as princeps
would be questionable. The future position of Germanicus and Dru-
sus would be even less clear. Catus thus offered to supply information
and prepared the way for future entrapment. But the information was
tenuous at best and at worst unsubstantiated. In any case, there was
no evidence of a capital crime. Tiberius could not destroy an impor-
tant member of the aristocracy (who was not stuck on an island)
without good evidence of serious wrongdoing, but nor did he wish to.
Negotiation was the better approach.
Here is my proposed chronology: (i) in the final week of August,
Tiberius is told about the execution of Agrippa; (ii) in early Septem-
ber, Agrippa’s execution is talked about in Rome, but not discussed in
the senate; rumour circulates that Agrippa was murdered by Livia and
Tiberius; (iii) Tiberius, meanwhile, is informed about the situation in
Pannonia, and then, shortly before 17 September, the situation in
Lower Germany; (iv) at this time Tiberius is also made aware of an
emerging coalition between the aristocrat Drusus Libo and Agrippa’s
known supporters; (v) on 17 September Tiberius deals successfully
with the situation in Germany and its consequences in Rome, as well
as the issue of Germanicus, but the situation concerning Drusus Libo
remains unresolved; (vi) concerned by the prospect of a new coali-
tion, Tiberius holds off accepting anything until the situation is made
clearer; (vii) rather than provoke his enemies into action, Tiberius
makes a deal with Drusus Libo, who agrees to accept Tiberius’
commendatio and by so doing, shows his support for the govern-
ment;37 (viii) Tiberius formally agrees in the senate to continue
holding supreme power; he accepts the moral responsibility of em-
pire, statio paterna: dum veniam ad id tempus, quo vobis aequum
possit videri dare vos aliquam senectuti meae requiem, ‘Until I come to
37 As Martin Stone points out to me, Drusus Libo could have made a political
statement by refusing to seek the praetorship, or else refusing to accept Tiberius’
support, running instead as an independent candidate. Both would signal a ‘vote of no
confidence’ in the government, and Tiberius in particular, i.e. Drusus Libo and
Tiberius had come to a mutual agreement. Drusus Libo was, therefore, doing Tiberius
a favour; he may subsequently have believed that Tiberius was beholden to him.
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that time, in which it may seem right to you to give some rest to my
old age’.38 He was almost 56.
I have here shown that a coherent picture can be produced to
support Suetonius’ contention without rejecting other evidence or
being, of itself, implausible. The situation in AD 15 is not clear, though
Tacitus hints at economic turmoil, and we know that popular anger
with the level of taxation was again an issue.39 As praetor and
pontifex, Drusus Libo socialized occasionally with Tiberius, as was
appropriate for an important noble and a relative, and performed
religious ceremonies. Suetonius and Tacitus hold that Tiberius re-
mained suspicious of him for two years before feeling ready to move.
The assertion cannot be tested. But since the government certainly
sponsored his prosecution in AD 16, it is plausible. Suspicion, how-
ever, does not require the presence of a ‘real’ plot, the evidence for
which emerged only in AD 16. Its appearance signalled Tiberius’
failure to convince important members of the aristocracy to support
Augustus’ succession policy and, with it, his government.
A FALSE DAWN
The decision to leave obscure Agrippa’s execution left Tiberius
vulnerable to suspicion. Plausible deniability was sacrificed and soon
replaced by innuendo: ‘Augustus ordered it’; ‘I heard it was Livia’; ‘No, I
have it on good authority that Tiberius is to blame’; ‘It was probably
Livia and Tiberius’. Gossip is a natural habit but political opponents
often make use of and encourage its dissemination. We have, for
Agrippa’s supporters, two separate and mutually exclusive messages:
(i) ‘Agrippa was murdered by Tiberius’; and, (ii) ‘Agrippa has been
saved by the gods and is alive and well.’ There are two possibilities:
Agrippa’s supporters broke into separate factions after his death; or (i)
occurred before (ii). The second postulate is the most plausible.
Tacitus implies that the government first became aware of a
pseudo-Agrippa only in AD 16. Having described Clemens’ plan to
rescue Agrippa from Planasia, Tacitus continues:
38 Suet. Tib. 24.2. 39 Tac. Ann. 1.78.
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Ausa eius inpedivit tarditas onerariae navis: atque interim patrata caede ad
maiora et magis praecipitia conversus furatur cineres vectusque Cosam
Etruriae promunturium ignotis locis sese abdit, donec crinem barbamque
promitteret: nam aetate et forma haud dissimili in dominum erat. Tum per
idoneos et secreti eius socios crebrescit vivere Agrippam, occultis primum
sermonibus, ut vetita solent, mox vago rumore apud inperitissimi cuiusque
promptas auris aut rursum apud turbidos eoque nova cupientis. Atque ipse
adire municipia obscuro diei, neque propalam aspici neque diutius isdem locis,
sed quia veritas visu et mora, falsa festinatione et incertis valescunt, relinque-
bat famam aut praeveniebat. Vulgabatur interim per Italiam servatum mu-
nere deum Agrippam, credebatur Romae; iamque Ostiam invectum multitudo
ingens, iam in urbe clandestini coetus celebrabant, cum Tiberium anceps cura
distrahere, vine militum servum suum coerceret an inanem credulitatem
tempore ipso vanescere sineret.
‘The tardiness of the cargo-boat hindered his bold venture; in the meantime
the execution [of Agrippa] was accomplished and so he turned to a more
significant and hazardous scheme: he stole the ashes of the deceased, sailed to
Cosa, a promontory of Etruria, and hid himself in unknown places until he
had grown his hair and beard: for in age and appearance he was not unlike
his master. Then, through suitable persons and friends who shared his secret,
it was rumoured that Agrippa was alive, first in private conversations, as is
usual with forbidden knowledge, and soon in vague rumour which found its
way to the open ears of the most ignorant or, on the other hand, those who
were trouble makers and consequently fomenters of revolution. He himself
entered towns at dusk or dawn, and he was neither to be seen in open places
or spending a long time in the same place, but since truth grows in strength
by appearance and time and falsehood by haste and uncertainty, he left
rumour behind him or preceded it. It was meanwhile rumoured throughout
Italy that Agrippa had been saved by heaven, at Rome it was believed; already
huge crowds greeted him at Ostia, already secret meetings were being held in
the city, while the attention of Tiberius was distracted with conflicting
concerns: should he put down his own slave by military means or allow
idle credulity to vanish over time.40
Dio places the whole affair in AD 16:
˚I 	fiH ÆP	fiH 	Ø ˚ºÅ
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 ÆP	fiH, KºÆ	 ÆP	e
 KŒE
 rÆØ . . .
40 Tac. Ann. 2.39–40.1.
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And in the same year a certain Clemens, who had been a slave of Agrippa,
and who resembled him to some extent, pretended to be Agrippa himself
. . .41
Tacitus understood his source to mean that news of Agrippa’s
survival surfaced only after Clemens had taken refuge in some secret
location near Cosa.42 Clemens surfaced looking, apparently, different.
Dio writes only that in AD 16 Agrippa’s survival was publicized. Only
Suetonius situates news of Agrippa’s survival in AD 14. He is mistaken.
Commenting on the reasons for Tiberius’ hesitation he writes:
Nam et servus Agrippae Clemens nomine non contemnendam manum in
ultionem domini compareret . . .
For a slave of Agrippa, Clemens by name, had collected a not contemptible
force to avenge his master . . .43
In ultionem domini refers not to the attempted rescue of Agrippa
but to Clemens’ own insurrection. Suetonius furthermore implies that
in September AD 14 Tiberius was aware of this development. In
contrast to his interpretation of Drusus Libo, which can be supported
by the versions of Tacitus and Dio, Suetonius’ interpretation of the
Clemens affair is impossible. Clemens did not have sufficient time to
travel from Planasia to Cosa, hide for long enough to grow his beard
and hair, and then gather enough men in Gaul and Italy to cause
Tiberius concern by late September AD 14. Suetonius’ interpretation
was probably his own. It was logical to make Clemens’ activities an
extension of Agrippa’s execution, but in doing so Suetonius
41 Dio 57.16.3.
42 Tacitus’ information, contra J. Bellemore (2000), 93–114, came from more than
one source. Clemens’ identity and the story of his flight, with Agrippa’s ashes, to a
promontory at Cosa would not come from his supporters, or even sympathizers; it
undermines their position. Most probably the information was official and dissemi-
nated post eventum. Bellemore, uncomfortable with this conclusion, dismisses the
government’s evidence and argues that Clemens was Agrippa. Bellemore holds that
we cannot accept as genuine any information which comes from the inquisition of an
authoritarian regime, or indeed any regime. This level of cynicism is not necessary.
A public declaration was certainly published which unmasked the pseudo-Agrippa,
but Bellemore has not considered the importance of Crispus. It was shown above that
Tacitus’ treatment of the execution of Agrippa Postumus was largely affected by his
reading the memoirs of the younger Agrippina, which preserved a secret history of
Sallustius Crispus. That Tacitus alone mentions Crispus in connection with Clemens
suggests that he has again referred to his ‘scoop’ for supplementary information, i.e.
details of the affair were known to members of Crispus’ family.
43 Suet. Tib. 25.1.
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constructed an impossible chronology. A chronology must, therefore,
be based upon Tacitus’ longer, and more consistent, narrative.
Speculating on the speed of hair growth is a futile exercise. It is
better to ask: from the moment that the ‘first secret conversations’
were held, how long would it take for the government to find out?
Two sentences are important: (i) ‘Then, through suitable persons and
friends who shared his secret, it was rumoured that Agrippa was alive,
first in private conversations, as is usual with forbidden knowledge,
and soon (mox) in vague rumour’; and (ii) ‘It was meanwhile ru-
moured throughout Italy that Agrippa had been saved by heaven, at
Rome it was believed; already huge crowds greeted him at Ostia.’Mox
in the first passage, though not meaning ‘soon’, necessarily suggests
that a long delay between the first secret conversations (occulti primus
sermones) and the spread of rumour (vagus rumor) is unlikely.44 If
Clemens was captured in the final few months of AD 16, then occulti
primum sermones belong, probably, to the first half of that year.45
This chronology supports the second postulation given above: in AD
14 it was said that Agrippa had been executed by order of Tiberius;
later, in AD 16, it was held that Agrippa had, in fact, survived and
intended to overthrow Tiberius. The second message obviates the
first, which necessarily became counter-productive. On this reading,
the decision to manufacture a pseudo-Agrippa, the recruitment of a
few thousand fighters and the emergence of conspiratorial ‘cells’
within Rome all belong to AD 16.46 Agrippa’s supporters obviously
believed that their position was untenable.
Traces of rebel propaganda survive in Tacitus. Agrippa munere
deum servatus is for the ears of a true believer, but secret ‘cells’ in
Rome would discuss more than propaganda. Tacitus describes the
44 H. J. Rose, ‘Mox’, CQ 21:21 (1927), 657–61, shows thatmox did not mean ‘soon’
in either Classical or Silver Latin, but rather, its meaning changed according to the
context. It could mean ‘next’, ‘then’, or ‘soon’ but rarely with the sense of ‘immediately
after’ or ‘after a very short space of time’. His findings, with some corrections, are
supported by G. Norwood, ‘Mox’, CJ, 37: 7 (1941), 421–3. Norwood cites instances in
which mox is used to pass over several years. It is nevertheless clear that in each
context, mox is used to describe an event which took place sooner rather than later.
Nevertheless, Rose suggests that, aside from a few rare instances which can be
explained contextually, mox is not used to describe a lengthy time-lapse.
45 Tacitus and Dio, whose works are annalistic, place the capture of Clemens at the
end of AD 16; Suetonius, whose treatment is thematic, places it before the death of
Drusus Libo.
46 Cf. I. Cogitore (1991), 134.
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attendees: ‘many (multi) from the imperial house, equestrians and
senators were said to have supported [Clemens] with money and
assisted with their advice’.47 Multi equites et senatores would, at
these meetings, discuss details of the plot: how will so-and-so be
put-away? Who will the praetorians fight for? What about the
urban cohorts? Who will take responsibility for the grain supply?
These men, whose names remain unknown to us, stand at the centre
of this reconstruction. They had supported Gaius, then Aemilius
Paullus, and finally Agrippa. Reconciliation with Tiberius was im-
possible; he had been too often made to feel threatened and humi-
liated. Distrust was mutual and deep. While Augustus lived they
rallied behind prominent members of the imperial family. Aemilius
Paullus, consul in AD 1, could plausibly supersede Tiberius. His
destruction in AD 6 is testimony to his potential. The use of Agrippa
Postumus, young, uncultured, and inexperienced, was, on the other
hand, an act of pure desperation. He provided only nomenclature, but
the nomena were popular and powerful. The government responded
accordingly.
The attempt in AD 11 to free Agrippa from incarceration evidences
a political reality, i.e. those who opposed Tiberius could not ignore
the public’s enthusiasm for members of Augustus’ family. In AD 14,
with Agrippa dead, they allied themselves with an important aristo-
crat who placed a premium on his connection to the domus Caesaris
by highlighting his own brand name. Drusus Libo, for his part,
accepted Tiberius’ olive branch and succeeded to the praetorship
(his brother was moreover designated consul in AD 15), but the seed
was sown. Seneca, alive when Drusus Libo was arraigned, believed
that he had desired the top job. A praetorship, or later a consulate,
might temporarily satisfy the ambitious, but their power and influ-
ence was limited so long as Rome was dominated by a princeps. AD 16,
so far as we know, brought no office or distinction, or military
command; an unoccupied Drusus Libo was left alone to reflect on
his situation. Others were also, at this moment, reflecting on their
situation. Multi equites et senatores had come to view as untenable
their participation in the current political milieu. The elder Julia, for
whom crowds gathered to demand her restoration in AD 4, had
starved to death within a year of Tiberius’ accession, while her alleged
47 Tac. Ann. 2.40.3.
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lover, Sempronius Gracchus, was executed; popular sympathy for
another victim of Tiberius’ scheming might, with the right agent,
mutate into violent support. In AD 16, at secret meetings in Rome,
equites et senatores agreed that Agrippa was still the best agent for
change, thus Agrippa munere deum servatus. A historical fiction soon
emerged: Augustus and Agrippa had, in fact, reconciled, but the
murder of Augustus prevented Agrippa’s full restitution. Tiberius,
desperate for unrivalled domination, ordered Agrippa’s immediate
execution, but, by the grace of the Gods, Agrippa escaped! The
destruction of a suspected ally in the very same year is surely not
coincidental.
Men refused to defend Drusus Libo, not because he was a fool but
because of his known connection to Agrippa’s supporters. Notorious
relationships stick to politicians for life. Support could easily be
mistaken for sympathy, as would any proposal that appeared lenient;
the reaction to Julius Caesar’s proposal on 5 December 63 BC that
Catiline’s associates not be put to death is apposite. Unlike Lentulus
Sura and his associates, Drusus Libo was not put in gaol, but the effect
was similar. A large group of praetorians would not guard a defen-
dant because he dabbled in necromancy, nor would the government
employ such resources to enhance the income of four delatores. Had
Drusus Libo been considered not dangerous, it would have been in
the regime’s interest to encourage voluntary exile. Indeed, voluntary
exile would prove the case for the prosecution and ensure their full
compensation. Instead, troops were used to separate Drusus Libo
from suspected confederates. There was, of course, no smoking gun.
That is clear from the trial. A parchment listing important figures
required interpretation; its use was not manifest, though its existence
was. The necromancer Junius, who had discussed the matter with
Fulcinius Trio, supplied evidence of a vague but sinister question,
something like: ‘What does my future hold should anything unfortu-
nate happen to the men on this list?’ It was enough to warrant a
senatorial investigation and allow for the dismantling of a provocative
coalition.
We can only speculate on Drusus Libo’s part in the conspiracy. He
was an important individual, and so his participation ought to have
been significant. But his decision to consult a necromancer demands
our caution. It indicates an uncertain psychology rather than con-
fident commitment to a cause, and it is therefore possible that he was
still, even with the Pseudo-Agrippa bearing down on Rome, weighing
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his options. Regardless, Levick is surely right to suppose that the
conspirators would have removed Clemens once Tiberius and his
entourage were dead.48 Levick further argues that Drusus Libo was to
be nominated princeps and presented, by the people, to the senate.49
This is unlikely. Drusus and Tiberius were present in Rome and
would, therefore, have been put to death, along with their closest
allies, but Germanicus, in Germany with thousands of troops, would
pose a serious threat to the conspirators. His position was physically
and morally superior to anybody who might occupy, or liberate,
Rome as princeps. To neutralize Germanicus, the conspirators
would require a device by which his position would appear untenable,
unpopular, and illegitimate. The best way to counter Germanicus’
popularity while avoiding an unpopular war was the abolition of the
Principate, which would effectively wedge Germanicus.50 Aggression
by Germanicus would be advertised as a repudiation of his father’s
purported Republicanism, damaging seriously his popularity in
Rome. It would also require the siege of Rome, now housing a free
and emboldened senate and people. The invidia of tyranny could be
avoided only by acknowledging the new res publica as legitimate, and,
in so doing, mortally wound any claim to supreme power. Germani-
cus, of course, may have reacted differently, but I believe, that the
conspirators in Rome would have had little option but to try and
wedge him: a war would have been costly and difficult to win. Having
deposed the tyrant and dismantled his government, the conspirators
would, therefore, have organized immediately fresh elections in ac-
cordance with ancestral custom, i.e. the new electoral arrangements
were to be abolished and the people would again determine the
outcome of elections. It was with good reason that Tiberius presented
his electoral reform as having been designed by the now deified
Augustus.51 The equites who made up the centuriae Caesarum had
no reason to support Tiberius’ electoral innovations, which were
barely two years old, and may have been satisfied with anything
other than the status quo. Nor should we assume that plebeians
took to political impotence with satisfaction or indifference. As was
noted above, aside from the right to vote according to ancestral
custom, distress had remained topical, being communicated to the
government via anti-tax protests. We know almost nothing about the
48 B. Levick (1999), 149 f. 49 Ibid.
50 Cf. E. Ciaceri (1944), 271. 51 Vell. 2.124.3.
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sate of Rome’s economy during these years, save Tacitus’ note that
people asked Tiberius to abolish the 1 per cent sales tax, and Tiberius’
reply that the state could not function without it.52 Even without
more information, it is safe to assume that things were not going well
for a large group of people. On this reading, the Tiberian experiment
was seen by many as a failure and they were now open to alternatives.
That talk of libertas and Republican praxis resurfaced on the death of
Tiberius, and more impressively after the death of Gaius Caesar, is
evidence that my conclusion is not impossible, nor even improb-
able.53 It certainly explains the presence or Concord. Augustus’ use of
a discourse which implied the extraordinary, and temporary, nature
of the supreme power, and Tiberius’ rambling about the eventual
laying to rest of a heavy burden allowed people to question the
legitimacy of the so called optimus status. The paradoxical nature of
the Principate sustained interest in a truly free res publica.
The ancient belief that Drusus Libo desired the ‘top job’ is, there-
fore, a rejection of his Republican image. The prosecution presented
evidence of supreme ambition: ‘Would he ever have enough money to
cover the Via Appia from Rome to Brundisium with gold?’54 The
image was accepted by contemporaries: ‘He possessed higher ambi-
tions than anyone could have been expected to entertain in that
epoch, or a man like himself in any epoch at all.’55 There were to be
no Republican martyrs in the changed conditions of Tiberius’ succes-
sion. Drusus Libo, nonetheless, was no mere tool.56 When Catiline
entered the senate on 8 November 63 BC, not one of his associates
would sit near him. Still, Catiline was no puppet.57 Clemens’ con-
spiracy nonetheless continued despite Drusus Libo’s very public
demise. Once a fighting force of thousands assembled, the conspiracy
would remain active so long as Clemens was alive or a serious defeat
52 Tac. Ann 1.78.2.
53 Suetonius (Claud. 10) has it that on the death of Gaius the consuls, with the
support of the senate and the Urban Cohorts, occupied the Forum and Capitol, being
determined to protect libertas. Suetonius goes on to suggest (Claud. 11) that the senate
had recorded its desire to ‘change the form of government’. The records were
apparently destroyed by Claudius as part of a general amnesty following his rise to
supreme power. It should be noted, moreover, that Gaius Caesar either abolished or at
least reduced the 1 per cent sales tax (Dio 59.9.6; Suet. Gaius 16.3).
54 Tac. Ann. 2.30.
55 Sen. Ep. Mor. 70.10.
56 Cf. L. Freytag (1870), 115.
57 Cic. In. Cat. 1.16.
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was suffered. The multi equites et senatores were committed to new
political order, not the inauguration of one particular aristocrat.
Drusus Libo was one of many senators secretly behind Clemens. He
was, however, closest to the ruling clique and therefore a major loss.
No manifest evidence existed to prove Drusus Libo’s involve-
ment in the Pseudo-Agrippa conspiracy, but the political climate—
affected by widespread speculation that Agrippa was marching to-
wards Rome—demanded caution. As with many Romans at that
time, Drusus Libo was evidently affected by fatalistic creeds; a strong
temptation to know the future proved his undoing. Those most
threatened by revolution pounced, while those with the most to
gain were in no position to help. Tiberius, and to a greater extent
Germanicus and Drusus, profited, but it is important to note Tiber-
ius’ own behaviour. His satisfaction should not be doubted, but he
wore on his public face signs of distress. Tiberius ostentatiously
preferred reconciliation and clemency, while the senate demanded
justice in the face of threats to the government. The result belied the
nature of the Principate: the princeps should not impose his will on
a free senate charged with the protection of the res publica, thus:
responsum est ut senatum rogaret.58 This is a complex approach to
power. On the death of Augustus, Tiberius surrounded himself with
the instruments of violent coercion. Praetorians accompanied him
everywhere. But the maintenance of authoritarian power requires
more than the tools for destruction; it involves public relations.
Tiberius advertised moderatio and sorrow at the death of a rival
whilst the senate was left to accept full responsibility. The irony
concealed real tyranny, as the chief victims were made to wear the
tyrant’s face.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In the process of showing that Tiberius’ position was threatened by
the persistence of a ‘real’ opposition, a model for understanding
Tiberius’ Principate has come to light which stands in contrast to
those hitherto produced. Scholars who construct a Republican
58 Tac. Ann. 2.31.1.
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paradigm to interpret Tiberius and the unfolding of his Principate are
shown to be seriously mistaken, as are those who insist that moral
abstractions like dissimulatio or moderatio were the key principles by
which Tiberius operated. I have shown that Tiberius responded to an
actual fear, not simply discourse: anything less than supreme power
would have meant his assassination. By grounding the Tiberian
Principate firmly in Augustus’ Principate, contra Tacitus, the above
approach is able to explain why this came about. But the benefits of
the model advanced here extend well beyond AD 16.
Concerning the affair of Drusus Libo, Levick held that: ‘the
genuine and remarkable concord between Germanicus and Drusus
will have been cemented by the episode.’59 We cannot be sure this was
ever the case, but Tacitus possessed evidence that by AD 17 hostility
between their respective friends and supporters had emerged:
Divisa namque et discors aula erat tacitis in Drusum aut Germanicum studiis
. . . Sed fratres egregie concordes et proximorum certaminibus inconcussi.
For there was division and discord in the court with silent preferences to
either Drusus or Germanicus . . . but the brothers were singularly united and
unshaken by the struggles of those around them.60
My approach explains this development. Since, as Tacitus writes,
there was no public inquiry following the death of Clemens, themulti
equites et senatores were left to reconsider their position. As I have
shown, most could not be reconciled with Tiberius. They required
therefore a new figurehead—someone, as we have seen, closely con-
nected to the imperial family. I would suggest that they got behind
Germanicus, or, more precisely, Germanicus and Agrippina. This
would explain the emergence of hostility between the supporters of
Drusus and Germanicus, but it also explains the later treatment of
Germanicus’ sons following his death. Nero and Drusus were, follow-
ing the death of their uncle Drusus, accused of conspiracy; both
eventually died amid suspicion.61 The history of Germanicus and
his supporters after AD 16 therefore deserves further analysis.
Finally, my approach allows for a new appreciation of the sources.
By not grounding Tiberius’ Principate in Augustus’ Principate, Taci-
tus fails to comprehend Tiberius’ approach to power; we find
59 B. Levick (1999), 152.
60 Tac. Ann. 2.43.5.
61 Tac. Ann. 6.23; Suet. Tib. 54; Dio 58.25.4.
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ourselves reading Suetonius and Dio with relief! What did Aufidius
Bassus, Servilius Nonianus, Cluvius Rufus, or Fabius Rusticus have to
offer? A re-examination of Tacitus’ sources is required. Tacitus had
before him more sources than is usually admitted. Indeed, Syme’s
belief that Tacitus relied heavily on the acta senatus seems to me
unlikely. A different approach must also be brought to the memoirs of
the younger Agrippina. Tacitus’ treatment of the death of Agrippa
Postumus and the conspiracy of Clemens suggests that Agrippina’s
work was not well known and, therefore, had little impact in the first
century AD. The absence of Sallustius Crispus in either Suetonius or
Dio is suggestive, and weakens the belief that Tacitus seriously
affected either historian. A better understanding of the historical
works of the first century AD is essential.
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APPENDIX 1
A Prosopography of M. Scribonius
Drusus Libo
What follows is an attempt to capture the essence of what Drusus Libo had in
mind as he considered his place in Roman society:
Firmius Catus senator, ex intima Libonis amicitia, iuvenem inprovidum et facilem
inanibus ad Chaldaeorum promissa, magorum sacra, somniorum etiam interpretes
impulit, dum proavum Pompeium, amitam Scriboniam, quae quondam Augusti con-
iunx fuerat, consobrinos Caesares, plenam imaginibus domum ostentat, hortaturque ad
luxum et aes alienum, socius libidinum et necessitatum, quo pluribus indiciis inligaret.
Firmius Catus, a senator and close friend of Libo’s, urged the short-sighted young
man, given to empty things, to resort to the promises of astrologers, the rites of
magicians, and also dream interpreters, reminding him of his great-grandfather
Pompeius, his paternal aunt Scribonia, former wife of Augustus, his imperial cousins,
his house crowded with ancestral images, and urging him to extravagance and debt:
Firmius associated himself in these debaucheries and embarrassments, in order to
entangle Libo in more evidence.1
Marcus Scribonius Libo Drusus would seem an appropriate name for a
young man who was born (M.?) Livius Drusus and was later adopted by a
Scribonius. He was, in fact, a Scribonius adopted by a Livius. The Fasti
Amiternini records his name as ‘M. Libo’, Velleius Paterculus has ‘Drusus
Libo’, Seneca ‘Drusus Libo’, and Tacitus uses the phrase e familia Scribo-
niorum Libo Drusus.2 Dio and Suetonius mistake Drusus Libo for his
brother, Lucius Scribonius Libo, consul ordinarius in AD 16.3 Hitherto the
standard preference is to apply the Tacitean formula, thus Syme, Shotter, and
Weinrib.4 Sumner shows that the preference is wrong.5 Tacitus alone uses
1 Tac. Ann. 2.27.2.
2 V. Ehrenberg and A. H. M. Jones (1955), 52; Vell. 2.130.3; Ep. Mor. 70.10.1; Tac.
Ann. 2.27.1.
3 Dio 57.15.4; Suet. Tib. 25; see the list of consuls for AD 16 in V. Ehrenberg and
A. H. M. Jones (1955), 40.
4 R. Syme (1986), table 14; D. C. A. Shotter (1972), passim; E. J. Weinrib (1968),
247–78.
5 G.V. Sumner, ‘TheTruthAboutVelleius Paterculus: Prolegomena’,HSCP, 74 (1970),
275, n. 113, who shows other instances where Tacitus has inverted a person’s name.
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‘Libo Drusus’, and as Tacitus himself tells us, one of the posthumous
penalties was to deprive Scribonian descendants from ever adopting Drusus
as a cognomen: ne quis Scribonius cognomentum Drusi adsumeret.6 The
preferred formula was M. Scribonius Drusus Libo. This slight emendation
makes it somewhat easier to envisage an adoption. That he was born a
Scribonius is certain. Seneca and Tacitus mention amita Scribonia, ‘Scribo-
nia, an aunt on the father’s side’, and Tacitus also mentions proavus Pom-
peius, ‘Pompey, a great-grandfather’. Scribonia can thus be found on his
father’s side, and Pompeius was the grandfather of his mother, Pompeia
Magna. Drusus Libo was, therefore, a Scribonius adopted by a Livius, but in a
manner that allowed for unconventional nomenclature, i.e. he should have
been M. Livius Drusus Libo Scribonianus, but was able instead to use
M. Scribonius Drusus Libo. Weinrib has argued that Drusus Libo annexed
the cognomen Drusus after the death of M. Livius Drusus Libo (cos. 15).7 His
hypothesis has not been challenged.
Drusus Libo’s brother was L. Scribonius L.f. Libo (cos. AD 16), and hence
their father was a L. Scribonius Libo. The father’s brother was M. Livius L.f.
Drusus Libo (cos. 15).8 Lucii filius signifies that their (i.e. the consul of 15 BC
and his brother) father was thus also a L. Scribonius L.f. Libo. He is the
consul for 34 BC.9 There are two points to consider. An eldest son was
provided with the praenomen Lucius, and that one generation before our
man, the second son of a Scribonius Libo had joined the ranks of the Livii
Drusi. Weinrib’s study of M. Livius L.f. Drusus Libo shows that he was not
adopted through either of the formal modes known to us- adrogatio or datio
in adoptionem- for we would not expect L.f., when his praenomen is clearly
Marcus.10 Instead, M. Livius Drusus Libo joined the Livii Drusi through the
process of testamentary ‘adoption’.11 His testator was M. Livius Drusus
6 Tac. Ann. 2.32.2.
7 E. J. Weinrib (1968), 263–4: ‘The proposal of Cn. Lentulus after the fall of
M. Scribonius Libo Drusus, ‘ne quis Scribonius cognomentum Drusi adsumeret,’
implies that the offender had incorporated the item Drusus into his nomenclature
through his own volition rather than that he possessed it from birth on the decision of
the father.’
8 V. Ehrenberg and A. H. M. Jones (1955), 37.
9 Ibid., 34.
10 E. J. Weinrib (1968), 252–3.
11 In this scenario, a man would perform the appropriate rites before a praetor, and
then be able to take on the estate of the deceased, his name, the masks of his ancestors,
and his sacra familiaria. Yet, most important of all, it did not require pontifical
approval, because the heir would not be under the patria potestas of the testator,
instead his familial position did not change. Due to this, such an adoption was only
defined within the civil law, not the sacral or public laws, and, hence, it was more or
less a private agreement between two families. J. Linderski, ‘Q. Scipio Imperator’, in
J. Linderski (ed.), Imperium Sine Fine: T. Robert S. Broughton and the Roman Republic
Historia Einzelschriften Heft, 105 (1996), 152–3. For alternative theories, see R. Syme
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Claudianus, a Claudius Pulcher who was adopted by the tribune of 91 BC,
M. Livius Drusus. Although M. Livius Drusus Libo did not come under the
patria potestas of his new father, he did have claims to his titles and estates,
which he shared with his new sister, Livia Drusilla. Weinrib goes on to
suggest that this eminent position was not underestimated by his young
nephew M. Scribonius Drusus Libo, who was so impressed by his uncle’s
fame that he chose to take on his praenomen and cognomen out of pure
regard.12 As evidence for this practice, Weinrib cites the example of L. Seius
Strabo, who gave his son the cognomen Tubero in honour of a family
friend.13 Yet he goes on to acknowledge that: ‘this idea is now out of
favour’.14 Other examples cited do not exclude the possibility that a will
had been drawn up, and in the case of M. Aurelius Cotta Maximus Messa-
linus, the evidence actually implies a testament was being followed:
Qui vir animo etiam quam gente nobilior dignissimusque, qui et patrem Corvinum
habuisset et cognomen suum Cottae fratri relinqueret . . .
This man [M. Valerius Messala Messalinus], was more noble in spirit even than in
family, who was very worthy to have had Corvinus as a father, and who left behind his
own cognomen to his brother Cotta.15
Weinrib has ignored the active verb relinquo: the brother left behind his
cognomen. The cognomen was not annexed. This is much like his reading of
Tacitus’ passage concerning the posthumous penalty suggested by Cn. Len-
tulus: ne quis Scribonius cognomentum Drusi adsumeret.16 Weinrib takes
adsumere to mean ‘to take’, and insists that the verb signifies a one-sided
transaction: Cn. Lentulus suggests that no Scribonius shall ‘take’ the cogno-
men Drusus.17 But adsumere is here used in the widest possible sense, in
which ‘to take’ can mean taking for oneself or to take when offered by
another. Weinrib is closest to the mark when he writes in a footnote
‘Mommsen’s instinctive suggestion of a testamentary adoption by Drusus
Libo may be correct (Eph. Ep. I (1872) 146). In this case the nomenclature
would be exactly parallel to that of Brutus Albinus.’18 Annexation of nomen-
clature did, of course, occur. The lex Cornelia de falsis, or an amendment,
dealt with the issue in relation to forming wills, as is evidenced by Dig.
‘Clues to Testamentary adoption’, in A. R. Birley (ed.), Roman Papers IV (1988),
159–74; and D. R. Shackleton-Bailey, Two Studies in Nomenclature (1976), 81–91.
12 E. J. Weinrib (1968), 263–4.
13 Ibid., 263.
14 Ibid., 263, n. 65.
15 Vell. 2.112.2. For the case of P. Suillius Rufus, see Tac. Ann. 11.36.5 and 12.25.1.
For P. Clodius Thrasea Paetus, see PIR² C 103.
16 Tac. Ann. 2.32.2.
17 E. J. Weinrib (1968), 264.
18 Ibid., n. 69, 263.
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48.10.13: Falsi nominis vel cognominis adseveratio poena falsi coercetur,
‘To lay claim to a false nomen or cognomen is punished by the penalty for
fraud.’ But the evidence suggests the perpetrators were usually freedmen or
foreigners passing themselves off as citizens.19 Moreover, it appears that
M. Scribonius Drusus Libo was never prosecuted for such a breach, which
is perhaps evidence that no breach was ever made. This supports the view
that he was adopted in the will of his uncle M. Livius Drusus Libo, on the
condition that he take his name.
Evidently, Drusus Libo chose to drop the gentilicium Livius, preferring
instead Scribonius. Shackleton-Bailey cites the case of T. Pomponius Atticus,
who was heir to the estate of his uncle, Q. Caecilius, by testamentary
adoption. Perhaps soon after Atticus had come into his new power as
heres, Cicero headed a letter with Q. Caecilio Q.f. Pomponiano Attico.20
The letter shows that a heres could revert to his natal nomenclature despite
the condicio nominis ferendi, since he continued to be called T. Pomponius
Atticus.21 Thus, M. Scribonius Drusus Libo publicized a cognomen rich in
social and political capital, but, for reasons that are not clear, dropped the
equally impressive ‘Livius’. Cicero’s anecdote, moreover, draws our attention
to another reason for viewing Drusus Libo as an adopted son rather than a
starry-eyed nephew. No doubt the congratulations given by Cicero referred
to the fortune that Atticus had acquired, important when considering the
role of testamentary adoptions. Once an heir had performed the appropriate
rites before a praetor, he would be able to take on the estate of the deceased,
his name, the masks of his ancestors, and his sacra familiaria.22 As a general
rule, this whole process favoured heirless nobles who wished for the con-
tinuation of the family name without legal fuss. The reason had sufficed
for M. Livius Drusus, and, in turn, his adopted son, M. Livius Drusus
Claudianus. He had only one daughter, Livia Drusilla, and so adopted
19 Suet. Claud. 25.3; Dio 60.17.7.
20 D. R. Shackleton-Bailey (1976), 85; Cic. Ad Att. 3.20. There are other occur-
rences. When P. Cornelius P.f. Scipio Nasica became Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius Scipio
via his testamentary adoption to Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius, Cicero, De Domo Sua,
123, could still call him P. Scipio. Linderski (1996), 153–4, has also pointed out that
Metellus Pius Scipio’s daughter continued to be called Cornelia. In 39 Tiberius
Claudius Nero became M. Gallius after a testamentary adoption, but Suetonius, Tib.
6.3, tells us that a short while after Tiberius dropped the name. E. J. Weinrib (1967),
257f., has shown that reverting to his natal nomenclature did not detrimentally affect
Tiberius’ claim to the inheritance.
21 Suetonius styles him ‘Caecilius Atticus’, Tib. 7. Cicero continues to refer to him
as Pomponius in their correspondence. D. R. Shackleton-Bailey (1976), 85; Onomas-
ticon to Cicero’s Letters (1995), 26–7 Oxford; P. Tansey, Pulsi maiorum loco?
A reconsideration of the Patriciate 218–49 B.C. Unpublished PhD (1997), 148.
22 J. Linderski (1996), 152. Cf. R. Syme (1982), 167.
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M. Livius Drusus Libo. Now, as far as we know, M. Livius Drusus Libo also
had one daughter, Livia Scriboniana and, more importantly, no sons.
Low fertility within the aristocracy concerned the Augustan government;
a social phenomenon that had plagued Rome for decades: ‘A well-known
feature of the social history of Rome is the infertility of the governing class,
its failure to rear enough children to maintain its numbers’, as Crook put it.23
Condicio nominis ferendi is an artificial reaction to this state of affairs.24 The
object of this device was to ensure a testator’s name was carried on after
death, and a growing tide of opinion suggests that condicio nominis ferendi
and testamentary adoption were one and the same.25 It is here that Weinrib’s
thesis requires correction. Though he, in fact, advocates this position for
M. Livius Drusus Libo, he seems to have downplayed its significance in the
case of M. Scribonius Drusus Libo; a brief Livian prosopography reveals why
such a process was necessary. The consul of 112 BC was M. Livius Drusus. He
had three children: Livia, M. Livius Drusus (tr.pl. 91), and Mam. Aemilius
Lepidus Livianus (cos. 77).26 Livia married both Q. Servilius Caepio (pr. 91),
and M. Porcius Cato, neither marriage produced children with the
23 J. A. Crook (1967), 111. A low fertility rate and the consequences this imposed
on the perpetuation of the nomenclature of the pater can be implied from Ulpian Dig.
1.7.15.2–3: in adrogationibus cognitio vertitur, num forte minor sexaginta annis sit qui
adrogat, quia magis liberorum creationi studere debeat: nisi forte morbus aut valetudo
in causa sit aut alia iusta causa adrogatio, veluti si coniunctam sibi personam velit
adoptare, ‘In cases of adrgatio the scrutiny of the court is directed to the question
whether perhaps the adrogator is less than sixty years old, because then he should
rather be attending to begetting his own children—unless it should so happen that
sickness or health is an issue in the case or there is some other just ground for
adrogatio, such as his being related to the person he wishes to adopt.’ The lex Iulia de
maritandis ordinibus and lex Papia Poppaea were seen as important attempts to arrest
the problem of fertility through legislation. See introduction to these texts in, Roman
Statutes, II (1996), 801.
24 So Sen. Cont. 2.1.17.1: Fabriciorum imagines Metellis patuerunt; Aemiliorum et
Scipionum familias adoptio miscuit; etiam abolita saeculis nomina per successores
novos fulgent. Sic illa patriciorum nobilitas <a> fundamentis urbis [habet] usque in
haec tempora constitit: adoptio fortunae remedium est, ‘The portraits of the Fabricii
found room for the Metelli; adoption merged the families of the Aemilii and
Scipiones; even names that age has destroyed shine through new heirs. That is how
the nobility of the patricians has survived to this day from the founding of the city.
Adoption is the remedy for luck.’
25 C. F. Konrad, ‘Notes on Roman Also-Rans’, in Imperium Sine Fine: T. Robert
S. Broughton and the Roman Republic, J. Linderski (ed.), Historia Einzelschriften Heft,
105 (1996), 126, has shown that during the early Principate evidence that the concept
of ‘testamentary adoption’ is nothing more than condicio nominis ferendi becomes
‘conclusive and abundant’. Also J. Linderski (1996), 152–13; P. Tansey (1997),
Appendix I, 143–50; the latter gives a full list of those scholars who adopt this
approach at 143 n. 6.
26 R. Syme (1986) table II; F. Münzer, Aristocratic Parties and Families, trans. by
T. Ridley (1920, trans. 1999), 268.
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cognomen Drusus.27 M. Livius Drusus (tr.pl. 91) had no children, while
Mam. Aemilius Lepidus Livianus, who was clearly adopted by an Aemilius
Lepidus, did not take the cognomen Drusus with him.28 It was thus left to the
tribune of 91 to adopt, and he chose a Claudius Pulcher, who became
M. Livius Drusus Claudianus. M. Livius Drusus Claudianus had one daugh-
ter, who took both gentilicium and cognomen, but it was not guaranteed that
her future children would bear either. This was the situation when M. Livius
Drusus Claudianus instituted a Scribonius Libo as heres, who became
M. Livius Drusus Libo (cos. 15). Thus, immediately after 42 BC Livia
and her new stepbrother were the only bearers of this very distinguished
cognomen.29
About this time Livia married Tiberius Claudius Nero (pr. 42); they soon
had two children: the future princeps, Tiberius Claudius Nero; and Decimus
Claudius Nero (the elder Drusus).30 Though the name ‘Drusus’ was not
given to either child, some time during his youth Decimus became Nero
Claudius Drusus; the plight of ‘Drusus’ was temporarily reprieved.31 Nero
Claudius Drusus had three children: Germanicus, the future princeps Clau-
dius, and Livia Julia. Germanicus was born Nero Claudius Drusus Germa-
nicus, whilst Claudius was Tiberius Claudius Drusus.32 In 13 BC Tiberius
named his only son Drusus, perhaps fulfilling a mother’s request. Tiberius
Claudius Drusus’ birth in 10 BC therefore brought the number of bearers up
to six. But fortuna is fickle. While Claudius was still a baby his father, Nero
Claudius Drusus, died. It was probably about this time that another Scribo-
nius Libo joined the ranks, though at which point he secured the bequest is
beyond us. Either way, having surveyed the recent history of the Livii Drusi,
it is not hard to understand why a device like ‘testamentary’ adoption
appealed, especially because ‘it merely signifies the instalment of an heir
under condition that he take the testator’s name’.33 Since an heir received the
deceased’s estates, his name, the masks of his ancestors, and his sacra
familiaria, it is not hard to understand why the situation benefited the
Scribonii as well. Thus M. Livius Drusus Claudianus adopted M. Livius
27 F. Munzer (1920, trans. 1999), 270.
28 Ibid., 268.
29 M. Livius Drusus Claudianus died in 42 at the battle of Philippi.
30 Later to become Nero Claudius Drusus (Suet. Claud. 1.1).
31 It must be noted that the change in nomenclature was not solely based on the
precarious future of Drusus as a cognomen. We cannot dismiss the political ramifica-
tions that followed accusations against Octavian that he was Decimus’ father, for to
change the child’s name to Nero could show an attempt to highlight the boy’s natural
paternity. For a review of all the arguments, see C. J. Simpson, ‘The Change in
‘Praenomen’ of Drusus Germanicus’, Phoenix, 42.2 (1988), 173–15.
32 Suet. Claud. 2.
33 C. F. Konrad (1996), 124.
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Drusus Libo, who, in turn, adopted M. Scribonius Drusus Libo, the form of
both having been defined through condicio nominis ferendi. M. Scribonius
Drusus Libo had inherited the masks of not only his natal ancestors but also
of the ancestors of the Livii Drusi.34 With the Scribonii and Pompeii already
on display, his collection was certainly impressive, both socially and politi-
cally: Weinrib’s hypothesis does not produce this image.
Having thus established a place for M. Scribonius Drusus Libo, we should
now consider his connections. The nomenclature of M. Scribonius Drusus
Libo indicates a desire to display his connection both to the Livii Drusi and
the Scribonii Libones. As the adopted son of M. Livius Drusus Claudianus,
M. Livius Drusus Libo was a brother of sorts to Livia Drusilla and an uncle to
Tiberius Claudius Nero, the future princeps. M. Scribonius Drusus Libo
could, therefore, claim to be a cousin to the emperor. Indeed, though the
passage drips with irony, Tacitus states that Libo frequently dined with
Tiberius, and Suetonius cites instances where the two spent time together,
even walking arm-in-arm.35 Both episodes are used to imply Tiberius’ fear,
but they also indicate that intimate connections were not unusual. No less
impressive were Drusus Libo’s Scribonian ties. His grandfather was
L. Scribonius Libo (cos. 34), a man found in some of the most significant
acts of late Republican history.36
34 After his appearance in the fasti,M. Livius Drusus Libo (cos. 15) does not appear
again. Syme has speculated that he may have died a few years after his consulship in
15, perhaps a victim of the plague which probably left three consuls dead in 12 BC,
(1986), 153–4 n. 85, though he admits that his approach is speculative.
35 Tac. Ann. 2.28; Suet. Tib. 25.
36 A brief and simplistic biography can be found in W. S. Anderson, Pompey, his
Friends, and the Literature of the First Century BC. (1961), 41–4. The earliest evidence
is possibly c. 62 in the form of coins: one a solo effort, the other a joint venture with
L. Aemilius M.f. Paullus (cos. 50) to advertise Concordia, a show of support for Cicero
and his associates. M. H. Crawford, Roman Republican Coinage, II (1974), plate 51,
416/1a 417/1a, dates it to 62. D. Weigel, ‘The joint issue of L. Libo and Paullus
Lepidus’, Society for Ancient Numismatics (1974), 3–4. Weigel associates
L. Aemilius Paullus (cos. 50) with his son Paullus Aemilius Lepidus (suff. 34). He
dates the coin to 56–5, not 62. Crawford believes Bonus Eventus refers to success
against the Catilinarians. The other coin celebrates the Puteal Scribonianum and
thanks Bonus Eventus. Festus reveals the Puteal to be the Atrium of Scipio, which
had been struck by lightning and destroyed. The task of rebuilding and administering
the structure had been given to one of Libo’s ancestors, and the note in Festus explains
Bonus Eventus, thanked for the successful completion of the entire business; Festus
494.34–38 L.; Hor. Epist. I.19.1–11. Dating the coin with Lepidus has proved highly
contentious, not least because it is central to understanding Libo’s age. Part of the
problem is pinpointing the identity of Libo’s partner, which the legend states was a
‘Paulus Lepidus’. Some argue for the suffectus of 34 (Groag PIR² A 373; Weigel (1974),
3–4), others for his father (Crawford (1974), I.441–2; P. Willems (1883–5), I.486, 495).
Since it is not central to the purposes of this chapter, the arguments will not be
examined. Suffice to say that no date hitherto suggested has found universal favour.
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In 56 BC L. Scribonius Libo appears as a lobbyist for Cn. Pompeius to be
given the commission for reinstating Ptolemy VII as king of Egypt.37 Libo’s
abilities were endorsed when Pompeius chose Libo’s daughter for his son,
Sextus Pompeius.38 Though he again goes missing, the threat of war suited
Libo’s abilities, and in February of 49 he and L. Cornelius Lentulus Crus (cos.
49) organized troops in Capua. By March Libo had met with Pompeius’
senior advisers in Brundisium and, apart from strategy and policy, it seems
evident Libo was involved in bribing soldiers.39 Early in 49, before fighting
broke out, Caesar tells us that he sent C. Caninius Rebilus to Libo for the
purposes of organizing an interview between himself and Pompey.40 He adds
that Caninius was Libo’s familiaris and necessarius (a very close relationship
of some kind). As with many others, Libo obviously had close friends on the
other side. The anecdote also signals Libo’s high standing, and Caesar adds to
the impression when he states elsewhere: quibuscum communicare de max-
imis rebus Pompeius consueverat, ‘one with whom Pompey was accustomed
to consult about the most important matters’.41 Defeat in the civil war, and
the death of Pompey, did not end the career of Libo. By 46 Libo had
befriended Cicero and at some stage during this period had his second son
adopted by M. Livius Drusus Claudianus. But these were additional amici.42
His rock remained the Pompeii, in the shape of his son-in-law, Sextus
Pompeius.
37 Cic. Ad fam. 1.1.3; some take this as evidence of a tribunate, so P. Willems
(1883–5) I.422, 495–6.
38 App. BC 5.52.; Dio 48.16.3; where Libo is described as Sextus’ father-in-law.
R. Syme (1986), 255, believed that the marriage occurred: ‘perhaps not before the
beginning of the Civil War’. It is impossible with current evidence to determine, with
real conviction, a date for the marriage. The years 56–49 and 43–2 have both found
favour with different scholars: F. Munzer RE.II.3.8884; R. Syme (1939), 228, n. 2, who
reconsiders his approach in (1986), 255; E. S. Gruen, The Last Generation of the
Roman Republic (1974), 108; E. J. Weinrib (1967), 249.
39 The troops in Capua had been raised by T. Ampius Balbus, Cic. Ad Att.
8.11B. The advisers at Brundisium included L. Lucceius, Theophanes, Q. Caecilius
Metellus Pius Scipio, and Faustus Cornelius Sulla, to which Cicero complains to
Atticus: ‘do you suppose there are any criminal lengths to which Scipio, Faustus
and Libo will not go?’ adding: ‘their creditors are said to be meeting’, Ad Att. 9.11.4.
40 Caes. BC 1.26.
41 BC 3.18; Throughout De bello civili Caesar portrays Libo as one of Pompey’s
chief negotiators. When Libo and M. Calpurnius Bibulus (cos. 59) found themselves
in trouble while commanding two fleets, they held a parley with two of Caesar’s
legates, M. Acilius and Statius Murcus, asking that they be allowed to speak to Caesar
to arrange peace. Significant is the absence of Pompey’s approval, as the decision to
negotiate was obviously within Libo’s responsibilities, as was the ability to command a
truce (3.16. See also 3.15, 3.17, 3.23, 3.90).
42 Ad fam. 7.4; Ad Att. 12.18; 12.19.
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In July of 45 Libo was Sextus’ voice at a meeting with Cicero and Brutus.43
In December of 44 Libo attended a secret meeting at Cicero’s house as Sextus’
representative.44 Along with the other attendees, Libo advised Brutus ‘not to
wait to be authorized by the senate in preserving the safety of the Roman
people.’45 Though Libo was involved with the planning of hostilities that
followed the death of Caesar, during the ensuing struggle his diplomacy was
again required. At sometime in 40 Libo was part of an embassy to bring
M. Antonius over to the side of Sextus.46 Accompanying Libo on the journey
was a C. Sentius Saturninus (cos. 19), who we know was related to Libo.47
Octavian’s response was to offer an alliance with Libo himself by marrying
Libo’s sister Scribonia, an important event in the history of the family.48 The
treaty of Misenum, though in hindsight a failure, was at the time an attempt
at real and long-lasting peace.49 Libo did well. His sister was married to
Octavian, his granddaughter was betrothed toMarcellus - Octavian’s nephew
and the stepson of Antony - and it was agreed that he would be consul
ordinarius in 34.50 Welch argues that Octavian was attempting to destabilize
the opposition by co-opting Sextus’ most able adviser.51 But Sextus cannot
have felt betrayed, since it was his daughter—and Libo’s granddaughter—
who was betrothed to Marcellus.52 Libo was instead mediating the truce
43 Ad Att. 16.4.
44 Ad Fam. 11.7: Cum adhibuisset domi meae Lupus me et Libonem et Servium,
consobrinum tuum.
45 Ibid. If we cast our minds back to the meeting with Cicero and Brutus in July of
45, questions with exciting implications emerge: how frequent were these meetings?
how often did Libo see Brutus? Definite answers are beyond us, but the implications
are obvious. If Libo was Sextus’ link to Brutus from 45 to the end of 44, was he
involved in the plan to assassinate Julius Caesar. His place among those at Cicero’s
house in December of 44 implies some form of collusion, with Sextus and his forces.
That Libo was not arraigned under the lex Pedia and was never called an assassin is
not a problem—since Sextus was.
46 App. BC 5.52. The group comprised Antonius’ mother, Libo, and C. Sentius
Saturninus, who was a cousin to Libo on the mother’s side, ILS 8892; R. Syme, ‘The
Stemma of the Sentii Saturnini’,Historia, 13 (1964), 160. About their objective Appian
wrote: ‘who, being attracted to Antony’s capacity for great deeds, sought to bring him
into friendly relations with Pompeius and to form an alliance between them against
Octavian.’
47 AE 1892 no. 73: SENTIA LIBONIS . . .MATER SCRIBONIAE CAESARIS.
Scribonia Caesaris was Libo’s sister.
48 App. BC 5.53; Dio 48.16.3; Suet. Aug. 62.2.
49 Though, as Kathryn Welch has pointed out to me, Libo would have preferred to
make a settlement with Antony.
50 App. BC 5.73.
51 K. Welch, ‘Sextus Pompeius and the Res Publica in 42–39’, in A. Powell and
K. Welch (eds.), Sextus Pompeius (2002) 31–64.
52 Concerning this episode, R. Syme (1939), 219, wrote: ‘But there was a more
important pact than the despairing and impermanent alliance with Pompeius, a more
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between Octavian and the Pompeii. The marriage between Octavian and
Scribonia lasted long enough to produce a child. Late in 39, as the treaty was
falling apart, Octavian sent notice of divorce and married Livia. This may
have caused problems.
There is no information on Libo between 38 and 35.53 He was probably
with Sextus in Sicily.54 Sextus died in 35, but Libo was still able to hold the
consulship as planned. If Scribonia’s divorce had soured Libo’s relationship
with Octavian, then the fact that Libo held the consulship, even after the
death of Sextus, might mark an attempt by Octavian to mend broken fences
and a decision by Libo to accept a renewed offer of friendship. Evidently
Octavian needed Libo—Libo, on the other hand, had gone to Antony before
he went finally to Octavian! Despite his new alliance with Octavian, Libo’s
connection with the Pompeii remained unaffected. His eldest son married
Pompeia Magna, daughter of Pompeia and L. Cinna (pr. 44).55 These are the
parents of our M. Scribonius Drusus Libo.56 The importance of this marriage
should not be underestimated when considering the role of Drusus Libo in
history. It was his mother’s ancestry that Drusus Libo is thought to have
advertised, and it provided him with a possible slogan for an adventure into
politics. On the other hand, the mere fact that the Scribonian House chose to
solidify further its connections to the Pompeii is significant in itself. Libo had
formed important ties with prominent aristocratic families that his grandson
would be induced to remember by the treacherous Catus 45 years later.
Nevertheless, it is the direct descendants of Scribonia who should above all
be noted when dealing with the connections of M. Scribonius Drusus Libo.
Producing a prosopography for Scribonia is one of the most hazardous and
vexatious endeavours known to Roman prosopography. Trouble begins with
her two marriages prior to Octavian. Suetonius writes:
glorious marriage than the reluctant nuptials with the morose sister of Pompeius’
father-in-law.’ How obvious is hindsight. During the feast held by Sextus and Octa-
vian, it is reasonable to believe sanguine faces filled the room, none more so than
Libo’s.
53 For the divorce, see Dio 48.34.3; Suet. Aug. 62.2.
54 App BC 5.139.
55 The identity of Pompeia’s husband is disputed. It is commonly thought to have
been the suffectus of 32, so R. Syme (1986), 30, 46–7, 257. I have been persuaded by
Patrick Tansey that it must be the praetor of 44. He bases his argument on Seneca, De.
Clem. 1.9, who states that the father of Cn. Cornelius Cinna Magnus died during the
civil wars: the suffectus of 32 must, therefore, be excluded.
56 It was this Pompeia, Sextus’ sister, who had given Tiberius presents while fleeing
from Octavian in Sicily, presents reportedly exhibited at Baiae as late as the beginning
of the second century AD, Suet. Tib. 6.3. There was, therefore, possibly a close friend-
ship between Drusus Libo’s grandmother and Livia, who were, of course, both
refugees.
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Mox Scriboniam in matrimonium accepit nuptam ante duobus consularibus, ex altero
etiam matrem.
Soon he [Octavian] took Scribonia in marriage, [she] had been married before to two
ex-consuls, and was a mother by one of them.57
One of the husbands is divined from a Propertian elegy, in which the
spirit of Cornelia comforts her still living husband.58 In it Cornelia names
Scribonia as her mother and implies that her brother was the consul of 16,
P. Cornelius P.f. Scipio. Thus, one of Scribonia’s husbands was a P. Cornelius
Scipio. The first problem: there is no P. Cornelius Scipio known as consul for
the appropriate years. Attempts to bestow the honour on a suffectus of 38
proved inadequate, as were those which summoned forth the suffectus of 35,
appearing in the Fasti magistrorum vici as P. Cornelius, but whom the Fasti
Tauromenitani revealed as P. Cornelius Dolabella.59 Nevertheless, the quest
continues.60 The second problem comes in the form of an inscription dis-
covered in 1639. It attests a Cornelius Marcellinus as Scribonia’s son, thus
Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus (cos. 56) has been deduced as her
husband.61 Yet Suetonius is sure that Scribonia had children by only one
husband. The above is not central to our efforts, but it shows that producing
a prosopography for this family is a perilous task and, hence, truly under-
standing the connections of M. Scribonius Drusus Libo is as difficult as it is
important. The other marriage was, of course, to Octavian in 40, and it lasted
long enough to produce a third child, Julia.62 Julia and Cornelia proved the
best political and social assets for the Scribonii.
57 Suet. Aug. 62.
58 Prop. Eleg. 4.11.
59 On the suffectus of 38, see L. Biondi, ‘Intorno un frammento marmoreo di fasti
consulari’, in Atti della Pontificia Accademia Romana di Archeologia, VI (1835), 273–
380; CIL 1² p. 65; Groag, PIR² C 1306, 1395, 1437; RE. IIA.1.891 Scribonia no. 32. For
the Fasti magistrorum vici, see AE (1937), no. 62. For the suffectus of 35, see R. Syme
(1986), 28, 246 f. and 486; T. R. S. Broughton, MRR II.406, 555. For Fasti Taurome-
nitani see AE (1988), no. 626 a-b, (1991), no. 894. For a history of the suffectus of 35 in
modern scholarship, see P. Tansey, ‘The Perils of Prosopography: The Case of the
Cornelii Dolabellae’, in ZPE, 130 (2000), 265–71.
60 Patrick Tansey suggested in discussion that the desired Scipio may be one of
those who received consularia ornamenta from Caesar or Augustus, and that Sueto-
nius was ignorant of the difference.
61 CIL 6.26033: Libertorum et familiae Scriboniae Caesar(is) et Corneli Marcell
(ini) f(ilii) eius [in fr(onte)] (edes) XXXII [in ag]r(o) P(edes) XX. This may be the
same Cornelius Lentulus Marcellinus epigraphically attested as a praetor in
29, CIL 11.7412. For a full examination of these characters, see R. Syme (1986),
250f., 287.
62 Vell. 2.100.5; Suet. Aug. 62.2; Tac. Ann. 2.27; Dio 48.16.3, 34.3; App. BC 5.53;
Zonaras 11.14; Epitome de Caesaribus 1.23; CIL. 6.7467.
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Through Julia’s marriage to M. Agrippa, M. Scribonius Drusus Libo
gained five important cousins: Gaius and Lucius Caesar, the younger Julia,
Agrippina, and Agrippa Postumus. Cornelia married Paullus Aemilius
L.f. Lepidus (suff. 34) and produced M. Aemilius P.f. Lepidus (cos. AD 6
and capax imperii) and L. Aemilius P.f. Paullus (cos. AD 1). It has been
conjectured that the elder son had more than one wife. The first is thought to
be a Vipsania Marcella, whilst the second remains ignota.63 This ignota
produced M. Aemilius M.f. Lepidus and Aemilia Lepida, both betrothed to
Germanicus’ children Julia Drusilla and Drusus Caesar, respectively.
L. Aemilius Paullus (cos. AD 1), who somehow beat his older brother to the
consulship, married his cousin Julia the younger: both were Scribonia’s
grandchildren. They produced Aemilia Lepida, whose engagement to Tiber-
ius Claudius Drusus Germanicus (Claudius) was terminated when her
mother was relegated in AD 8.64 Aemilia Lepida was instead engaged to
marry M. Junius Silanus (cos. AD 19). The evidence, scarce as it is, suggests
strongly that Scribonia had remained close to her children and grandchildren
as well as the descendants of her brother and, thus, it is reasonable to believe
that among such illustrious company, M. Scribonius Drusus Libo was no
stranger.65
There are two more persons to consider: the unattested but necessary
Livia Scriboniana; and P. Sulpicius Quirinius (cos. 12). Livia Scriboniana was
the daughter of M. Livius Drusus Libo.66 She was both a cousin and by
adoption a sister to Libo, and her husband was the consul for AD 8, M. Furius
Camillus (cos. AD 8). They produced M. Furius Camillus, L. Arruntius
Camillus Scribonianus (cos. AD 32), and Livia Medullina.67 Unfortunately,
nothing can be made from her nomenclature, for it is no more than a
product of Weinrib’s imagination, but her link to the Scribonii Libones is
borne out easily enough from her son’s cognomen, Scribonianus. P. Sulpicius
Quirinius is more interesting. Tacitus states that he was a propinquus to
Drusus Libo, which is commonly taken to mean ‘kinsman’. He was a close
friend to Tiberius, and capable of taking Drusus Libo’s request to the
emperor without long delays. The nature of their relationship is not attested.
P. Quirinius was married to a Claudia, and then to Aemilia Lepida, so that
the link must come from his own family.68 Nevertheless, he should not be
63 R. Syme (1986), 125 f.
64 Suet. Claud. 26.
65 Prop. Eleg. 4.11 for her intimate relations with Cornelia; Dio, 55.10.14 for her
choice to accompany her daughter Julia into exile; Sen. Ep. Mor. 70.10 for her presence
at Drusus Libo’s side during the trial.
66 Admittedly a postulation, but Weinrib’s evidence is strong, as is his reasoning,
E. J. Weinrib (1968), 265.
67 See E. J. Weinrib (1968), 274, stemma I.
68 Syme (1986), table VII.
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considered a party to Drusus Libo’s activities. Indeed, his friendship with
Tiberius was most likely the reason he was approached. In his darkest hour,
when most of his relatives and friends had deserted him, Drusus Libo pinned
his hopes of survival on a staunch Tiberian, something like: ‘Please Publius,
he trusts you . . . ’.69 The above thus treats Drusus Libo’s natal and testamen-
tary connections. We are left to consider the identity of his wife’s family.
An inscription found in the middle of the twentieth century attests the
existence of Q. Caecilius Drusus Libo. I have shown already that he was
the son of Drusus Libo. He was evidently adopted by a Q. Caecilius.70 The
Scribonii Libones and the Caecilii were somehow connected in the late
Republic. CIL VI 7.37380 attests:
Q CAECILIUS CAECILIAE CRASSI L. HILARUS MEDIC CAECILIA DUARUM
SCRIBONIARUM L. ELEUTHERIS EX PARTEM [sic] DIMIDIAE [sic] SIBI E SUI
[sic]
Q. Caecilius Hilarus, libertus of Caecilia [wife of] Crassus, physician; Caecilia
Eleutheris, liberta of two Scribonian women, part [of his tomb] for themselves and
for their own [i.e. family].
Caecilia Crassi is the daughter of Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus (cos. 69).
Her husband was M. Crassus, eldest son of the triumvir M. Licinius Crassus
(cos. 70). Syme has shown that Caecilia Metella was the great-aunt of
Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus Silanus (cos. AD 7) on account of his adoption
by a Metellus.71 But Caecilia Eleutheris is more interesting. She is evidence of
a Caecilian and Scribonian connection. Her name should have been Scribo-
nia Eleutheris.72 There are two solutions: (i) her formal manumission was
officially sponsored by a Caecilius, but it was thought appropriate to honour
her original owners (perhaps they had informally manumitted the woman by
manumissio inter amicos and her formal manumission was, therefore, seen
as simply a rubber stamp); (ii) Caecilius Hilarus and the soon to be Caecilia
Eleutheris wished to marry.73 Caecilius Hilarus convinced his former master
to buy his enslaved girlfriend from the duae Scriboniae in order to make her a
freedwoman. The duae Scriboniae agreed and were, in turn, sincerely
thanked by the now Caecilia Eleutheris, who repaid their kindness by
69 For his role in the trial of Libo, see Tac. Ann. 2.30; for his staunch support of
Tiberius, and Tiberius’ trust, see Tac. Ann. 3.48.
70 Cf. J. Scheid (1975), 349–75, who makes him the natural son of a Scribonia and a
Caecilius.
71 R. Syme (1986), stemma XVIII.
72 H. Dessau ILS III (1916), addenda 9433: Quomodo liberta earum Caecilia
appellari potuerit incertum; see also H. Gummerus (1932), 47, n. 163; and H. Bloch
(1982), 141–50.
73 For a general discussion of the various forms of manumission, see S. Treggiari
(1969), 20–36. Unfortunately, Treggiari does not consider Caecilia Eleutheris.
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continuing to acknowledge a connection with her former owners. Either way,
we have a connection dating back to the late Republic. The situation of
Q. Caecilius Drusus Libo is therefore suggestive: he was adopted into a family
probably long associated with the Scribonii Libones. The most likely possi-
bility is that this Q. Caecilius was Drusus Libo’s father-in-law.
Immediately following the death of Drusus Libo, Drusus Libo’s wife
probably moved into the house of a relative while her affairs were put in
order. Since Drusus Libo’s son was young when his father died, he will have
stayed with his mother. We would thus expect the child to have been adopted
by a member of his mother’s family. This is, of course, speculation, but it
is at least a reasonable hypothesis based on circumstantial evidence.
M. Scribonius Drusus Libo was married to a Junia (or Caecilia), whose father
was probably Q. Caecilius Metellus Creticus Silanus. Since Creticus Silanus
was in Syria until AD 17, he evidently did not adopt the child until he had
returned to Rome, i.e. a year had passed between Drusus Libo’s death and his
son’s adoption. If this assumption is correct, then Drusus Libo was connected
through marriage to an important ally of Germanicus.74
This investigation shows Drusus Libo in his social and political station.
He stood at the centre of the aristocracy and was connected to its most
important and powerful branches. A praetorship in AD 15 suggests a date of
birth in or around 15 BC, the year his adoptive father reached the
consulship. A date of birth c.15 BC makes Drusus Libo five years younger
than Gaius Caesar, two years younger than Lucius Caesar, the same age as
Germanicus, one year older than Drusus, and three years older than Agrippa
Postumus. Drusus Libo would have spent his youth with these boys: with
Gaius, Lucius, and Agrippa he shared the important Scribonia; with Germa-
nicus and Drusus he shared a connection with Livia. He would ultimately
view these men as peers, a presumptuous attitude that proved impossible to
sustain.
74 Tacitus writes, Tac. Ann. 2.43.2: Sed Tiberius demoverat Syria Creticum Silanum,
per adfinitatem conexum Germanico, quia Silani filia Neroni vetustissimo liberorum
eius pacta erat, praefeceratque Cn. Pisonem . . . ‘But Tiberius had removed Creticus
Silanus from Syria (he was a marriage connection of Germanicus, whose eldest son,
Nero, was betrothed to his daughter), and had appointed Cn. Piso . . . ’.
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APPENDIX 2
Family Trees
 M. Scribonius Drusus Libo and the Claudian Dynasty
L. Scribonius Libo
(cos. 34)
Scribonia L. Scribonius LiboM. Livius DrususLibo (cos.15)
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Scribonia’s Descendants
Suet. Aug. 62.2: ‘nuptam antea duobus consularibus, ex altero etiam materm’.
There is evidence nonetheless of another child,
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6 BC Tiberius receives tribunicia potestas; Gaius Caesar designated consul
by Comitia Centuriata; Tiberius retires to Rhodes; Gaius made a
pontifex.
5 BC Gaius Caesar takes toga virilis and is made princeps iuventutis, a sevir
turmae, and is allowed to give his opinion in the senate.
2 BC Lucius Caesar takes the toga virilis and is made a princeps iuventutis, a
sevir turmae, and is allowed to give his opinion in the senate, having
been designated consul; the elder Julia is banished; Tiberius and the
elder Julia divorce.
1 BC Gaius Caesar begins tour of the eastern empire.
AD 1 Gaius Caesar and L. Aemilius Paullus are consuls.
AD 2 Lucius Caesar dies in Spain; M. Lollius dies in Syria; Tiberius returns
to Rome; Gaius Caesar seriously wounded in Syria.
AD 4 Gaius Caesar dies in January; members of Gaius Caesar’s entourage
executed in Rome; Tiberius and Agrippa Postumus adopted by Au-
gustus on 26 June; the elder Julia moved to Rhegium; Tiberius receives
tribunicia potestas and imperium for war in Germany.
AD 5 Lex Valeria Cornelia passed; Agrippa Postumus takes toga virilis;
Rome flooded for eight days; food shortage in Rome; legions and
praetorian cohorts threaten to strike.
AD 6 January - revolt begins in Illyricum; February to April - tumultus
declaration is made and an emergency decree authorizing Tiberius’
control of the war in Illyricum is passed, troops are levied in Rome, an
inheritance tax is instituted; April to May - levied troops reach Ill-
yricum; June to September–a severe grain shortage occurs in Italy, war
begins in Illyricum; August to early September–an emergency decree
is passed on account of severe grain shortage; September - fires in
Rome lead to the formation of the vigiles; October to December - mass
protests occur and seditious pamphlets emerge, rumour circulates
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that Tiberius is planning to seize power, Aemilius Paullus is indicted
formaiestas; late November to December—Agrippa is made abdicatus
and sent to Surrentum, the younger Julia is sent away from the city,
gladiatorial games are presented by Germanicus and Claudius; early
December—Germanicus is made a quaestor.
AD 7 Tiberius dedicates temple of Castor and Pollux; Germanicus is quaes-
tor in Illyrian war; food shortage in Rome; sales tax introduced; unrest
at elections; Agrippa relegated and incarcerated on island of Planasia
by senatus consultum.
AD 8 The younger Julia, D. Junius Silanus, and Ovid exiled; Cassius Severus
exiled; Augustus’ health deteriorates, preventing him from attending
elections and most senate meetings.
AD 9 Varian disaster in Germany.
AD 10 Tiberius dedicates temple of Concord on 16 January.
AD 11 Augustus publishes his horoscope; problems with praetorian elec-
tions; Asinius Epicadus and Lucius Audasius attempt to free Agrippa
Postumus, the elder Julia, and possibly others from their places of
exile.
AD 12 Germanicus consul; Germanicus placed in the senate’s care and the
senate placed in Tiberius’ care; pamphlets critical of the government
are published; Tiberius receives imperium equal to that of Augustus in
every province and over every legion.
AD 13 Tiberius receives tribunicia potestas for another term; Augustus fina-
lizes his will; semenstre consilium reconstructed, able to pass decrees;
popular anger concerning vicesima hereditatium threatens to erupt.
AD 14–AD 16
May L. Aemilius Paullus dies.
May–June Augustus and Tiberius complete census and
perform a lustrum.
19 August Augustus dies; Tiberius informed of Augustus’
death.
20 August Tiberius reaches Nola; Tiberius sends letters to
the consuls and provinces.
21–22 August News of Augustus’ death reaches Rome; oath of
allegiance to Tiberius sworn in Rome; Crispus
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sends to Planasia the order to execute Agrippa
Postumus; funeral procession leaves Nola.
24–25 August Agrippa Postumus executed; Sempronius Grac-
chus executed (?)
25–27 Aug. News of Augustus’ death reaches troops in Pan-
nonia.
27–28 August Tiberius informed by centurion that Agrippa
Postumus is dead.
28–30 Aug. News of Augustus’ death reaches troops in
Lower Germany.
1–4 September Funeral procession reaches Rome; first senate
meeting of the month to discuss funeral ar-
rangements; news circulates in Rome that
Agrippa Postumus has been put to death.
4–5 September News of mutiny in Pannonia reaches Rome;
Germanicus sends a report of the unrest in
Lower Germany to Rome.
5–16 September Augustus’ funeral; Germanicus’ report to Tiber-
ius and the senate reaches Rome; Tiberius is
made aware of Drusus Libo’s position by Ves-
cularius Flaccus.
17 September Augustus deified; Germanicus receives imper-
ium proconsulare; the senate votes to send to
Germanicus a senatorial delegation; Tiberius
‘ceases to refuse and to be asked’ to accept the
supreme power.
18 September Drusus Caesar leaves for Pannonia.
18–26 September Tiberius offers to recommend Drusus Libo for
the praetorship, as Augustus had done; Drusus
Libo accepts Tiberius’ offer; Drusus Caesar ar-
rives at camp in Pannonia.
27 September Drusus Caesar sends report to Rome.
27 October to September Tiberius formally accepts supreme power; his
first act is to sponsor a rationalization of the
electoral procedure; at a senatorial meeting se-
nators are asked to vote on the candidates for
that year, the winners become ‘destined’.
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4–6 October Drusus Caesar’s report reaches Rome.
October–December The elder Julia dies.
AD 15 Drusus Caesar consul; Drusus Libo praetor.
AD 16 L. Scribonius Libo consul; news emerges in Italy
and Rome that Agrippa Postumus is alive;
Clemens gathers support in northern Italy and
southern Gaul; Tiberius asks Germanicus to
return to Rome; Germanicus resists.
11 September Drusus Libo is charged with maiestas.
12 September Drusus Libo commits suicide.
13 September Senate publishes its opinion on the case of
Drusus Libo and public thanks are offered to
Jupiter, Mars, and Concord.
October–December Clemens captured; the conspiracy dissolves.
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Per. 67: 36 no.32









Am. 3.9.63: 12 no.28
Ex Pont. 1.6.25–6: 127 no.17
Ex Pont. 1.9.25–30: 39 no.47
Ex Pont. 2.8: 39 no.47
Ex Pont. 2.9.71–76: 128 no.19
Ex Pont. 4.13.25–28: 160–161
Fasti 1.705–708: 96 no.93
Trist. 2.103: 128 no.20
Trist. 2.130: 127 no.18
Trist. 2.207: 127 no.16
Trist. 2.207–212: 129
Trist. 2.446: 12 no.28
Trist. 3.1.52: 127 no.17
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Trist. 3.4.1–4: 128 no.22
Trist. 3.6.11–13: 128 no.23
Trist. 3.6.28: 128 no.21
Trist. 4.10.99–101: 129
Trist. 5.9: 39 no.47
Paulus
P.S. 2.26.14: 126–7
P.S. 5.4.8: 92 no.76
P.S. 5.21.3: 21
P.S. 5.23.1: 22 no.71
P.S. 5.29.1: 21 no.65, 125 no.8
Pliny
NH 2.96: 96 no.92
NH 8.4: 96 no.92
NH 7.48: 98 no.106
NH7. 147–150: 68, 76 no.7,
79 no.22, 170
NH 9.118: 55
NH 18.6: 139 no.20
NH 34.6: 137 no.11
Pliny
Ep. 1.17.3: 39 no.55
Ep. 4.8.1: 139 no.20
Ep. 4.15.6: 79 no.24
Ep. 6.3.5–6: 127 no14
Ep. 6.29: 29 no.1
Ep. 7.16: 42 no.65
Plut.
Aem. Paull. 38: 94 no.84
Caes. 5–6: 39 no.51
Cic. 19: 36 no.33
Cic. 35: 137 no.11
Cic. 49: 41 no.62
Comp. Dion. and Brut. 5: 140 no.23
De Garrul. 508: 103, 169–70
Mar. 12: 36 no. 32
Quaest. Rom. 99: 139 no.20
Sulla 10: 39 no.54
Prop.
Eleg. 4.11: 229 no.58, 230 no.65
Quint.
Decl. Min. 376.3: 132 no.40
Inst. 3.6.96: 71 no.37
Inst. 3.6.98: 71
Inst. 3.7.20: 41 no.62
Inst. 3.8.53: 166 no.40
Inst. 7.4.11: 71
Inst. 7.4.27: 73 no.41
Sall.
Bell. Cat. 42: 81 no.36
Bell. Cat. 47: 36 no.33
Bell. Cat. 53: 36 no.34
Scholia in Iuv.
4.81: 178 no.28






Cont. 2.1.15: 70 no.33
Cont. 2.1.17.1: 223 no.24
Cont. 2.1.28: 70, 73 no.41
Cont. 7.6.22: 30 no.4
Cont. 10. prae. 5–6: 89, 90 no.69
Cont. 10. prae. 7: 89 no.63
Cont. 10. prae. 8: 14 no.43, 89 no.63, 90
Sen.
Cons. ad Marc. 22
De Ben. 3.26.1: 93 no.81
De Brev. Vit. 4.5: 13 no.33
De Clem. 1.9: 228 no.55
De Ira 2.5.5: 30 no.4
Ep. Mor. 70.10: 5, 25, 26, 29, 31, 214
no.55, 230 no.65
Servius
ad Eclog. 10.1: 12 no.28




Aug. 19: 48 no.8, 85, 95 no.88, 138,
173 no.15
Aug. 25.2: 79 no.22
Aug. 28.2: 191 no.31
Aug. 30: 81 no.35
Aug. 35.4: 146, 149 no.59
Aug. 41.2: 81 no.34




Aug. 56.4: 13 no.34
Aug. 62.2: 227 no.48, 228 no.53, 229
Aug. 64.1: 47 no.5
Aug. 64.3: 72 no.39
Aug. 65: 47 no.1, 50 no.19, 52 no.35,
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Suet. (cont.)
Aug. 65.2: 14.43
Aug. 65.3: 48 no.6
Aug. 65.4: 15 no.43, 68, 104,
120 no.61
Aug. 66.1: 97 no.101
Aug. 66.2: 12 no.28
Aug. 66.3: 13 no.35, 69 no.27
Aug. 67.2: 58
Aug. 72.3: 123 no.2
Aug. 94.12: 136 no.8
Aug. 98.5: 172
Aug. 99.2–100.1: 157 no.1
Aug. 100.2: 186 no.5
Aug. 101: 73 no.41, 152 no.67
Aug. 101.4: 174 no.21, 204 no.35
Gaius 1.1: 65 no.19
Gaius 16.3: 214 no.53
Claud. 1.1: 224 no.30
Claud. 1.4: 201 no.27
Claud. 2: 224 no.32
Claud. 2.2: 96 no.92
Claud. 4.1–2: 51, 53 no.37
Claud. 5: 51 no.27
Claud. 10: 214 no.53
Claud. 11: 214 no.53
Claud. 25.3: 222 no.19
Claud. 26.1: 85, 123 no.2, 230 no.64
De Gramm. 5: 12 no.28
De Gramm. 16: 12 no.30
De Rhet. 6: 140 no.23
Dom. 20: 181 no.38
Iul. 42.3: 137 no.11
Nero 6.3: 178 no.28
Nero 38.1: 75 no.4
Tib. 1: 41 no.62
Tib. 6.3: 222 no.20, 228 no.56
Tib. 7: 222 no.21
Tib. 8.1: 14 no.37
Tib. 9.1: 54 no.40
Tib. 10.1: 62 no.6, 69 no.27, 167 no.43
Tib. 11.1: 62 no.6
Tib. 11.5: 49 no.12
Tib. 12.2: 54
Tib. 13.1–2: 55, 56, 57, 59 no.61
Tib. 15.1: 57 no.53
Tib. 15.3: 47 no.4
Tib. 16.1: 47 no.2, 98 no.105
Tib. 16.2: 99 no.110
Tib. 20: 96 no.93, 151 no.66
Tib. 21.1: 98 no.106, 144 no.43
Tib. 21.2: 99 no.111
Tib. 21.3: 98 no.103
Tib. 22: 176, 179 no.30
Tib. 24.1: 144 no.43, 158, 159, 161,
193 no.39
Tib. 24.2: 162, 207 no.38
Tib. 25.1: 1, 5, 6, 25 no.82, 33, 34,
162 nos.24 and 25, 167, 199
no.21, 209, 219 no.3, 225 no.35
Tib. 25.2: 162 no.24, 189 no.19,
192–3
Tib. 25.3: 195, 198 no.14
Tib. 28: 92
Tib. 30.1: 11, 148 no.54, 150
Tib. 31.1: 11, 148 no.55
Tib. 36: 20
Tib. 49.1: 21 no.67
Tib. 50.1: 201 no.27
Tib. 54: 216 no.61
Tib. 57.2: 200 no.24
Tib. 61.1: 181 no.39
Tac.
Ann. 1.3: 50 no.19, 63, 66, 104
Ann. 1.4: 50 no.20
Ann. 1.5: 157 no.1, 157 no.3, 170
Ann. 1.5.3–4: 169, 179 no.30
Ann. 1.6: 49 no.15, 175–6,
179 no.32
Ann. 1.7.2: 158
Ann. 1.7.5: 144 no.43, 157, 157 no.2,
159, 161
Ann. 1.7.6: 185
Ann. 1.10.1: 90 no.70, 201 no.25
Ann. 1.12.1–2: 165
Ann. 1.13: 165 no.38
Ann. 1.13.5–6: 166
Ann. 1.14: 187 no.10
Ann. 1.14.6: 202, 203
Ann. 1.15.1: 109 no.24, 110 no.30,
114 no.40, 199 no.19, 202, 204
no.35
Ann. 1.16: 185 no.1
Ann. 1.24: 40 no.61
Ann. 1.25.3: 188 no.11
Ann. 1.27: 40 no.60
Ann. 1.31: 185 no.1
Ann. 1.31.1: 188 no.15
Ann. 1.34.1: 158, 188 no.16, 189
Ann. 1.34–35: 189
Ann. 1.35.3: 189 nos.19 and 21
Ann. 1.36: 189 no.22
Ann. 1.37: 190 no.24
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Ann. 1.37.1: 190 no.25
Ann. 1.37.3: 190 no.26
Ann. 1.39.1–2: 140 no.25, 188 no.12
Ann. 1.45: 187, 192 no.34
Ann. 1.46.1: 167 no.42
Ann. 1.53.1: 62 no.6
Ann. 1.53.3: 139 no.17
Ann. 1.53.6: 182
Ann. 1.55: 174 no.19
Ann. 1.72: 88, 92 no.79, 182 no.43
Ann. 1.72.2: 162 no.23
Ann. 1.72.3: 173 no.19
Ann. 1.75.4–5: 149
Ann. 1.77.3: 150 no.61
Ann. 1.78: 106 no.12, 207 no.39
Ann. 1.78.2: 214 no.52
Ann. 1.81.2: 111 no.31
Ann. 2.27.1: 25 no.82, 27, 198 no.15,
219 no.2
Ann. 2.27.2: 6, 196, 200 no.23, 219
Ann. 2.28.1: 200 no.22
Ann. 2.28.2: 198 no.14, 201 no.26,
225 no.35
Ann. 2.28.3: 6, 9, 17, 32 no.17
Ann. 2.29.1: 31
Ann. 2.29.2: 33 no.20
Ann. 2.29: 7, 29
Ann. 2.30: 7, 22 no.74, 23 no.75,
214 no.54, 231 no.69
Ann. 2.30.3: 130 no.29
Ann. 2.31.1: 35, 215 no.58
Ann. 2.31.3: 37 no.39
Ann. 2.32.1: 7, 8, 19 no.57, 20,
24 no.79, 38 no.41, 39 no.50,
44 no.70
Ann. 2.32.2: 220 no.6, 221 no.16
Ann. 2.33.1: 198 no.11
Ann. 2.35.1: 198 no.11
Ann. 2.36: 198 no.11, 203 no.33
Ann. 2.38: 198 no.11
Ann. 2.39.1: 1, 34, 35, 208
Ann. 2.40.1: 33, 37 no.37,
44 no.71, 208
Ann. 2.40.3: 35, 141 no.29, 211 no.47
Ann. 2.42: 60
Ann. 2.43.2: 43 no.66, 232 no.74
Ann. 2.43.5: 216
Ann. 3.8.2: 16 no.46, 31 no.13
Ann. 3.10.3: 16 no.48
Ann. 3.12: 30 no.12
Ann. 3.12.7: 15 no.44
Ann. 3.14.4–6: 16, 31 no.13, 37 no.38
Ann. 3.22: 21 no.67
Ann. 3.23.1: 5
Ann. 3.24.2–3: 123–4, 131
Ann. 3.29: 64–5, 142 no.35
Ann. 3.30: 177 no.26
Ann. 3.30.2: 177 no.27
Ann. 3.30.3: 180 no.33
Ann. 3.37.1: 197 nos.6 and 7
Ann. 3.48: 56, 57 no.51, 231 no.69
Ann. 3.50.4: 125 no.8
Ann. 3.66.1: 29 no.4
Ann. 3.67.2: 29 no.4
Ann. 3.67.3: 130 no.29
Ann. 3.76: 39 no.55





Ann. 4.21.6: 88 no.62
Ann. 4.22.1: 197 no.9
Ann. 4.29.1: 40 no.59
Ann. 4.29.4: 22 no.74
Ann. 4.30: 38 no.40
Ann. 4.34: 40 no.58, 90 no.68
Ann. 4.53.2: 178 no.28
Ann. 4.71.4: 32 no.18, 85 no.53,
123 no.2, 124
Ann. 6.5: 39 no.49
Ann. 6.23: 216 no.61
Ann. 6.51: 62 no.6
Ann. 11.36.5: 221 no.15
Ann. 12.4: 197 no.9
Ann. 12.25.1: 221 no.15
Ann. 13.44: 197 no.9
Ann. 14.28.1: 115 no.43
Ann. 14.48: 93 no.81, 197 no.9
Ann. 15.36: 76 no.6
Ann. 15.39.3: 75 no.4
Hist. 3.35: 197 no.9
Dial. 7: 29 no.1
Ulpian





5.1 ext.2: 132 no.39
Vell.
1.11: 36 no.32
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2.102.3: 52 no.35, 58–9
2.103: 47 no.2, 193 no.40
2.103.3: 163 no.29





2.111.1–2: 79, 80 no.27, 98 no.102
2.111.3: 79 no.23
2.111.4: 96 no.96





2.120.1–2: 140 no.27, 151 no.66
2.121.1: 144 no.43
2.123.1: 98 no.106, 172 no.9
2.124.1: 184, 201 no.25
2.124.2: 144 no.44, 160
2.124.3: 198 no.13, 202, 203, 204
no.35, 213 no.51
2.124.4: 109 no.24, 165 no.36,
197 no.9, 198 no.16, 199 no.18,
202, 203






2.130.3: 5, 25 no.82, 219 no.2
Inscriptions
AE
(1892) 73: 227 no.47
(1937) 62: 229 no.59
(1964) 82: 41
(1988) 626 a-b: 229 no.59
(1991) 894: 229 no.59












I² p244: 5, 24, 25
I² p65: 229 no.59
V² 3503: 139 no.22
V² 3504: 139 no.22
V² 3505: 139 no.22
V² 5150: 139 no.22
V² 5749: 139 no.22
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